Good and Bad, an illusory dimension as the cornerstone of human personality

This chapter deals with a typical human personality dimension. It is a common layman's misconception to think that personality differences only occur among human beings. In animals differences in behaviour between individuals occur in a similar way. And in the case of socially living animals, our closest kin in evolution, the differences in behaviour between individuals are very similar to what is found in humans.

The personality-dimension which is the focus of this article, the Good-Bad, Positive versus Negative or Appreciatedness dimension, is the only major personality dimension that is exclusively human. Peculiarly, this dimension is virtual and in a sense not real. It does not refer to or relate to any actual behaviour of the rated person, but instead just refers to the relationship between the rater and the ratee. In short: the only exclusively human personality dimension does not describe any actual behaviour of the ratee. Still, as we will see, this dimension plays a central and crucial role in our understanding of human personality and the dynamics between the various personality dimensions.

As described in more detail in the chapters "Personality Traits in terms of Social-Role Probabilities; an innovative theoretical essay on the possibility of overcoming the chaotic diversity in personality theories" and "Escaping from Chaos: Temperamental Personality Traits in terms of Social-Role Probabilities", the Good-Bad dimension is on the one hand the largest, mathematically most important of all personality dimensions and on the other hand is merely a function of two major dimensions of interpersonal behaviour / social-role behaviour. More precisely, it refers not to actual social role behaviour, but describes the characteristics of how social roles (actual behaviours) are worked out and are stabilized in time between parties (in this case between dominant and subordinate group members and between incrowd and outcast group members).

Let's start with discussing two personality dimensions describing the major varieties of social behaviour (see also the chapter " ").

In summarizing studies and reviews of social psychological research two more or less orthogonal dimensions generally emerge as the most important points of reference (Wiggins, 1979,1982; Kiesler, 1982,1983). One of these may be labeled "Ascendancy" or "Dominant versus Submissive" and the other dimension "Acceptance versus Rejection", "Love versus Hate" or "Positive Affiliation versus Hostility" (dimensions [9] and [10] in fig.l). Specifically, the following interpretations emerge in factoranalytic studies: "Dominance versus Submission" and "Love/Positive versus Hate/Negative/Hostility" (Leary, 1957; Foa, 1961; Lorr & McNair, 1965; Hare, 1972); "Assertiveness" and "Sociableness" (Borgatta, 1963); "Authority" and "Solidarity" (Gouman, Hofstee & de Raad, 1973); "Authority/Control" and "Affection/Intimacy" (Sampson, 1971); "Aggressive Dominance" and "Affiliation/Sociability" (Golding & Knudson, 1975). And these factoranalytic dimensions of social behaviour may be found on the verbal level as well as on the non-verbal level of behaviour: "Positiveness" (affiliative behaviour) and "Dominance vs. Submission" (relaxation) are two of the most conspicuous dimensions which Mehrabian (1972) found in his R-type factor-analytic studies on non-verbal social behaviour in man. (Refer to van der Molen (1979) for a comparison of the use of R-, Q- and other types of factoranalysis in observational behaviour studies.)

Peabody (1970) points at a very basic distinction between the two axes spanning this two-dimensional domain. One of them represents "asymmetrical" interactions, whereas the other describes "symmetrical" interactions. Relations involving "love/hate" or "affiliation" (dimension [10]) tend to be symmetrical - i.e., involving similar characteristics for the two parties - and relations involving "power" (dimension [9]) tend to be asymmetrical - i.e., involving dissimilar characteristics for the two parties - (see also Wiggins, 1982 and Kiesler, 1983 for recent reviews of research on this aspect).

Note: In the trans-specific behavioural literature the symbols α, β and ω are generally used for: dominant role (α), compliant and tolerated subordinate role (β), and non-compliant, non-tolerated type of subordinate, leading to an outcast role (ω)).

Styles of Dominance

✰✰✰ <level 3> In order to gain more insight into the possible relationship between these dimensions of social role behaviour and congenital traits of temperament, we have to take a closer look at how these two social-role dimensions work out (see fig.l). Let us first therefore focus on how the "Affiliation" ("Sociableness") dimension [10] has to be interpreted at the High-Ascendancy/Dominance side of the "Dominant versus Submissive" axis [9].

Fig.l about here

Dominating individuals may behave in an easy-going way towards their companions or they may not. On the one hand a dominating person may exert a lot of aggressive dominance, bullying his subordinates all the time, on the other hand he may act as a sort of "controller" who governs social relations by social skill, sustained by appreciation from his companions, rather than by aggressive intimidation.

This polarity in possible dominance styles is so general that it has also frequently been reported in animal research (See for instance the empirical and experimental findings about differences in dominant behaviour in e.g., langurs by Poirier (1970), stumptail macaques by Bertrand (1969), in japanese monkeys by Itani et al.(1963) and by Yamada (1966), in mountain gorillas by Fossey (1972), and in chimpanzees by Reynolds & Luscombe (1969)). Differences of this sort between dominant individuals have been described in a number of species including man by Chance & Jolly (1970) and Wilson (1977,pp.311-313), and in Man by e.g., Lippitt & White (1958) and Krech et al. (1962,ch. 12). Gibb (1969), Strayer & Strayer (1976), Hold (1976), and Sluckin & Smith (1977) report such differences in dominance-styles of children, and of adolescents (Savin-Williams, 1977). Hold labels these differences thus (p. 194) :

" , there are two opposite leadership styles, called by Gibb (1969) "leadership" and "domination". With leadership, authority is spontaneously accorded by fellow group members whereas with domination there is little or no shared feeling or joint action and authority derives from some extra-group power."

Benjamin(1974,1979) and Golding & Knudson (1975), evaluating and revising earlier theories (Leary, 1957; Schaefer, 1965), construct a three-dimensional structural analytic model of interpersonal behaviour in which "differences in dominance style" is one of the crucial dimensions. In their model this dimension is labeled "aggressive dominance" versus "autonomy" and is suggested to depend on a sort of social learning. Individuals may learn to or be trained to behave less dependent and more autonomous, thus overcoming negative and aggressive dominant behavioural tendencies towards (dependent) subordinates. Similar differences are labeled as "authoritarian" versus "democratic" leadership in a survey by Krech et al. (1962).

Kirton (personal comm., 1986) also distinguishes different types of leaders, "innovators" and "adaptors". The latter tend to be more in line with group norms, traditions and established working methods. They can more often be characterized as "consensus-leaders" than the former type of leaders, the "innovators". Innovators have a tendency to be abrasive and insensitive at the social level, causing a great deal of unintentional havoc and conflict involuntarily. This type of leader is much like Rogers' "creative loner" (Kirton, 1976; Rogers, 1959). Kirton's research has shown a personality-temperamental basis to exist behind these differences in leadership style, among other things in terms of cognitive style differences (Kirton, 1986). We shall return to this temperamental aspect further below.

table 1 about here

[edit] Styles of Subordinacy

✰✰✰ <level 3> Having reviewed these aspects of dominance, we shall now take a closer look at subordinacy and the varying forms it may assume.

Variation between subordinate roles in terms of tolerance and accepted-ness, in terms of incrowd-outcast differences, and so forth, are reported from social psychological research as well as from research on other socially living mammal species. In general, it appears that individuals who do not manage to attain a dominant role (α-position in fig.l) may either stay in a subordinate position while adapting to existing rule, or tend to lose their in-crowd position. Accepted (incrowd-)subordinates (β-position in fig.l) may gradually grow into a semi-outcast or outcast position (ω-position in fig.l). Such outcast-like subordinates are potential migrators, running all the risks implied (ω — > α ; or ω - >dead), whereas the better accepted incrowd-type subordinates, who show a better adaption to existing hierarchical pressures eventually may succeed the dominant(s) present in case of death or otherwise incapacitation of the latter (β —> α). Especially in relation to dispersal mechanisms operating through young individuals, such differences in social-role types have frequently been observed (Wilson, 1977; Barash, 1977). (Similar descriptions have been given for e.g., deermice (Healey, 1967), free-living populations of black rats (Ewer, 1971,pp. 135-137), free-living lions (Bertram, 1975) rhesus monkeys (Vandenbergh, 1966), free-living japanese monkeys (Itani et al., 1963; Yamada, 1966) and by Eisenberg et al.(1972) for a number of primate species.) Bertrand (1969) reports the occurrence of "scapegoats" in stumptail-macaques and de Waal (1975) in java monkeys. The latter reports that high ranking individuals often formed alliances against the lowest ranking adults or adolescents although each of the highranking monkeys clearly dominated the scapegoat in question also without any help of others. De Waal (1975,p.530) suggests:

"...., one might suppose that higher-ranking groupmembers "work off their mutal irritations and tensions"in that way. In other words: the (inevitable) confrontations between them facilitate aggressiveness, which is not expressed in aggressive actions between each other, but ((inevitable) confrontations between them facilitate aggressiveness, \which is not expressed in aggressive actions between each other, but/ in cooperative aggression (re)directed at subordinates which serve as "scapegoats"."

Whatever the reason for this "mobbing against scapegoats" may be, it certainly magnifies the differences between β- and ω-type subordinates.

Breaking out of the customary intelligence ceiling

✰ <level 1> So, what we see is that intelligence may / might be used to find – easier - shortcuts to short term satisfaction. And such shortcuts are quite likely to outflank the collateral behavioural effects of those primordial instincts, collaterals that serve procreational purposes, for which reasons those instincts were evolutionarily selected for in the first place. So, intelligence, applied to our own behaviour, therefore quickly leads to sterile behaviour, no matter how satisfactory from a personal emotional (very proximal) point of view.

Our hominid ancestors however, still less intelligent at that time in evolution, were living in circumstances where a high intelligence did indeed yield very high premiums. Complex communication skills for instance would increase the effectiveness of group hunting tremendously. Better communication and other advantages of intelligence would enable those hominids to become far more effective hunters. However, a too high intelligence, higher than the "intelligence ceiling", would on the other hand yield detrimental procreational effects if applied to the own (social) behaviour.

Our hypothesis is this: mother nature finally came up with a solution for this stalemate evolutionary situation. It invented in our hominid ancestors a specific awareness block regarding the own behaviour. Once this specific "Blindness for the Self" was emerging, the evolution of intelligence could carry on, also beyond the aeons old upper limit or upper ceiling as applicable in all other "intelligent" animal species.

If this hypothesis is correct, a superior capacity for language and for complex communication and for tool making only could develop in our human ancestors "in exchange for" blindness for the Self.

Such a "blindness for the Self", in short, has the following function. It serves to prevent short cuts between proximal urges in our behaviour and the desired outcomes. Such short cuts would namely destroy the functional links between the proximal organization of our behaviour with all the emotional urges implied, and the ultimate evolutionary goals of such behaviours. Whereas very satisfactory to the individuals in question, such short cuts would impair their participation in procreation, which in turn would make the short cut capacity (superior intelligence) go extinct again. Therefore a higher intelligence is in principle self defeating in the evolution of any species, unless it is combined with "Self-blindness".

In humans intelligence could only rise above that certain level after such a specific provision had been built into our behavioural system, making sure that such high intelligence only could be applied to any type of problems in life as long as it would not be applied to the bearer's own behaviour.

Built in blindness and well consolidated ignorance towards the self have therefore been the key to the evolution of higher human intelligence. [edit] Self Blindness and Social-role Blindness

✰✰ <level 2> So, we have a peculiar situation in Homo sapiens. We can put a man on the moon, we can dive to the bottom of the deepest oceans, we have produced Hydrogen bombs, but . . . . . . we cannot think clearly in front of a mirror. Very strange indeed ! But now we can at least understand how this strange situation came about.

Quite obviously, we seem not to be capable of understanding our own behaviour, let alone organize it in a mutually useful way. It seems for instance far more easy to organize war involuntarily than to organize lasting peace. This failure to understand our own behaviour can indeed also be corroborated by psychological research from the last half century. It appears indeed that human beings possess an uncanny capacity to not-see how they are functioning themselves. We are struck with a very strong form of blindness for our own emotions, motivations and feelings. Of course, we do have some sort of notion of what we feel, what we see and what we want, but, as an overwhelming avalanche of scientific psychological research shows, these personal, internal notions differ greatly from reality. (See for instance: Bateson, 1972,1979, Dixon, 1976, Laing, 1967,1969,1970)

What is more, human beings in fact spend surprising amounts of energy and brain capacity to mystify and hide their own behaviour from sober and intelligent investigation, by themselves as well as by each other (see the next chapter on personality research for massive research data on this phenomenon). Evidently, it appears that this typical blindness, blocking our awareness and thinking power in certain areas, does have a significant evolutionary advantage. This human blindness apparently is an ESS, an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.

One of the areas where this blindness is very conspicuously present is in social relations and the way social roles develop and are distributed. The ruling awareness blocks for one’s own behaviour, one’s emotions and motivations, make human beings in particular blind for how they interact socially. For more on this phenomenon of “Social-Role Blindness” and for exploring some examples of how this works and what are its consequences for the present as well as for our future, click here(***) .

In summary, the human species is peculiarly unable to think clearly about its own behaviour. Our intelligent capacities are effectively blocked regarding our personal and social functioning.