Difference between revisions of "The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning"

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Abstract - One of the highest evolutionary achievements is the open-ended capacity for learning. This is the ability to acquire a behavioral repertoire which is specifically tailored to the environmental situation(s) an individual happens to live in. This capacity is best exploited if the individual's behavioral organization causes any surplus of energy to be invested in expanding and refining the repertoire, and adapting it to prevailing circumstances. Adaptations of the repertoire are most likely to have survival value if applicable to emergencies and other situations causing high arousal. Experience and skills are therefore maximizing fitness if acquired, and subsequently used, in arousal-evoking, and often risk involving, situations.

Entering high-arousal situation, either voluntarily or involuntarily, however, may be harmful to the individual if the resulting state of high stress lasts too long to allow proper (neuro-)physiological functioning, or if too much risk is involved. An open-ended learning capacity is therefore maximally adding to survival if paired to two distinct tendencies:

1. a tendency to seek high-arousal evoking situations whenever surplus energy is available; and
2. a tendency to seek arousal reducing situations as soon as an emergency occurs or as soon as the surplus energy is exhausted.

This suggests that a bi-stable "telic/paratelic" system of preferred levels of arousal, as described in Apter & Smith's theory of motivational reversals (Apter, 1982), can be considered an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (E.S.S.), as compared to homeostatic systems of arousal and motivation.

Introduction

One of the most recent evolutionary achievements is an open-ended capacity for learning. This is the ability to acquire a behavioral repertoire which is specifically tailored to the environmental situation(s) an individual happens to live in. It will be argued here that this ability is highly enhanced by a bi-stable organization of motivation as described by Apter & Smith in their "reversal theory"(see Smith & Apter, 1975; Apter, 1976, 1982; Apter & Smith, 1976abc, 1977, 1979; and Apter et al., 1985).

In fact, it will be shown that the predisposition for such a bi-modal antagonist system of emotional and motivational reversals constitutes the basis of behavioral flexibility Pelt (this volume) is referring to. The present paper therefore deals with the dynamic structure of the biological substrate of what may be called "memes" (Dawkins, 1976) or "culturgens" (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). It deals, so to speak, with the interface between "genes" and "memes", between the "hardware""and the "software", as has occurred in man. Here we will deal with the motivational mechanisms taking care of the acquirement and the selection of "software" at the individual level.

Reversal theory

Let us first have a look at what this "reversal theory" is all about. Apter (1982) introduced his reasons for proposing a model of motivational bi-stability as follows and as schematically pictured in Fig. 1.

Let us start by reflecting on a number of different situations in which different levels of arousal, high and low, can be experienced, and see if any pattern or structure can be discerned.

First of all reflect, if you will, on what it is like to be in a dentist's waiting room, about to have a filling. Focus on particular on the kind of arousal which you feel. Now imagine that you are soaking in a hot bath after a hard day's work, and again try to conjure up what the arousal which you experience in this situation feels like. Next, make believe that you are waiting for a bus which is taking a long time to come; you are not in a hurry so that there is no pressure of time, but you have nothing to read or take your attention. Finally, imagine yourself to be in a cinema watching a thriller film and the film has a particularly tense point. I thing you will agree that the arousal feels different in some important sense in each of these cases.

For one thing, of course, the amount of arousal which you feel will be different. If you are like most people, the level of arousal which you experience is likely to be high to some degree or another in two of the cases (waiting for the dentist and watching the film), whereas in the other two cases (waiting for bus and in the bath) it is likely to be rather low.

A second obvious way in which the arousal-experience will be found to differ is in terms of its pleasantness or unpleasantness. Again, two of the situations listed are likely to be found to involve unpleasant arousal (waiting for the bus and waiting for the dentist). Pleasentness and unpleasantness are not, therefore, simple reflections of the amount of arousal.

In terms of just these four examples, high arousal can be pleasant or unpleasant, and so can low arousal. In fact, there would appear to be at least four types of arousal experience. This is corroborated by the fact that there are four widely-used arousal words in everyday language which relate exactly to these four types: anxiety (unpleasant high arousal), excitement (pleasant high arousal), boredom (unpleasant low arousal) and relaxation (pleasant low arousal).

Insert diagram here

Fig. 1. The very existance of colloquial labels for our emotions like relaxation, boredom, excitement and anxiety illustrates emotional/motivational bi-modality.

Apter & Smith (1979) have generalized these and similar findings into a simple but comprehensive theory. One of the fundamental postulates of their theory is

[...] that certain psychological processes, especially certain motivational and emotional processes, exhibit bistability rather than homeostasis (i.e. unistability). Switching from one stable state to the other in a bistable system can be referred to as a "reversal" (hence the name of the theory) and may be brought about by a number of different factors.

Insert Fig. 2. here

Figure 2. At certain times the individual seeks high arousal which is then felt as pleasant when achieved ("excitement"); at other times he reverses to a state in which he seeks low arousal, at which time high arousal is felt as unpleasant ("anxiety"). In the former case low arousal is felt as unpleasant ("boredom") and in the latter case low arousal is felt as pleasant ("relaxation"). (After Apter & Smith, 1979).

Insert Fig. 3. here'

Figure 3. Each hypothetical curve represents the relationship between arousal and affective for one of the two stable states. These two states are labels "telic" (goal-directed; from the Greek word "telos" = "goal, end, close") and "paratelic" (behaviour-directed) repectively. (After Apter & Smith, 1979, with permission).

Apter & Smith (1979) explain that the point of presenting this figure is to illustrate that the relationship between arousal and anxiety may not be linear but bi-variate: high levels of arousal may provoke anxiety in the telic state but may be regarded as both exciting and pleasurable in the paratelic. Thus this figure implies that, when the homeostatic nature of certain psychological processes is rejected in favor of bi-stable models of such processes, human action may be seen to be far more complex. Evidence of these relationships can be found in Apter (1976, 1982) and in Apter et al. (1985).

It should be emphasized that the telic and paratelic states are self-perception-determined. That is, a person can be said to be in one or other of these states only as a result of the way in which he sees his own actions; it is not the actions themselves which identify the operative state an individual is experiencing.

To illustrate this point, consider an individual driving a car at 130 mph. This action may be regarded by the individual performing it as telic if he is driving at this speed in order not to miss an important appointment very relevant to an essential business transaction. Alternatively, the individual may perceive his action as paratelic if he performs it because driving at high speed is thrilling and exciting. This point---that these states are self-perception-determined and may be examined only by reference to the individual's perception of his own action---is crucial to an understanding of the theory of reversals.

This and other features of the theory involve a development and systematization of the notion (Schachter & Singer, 1962) that particular emotions derive from the conjunction of a particular arousal level with a particular cognitive interpretation.

Difference with homeostatic theories

The view of Apter & Smith on the relationship between felt arousal and affective tone contrasts sharply with Freudian theory, with 'drive-reduction' theory, and with optimal arousal theory, which are all homeostatic theories. The basis of Freud's earlier theory of motivation is the constancy or 'stability' principle, which he took over from Fechner (1873) and restated in the following terms: "The mental apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant" (Freud, 1920; 1961 edition, p. 9). This principle dates back to the beginning of Freud's psychological work, and as early as 1888 he was writing of a "stable amount of excitation" (Freud, 1888). Apter (1982, p. 129) suggests that it forms the basis for Freud's pleasure principle, the idea being that 'unpleasure' is avoided if excitation (or 'tension') is kept constant or reduced to a minimum.

In a similar way, reversal theory differs from, and is an essential addition to, other homeostatic theories of motivation; e.g., Lorenz'(1950) hydrolic models of (aggressible) behavior; Hull's (1943) learning theory which assumes that all reinforcement, and therefore all learning, depends ultimately on the reduction of primary homeostatic drives; Zuckerman's theory (1974, pp. 82, 136) on "sensation-seeking"; and Festinger's (1957) theory of "cognitive dissonance".

From the perspective of reversal theory, then, most theories of motivation up to the present time have been at best little more than half theories: they have in the main dealt in their different ways with motivation in relation to the telic system, but not to the paratelic. (Apter, 1982, p. 133).

The alternating antagonistic telic and paratelic tendencies may be expressed at various levels and areas of functioning (see Table 1).

On explorative behavior and the familiarity/novelty opposition Smith & Apter (1975, pp. 10, 11) write:

In the telic system, familiarity is the dominant member of the pair and novelty is the dominant member in the paratelic system. That is to say, in the telic system the organism searches for security and safety in order to reduce arousal; in the paratelic system it searches for novelty and surprise in order to increase arousal. However, calling exploration a drive as is now done widely, following the work of Butler, 1953, Berlyns, 1960, and others, implies that to discover new things is arousal reducing. Our claim is the contrary: namely that such discovery increases arousal and, in the paratelic state, this is in fact pleasurable. This idea therefore constitutes an attack on the assumption that all behaviour is governed by principles of drive-reduction.

Whereas this "reversal theory" cannot be denied intrinsic elegance, it is not exceptionally attractive in terms of parsimony and simplicity, compared to models of drive-reduction, of homeostatis, and of optimum-arousal theory. As may be clear from the foregoing, Apter & Smith defended the introduction of their theory quite straightforwardly on the grounds of fitting better to the data.

Below I will present another argument in favor of adopting reversal theory, an argument in terms of evolutionary stability of behavioral strategies. The evolutionary stability of the reversal system is linked directly to the existence of an open-ended learning capacity. But in order to see how a "reversal system of antagonistic motivational modes of behavior" ties in with open-ended learning, and how it can be stable evolutionarily, we will first have to take a closer look at the organizational requirements and implications of the capacity for open-ended learning itself.

Requirements of open-ended learning

If an open-ended learning capacity is present, it is of course best exploited if also a behavioral program is included which causes any surplus energy to be invested in expanding and refining the behavioral repertoire and in adaptations to prevailing circumstances. Surplus energy is to be understood here as the basis of physical and psychological preparedness for activity, i.e., after the various immediate goals, related to physiological and social needs have been fulfilled. There are, of course, differences between the various levels of energy, e.g., between the physical and the psychological level, but it is not necessary to differentiate here. Surplus energy on any one level may facilitate paratelic activity on the level in question. Even when being dead-tired physically, one may very well derive pleasure from arousal on a purely mental level, and the other way around.

Furthermore, it matters what sort of experience and skills are gathered, and in what sort of situation. Most crucial to the individual are those experiences and skills that are applicable to emergencies and to other situations of vital importance. Skills are especially needed when much is at stake and when high risks are involved. Situations of vital importance in which much is at stake, are likely to be highly arousal inducing; and conversely, experiences and skills, learned in highly arousal inducing situations, are more likely to be applicable or transferable to emergencies and other vital situations than are experiences gathered in low-arousal situations. Whenever surplus-energy is available to be invested in the learning process, it seems therefore most advantageous if this energy is invested in high arousal inducing situations.

On the other hand, high arousal inducing situations often imply relatively high risks and a relatively high probability of emergencies turning up. If one seeks excitement, one might get more arousal than one would appreciate; and this is felt then as anxiety. What, after all, is exciting (arousal inducing)? Exploration, the unfamiliar, experimentation with situations and social roles, play, spontaneity, etc. are; and such behavioral tendencies are likely to lead sooner or later to unforeseen problems or to outright emergencies. Emergencies and other problem situations evoke high arousal and other behavioral adaptations useful for immediate and short-lasting top-performance. But such adaptations for emergency peak performance are harmful to the individual if they last too long. A neuro-physiologically strong activation of the sympathetic system has to give way after some time to the activation of the parasympathetic system; if not, lasting damage to the individual's organs will occur and physiological balance will not be restored.

It is therefore essential for an individual to stop seeking arousal (excitement) as soon as exploration, play, spontaneous experimentation, or any other excitement-seeking behavior has run out of hand and an emergency had arisen (anxiety), or as soon as his surplus-energy has been exhausted (fatigue).

In summary, the survival value of an open-ended learning capacity is maximized, if paired to two tendencies:

1. The tendency to seek high-arousal-evoking situation whenever surplus-energy is available; and
2. the antagonistic tendency to seek arousal-reducing situations as soon as an emergency occurs, or as soon as the surplus-energy has been exhausted.

Such elaborations may seem a bit superfluous and self-evident, but combination of these two requirements in fact implies a departure from optimum-arousal theory, and from principles of drive-reduction.

In fact, these requirements are met perfectly by a bi-modal organization of motivation as described by Apter and Smith's hypothesis. It is therefore concluded that, given the possibility of a telic/paratelic system of antagonistic motivational states, an open-ended learning capacity without such a system can never be an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (E.S.S.) (van der Molen, 1984, 1985).

Function of the motivational states in the process of learning

Having concluded that a reversal system of telic and paratelic antagonistic motivational states is a behavioral adaptation to maximize the effect of an open-ended learning capacity, we still need to find out how the learning process works as seen in the light of that reversal system.

One commonly occurring sequence of changes between different types of experienced arousal is depicted in Figure 4b (see Apter, 1982, p. 100). It is important to note that a reversal from relaxation 1 to boredom 2 (as indicated in Fig. 4b) is not just dependent on a quick and sufficient decrease of the arousal level, but that some time is required during which the state of relaxation must last and grow deep enough for the telic state to become satiated. In other words, after anxiety has been overcome successfully by effective attempts to reduce the level of arousal, the individual needs some time to restore mental and physical equilibrium to the extent as is necessary for the paratelic state to emerge again. In fact, as was explained in Section 4 [ADD LINK], the shift to the paratelic state can be assumed to depend on the availability of surplus-energy which can be invested in gathering experience and information.

Learning-drive mechanisms

Positive and negative learning spirals

Positive and negative clusters of COndensed EXperience

An illustration: the Neurotic Paradox explained

One-sidedness of psychological theories

Behavioral idiosyncrasies and the dimension of "self-actualization"

Acknowledgement

References