Energy and Strokes

(draft) Sorry for the baddy English in this article. We are working on improvement.

STATE UNIVERSITY GRONINGEN - HEYMANSBULLETIN HB-91-1029-EX

Energy and Strokes:
how the quality of social relationships influences the process of learning and individual development

by

Bernard B. Maarsingh

and

Popko P. van der Molen

Presented for the fifth international conference on
Reversal Theory, June 21-25, 1991 at Kansas City, Missouri, U.S.A.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Cognition-Energy-Learning Model:
on the Bistable Organization of Motivation and its Effect on Cognitive Development.

1.1. Homeostasis versus Bi-Stability
1.2. The Bistable Organization of Motivation
1.3. Two Metamotivational States and Reversals
1.4. The Energy Basis of Motivation: Different Consequences on the Proximal and on the Ultimal Level
1.5. Motivational Sequences, Learning Spirals and Cognitive Areas of Experience
1.6. Cognitive Development
1.7. Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 2. An Extension of the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model:
on the Interaction between the Quality of Social Relationships and Individual Development.

2.1. Transactional Emotions and Reversals in Social Interactions from an Evolutionary Point of View
2.2. Pro-social Behaviour and Conditions for its Occur­rence
2.3. Two Postulates on the way in which Social Behaviour is Regulated
2.4. Two Metamotivational States, Ruling Social Behaviour
2.5. Social Means or "Strokes" as the Currency in Social Transactions
2.6. Combinations of Telic and Paratelic States with Allocentric and Autocentric States
2.7. Synergetic Effects in Somatic and in Transactional Emotions
2.8. Conditions for Synergetic Effects
2.9. Social Contacts and Positive or Negative Learning Spirals
2.10. "Contagiousness" of Interpersonal Psychological Skills and Adaptation
2.11. Social Support: Data from Effectivity Research and what is missing up till now
2.12. Summary and Conclusions

References

---

Chapter 1. The Cognition-Energy-Learning Model

On the Bi-stable Organization of Motivation and its Effect on Cognitive Development.

1.1. Homeostasis versus Bi-Stability

One of the most widespread concepts in psychology is "homeostasis" or synonimous words such as equilibrium and stability. The word homeostasis originates from the physiologist Cannon (1932) who used it to describe a range of physical systems whereby body temperature, respiration frequency, or the illumination of the retina (Lakke 1985) are maintained at a constant level. In psychology, we encounter this concept in a diversity of areas, for example in the work of Pavlov, where he writes about the equilibrium between the systems of the organism and external conditions (Ban 1964); in Jung (1954) in his compensation theory of personality; in Lewin (1951) where he writes about the "quasi-stationary equilibria" in group processes and in Piaget when he describes the cognitive development of the child. In theories on motivation the homeostasis concept is also often utilized. Examples are Freud's "pleasure principle" and "reality principle" which are focussed on excitation or tension reduction and even in Butler (1953, 1954, 1957) who advocated a "curiosity drive", in Montgomery (1953) who proposed an "exploratory drive" and in Myers and Miller (1954) who postulated a "boredom drive". The end product of behaviour, even if an attempt is made to explain explorative behaviour, is in fact still considered to be a reduction of the drive to a lower preferred level. More recently, Buck's motivation theory (1985) has attracted attention. Buck adopts White's non-homeostatic concept and subsequently moulds it back into a homeostatic framework. This is the concept of "effectance motivation" (see Wever, 1989, unpublished, for a survey). Other examples stem from the research on whether or not altruistically motivated behaviour occurs at all. Piliavin and Piliavin (1973) and Piliavin et al. (1981, 1982) consider altruistic behaviour to be pro-social behaviour which is focussed on reducing one's own aversive arousal as a result of having seen somebody else "suffer". Variations on the same theme originate from Hornstein (1976, 1978, 1982), Reykovski (1982) and Lerner (1970). Batson (1987, 1988) ends two of his articles, on whether altruistically motivated behaviour does or does not occur, with:

"More and more it appears that motivation to help, evoked by feeling empathy, is at least partly altruistic. If it is, then psychologists will have to make some fundamental changes in their perceptions of human motivation and, indeed of human nature" (Batson et al. 1988, pp. 75-76)

Apter and Smith (1976, 1979a, 1979b) and Apter (1976, 1982, 1988), on the other hand, propose a bi-stable explanation of motivation in their reversal theory. A bi-stable system is a system in which there are two levels of preference with a given variable (Murgatroyd 1981). The Cognition-Energy-Learning model (CEL: van der Molen, Stoelhorst, Van Dijk, Maarsingh) is based on the reversal theory in relation to the concept of bi-stability of motivation.

1.2. The Bi-stable Organization of Motivation

In the CEL two arguments are given to underpin the concept of bistability: an ethological and a phenomelogical argument.

The first argument was originally formulated by Van der Molen (1977, 1983, 1985) and revolves around the idea that one of the most recent evolutionary developments is the open-ended learning system. This is a learning system by which a behavioural repertoire develops which is especially appropriate to the situation or surroundings in which the individual incidently happens to live. The capacity to develop such a behavioural repertoire is only utilized optimally when supplies and shortages in the energy balance are treated in a very specific way. This means that behaviour should be organized in such a way that a surplus of energy is immediately invested in the extension and refining of this repertoire. Adjustments in the repertoire will be especially meaningful when those adjustments offer a higher probability of survival in emergency situations and in situations which are very stressful. This means, however, that one has to practice in situations which engender a high level of arousal, for such situations are exactly the situations in which risks have to be taken. But taking risks which afterwards turn out to be too great can have unpleasant consequences. Also, situations which are (too) stressful for a long period of time, can be harmful to the individual. Thus, apart from the necessity to practice with difficult situations, it is also of the utmost importance that the individual has, with regularity, the possibility to escape from threat and danger and to settle down.

An open learning system will contribute maximally to survival when the following two conditions are met: - firstly, there should be a tendency to seek situations which give rise to a high level of arousal when there is a surplus of energy and - secondly, there should be a tendency to look for situations which reduce the arousal as soon as the energy supply is exhausted or in cases of emergency.

The second argument which is used by the CEL has a phenomenological nature and is borrowed from Apter and Smith (e.g. Apter, 1982). These authors indicate that a specific level of arousal can be experienced in two different ways. They mention as examples of situations which cause a high level of arousal: having to wait at the dentist while worrying about the condition of your teeth, or watching an exciting movie and feeling thrilled. Situations with a low level of arousal are: waiting for the bus whilst you have nothing to do and are bored stiff, or sitting in a nice warm tub after a hard day's work and enjoying a pleasant relaxation. What distinguishes these four situations is, in the first place, the level of arousal and, in the second place, the extent to which a person feels comfortable or not, in other words, the hedonic tone. Apter and Smith generalized such phenomenological occurrences and elaborated them into their reversal theory. One of the fundamental postulates in their theory is:

"... that certain psychological processes, especially certain motivational and emotional processes, exhibit bi-stability rather than homeostasis (i.e. uni-stability). Switching from one stable state to the other in a bi-stable system can be referred to as a "reversal" and may be brought about by a number of different factors." (Apter and Smith, 1979)

Both arguments, the one phenomological and the other ethological in character, plead for a bipolar organization of behaviour, as described in the CEL.

1.3. Two Metamotivational States and Reversals

Both states of the bi-stable system in the CEL, following Apter and Smith, are called metamotivational states. They can be seen as "frames of mind" which determine the general phenomenological characteristics of motivation at a certain moment in time: in other words, the individual interprets his own motives in one of two ways. Because states are not motives in themselves but rather organize the motivation, they are called metamotivational states.

Both metamotivational states indicate a level of preference as to the variable "level of arousal" or "tension". They are called "telic" and "paratelic", derived from the Greek word "telos" which means goal. In the telic state the individual is serious minded, tries to avoid high arousal and wants to plan and structure the future as much as possible (Murgatroyd 1981). The phenomenological characteristics of the paraletic state are, in short: to carry out behaviour for the behaviour itself or for the excitement and sensation which this behaviour arouses (Apter 1979), e.g., impulsiveness, fickle or frivolous behaviour and searching for arousal because it is pleasant in itself (Murgatroyd 1981). (See table 1.1 for a more elaborate summary of the telic and paratelic state.)

The CEL not only postulates, following reversal theory, a complex "control adjustment system" (Murgatroyd 1981, p. 185), but also indicates that the relation between arousal and other variables, such as being full of fear or fun, is much more complex than was generally assumed. This is because, as described above, arousal in the paratelic state is experienced as being exciting and pleasant, and in the telic state as being frightening, unpleasant and as something which has to be avoided. (In table 1.2 this relation between the two metamotivational states and the level of arousal is summarized again.)

Table 1.1: Summary of the Telic and Paratelic States (from Apter 1982, p. 52).

Table 1.2: Experience of arousal in telic and paratelic state.

In the last paragraph, a statement by Apter (1979, page 405) was quoted which, among other things, dealt with the "reversals", or changes, from one stable state into the other, that occur with a certain regularity (Murgatroyd 1981). These reversals can occur under a variety of conditions (Murgatroyd 1981), but will especially take place when: (a) the individual gets frustrated in one state, or (b) the individual gets satiated in the other state (Van der Molen et al., 1991). The former (a) takes place in particular in the paratelic state in which the organism seeks tension and accordingly takes risks. Taking risks implies that unexpected things and unforeseen contingencies may happen which can lead to a telic state. Because of the fact that in such a state the person searches for tension or arousal, satiation will not very often be the cause of a reversal. However, a reversal by satiation may occur when the supply of energy gets exhausted (Van der Molen, 1983, 1984, 1985; see also (Van der Molen et al. 1991). The reversal from the telic to the paratelic state will more often be caused by satiation, because at a certain moment in time the energy supply is replenished to the extent that the search for situations which offering arousal may continue (Van der Molen, 1983, 1984, 1985).

In the CEL model of Van der Molen et al (1991) the energy dependent basis of motivation is an important explanation for such an interaction between level of arousal and metamotivational state and the reversal from one state into the other.

1.4. The Energy Dependent Basis of Motivation: Different Consequences on the Proximal and on the Ultimal Level

In contrast to most psychological approaches, the concept "allocation of energy" is very important in ethology. Strategies and tactics (e.g. to find food) of various animals are analyzed in the light of the hypothesis: " ... behavioral control mechanisms are designed to maximize the rate of net energy gain" (Daly & Wilson 1983, p. 39). To illustrate the concept we will give two examples to indicate what the term means in ethology. Tits are small birds which are found often in wooded areas in Europe and North-America. These birds remain in the same area the entire year and they breed there in summer. In winter it is hard to find larvae because they are well hidden and irregularly spread. So the tits must have a special strategy which makes finding food as efficient as possible. It seems to be the case that they use a "giving-up time" decision-rule. This means that they look for food only during a specific period of time at a specific place and if by then they have not found anything yet, they give up and look for another place. Krebs et al. (1974) have shown by means of experiments and calculations that this strategy produces the maximal number of food-units within a specific period of time compared to other strategies, such as, for example, examining a pine-cone during a pre-set period of time, or starting to look elsewhere, having found a fixed number of larvae.

This is an example in which a number of strategies for collecting food are compared on the basis of their efficiency, and in which the animal appeared to use the most efficient method; the animal allocated energy as efficiently as possible. The next example is completely different, but corresponds with the former in using energy as efficiently as possible.

The hermit-crab lives in "discarded" snail-shells and looks for a new house when she grows too large for her current house. If the crab succeeds, she continues to grow. But if the crab does not succeed to find a larger house, she stops her own growth, for a house is necessary in order not to be caught by predators. The energy which normally is put in the growth, now is used to mature sexually. Instead of putting energy in the growth, the crab puts it in reproduction (Bertness 1981). Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) and Van der Molen et al. (1991) assume that the motivation with specialized learning-animals (human beings), is steering behaviour in such a way that the energy spent is actually utilized in an optimal way. This means that arousal inducing situations will be sought as soon as there is a surplus of energy and that the situation will, if possible, be controlled as soon as the supply threatens to be exhausted (see pp. 4, 5, and 6).

The question which now arises is: what are the implications of an energy-efficient learning system? In the first place, it can be said that the energy which is invested in experimenting with new and exciting situations is no longer available for other activities (such as eating). So only when there is a surplus of energy i.e. when there are no other outstanding needs to be fulfilled, can investments be made in learning. This learning should produce long-term results in terms of survival or reproduction (see for instance Dawkins 1976. When the system results in a more exact, more efficient and more economical representation of the surroundings, especially concerning relevant situations, it contributes to a higher survival value. A side effect of such a learning-system is that eventually energy and time will be available for activities other than those considered to be essential necessities of life. This is so because the surroundings have been mapped out in such a way (cognitively) that one responds to the situation in the right way at the right time.

When we compare the ethological argument which was used by Van der Molen to the phenomenological argument which was used by Apter (see pp 4, 5, 6), we can draw an important conclusion regarding "cause" and "function" of behaviour (Tinbergen, 1963, 1968). By "cause" Tinbergen means the proximal causes and goals of behaviour and by "function" he means the ultimate causes and effects.

The paratelic state results, in the long term, in a surplus of experience (especially in important areas) which in the end is sedimented in a refined and extended behavioural repertoire (Van der Molen, 1983, 1984, 1985). In the short term, the main goal is to have fun doing things which are exciting (see for instance Apter, 1976 or 1982). So the behaviour is, at the proximal level, aimed at the principle: just do what is exciting. The effect at the ultimate level of such behaviour (an extended and refined behavioural repertoire) seems to play no part in the proximal motivation of such behaviour. In our view, this is a logical consequence of the observation that learning competes with other activities (e.g. eating) and so should be inviting at the proximal level.

Batson et al. (1987, 1988) also ascertain the importance of the distinction between proximal and ultimate results when they study the motivation of altruistic behaviour. From a number of very well organized experiments Batson concludes that altruistic behaviour indeed appears to exist when the proximal goal of the behaviour is examined and not only the long term results. Now that a clear distinction has been indicated between proximal and ultimate results and goals, it seems obvious to ask next how the learning progresses in detail.

1.5. Motivational Sequences, Learning Spirals and Cognitive Areas of Experience

In figure 1.1 both the metamotivational states and the reversals from one state to the other are represented graphically. The sequence, shown in this figure (fear - relaxation - boredom - excitement - fear, etc) is important for the learning process.

Figure 1.1. A commonly occurring Motivational Sequence.

Van der Molen (1984) explains how a behavioural repertoire develops by way of positive and negative learning spirals. If the indicated sequence relaxation - boredom - excitement - fear - relaxation - etc. can be completed often enough, it means that generally speaking there have been sufficient opportunities to achieve relaxation timely and to replenish the energy supply. In this way an individual will develop a behavioural repertoire which functions adequately and in which the various skills have been well consolidated and integrated.

As a consequence, the person is (better) able to deal with emergencies and to relax more quickly and effectively, with the result that after some period of time he or she is able again to explore, etc. We label this a positive learning spiral.

If, however, the person does not succeed in finding enough moments of relaxation, he or she can replenish his/her energy less often. The individual will then be in the paratelic state less often and consequently will explore less and exhibit telic behaviour more frequently. This results in the person acquiring fewer new skills and practicing "old" skills less often. And being less skillful subsequently lessens the chances of further moments of relaxation. Thus a negative learning spiral develops (figure 1.2).

According to this model, skills have the tendency to grow in clusters. Van der Molen calls such clusters, after Grof (1972, 1973, 1976) "clusters of COndensed EXperience" or "COEX-systems" (see figure 1.3). Grof defines a COEX-system as follows:

"A COEX-system can be defined as a specific constellation of memories consisting of condensed experience (and related fantasies) from different life periods of the individual. The memories belonging to a particular system have a similar basic theme or contain similar elements and are associated with a strong emotional charge of the same quality. The nature of these systems varies considerably from one COEX-system to another."

Grof distinguishes positive and negative COEX-systems, depending on the emotions connected with the cluster. The reason for such clustering of areas of experience is explained by Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985). When certain situations have been explored regularly and the experiences have been processed well, we can speak of a positive COEX-system in which various skills have been incorporated. Such skills can often also be applied in other, comparable situations, so that these too, can turn out to be controllable and manageable. In this way positive experiences can extend to related areas of experience and thus stimulate a positive COEX-system to grow. Poorly processed experiences also have the tendency to grow in clusters. When, in a given situation, there is little exploration and consequently little practice with certain relevant skills, it is more difficult to control that situation if needed, and subsequently it is also more difficult to relax and settle down after solving the problems at hand.

Figure 1.2 Two possible learning spirals (Molen, van der 1984) in which the development and refining of the behavioural repertoire is the result of positive learning spirals, and in which a rigid and stereotyped way of reacting will be the outcome of negative learning spirals

This implies a high probability that only few new skills will be learnt, so that the next time the individual finds himself in the same, or a similar situation, he will, most likely, have another problematic experience. This increases the likelihood of telic behaviour (i.e. behaviour for escaping and avoiding) in such situations, resulting in even less experimenting. An example of a negative cluster is the behaviour of somebody who, as a result of his or her shyness, no longer dares to appear in public. By doing so, the fear for such kind of situations will grow, because the familiarity with those situations will diminish, and the person can not properly develop other skills for which he or she needs the help of others in a group context(for instance school tasks). In this way the individual easily ends up in a negative learning spiral in which new experiences are no longer utilised to learn, but rather to strengthen the existing, inadequate avoidance behaviours. Breaking out of such a spiral is very difficult. The most important (and most necessary) condition for this is the ability to acquire relaxation and rest whenever needed, which is necessary for the processing of experiences and replenishing the energy resources. If a number of well-processed areas in which there are well-controlled skills, are in some way related to badly processed areas of experience, those well-processed areas of experience can sometimes serve as a "refuge" when situations become too frightening. Such refuges serve to provide the necessary opportunities for relaxation.

Figure 1.3 Hypothetical example of the growth of positive (+) and negative (-) systems of COndensed EXperience in the total area of experiences (from: (Molen 1984).

Here it is important to bear in mind that a positive COEX-system does not necessarily consist of pleasant experiences. It can also be a matter of a positive end result, i.e. the good processing of negative experiences. A negative COEX-system consists of badly processed unpleasant experiences.

The term unpleasant can easily lead to misunderstanding. The experiences were unpleasant at that time, but after a while the negative COEX-system may be experienced as intriguing, i.e. when the person is in the paratelic state, precisely because of the arousal elevating characteristics of such a COEX-system. Positive areas of experience are then experienced as boring and thus as less pleasant, for they no longer produce excitement.

In the telic state, of course, the situation is reversed. The positive areas of experience will be sought, whereas the negative areas of experience will be experienced as unpleasant and frightening.

This difference in the way in which positive and negative COEX-systems are faced, has interesting implications for cognitive development.

1.6. Cognitive Development

Lewicka (1985, 1986, 1987, and 1989) speaks of "standards of goodness" and "standards of badness"; certain standards indicating what kind of behaviour should be pursued and what kind of behaviour should be avoided. Czapinski (1982, 1985, 1986, and 1987) extends this with his research on the judgement of experiences, from which it is evident that, generally speaking, people have a slight "positivity bias". This means that experiences generally acquire a slightly positive emotional value rather than a zero or neutral value (except when they have a specific and very strong emotional value). According to Czapinski one can speak in the cognitive representation of the experiences of a slightly positive background field, against which the negative areas of experience especially stand out. Using these concepts, we can now say more about cognitive development. (see figure 1.4).

This figure resembles the figure which van der Molen used to depict Grof's theory of COEX-systems (see the previous paragraph), but is now further specified. The development of the cognitive system can now be described as follows.

The areas of experience with the unpleasant connotations, i.e. the areas which have not yet been properly processed and digested (- -), will raise the level of arousal and be accompanied by tension. In the telic state, the well processed areas (+ +) are attractive, because they are controllable in such a way that in the case of an emergency a state of rest can easily be achieved. For such areas we therefore have chosen the term "refuge". In the paratelic state, the not yet well processed areas will be particularly attractive, because the tension they afford will be experienced as pleasant.

Figure 1.4: Cognitive representation of areas of experience.

We assume the following: in the paratelic state the borders of the exciting areas are explored, i.e. exploration will occur in those areas that are closest to the area for which there is a "standard of badness" and where there is a relatively high chance of an arousal inducing (and thus also possibly unpleasant) experience. On the proximal level, if things go well, it is however simply a matter of (pleasant) tension and excitement. A consequence of such an exploration then is that the borders of the badly processed areas start to shift; as a result of the positive experiences, parts of the problem area are "nibbled away" and gradually change into well-processed areas. In this way the individual learns and is able to develop further. On the ultimate level we may in a way speak of a "goal" of the paratelic state, namely, "striving after" and gaining new experiences which are necessary for further development.

What then happens on the logical-cognitive level? Following the line of argumentation on page 12, the experiences should be represented in such a way that the organism acquires precise, relevant and economical schemes of the surroundings (otherwise the gain from the energy spent would not be maximized). Lewicka (1985, 1987, and 1989) concludes that we can say more about this when we make a distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions. Sufficient conditions are conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to attain a certain result. When for instance, somebody wants to boil an egg for his breakfast, a sufficient condition could look like this:

1. Fill a pan with water.
2. Place the egg into the pan.
3. Put the pan on the cooker and turn on the gas.
4. Once the water is boiling, wait for 4 more minutes.
5. Turn off the gas and pour the water away.

When these conditions are met, the person will indeed get his boiled egg. However, this is not the only way to boil an egg: it could also for instance be boiled in an old can over a camp-fire or in a micro-wave. A (series of) sufficient condition(s) indicate(s) how a certain result can be obtained, but this does not mean that when these conditions are not met, the result cannot possibly be obtained.

A necessary condition is a condition which hás to be fulfilled; without that condition a certain result cannot possibly be obtained. A necessary condition in the example of boiling of an egg could be: "heat the egg to a temperature above the coagulation temperature of the white of the egg, just long enough for the heat to penetrate the whole egg". The way in which the egg is heated is not specified, it is in fact unimportant. Only the fact that the egg is heated for a certain period of time is relevant; otherwise it never never will become "boiled". Given the necessary condition(s) for a certain result it is often possible to lay down a varied number of sufficient conditions.

Lewicka (1985, 1986, 1987, and 1989) subsequently speaks of "necessity-oriented" and "sufficiency-oriented" procedures (behavioural strategies / -recipes). In the CEL these procedures are treated as a number of "recipes" for behaviour, belonging to a certain COEX-system which are based on sufficient or on necessary conditions. The recipes which are based on conditions (necessity-oriented procedures) are related in particular to those areas of experience which are mapped out thoroughly. The recipes which are based on sufficient conditions (sufficiency-oriented procedures) are conceptually simpler, but in general less economical, because in general more instructions and recipes are then needed and they are less well (causally and logically) integrated (see Van der Molen et al. 1991).

What happens eventually at the logical-cognitive level in the optimal case is that, starting from the experiences that exploration has yielded, an all-encompassing necessity-oriented recipe of a higher abstraction level is generated out of the initially acquired sufficiency-recipes. For this to happen it is a prerequisite that there is enough time and relaxation between such situations for the processing and integration of the new experiences. A simple example will clarify this: Imagine John is walking in a forest. He enjoys the surroundings and is completely relaxed. Every now and then he climbs a fence to walk through the pastures or through a piece of fenced-in woodland. Suddenly a horse gallops towards him from out of the wood and without thinking John starts running. Somehow he can escape and not until later he asks himself what exactly has happened. First he hesitates to enter the forest again, but after a while when he has settled down again it seems to him quite exciting (paratelically) and he resolves to constantly stay close to the fences, so that he can escape quickly should that be necessary (refuges in frightening situations). In this way John re-investigates the situation and finds out in which area of the forest the horse is and which area of the forest and which pastures he must try to avoid. Eventually, the excitement of walking is diminished, because he exactly knows where he has to be careful. The motivation during the paratelic phase - to explore the forest - eventually disappears.

In this example, John is unpleasantly surprised and at first reacts frightened upon the entire forest. But by exploring the situation a sufficiency-oriented recipe ("If I walk in the forest, a horse may gallop towards me at any given moment in time") is converted into a necessity-oriented recipe ("Only if I climb that particular fence can the horse gallop towards me"). The consequence hereof is also that John's freedom of movement has increased, for the area to be avoided is clearly reduced. This is represented in figure 1.5.

Figure 1.5 Avoidance, exploration, and reduction of an unpleasant area of experience (after positive experiences).

An area of experience which is first experienced as problematic (unpleasant in the telic phase), gradually reduces in size, as its borders are explored (in the paratelic states) and positive experiences in that marginal area may occur. On the ultimate level the aim of the paratelic behaviour is, to speak in Grof's terms, to convert as many negative COEX-systems as possible into positive ones. In other words, the aim is, among other things, to convert less efficient sufficiency-oriented recipes, connected to badly processed experiences, into highly efficient necessity-oriented recipes which are are in particular connected to well-processed and digested experiences. This means that the representations of the surroundings become more efficient and more economical.

It now becomes clear why experiences tend to result in well processed and badly processed clusters. When certain situations have been explored often enough and the experiences have been well-processed, we speak of a positive COEX-system in which skills have been learned that are applicable in different, but comparable or related situations. In such an area of experience the individual can more easily establish positive learning spirals. In a similar way badly processed experiences also tend to grow in clusters; there is a strong likelihood that the next time the individual finds himself in the same, or a similar or related situation, he will experience it as problematic. This raises the probability of telic behaviour in such situations, with the result that less exploration and experimentation will take place. In this way the individual gets caught up in a negative learning spiral in such areas of experience; new experiences cannot be used for learning, but only for strengthening and extending the existing, relatively inefficient behavioural strategies. In terms of figure 1.4 this means that, given such an accumulation of bad experiences, the cognitive representations of the refuges (+ +) remain relatively limited and small and that for the cognitive representation of the problem areas (- -) relatively broader and less efficient margins are maintained.

Figure 1.6 Safety margins in the telic state. Explanation: the dotted lines indicate the direction in which the circumference of the COEX-systems changes in the case of an unfavourable direction of the learning process.

Should necessity-oriented recipes of high precision and a high level of abstraction be absent, and relatively many sufficiency-recipes be used instead, the indicated borders in figure 1.4 are less favourable during the telic state. The refuges of well-processed areas are small because of the overly simple, badly generalizable and thus limitedly useful sufficiency-recipes, whereas for the badly processed areas, excessive safety margins are maintained. The individual's freedom of movement is then relatively limited (see figure 1.6).

In such a negative learning spiral a negative COEX-system may gradually extend via an accumulation of avoidance reactions which are principally based on sufficiency recipes. These can be generated relatively quickly, but they are also accompanied by relatively large safety margins, with the result that a relatively large area of experience is considered to be risky.

1.7. Summary and Conclusions.

In this chapter about the Cognition-Energy-Learning model (CEL), which explains the most essential aspects of the learning process, two arguments have been put forward to support the bi-stable character of motivation. One argument was ethological and refers in particular to the ultimal effect of an open-ended learning system: the accumulation of a refined and extensive behavioural repertoire. The second argument was phenomenological and refers to the fact that the bi-stable character of motivations indeed is reflected in the personal experience of the individual.

Subsequently, the energy dependent basis of learning was discussed. The concept of energy allocation was illustrated using a number of examples from ethology which then were applied to the CEL model. The alternating preference for a high or a low level of arousal provides two essential parts of the process of learning: on the one hand the acquisition of new and novel experiences, on the other hand the reserving of time and energy for structuring and processing this experiential knowledge. The alternation of the telic and the paratelic state guarantees that the learning process continues, every time when time as well as energy are available for other matters than for the primary necessities of life.

Experiences can be problematic or non-problematic. Depending on the meta-motivational state of an individual, an area of experience can be experienced as pleasant and attractive, or as unpleasant. In the telic state problematic areas (for which no adequate behavioural strategies exist yet) will be avoided as much as possible: in the paratelic state, however, they can be a source of (then pleasant) tension and arousal and can thus be attractive to explore. In this way the individual can glean some measure of experience in areas which are (relatively) unknown. And such experiences are a prerequisite for the development of the individual to higher levels of behavioural organization. Non-problematic areas of experience will not be sought in the paratelic state, for they do not produce arousal and are thus considered to be "boring". In the telic state however, these areas are essential for the individual in order to be able to relax. Only when a certain amount of rest can be achieved regularly is the individual able to process his or her experiences optimally.

There are circumstances in which it is impossible for the ideal sequence of telic-paratelic reversals to occur. If such circumstances last too long, this will lead to the establishment of a negative learning spiral which will force the individual into stereotyped and inefficient ways of responding.

The likelihood that the negative, problematic experiences within a certain area will spread to other areas will then increase. Hence the term, the "contagiousness" of experiences. This contagiousness of experiences also applies to the positive, well processed and consequently non-problematic experiences. In a positive learning spiral, the individual continually learns new skills which can sometimes be applied to other areas of experience. In this way, the likelihood of having positive experiences increases. Contagiousness of the way in which learning experiences are processed, both in the positive and the negative direction, primarily manifests in areas of experience than are functionally related. However, the principle of contagiousness manifests also in all other areas of experience in their totality.

In the next chapter, the CEL-model will be expanded to include two other metamotivational states, namely social contacts and the emotions arising from them. By incorporating these two states, it is possible to describe and explain how the quality of social relationships influences the learning process.

---

Chapter 2. An Extension of the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model

The Interaction between the Quality of Social Relations and Individual Development.

2.1. Transactional Emotions and Reversals in Social Interactions from an Evolutionary Point of View

In the previous chapter, the Cognition-Energy-Learnin­g model (CEL) was discussed and emphasis was placed on the energy-based process of learning. Subsequently it was indicated how the learning process could progress and what the implications of the learning process are for cognitive develop­ment. With respect to this development, the Cog­nition-Energy-Learning model, as is discussed up to now, has traced the origin of the differences between positive COEX systems (pleasant, agree­able, easy, boring, etc) and negative COEX systems (di­fficult, unpleasant, dangerous, etc). The model allows predictions to be made about the dynamics of the (cognitive) processes which control the attribution of labels to objects and experiences; it speci­fies when the "positive" and when the "negative" labels are applicable; and it describes how the dynamics of the learning process may effectuate gradual changes in the cognitive representation of objects and situations and in what set of cir­cumstances this may occur.

A completely different aspect is the relationship bet­ween social interaction patterns and the learning process. The CEL-model also allows predictions about these interac­tions. However, the theoretical model, as discussed up to now, must be expanded considerably, in order to be able to describe this interacti­on. This is possible by inserting Apter's (1988) concept of reversals between transactional emotions into the CEL-model. prior to explaining the concept "transactional emotions", we shall attempt to provide an ethological foundation to the concept of "social inter­actions". In other words: a model is sought which can explain social interactions from an evolutionary point of view. In order to discover such an ethological explana­tion, we assume that social behaviour always contains a certain measure of altruistic behaviour. Hence, if a group wants to be able to work together efficiently, the indi­vidual members of the group will every now and then have to embark on investing time and energy which initially will be at their own expense of themselves. This investment will yield long term benefits.

2.2. Pro-social Behaviour and Conditions for its Occurrence

At first sight pro-social behaviour would appear to be an anomaly within evolutionary theory seeing as the mecha­nisms of evolution seem to be so very "egoistic". Evolution would favour behaviours which help the individu­al at the expense of others. Moreover, we may presume that in the environment, at least in most cases, there is only room for a limited number of individuals or of species. In other words, there only is room for a limited number of genes which compete for the chromosomal space (Barash 1986, Dawkins 1976). An individual when he or she wants to contri­bute to his or her own reproductive success, should possess certain characte­ristics which are not only personally advantageous, but also actively obstruct the reproductive success of others.

In great contrast to this reasoning stands the fact that many species (amongst others, human beings) are social and often even actively work together. For example, bees make very laborious hives which house thousands of bees; buffaloes live (used to live) in gigantic herds and baboons live in a complex social system which is comple­tely based on being a member of the group. Evidently, social behaviour is not so much an anomaly as it would seem to be at first sight. Every individual within a cert­ain (socially living) group is better able to maintain itself better when belonging to a group, than when it leads a solita­rily existence. Advantages of groups could for instance be: more effective defence against preda­tors, such as in the case of baboons which, as a group, can badly maul a leopard; or a more effective alertness-system, such as with the tamarinds (New World monkeys) which "use" each other's eyes, noses, and ears to promote their own safety. Another advantage could be that juvenile animals are able to learn from adult animals. Humans are an outstanding example of this principle and cul­tural theories of evolution are based on this ad­vantage (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985). In short, there are many advantages in working together, and in living socially.

It is even more interesting, psychologically speaking, when we con­sider human situations in which one person helps the other, even if this does not benefit him or her anything at that moment in terms of survival (or reproductive suc­cess, see Daily and Wilson, 1983). This type of behaviour is called pro-social or altruistic behaviour. This is interesting from a psychological standpoint because especially this kind of behaviour must have been absolutely necessary at the "dawn" of human evolution and because working together, which was necessary to survive, might well have been based on pro-social behaviour.

In order to be able to explain how such behaviour was able to evolve, three different theories have been sugge­sted, having as central concepts: group selection, kin selection and reciprocal altruism respectively.

The theory of group selection implies that the group (of animals) is seen as the unit upon which selection pressure operates. So the individual members of the group manifest certain types of behaviour, because such behaviour supports the group. This approach was suggested by various authors (a.o. Wynne-Edwards, 1962), but according to many it was convincingly contradicted by Lack (1966) and later by Williams (1966) (see Daily and Wilson, 1983 or Campbell, 1972) and will not be further discussed here.

Kinship selection was introduced by Hamilton (1964) and implies that a person's altruistic act, even if this person more or less sacrifices himself, contributes to the survival of relatives (for instance family), so that this person contributes to the reproductive success of each (altruistic) gene which is shared with this relative. According to Hamilton a condition for this model is that the groups to which human beings must have belonged, must have been small. At any rate, small enough for there to be a reason­able chance that somebody actually helps a rela­tive with an altruistic act.

The third model stems from Trivers (1971) and it is this model which we will investigate in more depth. Recipro­cal altruism is the situation in which one person helps another and the latter in turn later helps the former. These two acts can be seperated in time. Shapi­ro gives the following example of reciprocal altruism:

"Let us take a relatively small group of people. In this group, there are, say, five hunters from each of the five unrelated families in the group. Let us imagine that the main food source consists of dodo birds and that the average probability of a hunter catching a dodo bird is low, so that he catches a dodo only once every five days. Let us also suppose that an average dodo bird will last a family for five days but really only lasts at most two days because of spoilage. Let us also suppose that a single dodo will suffice all five families for one day and that the total probability of any hunter's catching a dodo every day is unity. Than it would appear that those genetic variants that have a predisposition to share food will be more fit than those that hoard food. The sharing individual's reproductive potential will increase, and this altruistic quality will be selected for." (Shapiro, 1974, pp. 7-8).

Trivers mentions a number of conditions which must be fulfilled for the evolution of reciprocal altruism. These are: (a) a large number of situations in which altruistic behaviour can occur, (b) a large number of interactions between members of a relatively small group, and (c) a division of symmetric situations in which the roles of altruist and receiver constantly interchange (for instan­ce through role specialism). In addition Trivers (1971) mentions a number of conditions such as: a relati­vely long life; the ability to recognize the other members of the group; a localized existence and a high degree of mutual dependence (for instance being endangered by the same predators or suffering food-shortage). This then results in small groups with stable numbers and little hierarchical organization in which the members provide mutual in fights with other groups. These conditions appear to be exactly the conditions which existed in the middle of the Pleistocene (ca 600.000 to 200.000 years ago), in the time that co-operative hunting behaviour in "humans" appears to have developed (Mazak, 1980). Before we go deeper into the consequences of Trivers's conditions, two postulates have to be discus­sed that will clear the way for the formulation of a system which can mediate and regulate social behavi­our.

2.3. Two Postulates on the way in which Social Behaviour is Regulated

The first postulate is that social behaviour is regulated in such a way that social interacti­ons with others proceed optimally. And the second postulate is that such a system must allocate energy resources in the most efficient way. Both postulates can be linked together in one sentence: there must be a system, or rather a capacity, for the regulation of social interac­tions, in an energy efficient way.

The question now is how such a system can regulate behaviour. One idea could be that the regulation of social behaviour proceeds in a way comparable to the regulation of learning behaviour. In the previous chapter it became clear that the learning system is regulated by emotional processes. In other words, the energy surplus together with the environmental demands result in a certain reaction, an emotion, and this indi­cates the direction of the motivation. For instance: if there is an energy-deficit and the environmental demands lead to a high level of arousal, the reaction is fear or nervous tension (Apter calls this anxiety). And this reaction is experienced as unpleasant. The organism then will seek to control the situation and this is more likely to lead to constrictive behaviour than to expansive behaviour. A similar regulation by means of emotional processes may also be expected in the case of social behaviour.

2.4. Two Metamotivational States ruling Social Behaviour

A prediction concerning the repercussions of a system of motivation, that could be made on the basis of Trivers's conditions (1971) and the terms of both postulates, could be described as follows: it is a system which functions by the frequent exchange of social lending means. A person will invest in others when there is a surplus of social means and will try withdraw that investment when there is a shortage of social means. This implies that (just as with learning) we should be able to find two states of prefe­rence.

The reversal theory (e.g. Apter, 1988) does indeed claim that two states of preference can be found. Apter distinguishes two categories of emotions: soma­tic and transactional emotions. Somatic emotions are the emotions which were discussed in chapter 1 (fear, excite­ment, bore­dom, and relaxation). Transactional emotions are emotions whose origins stem and have refe­rence to association with others (Apter, 1988, p. 45). Examples of such emotions which Apter among others, mentions are: guilt, modesty, shame, pride and spite. This concept of transactional emotions seems especially suitable to serve as a further specification of the much after sought system which regu­lates social behaviour.

With somatic emotions the level of arousal is the key variable and with transactional emotions the key varia­bles is: the feeling that somebody has about the outcome of a certain transaction between himself and the other (this variable is called from now on: the result of the transac­tion). What do the various terms in this statement mean? In principle, "the other" not only refers to a person, but also to, for example, a group of people, an object or a situation (Apter, 1988). In this chapter it usually is assumed that the "other" refers to a person, because espe­cially face to face contacts will be discus­sed here. The outcome of an interaction has to do with for instance the experience of winning or loosing, succeeding or failing, doing something right or wrong, and domi­nating or being domina­ted. Such an outcome is expressed on a sliding scale ranging from great loss to great profit. Just as with somatic emotions it is impor­tant to realize that with transactional emotions the key variable, the outcome of an interaction, is also a subjective variable. This means that it cannot objectively be established whether there was profit or loss, but that the person feels himself more or less well off. And this feeling about the transactional result may change suddenly (reversal).

Just as with somatic emotions, there are the telic and para­telic metamotivational states, with transactional emotions there are the "autocentric" and "allocentric" states. In the autocentric mode of behaviour the (subjective) reward for the person himself is the most important determinant of the hedonic tone (how good or bad a persons feels), whereas in the allocentric state the person iden­tifies himself with the other and then the benefit for the other determines his own hedonic tone. This means that the state - spending part of the sur­plus of social energy or social means - is "activated" because the other is considered to be the most important determinant for the hedonic tone. It also holds the other way around: when the person himself is the most important determinant for the hedonic tone, it is pleasant to reap social means. So the motivation for an allo- or autocentric state receives its direction from how the person is focused, either on the other or on himself. Apter not only describes the metamoti­vational states, he also names the specific emotions which belong to a certain motivational state as well as the result of the interaction.

Table 2.1 shows the somatic and transactional emotions. The arrows indicate the emotional state which is prefered in the relevant metamotivational state.

Table 2.2 provides an example of the types of beha­viour that are felt as pleasant in the allo- or autocentric state respectively. This table presents the naturecharacter of the social means. They can be material as well as imma­terial.

Now we can revert back to the stipulations mentioned by Tri­vers. The model as described by Apter (1988) must, if it also purports to describe the altruistic side of social beha­viour, among other things also fulfill the conditions enumerated by Trivers (1971) mentions. The first condition was: a large number of situations in which pro-social behaviour can occur (a). This condition certainly is fulfilled. The second, a large number of interactions (b), is also met and the division of symmetric situations (c) is also fulfilled as both parties have in principle the same social means at their disposal. The condition concerning small groups is not met, and nor, for instance, is the condition concerning weak hierarchical structures, but these conditions do not refer to the character of the social means. They refer to the question how pro-social beha­viour has been able to evolve. Reversal Theory therefore meets the con­ditions that Trivers stipulates as far as the character of the social means of exchange is concerned. One gap in the Reversal Theory is however, that it does not specify what exactly is exchanged.

Table 2.1: Somatic and transactional emotions.

2.5. Social Means or "Strokes" as the Currency in Social Transactions

In the last paragraph, part of Apter's Reversal theory (1982, 1988) was described. Note here that the concept "social means" as the basis of the two metamo­tiva­tional states, does not stem from Apter. Apter deals with transactional emotions on a descriptive, phenomen­ological level and does not attempt to explain their dynamics. The CEL-model postulates, following Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985), that the energy management forms the basis of the bistability of motivation.

Table 2.2: Examples of situations in which auto- or allocentric metamotivational states occur.

	Autocentric	Allocentric
a)	trying to profit from a business deal	striving for solidarity in a trade agreement
b)	trying to win in a match	allow somebody to win
c)	trying to check and control an employee	trying to support and protect and employee
d)	desiring a present	giving a present
e)	trying to make people to listen to your story (at a party or such)	being prepared to listen to somebody else's story
f)	seeking help when in trouble	trying to help people in trouble
g)	trying to exercise political power	wishing to serve the interests of a political party

The result of this was that, Apter's motivational model could be extended into a model which in particular describes the lear­ning of coping skills and the cognitive representation thereof. A similar concept was also postulated in the case of transactio­nal emotions. That which determines the dynamics of transactional emotions, could be called social means, or social atten­tion. This concept of social attention can be compared to what Berne calls a "stroke" (1976). Berne describes a stroke as being a unit of recognition, and states furthermore: "... a stroke may be used as the fundamental unit of social action." (Berne, 1976).

A stroke can also be a pat on the shoulder, a word of appreciation, a cup of coffee or for instance looking after somebody, etc. It is also possible, in Berne's terms, to get too many or too few strokes and to need a stroke at some times more urgently than at other times. Van Gorp (1984) speaks of a "stroke optimum", and explains this as follows:

"The stroke optimum continually changes, as a result of different experiences, situations, personal developmental tasks, and it is quite likely to be influenced by biochemical processes which can sometimes cause a comfort or discomfort not easily accounted for by psychological factors alone."

The CEL-model, as described above, explicitly states that tran­sactional emotions, are also not homeostatically organized, i.e. a prefered stroke-position may change radically, due to sudden reversals.

Just as the telic and paratelic experience of arousal differs under the influence of changes in the energy-maintenance so could the allo- or autocentric experience of the result of a trans­action differ under influence of the stroke-maintenance. So when there is a surplus of social means (allo­centric), the individual distributes strokes (allocentric) and when there is a deficit of social exhausted, the individual strives to receive strokes (autocentric). By adding to Reversal Theory the concept of distributing gathering social means (strokes), the key variable of transactional emotion (the subjective experience of the result of a transaction) will acquire more substance. What happens is, that in the allocentric state the person has a surplus of social means to give to another person (wants to distribute strokes). And in the autocentric state the person demands attention from another person (wants to receive strokes). Both states alternate under the influen­ce of either the surplus or the shortage of social means. We can now further elaborate on the (causal) connection between telic and paratelic states on the one hand and allo- and autocentric states on the other.

2.6. Combinations of Telic and Paratelic States with Allocen­tric and Autocentric States

From an energy point of view, it is of the utmost importance whether a person has a surplus or a shortage of energy. In the case of a surplus of energy, it can be expected that the person is often in the para­telic state and thus shows exploratory behaviour (expansive behaviour). In other words, in the paratelic state, when a person is actually focussed on new input, that person will also be open for "input" which comes from another. So he or she will sooner be able to pay attention to another. This pinpoints exactly the behaviour that is characte­ristic for an allocentric state. In other words, the person is more likely to be in an allocentric state. Another way of saying this is that energy-management is stochastically related to the management of strokes. Paratelic states and allocentric states more often occur in combination. The same is true in reverse, a telic state implies that there is a need for comfort and relaxation and that can be achieved by receiving strokes. A telic state therefore frequently occurs in combination with an autocentric state. For example:

Imagine that the energy surplus is depleted and the person switches to the telic state (focussed on behavioural constriction). As there is a deficit of energy it is to be expected that this person is more likely to ask for help or attention than to give help or attention to others. This means that the person who is in the telic state also has a fair chance of being in the autocentric state.

This does not imply that a telic state always coincides with an autocentric state and that a paratelic state always coincides with an allocentric state, but rather that the likelihood of the above mentioned relationship combinations is higher than of other combinations.

Another reason for the described stochastic relati­onships might be that the reception of attention can pro­vide a certain reassurance which was sought in the telic state.

From research by Bowlby (1977) it appeared that regu­lar periods of relaxation are crucial for the readiness and ability to explore new situations. He describes how a child who is exploring an unknown situation, regularly returns to a familiar person (with Bowlby: the mother). In that way the child can relax and build up energy for the next phase of exploration. All kinds of behavioural deficiencies, such as chronic fear, can arise when the periodical need for relaxation and reassurance cannot be satisfied. Since the child every now and again returns to mother (receive attention), it can explore again (exert energy). Attaining relaxation which was earlier defined as somatic, is thus facili­tated by the supportive attention of others. The reassurance which results from a supportive social contact, may contribute to another interesting consequence. Namely, it provides the possibility of synergetic effects.

2.7. Synergetic Outcomes in Somatic and in Transactional Emotions

Murgatroyd (1985) describes how the tension (level of arousal) and with that the hedonic tone - with somatic emotions - can be increased, when a person who is in the paratelic state, applies behaviour and routines from the telic state. For this he uses the term synergy from system theory. Synergy means that two processes interact in such a way that the combined effects exceed the sum of their individual effects (Murga­troyd, 1985, p. 13). Routines from the one state (telic) are then applied within the other state (paratelic) in order to increase the ef­fect. To put it more simply, it comes down to the principle that two and two make five (Postle, 1989).

A synergy can occur when two different perspectives or levels of meaning of the same entity or event occur immediately after each other or simultaneously, while these perspectives are in principle mutually exclusive or are each other's opposite. A sport such as badminton may serve as an example.

A feeling of security and safety is obtained by the "context" of the game: the hall, the net, the lines, the player's positions on the court etc., together with a series of strict rules of the game and the referee who enforces the rules. Within this fixed context which is predictable and safe, the badminton-players play the game. The game itself can be called the "content" of the situation which always differs, always produces unexpected incidents of which the outcome is uncertain as well as the way in which they occur.

The opposing characteristics in this example are (1) the safety and security provided by the context of the game and (2) the tension and arousal, produced by the content. In such a situation (context is safe, content is uncertain) the context must provide the security or relaxation which will induce the paratelic state and the content provides the extra tension which is pleasant in the paratelic state. The synergetic effect that is caused by the excitement of the game and the security of the context, raises the arousal and provides a pleasant situation (in the parate­lic state). In the telic state this extra tension is felt as extra unpleasantness. Especially in the beginning, the aspects which are certain must often have a dominating function, because otherwise a telic state would be induced and the arousal would be experienced as unpleasantly threatening (Apter, 1982).

Synergy can also be observed in transactional emotions. By using routines from, for instance, the auto­centric state within the allocentric state, the emotional "profit" for both parties can be increased. In other words: by receiving strokes every now and then in an allocentric state in which it is basically pleasant to distribute strokes, part of the positive meaning of receiving stro­kes in the autocen­tric state can "penetrate" into and merge with the pleasant feeling of distributing strokes in the allocen­tric state. Seeing that the allocentric state domi­nates, the autocentric subrou­tines can be regulated and controlled more safely and easily. One can, as it were, choose the meta­motivational state with the mat­ching emotions and emotio­nal value (hedonic tone) and adjust better to the requirements of the moment. The effect of this is that both the gratitude (for benefitting from the interaction) and the feeling of virtue (for doing much for the other) will occur more often. Thus the emotions with a low hedonic-tone (e.g. the feeling of guilt or rancour) will occur less frequently. "Gratitude" and "virtue", occurring next to each other (and mixed with each other), thus strengthen both types of pleasant feelings (= synergy). This synergy in which opposite ways of experiencing social relationships occur together, differs in an important respect from the telic and paratelic synergies as discussed above. There is more than one person involved. Synergy in trans­actional emotions implies the interests of another person. By enlarging the reciprocity of the interaction, the net benefit can become more attractive for both par­ties.

Transactional synergies also occur regularly in interac­tions in which there are two opposite levels of meaning:on the one hand a (social) context which provides security, familiarity and predictability and on the other hand the content of the social contact which provides tension and has the effect of raising arousal. The context must offer a sense of security and familiarity, so that a paratelic state is facilitated. The content of the contact then may induce arousal and excitement and this will be the case with events that are related to negative COEX systems (for instance: talking about your own fears and intimate prob­lems). The exciting areas (in a paratelic state) are namely exactly those areas where there is still a great deal to be learned (negative COEX systems).
In summary: the simultaneous occurrence of the restful, certain context with the exciting, thrilling content of the social contact a synergic effect is brought about which is experienced as extremely pleasant in the paratelic state. It is important that initially the safety of the context is prominent for otherwise a telic state would be facilitated and the arousal would be experienced as threatening. When the con­text is safe enough, the excitement of the content may be evoked by matters which are related to negative COEX systems.

Synergy which is based on the reciprocity of the social interaction, can influence the relationship in two ways. In the first place, it can increase arousal for the content of the contact at the moment synergies occur. So on the proximal level (at the moment that synergies occur) the contact can be extra exciting. In the second place, having a reciprocal relationship can lead ultima­tely to a feeling of ease, relaxation and rest in combination, and thus lead to a restful context. And this context in itself forms the basis for more synergies.

Synergies could also occur with the person in the autocentric state, but the likelihood is smaller because of the state of his or her social means. The person in fact needs social attention (social means) and the distribution of this attention will not occur easily. The well-known (but unpro­ven) principle that a relationship functions the best when there is giving and taking, is clearly supported by intro­ducing this notion of synergy. Conside­ring the evolutionary background of social interactions, this is not surprising. Considering the "egoism" of the genes, it is impossible for one of the parties to always give more than the other, without dissatisfaction occuring. (Of course one can think of cultural influences which promote an unequal distribution, but from the biological point of view we expect dissatisfaction with such a distribution.)

One implication of the above for clinical practice must now be obvious. A client in a low energy state will often be in an autocentric state and hence be economical with the social attention he or she pays. But it is exactly this economizing that diminishes the benefits of the client's social interactions, seeing as there can be no question of synergies. The responsibility of the therapist must then be to create such a climate that (1) the client is offered the possibility to settle down in the relations­hip with the therapist and (2) the client is encoura­ged to gradually invest a little more social attention, so that a reciprocal interaction will become possible again. In this way the client will be offered the opportunity to accumulate ener­gy.

In the literature on synergetic effects and on how relationships might develop in the optimum case, a number of conditions are mentioned for the establishment of such a relationship.

2.8. Conditions for Synergetic Effects

Various authors put forward a number of different conditions for "good" relationships. Three such authors will be discussed in order to illustrate the predictions the CEL-model makes and to show how the mentioned conditions match the theory.

Postle (1988, in his publication on: "...the results of enquiries into how synergy, high energy creative col­laboration, can best be promoted...", arrives at a number of interpersonal skills required for syner­getic effects. He distinguishes two types of interpersonal skills. Interpersonal skills can be focussed on (1) being able to communicate clearly and make choi­ces, and on (2) regulating emotions and fee­lings. When, in the groups Postle was working with, no attention was paid to the second type of interpersonal skills, behaviours recurred which resulted in pola­rization on the division of the group into parties and also lead to sudden changes in moods and feelings of the members of the group. This occurred especially when the members of the group were enthusiastic and wanted to devote themselves to the purpose of the group (for in­stance, making a T.V. production). Postle then states that when members of the group are very enthusiastic and as a consequence are strongly aroused it is extremely difficult to maintain co-operati­ve behaviour. As soon as self-interest emerged, the result was that co-opera­tion suddenly ended, resulting in conflicts, argu­ments and mutual hostility.

Postle (1989) considered the second type of interpersonal skills to be very important for synergetic effects. In other words, the level of the emotional competency of the individual members of the group has to be considera­bly high for synergetic effects to be established in situations in which the emotions are strong. The emotional competency put forward by Postle (the conditions for synerge­tic effects) requires that a person "...will be:

• able to freely express both positive and negative feelings.
• able to hold on to feelings when appropriate.
• able to tolerate the expression of others.
• aware of the transference and countertransference and diligent in seeking it out and dealing with it (transference means to interpret the present situation in terms of earlier experiences)
• aware of the significant patterns of their state-specific learning and how they are manifest in present time." (Postle 1989, p. 12)

Another author who mentions conditions for an opti­mum social contact in which both parties are able to develop personally, is Swensen (1977). He deals with the con­ditions for interpersonal contacts which are characterized by:

"...promoting the growth and development of the people with whom (one) relates." (Swensen 1977, p. 46)

He concludes among other things that the development of the ego, as was defined by Loevinger (1966, 1970) (who also emphasizes emotional competency in her concept of the development of the ego), is a variable of persona­lity which for a large part determines how people treat each other. When an individual stimulates others in their development and growth, this person transcends tole­rating in­dividual differences to:

"...cherishing individual differences. He has transcended conflict and reconciled the polarities. He has put it all together." (Swensen 1977, p. 46)

Rogers (i.a. 1976, Dutch edition) identifies, final­ly, three basic conditions for a certain kind of relati­onship in which the other will discover in himself the capacity to use this relationship for his own personal development. These basic conditions are: genuineness or authenticity, unconditional acceptance and empathy.

The question which now arises is how this information relates to the model which has been developed here, where allo- and autocentric states and the rever­sals in between them play an important role. To recapitulate: for synergetic effects (1) the contact must be reciprocal and (2) the context of the contact must provide security whereas its content must be exciting. These conditions, and for that matter also the conditions mentioned by the other authors, should either serve the reci­procity of the contact or they should create a basis or context which offers security and safety.

The reciprocity is in our view stimulated when an individual is: real; empathetic; able to express both negative and positive feelings; able to trust and persist in his/her own feelings if they are appropriate in the contact at that moment; able to tolerate other people's means of expression and not only to tolerate, but also to cherish them. Being real and empathical has the important effect that the strokes which are exchanged, are more "effective" (the stroke is more easily recognized and tunes in to the needs of the "receiver"). When strokes are more effective, the result is that a person more often has the feeling that he/she receives attention. And this has a posi­tive influence on the stroke-reserves.

The ability to express both negative and positive feelings results in the individual being able to the other for strokes and it becomes more clear how this individual functions. In addition the strokes will then often be more effective. Being able to persist in your fee­lings when they are valid and approprate to the situation, means that one provides clarity about oneself while at the same time standing up for one's own feelings, so that the other can, in turn react appropriately. Cherishing individual differen­ces has the effect that the difference between the individuals is not considered to be distur­bing but rather as inspiring towards further contact. The above mentioned conditions render the contact generally more exciting and are thus pleasant when both persons are in a paratelic state.

These conditions which the individual needs to fulfill in order to build up reciprocal contact, can also be seen to define the context. The other conditions mentioned in our view also promote the establishment of a safe context. The conditions Postle fur­ther mentions highlight the nuances in a person's behaviour, so that it can better be applied in the right place and can be expe­rienced as less problematic and threatening.

All in all most conditions seem to influence the experienced safety of the context. This is, in view of regarding the energy dependent basis of development, in our view no surprising result. The context of the contact obviously influences the degree to which and the ease with which a person can settle down (see Bowlby's research, 1977, p. 41). This implies that social contacts influence the learning spirals as described in chapter 1.

2.9. Social Contacts and Positive or Negative Learning Spi­rals

The facilitating effect of "good" social relationships on development lies, according to the CEL-model, especially in the security and relaxation the contact offers. When suffi­cient security and safety originate from such a context, the content of the social interaction can be more exciting and envigorating. The security of the context results in a stronger sense of control. Having the sense that one can control the situation well means that (provi­ded that this really is the case) the individual can more often easily relex at the moment he or she is in a telic state. Moreover, the very feeling of having the situation under con­trol is safe and hence diminishes arousal. Being able to settle down more often has the effect that the the individual more often has the opportunity to replenish the energy resources and to process and "digest" the expe­riences. Replenishing the energy supply means that the individual will be in the paratelic state more often and will build up, in an explorative way, an surplus of experience. Such a surplus results "automa­tically" in neces­sity-orientated behavioural strategies (see chapter 1) and hence in a more efficient and economical represen­tation of reality. This means, in turn, that an individual will be better able to organize his social contacts in such a way that they regularly produce security, relaxation, etc.

The reverse may, however, also be true. A social contact can also have a stagnating influence on the individual learning process. What tends to have gone wrong concerns, in principle, the security a contact can offer. This may for in­stance occur when both parties feel that they are not understood by the other (for example, because, the conditions of authenticity and empathy are not fulfilled). Rogers (1976, p. 265) mentions that the greater the extent of communicated incongruity, the more the relationship which emerges will contain the following elements: further communication with the same qualities; less accurate understanding, decreasing psychological "adjustment", and therefore more defensive behaviour and rigidity, worse functioning on both sides; and finally mutual disappointment in the relationship.

Or in terms of the CEL-model: the context of the relationship offers too little security so that the likelihood that a parate­lic state is induced, diminishes. Moreover, the reciprocity of the contact is not initiated. The contact easily results in tension and because the context offers too little security, the person normally is not in a paratelic state and the tension will be experienced as unplea­sant. Being more often tense in a telic state means that one can less often relax when this is needed. And less relaxation often implies that there will be a diminished supply of energy. Less energy results in more frequent telic behaviour, and moreover, the tension of the contact will more often be experienced as unpleasant. Less energy also results in less paratelic states and so less explora­tion will be undertaken in exciting and new situations and attention will be paid to others less often. In this way, no surplus of (social) experience sur­plus will accumulate and the person will continue to use sufficiency-orientated recipes. The person has an inaccurate and ineffi­cient represen­tation of the relevant surroundings and the behavioural reper­toire shows deficiencies accordingly (see also chapter 1).

Such a clear-cut "one-way traffic" in the direction of a good or a bad development will mostly be more ambiguous, as in the meantime other relationships and other situations can also assert their in­fluence. Still, it is good to realize that in a short period of time an individu­al can, in spite of, or better still despite his or her social contacts, end up in a negative learning spiral. This seems to be specifically relevant when a person needs extra time to process a life-event (for in­stance, the loss of the partner).

Rogers mentions in the work quoted above yet another important aspect of relationships, namely that both parties in a relationship start to function less well because of what he calls communicated incongruity. He means that the par­ties in a relationship influence each others psycholo­gical "adaptation".

2.10. "Contagiousness" of Interpersonal Psychological Skills and Adaptati­on

As in the paragraph on the conditions for syner­getic effects, we will first mention a number of examples from the literature and then discuss these from the point of view of the CEL-model. The examples also serve to illustrate the concept of contagiousness of psychologi­cal adaptation, and are not intended as an exhaustive list or as profound analysis.

Hoevenaars and Van Son (1989, p.108) state that with the exception of marriage conflicts, all connections between assumed causal factors (life-events, stress, social support and expressed emotion) and depression can be reduced to epiphenomenal relationships. Why conflicts in marriage-relationships are a prediction of depression is unknown.
Considered from the CEL-model, such a connection between laborious relationships and other problems relating to psychological adaptation is obvious. The marriage partners, whose relationship is not sufficiently reciprocal and offers too little relaxation, disturb each other's optimum motivational sequence (Maarsingh and Van der Molen, 1990) and this easily results in a reduced psychological adap­tation in the broad sense and a chronically reduced sense of well-being (for example in depression).

Another example of contagiousness is the case of a so-called "folie a deux", where psychotic symptoms (usually delusions) are passed on from a psychotic person to a "healthy" person (Freedman et al., 1975). It even happens that several persons are involved in an induced psychosis.

Goduco-Agalar and Wintrob (1964) mention a `folie à famille'. The eldest daughter "infected" the entire fami­ly, with the result that they, all seven together, beat an aunt to death in a state of religious frenzy.

This contagiousness of psychotic symptoms only occurs in exceptional circumstances in which (a) the psychotic person is dominant and (b) the persons interact very closely with each other for a long period of time, relatively isolated from others. Even then the delusions remained within the limits of what is possible and they were based on events from the past or on similar expectations (Lase­que and Falret, 1877, in Freeman et al., 1975). In the case of a folie a deux two separate, but related things happen. The people concerned not only influence each other's psychologi­cal adaptation, but the cognitive contents also turn out to be contagious. This contagiousness of cognitive contents will not be further discussed here.

Both examples originate from the realm of psychiatric aid and serve here to illustrate the concept contagiousness of psycho­logical "adaptations". They are clear because they both had a pronounced effect. Nonetheless, in our view, it is suf­ficient to study one's own relationships in order to recognize the contagiousness of moods and emotions in particular. But also the feeling of loosing energy in certain contacts is for most people a not un­familiar phenomenon. Such phenomena occur according to the CEL-model in particular (we repeat) when the contact is characterized by misunderstanding (strokes are not effec­tive) and tension, while both are in a telic state. For example, when one party constantly tries to demand attention and the other constantly has to give. Especially when both persons are in an autocentric state, they will not be able to relate.

An example which, in our view, clarifies how difficult it is to remain in an allocentric state, while the person one spends time with, is mainly is in an auto­centric state, is the relationship between client and therapist. Especially the "burn-out" phenomenon (Edelwich, 1980) is clarifying. Newman and Newman (1979, p.430) give a description of what such a burn-out can mean:

"In daily work interactions, human service professionals often encounter situations that are emotionally arousing, frustrating, and perhaps personally threatening. In response to these intense experiences some people begin to take a very cynical, derogatory view of the people they are hired to help. (...) They begin to experience physical symptoms, increased use of drugs, marital conflict, and needs for solitude or detachment from all social contacts. (...) In this and other examples of stagnation, the person loses sight of the potential for nurturing, education or guiding others and becomes trapped in the struggle to protect the self."

The fact that especially the psychiatric relief worker is a "victim" of this kind of burn-out can in our view easily be explained by way of the CEL. The therapist, according to the CEL-model, must be able to build up a contact which satisfies the basic conditions which were discussed in the previous chapter. This means that the thera­pist must himself has sufficient energy at his disposal to absorb the emotional arousal and the frustration (Newman and Newman, 1979) in the paratelic state. If this cannot be done, the therapist must regularly have the oppor­tunity to replen­ish his/her energy resources. Otherwise his or her motivational sequence may get more and more upset with all the consequences this entails. Van der Molen (1981) formulates this as follows:

"Getting deeply and emotionally involved in other people's severe psychological problems and emotional disturbances - one of the prerequisites for therapeutic success -, takes an awful lot of emotional energy, warranting quite frequent periods of emotional recovery in order to maintain a proper motivational balance ...."

Especially these necessary periods of rest are frequently curtailed because of the average number of clients a therapist is supposed to see each day.

Interpersonal contagiousness of psychological adapta­tion cannot only be explained from the CEL-model, but is even specifically predicted. Other predictions of the CEL-model con­cern the learning spirals as described in the previous paragraph and the possibility of synergies.

The most obvious next step in our view is to check what can be found in the literature in the field of social contacts and the influences thereof on the learning process. In other words, to check whether the predic­tions which can be sifted from the CEL-model can indeed can be traced in the research literature. To that end the research on social support seems most relevant.

2.11. Social Support: Data from Effectivity Research and what has been missing up till now

What predictions can be derived from the CEL-model in relation to social support? Owing to the influence of social contacts on the learning process in both a facilita­ting, positive direction as well as in a stagnating, negative direction, it may be expected that both outcomes indeed can be found in the results of the research in the field of social support. In order to check this, first and foremost a distinction should be made between the direct effects and the buffer effects of social support (Thoits, 1985; Cohen and Wills, 1985; Marcelissen, 1987; Buunk, 1988). Such a distinction must be made because this is also done in the literature on social support and because such a distinction can also be traced in the research data. Buffering effects occur when the social support reduces the negative psycho­logical effects of unpleasant events and/or chronical difficulties in a person's life, whereas this support does not influence psychological symptoms when there are no stress­ful circumstances (Cassel, 1976; Cobb, 1976; Kaplan et al., 1977; see Turner, 1983, for a survey of the research on buffering effects). Others (for in­stance Thoits, 1982, 1983) maintain that the changes themselves in social support already function as stressors. These changes are called direct effects of support. Finally, there are a number of studies (Dean and Ensel, 1982; Henderson et al., 1980; Husaini et al., 1982) which have found both effects (di­rect - and buffering -).

In our view we can conclude from this cumulation of empirical material that both effects do indeed occur. Direct and buffer effects can mediate psychological consequences of stressful circumstances.

The prediction was, however, that the reverse could also be the case: negative effects of social support should also be found in the results of the effectivity research. Buunk et al. (1988, pp.23-24) observe the following:

"It is further remarkable that regular reports of negative connections between (direct effects of) social support and well-being are reported(...). The results in relation to the possible buffer function of social support with stress at work, are even less convincing than those in relation to the direct effects."

So these predictions of the CEL-model in relation to the ef­fects of social support are also valid. For many a support scheme this is not a very en­couraging result, as an explicit attempt is made in such cases to promote social support in such a way that it facilitates development. The main reason why nega­tive effects of social support are also found is that little is known about the mechanism of supportive processes and therefore it remains unclear what precisely has to be done and when.

As Thoits says:

"We currently lack an understanding of supportive processes."

and

"... we know little about what aspects of support are really supportive, and from whom, through what mechanism, and under what conditions support can be beneficial (or harmful)." (Thoits 1985, p. 52)

And Buunk et al. (1988, p.23) come to the same conclusion, i.e.:

"Little systematic research has been done on psychological mechanisms which can explain the direct and buffer function of social support."

So not only the results of the research on social support seem to support the predictions of the CEL model, but in our view this model can also contribute to the stimula­tion of systematic research on the mechanisms behind social support. The CEL model specifically allows predictions to be made concerning the question when support can be effective and when not.

2.12. Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, an extension was presented of the Cognition-Energy-Learning model. In order to be able to draw up a number of conditions for the evolution of social processes, we first adopted an ethological viewpoint. This enabled us to design a likely monitoring system of social interactive processes. Subsequently those conditions were integrated into a model which implies a bistable or­ganization of social interactions. These two states in fact correspond to the allocentric and the autocentric state, as described by Apter. In the allocentric state the individual is not so much oriented towards personal social gains, but identifies him/herself with the other. The benefits for the other are then the primary determinant for the hedonic tone. In the autocentric state the reverse is true; the benefits of the interaction are experienced and appreciated as pleasant when the person himself is the receiver.

The interplay between social interactions and the dynamic state of the learning process was further elucidated in the light of transactional and somatic emotions.

By including a social exchange unit (strokes) to Apter's explanation of transactional emotions and discussing the implications thereof, a number of processes were clari­fied which until now had not been explained sufficient­ly. Examples of these are synergetic effects, contagiousness of psychological adaptation and the processes behind social support.

Synergies can facilitate the individual learning pro­cess, but this will only take place when the person involved is in a paratelic state. The influen­ce of a social contact on the learning process proceeds, according to the CEL model, mainly via the certainty, security and relaxation which the contact can or cannot provide. In other words, if a contact influences the alternation between paratelic and telic states, the contact will influence the development. This can be an influence which facilitates psychological adaptation, but it also can be an influence which obstructs this adaptation.

From the research literature on social support it is not clear which processes do what. The CEL modelas developed here allows us to make predictions on the question when social support can be active and when absolutely not, and thus contributes to a useful definition of social support.

Contagiousness of psychological adaptation, was also discussed. Here it also holds that this contagiousness occurs because individuals can influence each other's energy state and hence each other's metamoti­vational states.

In view of the conditions which a contact must fulfill in order to facilitate develop­ment, predictions can be made about the relationship be­tween a therapist and a client. According to the CEL model the security which a contact can offer is the most impor­tant predictor of success and this is also an important con­dition for a therapeutic relationship. It was argued that the content of a contact can be more exciting when the context of that contact offers more security. According to the CEL model, this also has consequences for the success rate in psychiatric relief work. If we may assume that talking about intimate problems contributes to pro­cessing and digesting them, a rela­tionship which offers the space (in terms of energy), needed for an exciting content, will contribute to this processing of experience. This happens more or less automatically because the areas of experience which were represented as exci­ting also are the areas which contribute maximally to development once they are provided with necessity-oriented cognitive representations. In terms of Vygotsky (in Parreren and Carpay, 1980) it can be said that the exciting areas are the potential areas of further development. In these areas one can learn most. Is the context not secure and relaxing enough, the CEL model predicts that the client will prefe­r not to broach the relevant areas of experience in the conversation or at least will find it very difficult.

Another aspect of the CEL model as developed so far, is that predictions can be made about for example the attribution of emotional labels to objects, situations and experiences. In view of Czapinksi`s re­search (see chapter 1) it may be expected that the mass of experiences which are not directly interesting, will "end up" in a diffuse, slightly positive cognitive background field. Only the experiences with a pronounced emotional "colour" are pro­cessed well or represented as problematic areas of ex­perience. The advantage of such a representa­tion system is that, as soon as there is a surplus of energy, one can ex­periment in the areas which are known to be problematic areas of experiences. And these are exactly the areas which can provide the most new and relevant information.

Finally we provide a short recapitulation of all implications of the model. In the first place, the CEL model indicates how the learning process depends on a person's energy state. Moreover, this also explains how the lear­ning process is controlled by emotions. Subsequently, from the detailed description of the learning process, predictions can be infered concerning cognitive processes. The way in which the experiences are represented (in COEX systems) as well as the gradual shifts in those representations are described. It is further clarified how a certain cognitive representation, with concomitant behaviour-procedural characteristics (neces­sity- or suf­ficiency-oriented recipes) leads to specific types of behavi­our. The CEL moreover allows detailed predictions about the possibilities of intervening in the development of a person by redirecting the basis of this development, energy management. With this a model was developed which describes how social interactions are regulated once again via emotions. All in all the CEL modelis an attempt to integrate a number of phenomena which generally belong to distinct and more or less incom­patible areas of research. The reported phenomena range from ethological and biolo­gical influences through motivation and learning processes to cognitive representations and social interactions.

The research which has thus far been discussed in relation to the CEL model was collected more or less ad hoc, seeing as little research has as yet especially been set up for testing hypotheses stemming from this model. This is of course not so surprising since the CEL model is still being developed. From the previous chapter it must however be clear that the CEL model more than adequately allows substantial predictions to be made that can be tested empirically.

References

Apter, M.J. & K.C.P. Smith (1976), Negativism in adolescence. The Counsellor, at 23, 24, 25-30

Apter, M.J. & K.C.P. Smith (1979), "Sexual behaviour and the theory of psychological reversals", in Cook, M. & G. Wilson, Love and Attraction, Oxford: Pergamon Press

Apter, M.J. (1982), The experience of motivation. The theory of psychological reversals, Londen: Academic Press

Apter, M.J. & K.C.P. Smith (1983), "Experiencing personal relationships", in Apter, M.J. & D.F.S. Murgatroyd, Reversal Theory: applications and development, Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, at 161-178

Apter, M.J. & K.C.P. Smith (1985), "Experiencing personal relationships", in Apter, M.J. & D.F.S. Murgatroyd, Reversal Theory: applications and development, Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, at 161-178

Apter, M.J. (1988), "Reversal theory as a theory of the emotions", in Apter, M.J.; J.M. Kerr & M.P. Cowles, Progress in Reversal Theory, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, at 43-62

Ban, T.A. (1964), Conditioning and psychiatry, London: Allen and Unwin

Barash, D.P. (1986), The hare and the tortoise: culture, biology, and human nature, New York: Penguin Inc.

Batson, C.D. (1987), Prosocial motivation: is it ever truly altruistic?, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (no. 20): 65-117

Batson, C.D.; J.C. Dyck & J. Randall Brandt et al. (1988), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (no. 55 (1)): 52-77

Berne, E. (1976), Beyond games and scripts, selections of this major writings, New York: Ballantine Books

Bertness, M.D. (1881), Pattern and plasticity in tropical hermit crab growth and reproduction, American Naturalist (no. 117): 754-773

Bowlby, J. (1977), "The making and breaking of affectional bonds", British Journal of Psychiatry (no. 130): 201-210, 421-431

Boyd, R. & P.J. Richerson (1985), Culture and the evolutionary process, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Buck, R. (1985), Prime theory: an integrated view of motivation and emotion, Psychological Review (no. 92): 389-413

Butler, R.A. (1953), Discrimination learning in rhesus monkeys to visual exploration motivation, Behavior Research and Therapy (no. 3): 245-250

Butler, R.A. (1954), Incentive conditions which influence visual exploration, Journal of Experimental Psychology (no. 48): 19-23

Butler, R.A. (1957), The effect of deprivation of visual incentives on visual exploration motivation in monkeys, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology (no. 50): 177-179

Buunk, B.; N. van Yperen & P. Janssen (1988), Een nieuwe blik op angst en affiliatie: sociale ondersteuning en stress in organisaties

Campbell, D. (1972), On the genetics of altruism and the counterhedonic in human culture, Journal of Social Issues (no. 28): 21-37

Cannon, W.B. (1932), Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage, New York: Appleton

Cassel, J. (1976), The contribution of the social environment to host resistance, American Journal of Epidemiology (no. 104): 107-122

Cobb, S. (1976), Social support as a moderator of life stress, Psochosomatic Medicine (no. 38): 300-314

Cohen, S. & T.A. Wills (1985), Stress, social support and the buffering hypothesis, Psychological Bulletin (no. 98 (2)): 310-357

Czapinsky, J. (1985), Positive and negative asymmetry at group and individual level: further evidence and a new interpretation, Polish Psychological Bulletin (no. 13 (2)): 153-158

Czapinsky, J. (1985), Negative bias in psychology: an analysis of Polish publications, Studia Psuchologiczne (no. 22 (2)): 25-53

Czapinsky, J. (1986), Interpersonal communication, informativeness of evaluations in interpersonal communication: effects of valence, extremity of evaluations and ego-involvement of evaluator, Polish Psychological Bulletin (no. 7 (3-4)): 155-164

Czapinsky, J. (1987), "Informational aspects of positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations", Paper delivered in the Small Group Meeting on Social Cognition

Daly, M. & M. Wilson (1983), Sex, evolution and behavior (2nd ed.), Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company

Dawkins, R. (1976), The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Dawkins, R. (1986), The Blind Watchmaker, London: Penguin Group

Dean, A. & W.M. Ensel (1982), Modelling social support, life events, competence, and depression in the context of age and sex, Journal of Community Psychology (no. 10): 392-408

Edelwich, J. (1980), Burn-out: Stages of disillusionment in the helping professions, New York: Human Scientific Press

Egan, G. (1982), The skilled helper, Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company

Freedman, A.M.; H.I. Kaplan & B.J. Sadock (1975), Comprehensive textbook of psychiatry/4, Baltimore: Williams and Williams

Goduco-Agular, C. & R. Wintrob (1964), Folie à famille in the philippines, Psychiatric Quarterly (no. 38): 278

Gorp, J. van (1984), "Quantity and quality of strokes", in Stein, E., TA, The state of the art, a European contribution, Dordrecht: Foris Publications, at 77-89

Grof, S. (1972), "Varieties of transpersonal experiences: observations from L.S.D. psychotherapy", Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (no. 4): 45-80

Grof, S. (1973), "Theoretical and empirical basis of transpersonal psychology and psychotherapy: observations from L.S.D. research", Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (no. 1)

Grof, S. (1976), Realms of the Human Unconscious. Observations from L.S.D. Research, New York: Dutton

Hamilton, W.D. (1964), The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I & II, Journal of Theoretical Biology (no. 7): 1-52

Henderson, S.; D.G. Byrne & P. Duncan-Jones et al. (1980), Social relationships, adversity, and neurosis: A study of associations in a general population sample, Journal of Psychiatry (no. 136): 574-583

Hoevenaars, J. & M.J.M. van Son (1989), "Gedragstheorieën over depressiviteit", Directieve therapie, at 108-126

Husaini, B.A.; J.R. Newbrought & J.A. Neff et al. (1982), The stress-buffering role of social support and personal competence among the rural married, Journal of Community Psychology (no. 10): 409-426

Jung, C.G. (1954), "The aims of psychotherapy. In "The practice of psychotherapy"", Collected Works, vol. 16, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Kaplan, B.H.; J.C. Cassel & S. Core (1977), Social support and health, Medical Care (no. 15 (Supplement)): 47-58

Kohlberg, l. (1969), "Stage and sequence: the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization", in Gostlin, D.A., Handbook of socialization theory and research, Chigaco: Rand Mc.Nally

Krebs, K.r.; J.C. Ryan & E.l. Charkov (1974), Hunting by expectation or optimal foraging?, Animal Behaviour (no. 22): 953-964

Lack, D. (1966), Population studies of birds, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Lakke, J.P.W.F. (1985), Inleiding in de neurologie, Lochem: De Tijdstroom

Lasèque, C. & J. Falret (1877), Folie à deux folie à communiquée, Annual Med. Psychol. (no. 18): 321

Lewicka, M. (1985), Positive- negative evaluative asymmetry and human cognitive biases (paper), Helsinki

Lewicka, M. (1986), Action involvement and action control

Lewicka, M. (1987), "On objective and subjective anchoring of cognitive acts", in Baker, W.J.; L.P. Mos & H.V. Rappard et al., Recent trends in Theoratical Psychology, New York

Lewin, K. (1951), Cartwright, D., ed., Field theory in social science: selected theoretical papers, New York: Harper & Row

Marcelissen, F.H.G. (1987), Gangmakers in the stressproces, Leiden: NIPG/TNO

Mazák, V. (1980), Prehistoric man: The dawn of our species, Prague: Artia (for the Hamlyn Publishing Group Limited)

Molen, van der, P.P. (1977), Anxiety, joy and the dynamics of personal growth: on the process of learning in the play and struggle called life, Rijks Universiteit Groningen, HB-77-324-EX

Molen, van der, P.P. (1983), "The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning", in Wind, J.; V. Reynolds & R. Corlay, Essays in human social biology, vol. 2, Brussels: V.U.B. Study Series, at 189-211

Molen, P.P. van der (1984), "Bi-stability of emotions and motivations: An evolutionary consequence of the open-ended capacity for learning", Acta Biotheoretica (no. 33): 227-251

Molen, P.P. van der (1985), "Learning, self-actualization and psychotherapy", in Apter, M.J.; D. Fontana & S. Murgatroyd, Reversal Theory: Applications and Developments, Cardiff, U.K.: University College Cardiff Press, at 103-116

Montgomery, K.C. (1953), Exploration behavior as a function of 'similarity' of stimulus situations, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology (no. 46): 129-133

Murgatroyd, S.J. (1981), A new perspective on srises counselling, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling (no. 9, (2)): 180-193

Myers, A.K. & N.E. Miller (1954), Failure to find a learned drive based on hunger; evidence for learning motivated by 'exploration', Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology (no. 47): 428-436

Newman, B.M. & P.R. Newman (1979), Development through life: A psychological approach, Homewood: Dorsey Press

Parreren, C.F. & J.A.M. Carpay (1980), Leerpsychologie en onderwijs 4: Sovjetpsychologen over onderwijs en cognitieve ontwikkeling, Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff

Piliavin, J.A. & I.M. Piliavin (1973), The good samaritan: Why does he help?, University of Winconsin-Madison: Unpublished manuscript

Piliavin, J.A.; J.F. Dovidio & S.L. Gaertner et al. (1981), Emergency intervention, New York: Academic Press

Postle, D. (1989), Synergy: creativity in interpersonal relations, mapping the terrain of cooperation, The Wentworth Institute

Rogers, C.R. (1976), Mens worden, de visie van een psychotherapeut op persoonlijke groei, Utrecht: Bijleveld

Shapiro, H.L. (1981), Man, culture, and society, London; New York: Oxford University Press

Swensen, L.H. (1977), "Ego development and the interpersonal relationships", in Nevill, D.D., Humanistic psychology, new frontiers, New York: Gardner Press

Thoits, P.A. (1983), Life stress, social support, and psychological vulnerability: Epidemiological considerations, Journal of Community Psychology (no. 10): 341-362

Thoits, P.A. (1985), "Social support and psychological well-being: theoretical possibilities", in Sarason, I.G. & B.R. Sarason, Social Support: Theory, Research and Applications, Dordrecht: Martnus Nijhoff Publishers

Tinbergen, N. (1963), On aims and methods of ethology, Zeitschrift für Tierpscyhologie (no. 20): 410-433

Tinbergen, N. (1968), On war and peace in animals and man, Science (no. 160): 1411-1418

Trivers, R.L. (1971), The evolution of reciprocal altruism, Quarterly Review of Biology (no. 46): 35-37

Turner, R.J. (1983), "Direct, indirect, and moderating effects of social support upon psychological distress and associated conditions", in Kaplan, H.B., Psychological stress: trends in theory and research, New York: Academic Press

Wever, D. (1989), Biopsychologische aspecten van gemotiveerd gedrag, Rijks Universiteit Groningen: Ongepubliceerd

White, R.W. (1959), Motivation considered: The concept of competence, Psychological Review (no. 66): 297-333

Williams, G.C. (1966), Adaptation and natural selection, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

Wynne-Edwards, V.C. (1962), Animal dispersion in relation to social behaviour, Edinsburgh: Oliver and Boyd

Research Reports and Prepublications on this subject

Dennen, v.d., J.M.G. & P.P. Molen, v.d. (1981), Violent Aggression as a Social Unskill: Notes on the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Polemological Institute, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)

Molen, v.d., P.P. & J.M.G. Dennen, v.d. (1981), Striving, Playing and Learning: An Ethologists View on Aggression and the Dynamics of Learning in the Play and Struggle called "Life", Heymansbulletin, Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.), HB-81-551-EX

Maarsingh, B. & P.P. Molen, v.d. (1990), Energie en Strokes: de Wisselwerking tussen de kwaliteit van sociale relaties en de individuele ontwikkeling, Heymansbulletin, Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.), HB-90-1004-EX

Molen, v.d., P.P.; C. Dijk, v. & B. Maarsingh et al. (1990), Naar een Cognetief-Energetisch Leermodel; over de bi-stabiele organisatie van emoties en het effect daarvan op de ontwikkeling van copingvaardigheden en cognitie; een integratie van de theorieën van Lazarus, Apter, Van der Molen en Lewicka, Heymansbulletin, Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.), HB-90-1012-EX