Point Omega Research - User contributions [en]

Omega Research:Sandbox

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== Test ==

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Main Page

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'''Warning: we advise to read the [[Omega Research:General disclaimer|''disclaimer'']] of this Wiki first'''
 
'''Welcome to the: <center><big style="font-size: 300%; line-spacing: .5em;">Point Omega Research Wiki</big> '''

<big style="font-size: 200%; line-spacing: .5em;">
(for understanding who we are, 
beyond superstition, answers to the "eternal" questions, 
with courage, integrity and intelligence)
</big>
</center>

For an overview of this Wiki go to''':''' [[Omega Research:Map|Wiki map / Reading scheme / Overview / Contents]]

==About this wiki==

* [[Omega Research:About#Disclaimer|Disclaimer]]
* [[Omega Research:About#Goal of this site|Goal of this site]]
* [[Omega Research:About#Definitions of "Point Omega"|Definitions of "Point Omega"]]
* [[Omega Research:About#What this site is about and what it is not|What this site is about and what it is not]]

==Featured articles ==

* [[Point Omega (summary)]]
* [[Curiosity replacing fear, rather than science replacing belief systems]]
* [[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki|A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki (40 pages)]]
* [[To_finally_put_an_end_to_war,_genocide,_wholesale_rape_and_the_destruction_of_the_living_world|Goal of this Wiki: To finally put an end to war, genocide, wholesale rape and the destruction of the living world]]
* [[The_end_of_the_second_intermediary_phase_before_any_evolving_intelligence,_whenever_and_wherever_in_the_universe,_reaches_maturity_and_full_deployment.|Point Omega: extended definition]]
* [[Curiosity_replacing_fear,_rather_than_science_replacing_belief_systems|The Crux: Curiosity replacing Fear, rather than Science replacing Belief systems]]
* [[Why a Point Omega transition ?]]
* [[Directives for after Point Omega]]
* [[Learning from aversive experiences; the effect of timing]]
* [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning]]
* [[Striving, Playing and Learning]]
* [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (1)|Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (C.E.L.) (1)]]
* [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (C.E.L.)]] (2)
* [[Energy and Strokes|Energy and Strokes: how the quality of relationships influences the process of learning and individual development]]
* [[Behaviorism versus Humanism, an Integration; Application of the Cognition Energy Learning Model (CEL) on an old controversy]] (under construction)
* [[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]
* [[Selection pressure for high as well as for low levels of intelligence in modern Homo sapiens]] (under construction)
* [[ Eating from the Forbidden Fruit|Eating from the Forbidden Fruit: on the power of Good and Evil]]
* [[Good and Bad, an illusory dimension as the cornerstone of human personality]] (under construction)
* [[Impersonal Power Structures ruling our world]] (under construction)
* [[The biological instability of social equilibria (abstract)]]
* [[The biological instability of social equilibria]] (main article)
* [[K.A.I. and Changes in Social Structures: on the Anatomy of Catastrophy]]
* [[The effects of genetic pollution on political structures and human history]]
* [[Genetic pollution precluding social stability]] (under construction)
* [[Personality differences in House mice]] (to be added)
* [[Personality of Mice and Men; re-arranging personality dimensions in a six-dimensional adjective space]]
* [[Personality Traits in terms of Social-Role Probabilities; an innovative theoretical essay on the possibility of overcoming the chaotic diversity in personality theories]]
* [[Escaping from Chaos: Temperamental Personality Traits in terms of Social-Role Probabilities]] (to be added)
* [[Why never peace ?]] (to be added)
* [[The significance of the Point Omega transition]] (under construction)
* [[Characteristics of human behaviour before and after Point Omega]] (to be added)
* [[Enlightenment]] (under construction)
* [[What it means to be human]] (concept, schedule)
* [[First Aid pages]]

== The [[Omega Research Foundation]] ==

This wiki is brought to you by the [[Omega Research Foundation]].
You might also be interested in our [http://blog.omega-research.org/ Weblog].

* [[Omega Research Foundation|Goals of foundation]]
* [[Omega Research:Site support|How to contribute]]

== Further reading, movie pictures, websites ==

* [[Omega Research:Videos and websites on related subjects]]

* Comments on Richard Dawkins' "[[The God Delusion]]"
* Comments on John Gray's "[[Straw Dogs, Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals]]"
* Comments on John Gray's "[[Black Mass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia]]"
* Comments on Daniel Quinn's "[[Beyond Civilization, humanity's next great adventure]]"
* Comments on Ruiz
* Comments on Eckhart Tolle's "[[A New Earth|A New Earth, Awakening to your life's purpose]]"
* Comments on Kris Verburgh's "[[Fantastisch, over het universum in ons hoofd]]"
* Comments on Amy Wallace's "[[Sorcerer's Apprentice, my life with Carlos Castaneda]]"
* List of Cognitive Biases in Humans [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (from Wikipedia)]

* [[Further reading|List of literature and references]]
__NOTOC__

Talk:Omega Research:Videos and websites on related subjects

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== Lost content ==

The Wayback Machine has the version of this page as of March 10 2016, from before the rename that triggered the MediaWiki bug due to which all the page content + history got lost:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160310032904/wiki.omega-research.org/Movie_pictures_and_websites_on_related_subjects
--[[User:BigSmoke|BigSmoke]] ([[User talk:BigSmoke|talk]]) 18:57, 11 October 2017 (UTC)

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User:BigSmoke

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BigSmoke:

BigSmoke is an alias for [[Rowan Rodrik van der Molen]]. That is a son of [[Popko Peter van der Molen]], the person who did the actual ''Omega Research''. I created this wiki (and the [http://blog.omega-research.org/ blog]) as a platform for my dad to persue his dream. That does not mean that I support or share particular philosophies or ideas featured here.

I have some other web projects too:

* [http://www.payformystay.com/ payformystay.com]
* [http://15monkeys.com/ 15 Monkeys]
* [http://www.worldwide-wilderness.com/ Worldwide Wilderness]
* [http://wiki.hardwood-investments.net/Main_Page Hardwood Investments wiki]

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First Aid page

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BigSmoke: BigSmoke moved page First Aid pages to First Aid page: User:BabyBoy couldn't figure out how to move this page, so I'll do it for him.

This page is meant to be of help for readers who find themselves in emotional turmoil through contents of this Wiki. Below, we will present a number of advises for different situations of distress, cognitive dissonance, depression or even suicidal tendencies.

== Feeling a failure ==
One of the more frequently occurring problems that readers of this Wiki may encounter is being overwhelmed by feelings of failure and fear. Some articles on this Wiki do lead to inescapable conclusions about personal shortcomings in our functioning, that is, for us humans in general.

On the one hand these personal shortcomings are occurring in Homo sapiens so frequently, that they can be considered as a current characteristic of our species.

On the other hand the personally emerging awareness of such shortcomings may come as an unpleasant surprise, demolishing many illusions of personal adequacy and personal well-functioning and well-being. If that happens to a reader, the fact that such a personal state is not really different from the average state of all other specimens of Homo sapiens, is often of not much help. The personal feelings of disappointment and failure then tend to rule and to determine the day. The result is feelings of helplessness, sadness, stress and fear, ranging from just a bad mood to even suicidal tendencies.

Experience has shown us that these possible effects on readers are not exaggerated. People often tend to take the described irrational biases in human behaviour as personal and since these biases are explained to have disastrous and deleterious effects on human life, many readers, recognizing that they too suffer from those biases, tend to take these biases with their negative effects on human society as personal failures. In such cases it does not help those readers that these biases are regular, species specific characteristics of human behaviour and that it is therefore unreasonable to be personally blamed for such characteristics. In spite of that fact they take it personally and may thus be overwhelmed by feelings of "being not good enough", of being a "failure".

If this happens, we can give some help with a number of considerations that the suffering reader could then try to become aware of. These are:

1) '''Emotional states are by definition (relatively) short lasting'''.

That is how mother nature has structured our emotional system and at that the emotional system of all animals.
Emotions are designed to make us move and for that very reason they are also designed to last for short periods only.
The advice should therefore be to "sit it out" and to not attach too much value to any emotion in question and in particular not attach too much "permanent value" to it.
Because emotions are designed to make the individual move, any awareness of its "temporary" character tends to be suppressed. That perceived permanent quality makes the emotions more "real" and thus more effective, but such sense of absoluteness or permanency in reality is just a perceptual fallacy.

Awareness of this factual "real" state of affairs may be of help.
Patience can in principle be sufficient to overcome bad feelings. That's how we are structured and that is how it is supposed to be. The problem here is that we are designed specifically to ''nót'' understand this state of affairs. "''Not understanding''" is an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy). "''Understanding''" is nót an ESS.

2) '''It is a fallacy to think that the reader's suffering is unique'''.

The articles on this Wiki underline that the condition of Homo sapiens during the last 5,000 to 10,000 years has primarily been a condition of fear, neuroticism and slavery, more so than it used to be in earlier times and more so than our genetic endowment would permit under better circumstances.
In short, the depressed reader is not the only one suffering this way. Many fellow victims may be found nearby.
Besides, humanity has known better times in this respect. And ........... such better times may return.

3) '''Being in existence is sufficient proof of being worth the trouble'''.

From a purely evolutionary perspective, the reader's very existence is proof of being of value. He/she is the result of long processes of natural selection. Mother nature apparently found this result good enough to bring it forth. That is not a small feat.

The reader may counter that nevertheless feelings of failure and shortcomings prevail and that one feels that this must be the "end of the line", feeling to be justifiably "weeded out" as a failure.
But that holds for all living beings that happen to be around. They all are involved in a struggle for survival. Therefore, feelings of falling short emerge regularly with all of us. They only may differ in the relative frequencies of such feelings to emerge and in the persistence of such feelings.

From the pages of this Wiki the conclusion can be drawn that we are, like all other living beings, subject to processes of natural selection. Being weeded out or failing to reproduce are therefore possible outcomes of our personal life. Statistically, such failure is even the most likely outcome of anybody's life.

However, it is argued [[Why_a_Point_Omega_transition_%3F#What_next_.3F|on this Wiki(*)]] that after the expected Point Omega shift, mankind will find itself in completely different circumstances. In those circumstances one of the primary rules will be that the whole of mankind will be held responsible for the life of every human being on earth and that this responsibility will be accepted.
Once this novel state of affairs will have spread, every human being can rely on being accepted as a fellow human being, deserving support and assistance from the beginning to the end.
Basically this is a logical and unavoidable consequence of [[Directives_for_after_Point_Omega#Procreating_consciously|"Conscious Evolution"(*)]] which will be one of the characteristics of after Point Omega.
Then, the customary evolutionary processes of competition and painful selection will be replaced by conscious strategies, taking the pain and misery stings out of the process for us humans.
So, anticipating on that novel state of affairs that is coming, we had better already accept the notion that each one of us is sufficiently worth the trouble.
It goes without saying that such a general attitude will make a tremendous difference for the well being, not only of the distressed reader, but of the whole of mankind.

== Perspective for better times ==
The [[Why_a_Point_Omega_transition_%3F|main conclusion of this Wiki (**)]] is that our personal and social behavioural systems are organized in such a way that we are at the brink of a completely novel way of functioning, personally as well as socially. We have labeled that transition as Point Omega.
If we interpret the current changes well, that transition is to be expected very soon. In fact it seems to have started already and gaining speed.

For our emotional states this implies that we may expect better times to come. This may help to exercise some patience if the going is rough.

Also, this knowledge may help to be aware that many a painful circumstance in the present day structures is not to last but is likely to be replaced by something more agreeable to us all, and that this may happen within the near future.
From this awareness one may derive confidence in one's own preferences as compared to what the power structures usually demanded and still demand from us. And that confidence may help us to not be as emotionally disturbed by the power structure's onslaughts as is generally (supposed to be) the case.

== Tricks and props to improve the quality of our feelings ==
From the [[Why_a_Point_Omega_transition_%3F#2.29_How_we_learn_from_experience.3B_The_CEL_.28Cognition-Energy-Learning_model.29|information on this Wiki(**)]] we can derive a better understanding of the mechanisms ruling our emotions and motivations.
And from this improved understanding we can derive a number of methods and recipes that can help us to improve our emotional states on the short term.
We mention here 4 of such recipes:

1) '''Breaks and pauses'''

From the information on this Wiki it can be concluded that the most powerful tool to improve a person's well being is to make sure that enough paratelic states can emerge.
In a "natural" situation, a situation for which our behavioural systems have evolved and have been adapted to, there is on average sufficient opportunity for paratelic states to emerge automatically and frequently enough to enable the individual to grow into mastery in most areas of life.
However, in our modern "advanced" and modern societies the power structures in charge make sure that for most people, for most carriers of their culture, there is not sufficient time and space to trigger paratelic states to emerge frequently enough. That is one of the most basic and elementary tricks of power structures to create highly dependent and malleable people. Neurotics are easier to manipulate than people who have attained mastery in most fields.

So, exerting counter-pressure on this power-structure force that keeps us down by blocking frequent enough paratelic states by preventing enough breaks and pauses and resting periods, is the best we can do.
The recipe is to make use of the available culturally established breaks and pauses, tea-breaks, lunch breaks, limited working hours per day, holidays, etc. In most modern societies these breaks and pauses are part of the societal fabric. However, large and by the pressures from society on its carriers to work under too high stress levels are still high enough to cause the average citizen to grow into a state of mild but still crippling neuroses. That average situation prevents most people from deploying their full potentials, but it makes them malleable and predictable and thus reliable for the power structures in charge.
The recipe is therefore to make ample use of the offered breaks and pauses, short term as well as long term and to expand this approach further than what is considered "normal". The neuroticizing "normalcy" should be outflanked.

2) '''Meditation techniques'''

Apart from the above one may apply meditation techniques, designed to bring about pauses in the internal radio, thus opening the road to breaks and pauses on another level, that may strongly help to regain emotional and motivational balance.

3) '''Understanding our (meta-)motivational system'''

From [[A_guided_tour_through_the_Omega_Research_Wiki#The_C.E.L._.28Cognition_Energy_Learning_model.29.2C_issue_.237|this Wiki(*)]] one can easily obtain the information needed to come to grips with our internal motivational system, including our meta-motivational system, the dynamics of the telic and paratelic state.
Once one is aware of these dynamic processes, one is less frequently "taken by surprise". It thus becomes easier to take "cool" decisions when and where needed, making it easier to manage one's own emotional dynamics.

4) '''Understanding the "Devil's tricks" that keep us down'''

This recipe is very powerful, but it is less suitable / applicable in phases of early acquaintance with this theory. It is more useful in later stages of gaining knowledge and insight.

It consists of acquiring insight in the many mechanisms, tricks, superstitions and deceptions that the power structures utilize to impose, exert and maintain their influence and power over us humans.
On this Wiki one can find descriptions of a host of such tricks. Since all those tricks serve to keep us down instead of helping us forward, we might, using ancient language, call these tricks the "tool-kit of the devil".
The number of such tricks [[Impersonal_Power_Structures_ruling_our_world|described on the Wiki(*)]] is too long to repeat them all at this place.
Suffice it to say that more understanding of that tool-kit of the devil will work as antidotes. Insight makes us less vulnerable for these tricks. And that in turn can improve our daily feelings and emotional states.
Thus the advice here is to take notice of all that information on the Wiki, irrespective of this being a longer term action.

== Renounce information or move forward ? ==

'''Knowing or not knowing'''

In case novel insights are causing turmoil, doubts and pain, when one's traditional world is shaken up and old certainties are vanishing, a first reaction may be to try and get rid of all those new insights and perspectives. The new information is felt as a threat to the familiar world.

However, that is not so easy. The [[The_evolutionary_stability_of_a_bi-stable_system_of_emotions_and_motivations_in_species_with_an_open-ended_capacity_for_learning|information on this Wiki(***)]] is dealing with the intricacies of our internal functioning, with how we tick ourselves. Basically, we are dealing here with our own learning process, with how the learning processes feel inside. The new insights are about how we learn, with how we wish to live, with how we choose our fields of experiences, and with how all this is processed and digested. It is dealing with how mastery comes about, but also with how fears and neuroses emerge and can grow into [[Point_Omega_(summary)#3.29_Impersonal_power_structures_ruling_our_world|overwhelming avalanches of misery(*)]], as alas is usually the case until now.

'''Learning process in two directions'''

As can be concluded from the [[The_evolutionary_stability_of_a_bi-stable_system_of_emotions_and_motivations_in_species_with_an_open-ended_capacity_for_learning#Positive_and_negative_clusters_of_COndensed_EXperience|information on this Wiki(***)]], the learning process in principle can work in two directions, the direction of mastery and the direction of continuing cumulation of fears and avoidance reflexes. This is a consequence of how our emotional and motivational system is organized. In that technical sense it is a symmetric system. It can work both ways and that makes evolutionary sense.

'''Learning is easier than un-learning'''

However, there is an important asymmetry in this learning mechanism in that once a situation has been mastered, it can hardly be undone. Reversely, fear clusters, negative COEX systems, can very well be undone. In fact the learning system is geared to reduce and reprocess negative COEX systems whenever enough time and energy is available to expand and improve the total of the learned capacities.
In that sense the learning system is large and by a one-direction process. It is far easier to "un-learn" fear clusters than it is to "unlearn" acquired skills and mastery. And that also makes evolutionary sense. (See for instance the [[Learning_from_aversive_experiences;_the_effect_of_timing|learning experiments with mice]](**) for an experimental demonstration of this principle.)

So, once the reader has acquired new insights about his/her own position and about the workings of society and his/her own role therein, it is almost impossible to return to the previous levels of ignorance. Acquired knowledge, acquired skills and mastery, can hardly be undone. It is basically a one-way dynamic system of development.

'''Forward or backward'''

Our advice in such cases of emergency through cognitive dissonance and stress is therefore to choose to move forward, rather than to try getting back in the previous ignorant states. In general, the latter just won't work. It is one-way traffic.
And once the theory on this Wiki has been understood and processed, it will be clear why this is the case.

The above implies that in other animals with learning capacity normally speaking the learning process is more likely to finally produce mastery than to produce unlimited cumulations of avoidance reflexes, phobia's and neuroses. Avoidance reflexes are in principle the most immediate and easy to achieve results from aversive experiences. They are meant to save the individual from emergencies, to save life. Besides, the system tends to keep the individual in safety until sufficient energy and equilibrium have been restored to tentatively seek contact again with the problematic field of experience in question. Thus experiences tend to be dosed precisely enough to maximize the likelihood that in the end mastery may occur. And where avoidance reflexes will not be overcome in the end, we are in general dealing with a danger that warrants continuous avoidance. So, under natural circumstances continuing cumulation of avoidance reflexes only keeps occurring in that minority of individuals that are on a path of final elimination. As such it is supporting the normal evolutionary forces and thus enhances the over all evolutionary outcome, supporting the adaptive qualities of the species in question.

'''Homo sapiens, an anomaly'''

That in human beings the situation seems to be different, in that a majority is suffering from overload of negative COEX systems (badly digested areas of functioning), seems to be an evolutionary anomaly. In a sense it is the "misfiring" of the open ended learning system, which in itself is one of the most successful achievements of evolution.
[[Why_a_Point_Omega_transition_%3F#The_Point_Omega_transition_in_Evolutionary_Perspective|On this Wiki(*)]] it is argued that this unfortunate situation with Homo sapiens only has emerged for no more than 5,000 or 10,000 years and that it is shortly coming to an end and that the mechanisms of "conscious evolution" will then replace the sources of neurotization and enslavement with more agreeable mechanisms.

'''Ahead of the herd'''

Whereas, subjectively speaking, this coming about of the Point Omega transition will still take a considerable time, it may here and now already give us the confidence that we inescapably will move into that direction and that we, by taking notice of the insights as presented here, just find ourselves in the vanguard of progress. That may at first feel uncomfortable, but in the end it is no doubt the best position as seen from the perspective of personal growth and well being in a changing world.

First Aid pages

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A New Earth

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<big>'''Comments on Eckhart Tolle's ''A New Earth, awakening to your life's purpose'''''</big>

For positive or negative reviews of this book on the Amazon site see:
[http://www.amazon.com/review/product/0141017821/ref=dp_top_cm_cr_acr_txt?%5Fencoding=UTF8&showViewpoints=1 Amazon reviews]

We consider Eckhart Tolle's book "A New Earth, awakening to your life's purpose" as a valuable new contribution to our understanding of the human condition and a worthy sequel to his first book "The Power of Now". In our view it is one of the contemporary books that no doubt help to prepare the way to the Point Omega transition. That is why we also discuss it here.

Tolle argues that almost all of us are caught in sub-optimal neurotic states all the time. These abominable states pass however for "normal" and he explains in great detail the alternatives that are possible and available to us instead of those perpetual common neuroses.
He also presents a number of practical methods to enhance the development in oneself of those more agreeable alternative states of being.
As such, it is another guide to enlightenment, and a rather effective guide at that.

Tolle's message is also in line with the well known theory of Self-Actualization from Abraham Maslow, also the inventor of the "hierarchy of needs".

In order to further increase the beneficial effectiveness of Eckhart Tolle's book, we will give below a number of additional facts and notions that can give the story of "A New Earth" a more complete scientific basis, make it easier to understand fully, and thus in fact make it more effective.

We will also discuss some issues that we do interpret in a somewhat different way than Tolle does, in order to make the total picture still more comprehensive and in particular easier to understand from an evolutionary point of view.

== Neurotic Normalcy and Reversal Theory ==

Tolle argues that it is of the utmost importance that people (re)gain the capacity to be in the "here and now" more often and that being more often in the "now" brings about better feelings and better development and growth. He says that being in the "now" produces more awareness and a better understanding of oneself and of one's situation. Being in the "now" stills the ever blabbering radio in one's head and reduces the needs of the ego.

In terms of "[[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]]" and of our CEL model ([[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|Cognition Energy Learning model]]) what Tolle describes with "being in the now" is basically the Paratelic State, one of the always alternating antagonist emotional - motivational states, whether we are aware of it or not (mostly not). The "Telic" and the "Paratelic" state continuously reverse into one another, but in most people the Telic state (goal directed and re-active) is the most dominant of these two emotional - motivational states.

Tolle advertises a shift from living in egoïc states in which the brain is continuously pre-occupied with thoughts about the past or about the future, to living in the "here and now" in which awareness grows and feelings can expand to eventually merge with the whole.
From [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]] we can however derive that being in the "here and now" is just one of the two basic meta-motivational states and that both of these two states, the "Telic" state and the "Paratelic" state do need, and always will need, to alternate in order to function properly and to develop properly. One cannot be continuously in just one of these two meta-motivational states and keep growing and developing properly. That just doesn't work. Dynamic alternations between these states are indispensable for a healthy development.

Tolle's description of the usual, ordinary state of human beings (neurotic, egoic, full of fears) basically is a description of the usual, ordinary human state of mind, in which the "Telic" state is highly dominant over the "Paratelic" state and in fact to such an extent, that most people have hardly any awareness at all of the characteristics of the paratelic state. Taking into account the dynamics and the mechanisms of the meta-motivational reversal system in human beings and in fact in any animal with a distinct learning capacity, Tolle's message becomes easier to grasp from a scientific point of view and in particular it becomes clear how it exactly operates and why his observations about our sorry condition and his predictions about our unheard of potentials are, surprisingly enough, correct indeed.

== "Seeking happiness" versus understanding ==

Tolle argues that it is best to stop "Seeking Happiness", which is a habit of many people. "Seeking" is the antithesis of happiness. It is a goal directed activity. In seeking a person is therefore automatically busy making up all sorts of stories, which in fact is the cognitive part of the seeking process. It keeps the internal radio going, in most people, alas, almost incessantly.

Better, says Tolle, is it to "face what is" instead of to resist and to fight the status quo. "Facing what is" can be done by focussing more on the "here and now". He argues to not give the ever flowing stream of thoughts and ideas too much credit because much of it is based on, or creating, illusions and delusions for the sake of maintaining the ego structures and other fears that rule our lives.

By creating distance from the neurotic fear reflexes, awareness may grow, also about the stressy aversive over-reactions to these fears. This may then create space for awareness of what is real about the situation(s) in question and what is not. Identification with the ego structures and pain bodies and the overreactions involved, may then stop.

The [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] and [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]] support Tolle's point of view. What in general is dearly missing is enough paratelic states, enough "here and now" and sufficient periods of rest in between the acquired experiences. In that respect the advice from Tolle and the contents of this Wiki are quite well in line. However, there is a practical paradox in this advice of Tolle. What Tolle basically says, boils down to the admonition "Be Paratelic !". It is the equivalent of screaming angrily to a depressed, crying person in distress: "be happy for god's sake !". We all know that it just doesn't work that way.

Whereas it seems quite usefull or at least harmless to spend more time in the here and now than is customary in our culture, Reversal Theory and the CEL [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|(Cognition Energy Learning model)]] predict that it is almost impossible to follow that advice of Tolle directly and consciously.

== "Trying" to be in the Here and Now, a behavioural paradox ==

In terms of the [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]], Tolle's advice boils down to "trying to be and stay in the Paratelic State". That however, cannot be done by will and on purpose, because reversing into and out of the Telic and Paratelic metamotivational states is to a high degree involuntary and automatic. If one wishes to spend more time in the Paratelic State one therefore needs to approach the issue in a more indirect and "sneaky" way. The only chance one has to gain results in that direction is to manipulate the emotional and motivational circumstances in such a way that the reversal system of emotions and motivations by itself predictably reverses more often into the paratelic state and if so, more lastingly than is customary. However, that cannot be achieved by any form of "trying" directly, because that in itself will only boost the Telic state with the opposite effect of what one tries to achieve.
This is like the commonly known wisdom that the more one tries to be happy, the more certain one can be not to succeed. It is sort of behavioural paradox.

As the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] explains, if we want to change anything in the usual appalling state of the human mind, we better start understanding how it all works. Only in that case we can hope to change something structurally and design really effective measures on a large enough scale to have any long term effect at all. In general these methods will be indirect in nature.
This is not to say that Tolle's advice is totally useless. On the contrary, for some - rare - people, who are at a particular point in their life, where they have a choice to change directions, it may be the crucial eye opener that they needed at that very point, and then it does have its beneficial effects. Only, for most people in most situations, Tolle's message will not have any practical effect, simply because the people addressed have no way to implement it effectively. Most of the time they are not at some brink, where that little extra push would make all the difference and besides, they basically do not know, or rather, do not feel, what Tolle is talking about.

As explained in the article on [[Point Omega (summary)|"point omega"]] on this Wiki, the readiness to understand and implement Tolle's message will arise gradually but automatically on a larger scale because of the gradually changing circumstances we live in. Once that point has been reached for most people, our intelligence will have extended its reach into the very basics of our emotional and motivational make up. Then intelligence will start to understand itself, its own source and functioning, including the seeming paradoxes included in its evolutionary development. Awareness will become aware of itself and that will happen on an impersonal, general scale. One of the effects of that development will be a general readiness of ever more people to understand and follow Tolle's advice. That's how it will work and not the other way around. Trying to approach these mechanisms on just the personal level will not do the trick. Communal awareness of how it works however, will. Understanding will make us free, together and only together. Nothing else will.

== More effective recipe to boost the time spent in the Here and Now ==

Once we understand the mechanisms of emotions and motivations and the dynamic processes involved, what can be done to end up in healthier conditions?

According to the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] the underlying cause of being too much of the time in the Telic State (not being able to enjoy being in the here and now often enough), is simply a '''lack of''' useful '''skills'''. Lack of skills causes too many and too strong fears to rule the emotional and motivational states. So, "not dwelling in the here and now" is not itself the source of the problems, but it is just a symptom of another, more basic, underlying cause, which is "too many and too strong fears, triggered and kept alive by lack of relevant skills". The CEL says that a person only can escape from these undesirable states of neuroses and from the "thinking disease" if he or she manages to let the process of gaining ánd digesting useful experiences work properly enough to produce more and better integrated skills, relevant for the living circumstances in question. (Just as mother nature designed it to work, but which, in us, seems to be systematically frustrated, one way or the other.) Therefore it is not necessary that one dwells just in the Paratelic State, as Tolle seems to argue, but rather that the Telic and the Paratelic state alternate in an optimal rhythm. In most of us, the Telic State is over-dominant, causing the process of development to run into the direction of an ever further cumulation of avoidance and fear reflexes, without a proper digestion and integration of the experiences gathered. According to the CEL this produces what Tolle calls neuroses and fear-bodies and what the CEL labels as Negative COEX systems, following the terminology of Stanislav Grof ([[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning#Positive and negative clusters of COndensed EXperience|systems of COndensed EXperience]]; see below).

A proper alternation of Telic and Paratelic states, with sufficient breaks and pauses in the stress producing situations, would, on the contrary, produce well digested experiences, resulting in a high over-all level of integrated skills.
Whereas one cannot wilfully change into the Paratelic State, one can increase the likelihood that reversals into the Paratelic States occur more often. That is, very simply, by applying more breaks and pauses and by re-arranging the circumstances in such a way that less stress is likely to be experienced and if so, less continuously. This means that Tolle's recipe does not work very effectively for most people in most circumstances. Rather, by understanding how these mechanisms work exactly, one could manipulate one's meta-motivational states in a more clever way in order to maximize the occurrences of the Paratelic State, and so enable the system to cure itself automatically, as it has evolved to do.

== "Pain Bodies" and "Negative COEX Systems" ==

Tolle describes the existence and the working of "pain bodies" in the human mind. His advice is to become aware of our pain bodies and, where possible, to not yield to them. That way they would lose their grip on our existence and diminish gradually in strength and effect. Also, Tolle explains that some types of pain bodies are so common, that they can be labelled as "collective pain bodies". Collective pain bodies do have extra strength and power, because they are continuously reinforced from the outside. (Local) cultures in fact consist for a large part of collective pain bodies that are specific for that local culture in question. Digression from the local culture is discouraged of course, and thus taking on the local collective pain bodies and yielding to them is encouraged. Becoming aware of collective pain bodies and overcoming their deleterious influence is therefore of course a strongly communal affair.

More detailed explanations of these mechanisms we can find in [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]] and in the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]]. They do strongly support the value of Tolle's descriptions and admonitions. Only, the CEL predicts that for individual people it is not easy to follow Tolle's advice without further technical and social help. Tolle's advice how to tackle pain bodies boils down to approaching one's pain bodies with increased awareness and with a change of habits regarding the pain bodies in question. The latter is obviously a creative move towards the pain body. According to the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] however, there is, as pointed out above, a practical paradox in that advice of Tolle.

Pain bodies, or "negative COEX systems" as Grof calls them (see the paragraphs on [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning#Positive and negative clusters of COndensed EXperience|systems of COndensed EXperience]] in the article on Reversal Theory and the learning system), are characterized by eliciting fear and avoidance behaviour in the person(s) in question, once they enter the situation to which that particular pain body pertains. In other words, a pain body triggers a reversal from the paratelic state to the telic state, if .... the person not already was in the telic state. This is an involuntary reflex. In the telic state the individual is not able to avoid feelings of fear and concern and cannot approach the situation with creative exploration, which would help to find out about the deeper causes of those fears and concerns.

According to the CEL the only way to diminish the influence of negative COEX systems (pain bodies) and stop the disturbing influence they exert on one's life, is to approach them carefully and very gradually from explorations in the paratelic state. But that requires to be often enough in the paratelic state to start with. And to be often enough in the paratelic state, one should first have regained a better balance between the telic and the paratelic state with a sufficient frequency of reversals between them. That can only be (re)gained by introducing sufficient periods of rest and recovery in between the periods of action. That implies short breaks in between the action bouts, pauses, holidays, vacations, etc. In a majority of cases it would ideally imply long periods of pause or vacation in order to regain some minimal measure of balance again where there (re)emerges emotional space for a reversal to the paratelic states. Unless there is some sort of basic equilibrium in which paratelic states can emerge frequently enough, there can be no hope on recovery from the influence of the pain bodies (negative COEX systems).

The [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] shows that to tackle pain bodies effectively there are better approaches possible than Tolle's recipe of noticing, becoming aware and then trying to not yield to them. By understanding the mechanisms involved more clearly and in more detail, we can design better and more effective approaches by including a clever management of the balance in the emotional - motivational reversal system. Whereas more indirect, it is a more effective approach, since it is based on a deeper understanding of how it works / we work.

== Necessary conditions for recovery ==

As explained in the paragraphs above, Tolle says that the method to tackle any type of ego-neurosis or some pain body is to become aware of the stressy aversive over-reactions to it and in that way to make space for awareness of what is real about the situation in question and what is not real but just personal fantasy. Identification with the pain body in question and the concomitant over-reactions then may diminish and eventually stop altogether.

As we have seen, the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] says that on top of what Tolle advertizes, it is of crucial importance that the balance between the occurrence of the Telic and the Paratelic state is restored. Only in that way there can be a structural and lasting change through a lastingly restored process of digestion and integration of experiences. As soon as there are sufficient paratelic states again, brought about by sufficient pauses, periods of rest and medium term and long term breaks, the energy balance can be restored, triggering the automatic and more frequent emergence of paratelic states. The paratelic states in turn, will produce more and deeper awareness of what is going on. A side effect of these more frequent paratelic states is that a person dwells in the Here and Now more of the time.

It is important to note that the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] predicts that without the restoration of a proper telic / paratelic balance, Tolle's recipe will certainly not work. In other words, producing sufficient pauses and periods of rest and repair in order to make more paratelic states emerge, is a necessary condition, a prerequisite to make recovery towards sanity happen at all.

The reverse does nót hold. Tolle's recipe of becoming aware of the pain body (negative [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning#Positive and negative clusters of COndensed EXperience|COEX system]]) is nót a necessary condition for recovery. In case the telic / paratelic balance is restored, repair is fully automatic, whether one is aware of the cognitive contents of the pain body or not. The [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] predicts furthermore that, once the telic / paratelic balance is restored, the first target(s) to be approached for further exploration and reconnaissance, are chosen automatically and involuntarily. It may not be the same, perceived, pain body in question. However, the reversal system of emotions and motivations guides the acquirement of new additional experiences and the proper digestion and integration thereof automatically into the direction of those realms of experience that are most relevant emotionally, but that also, at the same time, are of a level of seriousness that can still be handled. Otherwise, such experiences are not yet experienced as intriguing in the paratelic state, but still as frightening.

Eventually, the pain body in question may be approached in subsequent paratelic reconnaissance actions, after the reconnaissance and digestion of neighbouring areas of experience, followed by better processes of digestion and integration, due to a better telic-paratelic balance and sufficient periods of rest and emotional repair. In such a case the pain body in question will be repaired indirectly, later in time, but in a structurally more stable and permanent way.

What is more, in case Tolle's recipe is applied, and it seems to work in spite of a still improper talic / paratelic balance, then the CEL predicts that the dissolution of the pain body in question, for instance by cognitive conviction and rationalization, is very likely to be replaced by one or more other, new pain bodies instead.

On the other hand, becoming aware of the unreal and exaggerated reactions to a specific pain body, may break the chain of over-reactions and stress that are the cause that minor external affairs are the source of emotional turmoil and chronic energy drains. That, in turn, may help restore the telic / paratelic balance, making space for the dissolution of more negative [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning#Positive and negative clusters of COndensed EXperience|COEX systems]] (pain bodies and ego-structures).

All in all, adding knowledge about our reversal system of emotions and motivations and the cognition-energy-learning model ([[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]]) to Tolle's work, makes the message stronger and more effective, being based on a still deeper level of understanding the underlying mechanisms.

== Asking the right questions ==

Having arrived at the point of understanding Tolle's message better and on a deeper level of understanding, with help of [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]], we still should answer the question of why on earth we humans usually find ourselves in a condition in which the Paratelic Meta-motivational State seems to be relatively suppressed and malfunctioning (being very little in the here and now and if so, not being aware of it). According to [[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacity for learning|Reversal Theory]] and to the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]], continuously alternating between the paratelic state (the here and now) and the telic state (goal directed and re-active) is needed for a proper development which is in fact our birthright. According to our basic design, we humans should be in the Here and Now quite regularly and in fact during an important part of the time. How then can it be that a whole species functions sub-optimally? Not just a few failures and defective specimens but virtually the whole human race. This assertion sounds outragious and highly improbable at the very least. How can it be evolutionarily stable to function far below one's innate capacities?
Translated in terms of Tolle's message: why is it that human beings mostly have lost their capacity to be in the "now" regularly and to enjoy broad and sharp awareness of everything ? If Tolle is right, then it is very strange that such an attractive and in many many respects superior state of mind has not always been the standard rather than the exception. Evolutionarily, this seems impossible, or at least unheard of.

== Self-blindness, the price we paid for higher intelligence ==

The why of this unpleasant state of the human species is explained on this Wiki in the article [[Point Omega (summary)|"Point Omega"]].

Since the emergence of a superior level of intelligence in early hominids, an awareness block regarding our own behaviour was built into our (hardware) system making it utterly difficult to apply our newly gained intelligence to steer and modify our own (social) behaviour. Without such an intelligence block against the application of intelligence on our own behaviour, intelligence could never have evolved to its present level in humans. (See the article on [[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence|"'''Self Blindness'''"]] on this Wiki.)

== Another evolutionary novelty: the Reign of the Meme Power Structures ==

Apart from and on top of the emergence of Self-Blindness, more recently another handicap for the human species emerged. The agricultural revolution released the development of ever stronger power structures, which are basically information (software) packages, competing evolutionarily with one another. Therefore, since some 10.000 years, humans have been subjected to a very strong selection pressure to be able to function as agents of such impersonal power structures, rather than as individuals in their own right (in the classical evolutionary sense). These demands were quite different from the demands stemming from living in the social context of families and hunting bands. From then on we were selected as Meme-carriers, rather than as members of a species in its own right, as was still the case with our hominid ancestors.
It can be shown that the '''neurotic''', egoïc, unaware state of mind, battered continuously by an '''incessant flow of compulsive thought processes''', is an unavoidable result of the selective pressure on human beings during the last 10.000 years, which selection to a high degree makes use of the typically human propensity for blindness regarding its own behaviour (see [[Point Omega (summary)|Point Omega]] and [[The significance of the Point Omega transition]]). For these power structures the predictability and malleability of neurotic people is far more important than whether her carriers do produce a high, creative output each. Successful power structures therefore always have to consist of mentally sick people, ......... us. We are not only blind, since some odd million years or so, but also, since the agricultural revolution of some 10.000 years ago, neurotically sick.

== Explaining the "how" and "why" of Point Omega ==

The combined contributions on this Point Omega Research Wiki render an integrated picture that explains the how and the why of the present human condition of truncated behaviour patterns, mass neuroticism and concomitant misery. Also, after explaining the precise workings of the mechanisms involved, it also allows us to predict that, as Tolle says, by now humanity is in a position to escape from the clusters of the meme-power-structures that rule our existence since thousands of years. The reason why these novel possibilities are just now emerging, is also explained in detail on this Wiki (see [[Main Page]]).
This Wiki is therefore in strong support of Tolle's ideas that mankind is capable by now to launch itself out of misery and into a new world of unprecedented possibilities. What this Wiki adds to Tolle's story is a more detailed and thorough understanding of the [[Point Omega (summary)|how and why]] of this novel and promising situation in human evolution. It also explains why this new possibility never was available before and on the other hand also why it unavoidably had to come some time in the future, which moment in time is most likely "now", the days we are living in, or pretty soon at the very least. The various technical developments that are undermining and dissolving the foundation of the power structures are discussed and explained in detail in the last chapter of the article on "[[Impersonal Power Structures ruling our world]]" on this Wiki. It is also explained there why these foundations of the miserable mass neurotization of mankind could never be challenged successfully before on a lasting basis.

== Why are our chances to be in the Here and Now improving these days? ==

From the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] we have learned that what is crucial for a proper pattern of development, is regular reversals between Telic and Paratelic states. This is only possible in case sufficient periods of relaxation and rest occur in between the periods of struggle and strife. In such favourable circumstances the Paratelic state more frequently emerges, implying that one finds oneself more frequently in the here and now, which is a secondary result of it. Also, it produces more relevant skills and subsequently less continuous states of fear and anxiety. Ego structures and "fear bodies" (Tolle) are less prominent in that case and are not being reconfirmed and enhanced regularly. On the contrary, those negative COEX systems will gradually be subject to explorative reconnaissance of its aversive elements, then experienced as "intriguing", and a more proper digestion of the underlying experiences. As a consequence they will then gradually dwindle in size and influence.

Tolle states that in his view times are changing and that these days the ease with which people can successfully try to live more in the here and now, is on the increase. He says that it is easier and easier to escape from the ordinary neurotic cramps and states of perpetual fear.

However, Tolle does not indicate why this should be so, apart from noting that in his own experience there seem to be more and more people, although still a minute minority, who apparently do reach enlightened states, having escaped from the ordinary fear-ridden states of being. We think that Tolle is right in this assessment of the situation. However, this is in our view still not very convincing as an explanation '''why''' the human situation is on the improve.

==== Self-Blindness ====

The present Wiki tries to answer that question of the "why" more clearly. The contributions on this Wiki aim at providing a more complete and thorough picture of the Why and the How of our present situation and at allowing us to predict more precisely what we could expect to develop next. It is explained why in recent human evolution, somewhere in the last one million years or so, there emerged a specific blindness for our own behaviour. That is, our intelligence may be applied to all sorts of problems at hand, but not on anything pertaining to our own social and motivational reactions. Otherwise, intelligence would interfere with the evolutionary ultimate goals of our behavioural organization. And that would be self-defeating in evolutionary terms and therefore not an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy). The latter can be seen as the very reason why in other phyla in the animal kingdom intelligence never rose above a certain level, although in many very different phyla (e.g., primates, whales, parrots, molluscs) intelligence rose to a certain, just not dangerous, level (dangerous for evolutionary purposes and methods of behavioural organisation). (For details see the article on [[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence|Self-Blindness]]).

==== Neuroticizing Power Structures ====

Besides, it is pointed out on this Wiki that since the agricultural revolution, ever larger power structures emerged, based on cultural packages of knowledge and instruction (Meme-sets). These started an evolution of their own and at a much higher speed than the ordinary evolution of the flesh and blood and the underlying Gene Pools. In other words: a novel software evolution (of Memes) took the lead over the classic hardware evolution (of Genes). Since that time, some 10.000 years ago, we humans are evolutionarily torn between two evolutionary strands, our physical (slow) evolution and our cultural (fast) evolution, each with its own rules and demands. It can be shown that it is in the interest of the impersonal power structures in charge (the meme structures at the brink of the evolutionary frontier) that we humans are artificially kept in a state of permanent fear. That is why the human race seems to be ruled by massive neuroses and why so called Self-Actualization (Maslow) is the great exception rather than the rule. This situation is in fact quite the reverse of what one finds in any other animal species, and can therefore be seen as a strikingly strange evolutionary paradox of the human race. (For details see the article on the [[Impersonal Power Structures ruling our world|Power Structures]] ruling our human world.)

==== Weakening fetters ====

Having shown that the human race is saddled with 1) a specific Blindness for the own behaviour, and 2) with Power Structures in charge who keep us in permanent fear and neuroses, it can also be shown that this unpleasant state of affairs at present is losing its foundations. In fact, after analysing the various variables in the human psyche and its social life, the prediction follows that we can expect a collapse of the influence of the power structures over human behaviour, leading to a massive release of psychological and also physical energy and a transition which could be labeled as point Omega (after Teilhard de Chardin). Presenting the scientific argumentation for these mechanisms, this Wiki provides a''' '''[[Point Omega (summary)|better "explanation"]] for this notion of a new type of human world being near, than Tolle does. However, this Wiki does indeed strongly support and advocate the correctness of Tolle's very message.

== Contagiousness of positive learning spirals and psychological health ==

In the above it is argued that Tolle's recipe to be more often in the here and now is easily said, but not so easily done, unless one understands the underlying dynamics of emotions and motivations (according to the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]]) and thus can apply some more tactical and strategical strategems. An important factor that keeps human beings tightly bound in collective neuroses and cramps is in the contagiousness of mental states and conditions. Psychological health is very contagious, but on the other hand, so is neuroticism and fear. The technical reason for this contagiousness is further explained in the paragraphs 9 and 10 of the article on [[Energy and Strokes#2.10. "Contagiousness" of Interpersonal Psychological Skills and Adaptation|Energy and Strokes]].

Tolle describes collective pain bodies and collective ego's and the strong delusive binding power these structures do have on our behaviour. On the other hand, also the enlightened collectives do have the same - in this case positive - contagiousness for personal development. This will create, at some point in time, a vortex for collective consciousness that will accelerate a planetary shift.

The [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] explains the how and why of this contagiousness in both directions. For an individual it is very difficult to escape from the customary unpleasant psychological condition, prevalent in one's social surroundings. The CEL describes in detail how the social mechanisms suck every escapee back into the swamps of mass neuroses. Only very energetic and powerful individuals do have any chance at all to escape. And moreover, they should also have been very lucky from the start to begin with, having enjoyed a relatively low level of stressful and neuroticizing influence during their upbringing and development. No wonder that just a very low percentage of human beings manages to escape from the prison of ordinary cramps and fears and manages to enter the world of Self Actualization. On top of all these prerequisites they must have become aware, one way or the other, that there is more in terms of possibilities than the eye meets according to common knowledge. If that doesn't coincidently happen, a person is not likely to escape, even in case he or she has enough energy, intelligence and a favourable history.

== Point Omega ==
'''About a necessary condition to make Tolle's recipe work for any individual'''

For this reason Tolle's advice is not likely to harvest very much results for any specific individual, if not already for some other reasons there is in the person a heightened likelihood to end up in positive learning spirals as described in the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]]. And this holds for the advice and the admonitions of most guru's and teachers as well.

As argued in the article on [[Contemporary weakening of the foundations of Power Structures|Point Omega]] on this Wiki, our culture has ended up these days in a situation in which the structures, that have kept us humans bound in misery for so long, are wavering, and in fact are collapsing faster and faster. This novel situation is likely to create so much extra space in terms of human development potential, that for each individual the chances to escape are significantly improving. In terms of the CEL: the likelihood of managing to establish more optimal rhythms of Telic / Paratelic alternations is heightened. This will raise the percentage of self actualizers in the population and therefore we are gradually getting closer to a point where the contagiousness of positive learning spirals through social support is becoming stronger than the contagiousness of fears and neuroses.

That very point we may call [[Contemporary weakening of the foundations of Power Structures|Point Omega]], following Teilhard de Chardin. Our conclusion can be that by these changing circumstances the likelihood of Tolle's New Earth is gradually becoming higher because of the contagiousness of the positive learning spirals and psychological health. Changing technical circumstances in our modern world gradually increase the chances for any individual to escape from the neuroticizing fetters and enter a process of self-actualization. Once the percentage of enlightened people has reached a critical point, the contagiousness of mental health and sanity will gain the upper hand over the contagiousness of fears and neuroses. From that point on a chain reaction will make Tolle's prediction come true and a New Earth will materialize, involuntarily and inescapably.

== Enlightenment dependent on grace or on action ? ==

Tolle says that the process of awakening to your inner purpose, the process in which thinking and awareness separate, the establishment of consciousness without thought, is basically an act of grace, not of will.
One cannot "make" it happen, nor can one prepare oneself for it.

The [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] on the other hand, describes and explains ''why'' it is that, ordinarily speaking, striving, in whichever way, indeed does not bring one closer to the restoration of a healthy telic / paratelic balance, and thus to restoration of healthy growth and development, end thus to the dissolution of the overwhelming control of negative COEX systems (pain bodies and ego structures) and thus to the eventual emergence of enlightenment.
The point is that the act of striving corroborates, rather than weakens a sick telic / paratelic balance.

On the other hand, the [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model|CEL]] renders such improved insight and understanding of the processes involved, that one can, through a necessarily indirect approach, very well repair the telic / paratelic balance, reboot the natural process of repair and recovery, boost the process of growth and development and create a state in which, sooner or later, the grace, Tolle speaks about, must strike and will strike.
Bottom line of [[Point Omega (summary)|what the CEL predicts]] is that, once understanding of all these basic mechanisms of emotions and motivations has become sufficiently widespread and known, the structures that keep us bound in misery, in ignorance and in telic over-dominance, will lose their stability, collapse and give way to mass enlightenment.
Once a critical mass has been reached, the striking of that grace will become the rule, rather than the exception. The [[Point Omega (summary)|good news from the CEL]] therefore, is that we ourselves can very well take action to help bring that point, point Omega, closer. Just (re)organize your life in such a way that paratelic states are likely to arise more frequently and do the same for other people. All the rest will follow automatically. That's all there is to it. It seems too simple to be true, but this is what the CEL predicts.

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T19:45:49Z

BigSmoke:

== Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version ==

After repeated requests from [[User:Baby Boy]] for some critical notes on this article, I've picked Father's Day 2017 to start critically reading and responding. --[[User:BigSmoke|BigSmoke]] ([[User talk:BigSmoke|talk]]) 09:39, 18 June 2017 (UTC)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Introduction'' ===

The introduction is very long-winded. Twelve paragraphs are used to convey the following information:

* The article was written at the request of Victor Koekkoek.
* The article should be read '''after''' ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.
** Or, at least, after having read ''[[Omega Research:About#Definitions of "Point Omega"|Definitions of "Point Omega"]]'', or ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence#Point Omega|the same]]'' in ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]''.
* The information in this wiki is scattered about various islands of specialist knowledge,
** and therefore not readily accessible to the general public.
** Also, the general public—the ‘herd’—is, in your opinion, not capable of grasping this information.

Too much time is spent to convince the reader of the uniqueness of the information compiled on this wiki, and the unique, elite combination of mentality and intelligence that is required to follow the argumentation.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Lost perspectives, . . . . . what next ?'' ===

This section is quite readable and does entice the reader—me, at least—to continue to the rest of the article. It feels more like an appetizer than the first section, because it makes less of an appeal to the reader to join the “exclusive, smart, original” tribe, which, frankly, comes across as narcissistic and childish.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''New facts we need to take into account'' ===

Although I disagree with (the factuality of) some of the basic premises, I like how they are summarized here. I've gone over the sources of disagreement with [[User:Baby Boy]] before, but not in this medium. Perhaps, next Father's Day, if I feel brave enough, I will provide some critical feedback on ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''From fact-finding to courses of action'' ===

The four paragraphs could easily be reduced to two, and the first 3 are too long anyway. You lose precision because you are trying to be accurate and exhaustive. What is it ''precisely'' that you are tring to convey at this point in the story?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Democratization of education'' (1st issue) ===

Most of your readers, including me, wouldn't object to the notion that the democratization of education leads to less talent going to waste, but I don't understand the ''point'' of this section.
* Are you claiming that education is being democratized world-wide? If so, I'm missing numbers.
* Are you merely stating that, following Point Omega, education will inevitably be democratized?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Transparency'' (2nd issue) ===

Again, there's a whole lot of talk, but it's not clear where you want to go (except by implication).
* Are you claiming that transparency is, on the whole, increasing?
* If so, can you substantiate this claim?
* Are you claiming that communication technology is making people freeer, rather than serving as an extra means of solidifying existing power structures?
* If (certain) power structures are becoming unstable, how do you know that this is due to increased transparency and not just to the built-in periodical cycles of upheaval that you later mention?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Procreating consciously'' (3rd issue) ===

Are you claiming that we currently have the knowledge to predict all possible genetic and birth defects, based on embryonic screening? Your case would be much stronger with at least a percentage of types of avoidable genetic conditions. Also, there's the case of general fitness: intelligence, physical stamina, strength, available energy, etc. are all influenced by a large number of genes, most of which are not readily recognizable. My point is that, without strong evolutionary pressures, you may very well have a gradual decline of qualities which would influence fitness in a harsher environment, '''even if''' everybody has access to genetic planning (and is encouraged by their culture to utilize this).

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Avoiding Good-Bad social reflexes'' (4th issue) ===

I think your notion that “good-bad” judgements are the driving force of increased docility in social structures is sufficiently far-fetched that it needs some stronger argumentation rather than a simple proclamation. You don't have to judge somebody as “bad” to not promote this person to a position of power.

You say that “this change [for increasing numbers of people to overcome these primordial reflexes of attraction and repulsion and to consciously choose more fruitful ways to interact] will also be subject to positive feed back mechanisms that will make it progressively easier for people to adopt novel ways to interact, once certain critical numbers have been reached.” Which specific positive feedback mechanisms are you referring to? I'm not aware of any such positive feedback mechanisms that would counter nepotism, xenophobia and tribalism.

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Dealing with other aspects of Self-Blindness'' ===

For this section, I'll pick apart the following particularly troublesome paragraph:

: “Since Self-Blindness is one of the main ingredients for the structures that keep humanity bound in slavery and neuroticism [1], it is of great importance [2], and very urgent at that [3], that we collectively try as quickly and as effectively as we can, to come to grips with this typically human behavioural bias. If we wish to create a more agreeable world, we do have to take this hurdle [4]. There is no escape from that necessity [5]. In the above mentioned chapter on this Wiki it is argued that we should start a research discipline that is fully dedicated to create clarity and scientific insight in these aspects of Self-Blindness. In that chapter it is suggested to label such a research discipline as "Amathology" or "the science of ignorance" [6].”

[1] Do you have any proof that humans that are less self-blind are in fact to a lesser degree bound by slavery and neutoricism? And do such individual in fact exist? How would you test/quantify this?

[2] Why is it important that we become more aware of our self-blindness?

[3] What is the urgency?

[4] Again, on which basis do you assume that a world with more awareness of our self-blindness is a more agreeable world?

[5] Nowhere (in this article) have I seen you do the work to flesh out various possible scenarios for a more agreeable future.

[6] How could I not be in favor of more research. All this leaves me with are questions. ;-)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''What about Religion'' (6th issue) ===

You write:
: ‘"Seek ye the truth, and the truth will make you free", as the saying goes, a saying that can also already be found in the Bible. In that sense such philosophers mean to indicate science as juxtaposed to religious superstition, ignorance and belief-systems.’

How do you know what they mean by that? Besides, why does it matter? I wouldn't defer to the Bible's authority in a section in which you're setting out to predict the decline of religious thought.

Why do you predict that religious thinking and superstition will be replaced with secular thought? Is this prediction specific to after point Omega or is it something that is already happening now? If so, there surely must be some numbers on this somewhere. Even then, one point to consider is that even if the ''relative'' number of believers in some or many areas of the world is going down, has the ''absolute'' number of believers also fallen? (You could argue, for example, that the danger of fundamentalism is lies in the absolute number of fanatics, not in their proportion relative to moderates.)

Also, your claim that one of the functions of religion is to fortify self-blindness seems rather one-sided. I am even more surprised that you claim a role for religion in the maintenance of sufficient self-blindness for high intelligence to subsist. But, I guess I should direct my criticism to your ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]'' article.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Co-evolution of High Intelligence and Self-Blindness, the example of the Jews'' ===

Your usage of the situation of the (intelligence of) Jews as an example of self-blindness is highly contentious, for a number of reasons:

* It is not a scientifically broadly accepted fact that jews are of above-average intelligence.
* If if one considers as true the hypothesis that jews are cleverer than non-jews, there are other possible genetic and cultural explanations for this, none of which involve self-blindness.
For an overview of these criticisms, see the ''[[Wikipedia:Ashkenazi Jewish intelligence]]'' Wikipedia article.

* Without some solid background information on the relationship between Pallistines and Israeli Jews, it is a matter of political opinion to stamp the Jews as racist opressors. Without facts, I might just as well believe a [https://martienpennings.wordpress.com/2013/02/19/werk-in-uitvoering-een-korte-geschiedenis-van-israel-2/ pro-Israel reading of the situation].
* You assume that the rest of the world is judging Israel as you do, but perhaps it's just the left-leaning media/propaganda that you consume that's making you blind to the reality of anti-semitism (even in your own judgement). I wouldn't know, since you don't provide proof either way.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Curbing destruction of the environment'' (7th issue) ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Evolutionary Jet-lag & (Un)Happiness'' (8th issue) ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Evolutionary Jet-lag before Point Omega'' ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Evolutionary Jet-lag after Point Omega'' ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Treat others as you would like to be treated yourself'' (9th issue) ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''How to deal with hopeless cases ?'' (10th issue) ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Assuming responsibility for every human being in existence'' (11th issue) ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Competition and Work; how to deal with it in a different way'' (12th issue) ===

[…]

=== Priorities for an action list ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Relax .......... we can afford it now'' ===

You whole wiki is organized around the idea that a Point Omega is inevitable, yet this article, at many points, comes across as trying to preach action and instill urgency. Why? You say: “Relax .......... we can afford it now.” But, this is not the attitude that the rest of your article purveys. That attitude is rather: “Listen to me! It's important! We have to save the world!”

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T19:30:46Z

BigSmoke: /* Father's Day feedback on: What about Religion (6th issue) */

== Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version ==

After repeated requests from [[User:Baby Boy]] for some critical notes on this article, I've picked Father's Day 2017 to start critically reading and responding. --[[User:BigSmoke|BigSmoke]] ([[User talk:BigSmoke|talk]]) 09:39, 18 June 2017 (UTC)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Introduction'' ===

The introduction is very long-winded. Twelve paragraphs are used to convey the following information:

* The article was written at the request of Victor Koekkoek.
* The article should be read '''after''' ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.
** Or, at least, after having read ''[[Omega Research:About#Definitions of "Point Omega"|Definitions of "Point Omega"]]'', or ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence#Point Omega|the same]]'' in ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]''.
* The information in this wiki is scattered about various islands of specialist knowledge,
** and therefore not readily accessible to the general public.
** Also, the general public—the ‘herd’—is, in your opinion, not capable of grasping this information.

Too much time is spent to convince the reader of the uniqueness of the information compiled on this wiki, and the unique, elite combination of mentality and intelligence that is required to follow the argumentation.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Lost perspectives, . . . . . what next ?'' ===

This section is quite readable and does entice the reader—me, at least—to continue to the rest of the article. It feels more like an appetizer than the first section, because it makes less of an appeal to the reader to join the “exclusive, smart, original” tribe, which, frankly, comes across as narcissistic and childish.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''New facts we need to take into account'' ===

Although I disagree with (the factuality of) some of the basic premises, I like how they are summarized here. I've gone over the sources of disagreement with [[User:Baby Boy]] before, but not in this medium. Perhaps, next Father's Day, if I feel brave enough, I will provide some critical feedback on ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''From fact-finding to courses of action'' ===

The four paragraphs could easily be reduced to two, and the first 3 are too long anyway. You lose precision because you are trying to be accurate and exhaustive. What is it ''precisely'' that you are tring to convey at this point in the story?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Democratization of education'' (1st issue) ===

Most of your readers, including me, wouldn't object to the notion that the democratization of education leads to less talent going to waste, but I don't understand the ''point'' of this section.
* Are you claiming that education is being democratized world-wide? If so, I'm missing numbers.
* Are you merely stating that, following Point Omega, education will inevitably be democratized?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Transparency'' (2nd issue) ===

Again, there's a whole lot of talk, but it's not clear where you want to go (except by implication).
* Are you claiming that transparency is, on the whole, increasing?
* If so, can you substantiate this claim?
* Are you claiming that communication technology is making people freeer, rather than serving as an extra means of solidifying existing power structures?
* If (certain) power structures are becoming unstable, how do you know that this is due to increased transparency and not just to the built-in periodical cycles of upheaval that you later mention?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Procreating consciously'' (3rd issue) ===

Are you claiming that we currently have the knowledge to predict all possible genetic and birth defects, based on embryonic screening? Your case would be much stronger with at least a percentage of types of avoidable genetic conditions. Also, there's the case of general fitness: intelligence, physical stamina, strength, available energy, etc. are all influenced by a large number of genes, most of which are not readily recognizable. My point is that, without strong evolutionary pressures, you may very well have a gradual decline of qualities which would influence fitness in a harsher environment, '''even if''' everybody has access to genetic planning (and is encouraged by their culture to utilize this).

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Avoiding Good-Bad social reflexes'' (4th issue) ===

I think your notion that “good-bad” judgements are the driving force of increased docility in social structures is sufficiently far-fetched that it needs some stronger argumentation rather than a simple proclamation. You don't have to judge somebody as “bad” to not promote this person to a position of power.

You say that “this change [for increasing numbers of people to overcome these primordial reflexes of attraction and repulsion and to consciously choose more fruitful ways to interact] will also be subject to positive feed back mechanisms that will make it progressively easier for people to adopt novel ways to interact, once certain critical numbers have been reached.” Which specific positive feedback mechanisms are you referring to? I'm not aware of any such positive feedback mechanisms that would counter nepotism, xenophobia and tribalism.

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Dealing with other aspects of Self-Blindness'' ===

For this section, I'll pick apart the following particularly troublesome paragraph:

: “Since Self-Blindness is one of the main ingredients for the structures that keep humanity bound in slavery and neuroticism [1], it is of great importance [2], and very urgent at that [3], that we collectively try as quickly and as effectively as we can, to come to grips with this typically human behavioural bias. If we wish to create a more agreeable world, we do have to take this hurdle [4]. There is no escape from that necessity [5]. In the above mentioned chapter on this Wiki it is argued that we should start a research discipline that is fully dedicated to create clarity and scientific insight in these aspects of Self-Blindness. In that chapter it is suggested to label such a research discipline as "Amathology" or "the science of ignorance" [6].”

[1] Do you have any proof that humans that are less self-blind are in fact to a lesser degree bound by slavery and neutoricism? And do such individual in fact exist? How would you test/quantify this?

[2] Why is it important that we become more aware of our self-blindness?

[3] What is the urgency?

[4] Again, on which basis do you assume that a world with more awareness of our self-blindness is a more agreeable world?

[5] Nowhere (in this article) have I seen you do the work to flesh out various possible scenarios for a more agreeable future.

[6] How could I not be in favor of more research. All this leaves me with are questions. ;-)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''What about Religion'' (6th issue) ===

You write:
: ‘"Seek ye the truth, and the truth will make you free", as the saying goes, a saying that can also already be found in the Bible. In that sense such philosophers mean to indicate science as juxtaposed to religious superstition, ignorance and belief-systems.’

How do you know what they mean by that? Besides, why does it matter? I wouldn't defer to the Bible's authority in a section in which you're setting out to predict the decline of religious thought.

Why do you predict that religious thinking and superstition will be replaced with secular thought? Is this prediction specific to after point Omega or is it something that is already happening now? If so, there surely must be some numbers on this somewhere. Even then, one point to consider is that even if the ''relative'' number of believers in some or many areas of the world is going down, has the ''absolute'' number of believers also fallen? (You could argue, for example, that the danger of fundamentalism is lies in the absolute number of fanatics, not in their proportion relative to moderates.)

Also, your claim that one of the functions of religion is to fortify self-blindness seems rather one-sided. I am even more surprised that you claim a role for religion in the maintenance of sufficient self-blindness for high intelligence to subsist. But, I guess I should direct my criticism to your ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]'' article.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Co-evolution of High Intelligence and Self-Blindness, the example of the Jews'' ===

Your usage of the situation of the (intelligence of) Jews as an example of self-blindness is highly contentious, for a number of reasons:

* It is not a scientifically broadly accepted fact that jews are of above-average intelligence.
* If if one considers as true the hypothesis that jews are cleverer than non-jews, there are other possible genetic and cultural explanations for this, none of which involve self-blindness.
For an overview of these criticisms, see the ''[[Wikipedia:Ashkenazi Jewish intelligence]]'' Wikipedia article.

* Without some solid background information on the relationship between Pallistines and Israeli Jews, it is a matter of political opinion to stamp the Jews as racist opressors. Without facts, I might just as well believe a [https://martienpennings.wordpress.com/2013/02/19/werk-in-uitvoering-een-korte-geschiedenis-van-israel-2/ pro-Israel reading of the situation].
* You assume that the rest of the world is judging Israel as you do, but perhaps it's just the left-leaning media/propaganda that you consume that's making you blind to the reality of anti-semitism (even in your own judgement). I wouldn't know, since you don't provide proof either way.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Curbing destruction of the environment'' (7th issue) ===

I just hope you're right.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Evolutionary Jet-lag & (Un)Happiness'' (8th issue) ===

I have no objections to lay down on this point.

=== Father's Day feedback on: '''' ===

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Relax .......... we can afford it now'' ===

You whole wiki is organized around the idea that a Point Omega is inevitable, yet this article, at many points, comes across as trying to preach action and instill urgency. Why? You say: “Relax .......... we can afford it now.” But, this is not the attitude that the rest of your article purveys. That attitude is rather: “Listen to me! It's important! We have to save the world!”

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T18:22:46Z

BigSmoke: /* Father's Day feedback on Dealing with other aspects of Self-Blindness */

== Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version ==

After repeated requests from [[User:Baby Boy]] for some critical notes on this article, I've picked Father's Day 2017 to start critically reading and responding. --[[User:BigSmoke|BigSmoke]] ([[User talk:BigSmoke|talk]]) 09:39, 18 June 2017 (UTC)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Introduction'' ===

The introduction is very long-winded. Twelve paragraphs are used to convey the following information:

* The article was written at the request of Victor Koekkoek.
* The article should be read '''after''' ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.
** Or, at least, after having read ''[[Omega Research:About#Definitions of "Point Omega"|Definitions of "Point Omega"]]'', or ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence#Point Omega|the same]]'' in ''[[Self-blindness in humans as prerequisite for the evolution of advanced intelligence]]''.
* The information in this wiki is scattered about various islands of specialist knowledge,
** and therefore not readily accessible to the general public.
** Also, the general public—the ‘herd’—is, in your opinion, not capable of grasping this information.

Too much time is spent to convince the reader of the uniqueness of the information compiled on this wiki, and the unique, elite combination of mentality and intelligence that is required to follow the argumentation.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Lost perspectives, . . . . . what next ?'' ===

This section is quite readable and does entice the reader—me, at least—to continue to the rest of the article. It feels more like an appetizer than the first section, because it makes less of an appeal to the reader to join the “exclusive, smart, original” tribe, which, frankly, comes across as narcissistic and childish.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''New facts we need to take into account'' ===

Although I disagree with (the factuality of) some of the basic premises, I like how they are summarized here. I've gone over the sources of disagreement with [[User:Baby Boy]] before, but not in this medium. Perhaps, next Father's Day, if I feel brave enough, I will provide some critical feedback on ''[[A guided tour through the Omega Research Wiki]]''.

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''From fact-finding to courses of action'' ===

The four paragraphs could easily be reduced to two, and the first 3 are too long anyway. You lose precision because you are trying to be accurate and exhaustive. What is it ''precisely'' that you are tring to convey at this point in the story?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Democratization of education'' (1st issue) ===

Most of your readers, including me, wouldn't object to the notion that the democratization of education leads to less talent going to waste, but I don't understand the ''point'' of this section.
* Are you claiming that education is being democratized world-wide? If so, I'm missing numbers.
* Are you merely stating that, following Point Omega, education will inevitably be democratized?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Transparency'' (2nd issue) ===

Again, there's a whole lot of talk, but it's not clear where you want to go (except by implication).
* Are you claiming that transparency is, on the whole, increasing?
* If so, can you substantiate this claim?
* Are you claiming that communication technology is making people freeer, rather than serving as an extra means of solidifying existing power structures?
* If (certain) power structures are becoming unstable, how do you know that this is due to increased transparency and not just to the built-in periodical cycles of upheaval that you later mention?

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Procreating consciously'' (3rd issue) ===

Are you claiming that we currently have the knowledge to predict all possible genetic and birth defects, based on embryonic screening? Your case would be much stronger with at least a percentage of types of avoidable genetic conditions. Also, there's the case of general fitness: intelligence, physical stamina, strength, available energy, etc. are all influenced by a large number of genes, most of which are not readily recognizable. My point is that, without strong evolutionary pressures, you may very well have a gradual decline of qualities which would influence fitness in a harsher environment, '''even if''' everybody has access to genetic planning (and is encouraged by their culture to utilize this).

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Avoiding Good-Bad social reflexes'' (4th issue) ===

I think your notion that “good-bad” judgements are the driving force of increased docility in social structures is sufficiently far-fetched that it needs some stronger argumentation rather than a simple proclamation. You don't have to judge somebody as “bad” to not promote this person to a position of power.

You say that “this change [for increasing numbers of people to overcome these primordial reflexes of attraction and repulsion and to consciously choose more fruitful ways to interact] will also be subject to positive feed back mechanisms that will make it progressively easier for people to adopt novel ways to interact, once certain critical numbers have been reached.” Which specific positive feedback mechanisms are you referring to? I'm not aware of any such positive feedback mechanisms that would counter nepotism, xenophobia and tribalism.

=== Father's Day feedback on ''Dealing with other aspects of Self-Blindness'' ===

For this section, I'll pick apart the following particularly troublesome paragraph:

: “Since Self-Blindness is one of the main ingredients for the structures that keep humanity bound in slavery and neuroticism [1], it is of great importance [2], and very urgent at that [3], that we collectively try as quickly and as effectively as we can, to come to grips with this typically human behavioural bias. If we wish to create a more agreeable world, we do have to take this hurdle [4]. There is no escape from that necessity [5]. In the above mentioned chapter on this Wiki it is argued that we should start a research discipline that is fully dedicated to create clarity and scientific insight in these aspects of Self-Blindness. In that chapter it is suggested to label such a research discipline as "Amathology" or "the science of ignorance" [6].”

[1] Do you have any proof that humans that are less self-blind are in fact to a lesser degree bound by slavery and neutoricism? And do such individual in fact exist? How would you test/quantify this?

[2] Why is it important that we become more aware of our self-blindness?

[3] What is the urgency?

[4] Again, on which basis do you assume that a world with more awareness of our self-blindness is a more agreeable world?

[5] Nowhere (in this article) have I seen you do the work to flesh out various possible scenarios for a more agreeable future.

[6] How could I not be in favor of more research. All this leaves me with are questions. ;-)

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''What about Religion'' (6th issue) ===

You write:
: ‘"Seek ye the truth, and the truth will make you free", as the saying goes, a saying that can also already be found in the Bible. In that sense such philosophers mean to indicate science as juxtaposed to religious superstition, ignorance and belief-systems.’

How do you know what they mean by that? Besides, why does it matter? I wouldn't defer to the Bible's authority in a section in which you're setting out to predict the decline of religious thought.

Why do you predict that religious thinking and superstition will be replaced with secular thought? Is this prediction specific to after point Omega or is it something that is already happening now? If so, there surely must be some numbers on this somewhere. Even then, one point to consider is that even if the ''relative'' number of believers in some or many areas of the world is going down, has the ''absolute'' number of believers also fallen? (You could argue, for example, that the danger of fundamentalism is lies in the absolute number of fanatics, not in their proportion relative to moderates.)

Also, your claim that one of the functions of religion is to fortify self-blindness seems rather far-fetched.

[…]

=== Father's Day feedback on: ''Relax .......... we can afford it now'' ===

You whole wiki is organized around the idea that a Point Omega is inevitable, yet this article, at many points, comes across as trying to preach action and instill urgency. Why? You say: “Relax .......... we can afford it now.” But, this is not the attitude that the rest of your article purveys. That attitude is rather: “Listen to me! It's important! We have to save the world!”

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T18:12:22Z

BigSmoke: /* Father's Day feedback on Avoiding Good-Bad social reflexes (4th issue) */

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T17:57:49Z

BigSmoke: /* Father's Day feedback on Avoiding Good-Bad social reflexes (4th issue) */

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T12:30:06Z

BigSmoke:

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T12:09:05Z

BigSmoke:

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T11:59:18Z

BigSmoke: /* Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version */ More feedback

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T11:37:10Z

BigSmoke: /* Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version */ Feedback on ''New facts we need to take into account''

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T10:06:30Z

BigSmoke: /* Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version */ Feedback on ''Lost perspectives, . . . . . what next ?''

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T09:54:33Z

BigSmoke: /* Father's day feedback on: Introduction */

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T09:54:17Z

BigSmoke: Formatting

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T09:53:21Z

BigSmoke: /* = Father's day feedback on: Introduction */

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T09:52:56Z

BigSmoke: /* Critical feedback based on Father's Day 2017 version */ Feedback on the introdoction

Talk:Directives for after Point Omega

2017-06-18T09:39:45Z

BigSmoke: Father's Day feedback: introduction

File:Self actualization s-curve.png

2017-03-12T16:23:45Z

BigSmoke: BigSmoke uploaded a new version of File:Self actualization s-curve.png

File:Self actualization s-curve.png

2017-03-06T20:22:18Z

BigSmoke: BigSmoke uploaded a new version of File:Self actualization s-curve.png

File:Self actualization s-curve.png

2017-02-18T16:41:34Z

BigSmoke:

Why a Point Omega transition ?

2017-02-18T16:40:41Z

BigSmoke: /* 3b) The inflection-point relationship between self-actualization of individuals and self-actualization in the population at large */

(nog toevoegen: 2 figuren )
<center>

<big>Why we shortly can expect a sudden Point Omega transition:</big> 
the implication of antagonist mechanisms of positive reinforcement in processes of human learning and of human development

</center>
__NOTOC__

{{level|2}}This article explains how the conclusion was reached that it is likely that humanity will shortly go through a transition that will change the life of us humans more than anything before in human history, yes even more than anything in human evolution.
If our deductions are correct, the coming transition will even be a novelty from the perspective of evolution itself. In that case it will in fact be the emergence of "conscious evolution" which we can safely consider as the culmination of life on earth.

What is more, if our deductions are right it should be considered as a basic law of nature that on any planet in the universe where life is possible, sooner or later "conscious evolution" will emerge. For our planet that moment in time is now, or rather, very soon. And we humans are the carriers of that pinnacle of evolution.

This conclusion, that we can indeed expect such a sudden rise in human potentials and in the quality of human functioning, is based on a combination of 10 findings.
We will mention these 10 findings very briefly below, and then indicate how taking these 10 findings together, leads us to quite surprising conclusions, conclusions that seem quite unbelievable at first sight.
About each of these findings more detailed information and argumentation can be found in other articles on this Wiki. Links are provided in the text, indicated with (*), (**) or (***), depending on the level of detail.
Some of these findings are well known, but are commonly not applied in a context as we apply it here.
Some other findings are also well established, but as yet only in circles of specialist researchers.
Finally, some of the findings that we utilize here, are novel in the sense that they have not yet been published before, or only very briefly. The latter findings have as yet not been the subject of a broad scientific discussion.

The first of these 10 findings is about the following.
=== 1) Unfolding of innate (congenital) potentials, yes or no ? ===
==== 1a) Self-actualization the exception, rather than the rule, in Homo sapiens ====
{{level|1}} Self-actualization, the coming to bloom of a rather complete collection of innate potentials in a human being is the exception, rather than the rule. That is very different from how it works in other species. How is that strange and unexpected situation possible and how could that be an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) ?

==== 1b) Maslow and the foundation of [[Behaviorism_versus_Humanism,_an_Integration;_Application_of_the_Cognition_Energy_Learning_Model_(CEL)_on_an_old_controversy|Humanistic Psychology]](**) ====
{{level|1}}- Maslow, the author who launched that concept, I could not discard as being mistaken. He appeared to have done his homework quite thoroughly, starting with his research on monkeys and subsequently investigating if and how his findings also pertained to humans. Although going quite strongly against anything that an evolutionary biologist would expect, Homo sapiens emerged from his research as an anomaly, an evolutionary contradiction, in the sense that we apparently are a species in which the majority of the members are functioning way below their inborn potentials and not the other way around, as is customary in any other species. So, not being able to discard Maslow's work as mistaken, I was left with contradictory and seemingly impossible information about the behaviour of ourselves, of Homo sapiens.

==== 1c) Is the foundation of Humanistic Psychology an Evolutionary Paradox ? ====
{{level|2}} However, at first sight it does make absolutely no sense that in Homo sapiens, considering itself as the evolutionary pinnacle of intelligence, it seems to work the other way around as what is the case in the rest of the animal kingdom. Just a minority of the human population seems to be actualizing the full innate behavioural repertoire, while the majority gets stuck in truncated behaviour patterns, neuroses and other fear clusters. How strange ! If the available data are correct and interpreted in the right way, there must be something quite extraordinary going on in our own species !

In what follows below we need to stay aware of this puzzling question mark.

The second finding we need to take into account is about:

=== 2) How we learn from experience ===
==== 2a) The CEL (Cognition-Energy-Learning model)====
{{level|2}} The development of the CEL [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (1)|(Cognition-Energy-Learning)]](***) model, my novel theory of learning, based on Apter and Smith's Reversal Theory, but then expanded with some evolutionary considerations, shows that the system of emotional and motivational reversals can be regarded as the behavioural engine that is needed to enable individuals to make optimum use of an open-ended capacity of learning. This model deals with the antagonist system of telic and paratelic (meta)motivational states that motors the processes of gathering relevant experiences. That implies that any species with the capacity to acquire a behavioural repertoire that is specifically geared to deal with different personal coincidental circumstances of living, does have such a reversal system in its behavioural organisation. Without such a reversal system, a capacity for situational adaptation is not possible.
It does not need much explanation that such a CEL, when it developed some hundred million years ago, was a major step forward in the evolution of flexible behaviour patterns that can adapt to changing circumstances.

Whereas the CEL, as a relatively new learning paradigm, is not widely in use yet among scientists, it is basically nothing very special. It is a behavioural asset that is available in many animal species from different evolutonary phyla.

==== 2b) The CEL and contagiousness====
{{level|2}}What is of importance here, is that this CEL model describes that learning and behavioural growth is not only flexible, but also [[The_evolutionary_stability_of_a_bi-stable_system_of_emotions_and_motivations_in_species_with_an_open-ended_capacity_for_learning#Positive_and_negative_learning_spirals|highly contagious]](***). In other words, badly processed experiences lead to emergency-oriented, rough and ready, behavioural avoidance responses, fear complexes and neuroticism, and such fear complexes diminish the likelihood of a proper processing of further experiences in the future. Reversely, well-processed experiences increase the likelihood of well processing further experiences and thus a further increase of skills and mastery.
From [[Learning_from_aversive_experiences;_the_effect_of_timing|experiments with mice]](**) I learned that the "timing" of experiences was a major determining factor for resulting in either high level skills, or just in clusters of rough and ready avoidance reflexes.

There is a basic "unfairness" to the whole learning mechanism, in that the already favoured individuals learn best and the misfits have the worst chances to further profit from their further experiences. The learning system tends to further amplify already existing differences in development.

But from an evolutionary point of view, the system works very efficient en economical.
Basically the CEL harbours two types of so called positive reinforcement loops, one in the direction of gaining skills and mastery, and the other in the direction of culminating avoidance reflexes and eventually neuroses. (see the figure below)

[[File:Dependence of positive and negative learning spirals on proper rhythms of telic paratelic alternations.png|none|framed|'''Figure 2b.1.''' Positive and negative learning spirals, showing alternations between telic and paratelic states]]

[[File:Positive and negative learning spirals.png|framed|none|'''Figure 2b.2.''' The relation between the reversal system of antagonistic motivations and processes of learning]]

''(Note that both the "positive learning spiral" as well as the "negative learning spiral" are, technically speaking, "positive feed back loops, loops with a positive reinforcement.)''

==== 2c) [[Energy_and_Strokes|Contagiousness between individuals]](***) ====
{{level|1}}Within an individual, well processing of experiences is contagious and badly processing of experiences also is contagious, but in the other direction.
Besides, on top of that, a similar contagiousness also exists between individuals of the same group, living together. The more skilled the other members of the group, the better the chances of an individual to also end up in learning spirals in the desired direction, towards more mastery and skills. And the more neurotics and fear ridden cowards around, the worse are the chances for an individual to learn optimally from his or her experiences.

==== 2d) Evolutionary efficiency of the CEL ====
{{level|1}}The CEL predicts that there are basically two optional outcomes of a sequence of experiences. The one option is the favorable one, leading to increasing skills and mastery and the other option is leading to increasing avoidance clusters and a truncated behavioural repertoire.
In other species, the unfavorable option mainly occurs in a minority of the specimens, in the minority of individuals who don't make it and in that way are "weeded out" more efficiently and more quickly than what would be the case without such a behavioural provision. The open ended learning capacity is that way boosting processes of natural selection, favoring the specimens with the highest learning capacity. This organization of behaviour and of the learning system thus obviously makes evolutionary sense. And that's why this mechanism of flexible learning spread so successfully in many phyla of animals, and what is more, independently of one another.

=== 3) Theory of the point of inflection ===

==== 3a) Positive reinforcement loops in two directions ====
{{level|2}} The positive reinforcement character of both the favourable and the unfavourable option of the process of learning and development does have similar results as comparable systems with a double mechanism of positive reinforcement. As an example we may consider what happens in a chemical solution with a strong acid and a strong basic component. In such a watery solution the water molecules react in an acidic or in a basic way, depending on which types of molecules constitute the majority. The way the water molecules behave is more or less in line with how the majority of the molecules in that watery solution behave in their direct surrounding. And that statistic bias in the behaviour of the water molecules reinforces the percentual bias in the chemical behaviour of the solution. The behaviour of the water molecules is subject to two antagonist positive reinforcement effects stemming from the acidic part and from the basic part of the components in the solution. The net result of these opposite but complementary reinforcement loops is that the acidity (pH) of the solution very rapidly changes if close to the chemical equilibrium between acid and base and that it only changes gradually if the solution is far away from the equilibrium point. The result is the well known S-curve of acidity as depending on the amount of acid or base added.

[[Image:Acid base titration curve.png]]

==== 3b) The inflection-point relationship between self-actualization of individuals and self-actualization in the population at large ====
{{level|2}}Individual chances for an optimal development depend on the percentage of individuals around who have emotional space and energy to hand out "strokes", also to the individual(s) in question. Let's change focus from learning animals in general to the situation in Homo sapiens. Attaining optimal frequencies of telic-paratelic switches, necessary for the best possible learning results, is [[Energy and Strokes|most likely to occur in a social environment of Self-actualizers]](***). And the other way around. It is clear that also here we are dealing with a system with self-strengthening feed back loops in two directions.

The contagiousness between people implies that the more Self-actualizers there are in a population, the better the chances for any individual in that population to also attain self-actualization / actualization of the innate potentials. And reversely, the more neurotic and fear ridden individuals there are in a population, the more likely it is that any individual in that population also will end up as fear ridden and neurotic.

From the perspective of process dynamics we are dealing here also with two antagonistic positive reinforcement loops, each with an opposite final result.
From a technical point of view, both options are stable in itself, because of the built in positive feed back loops.

Having seen above that in present day humans the learning process is in general miraculously impaired compared to what in principle would be possible from a congenital point of view, the question arises why the neuroticizing variety of the two options apparently has prevailed. We will return to that question further below.

***************
hier figuur van S-curve van kans op actualization as dependent on % of self-actualizers in the population

[[Image:Self actualization s-curve.png]]

The above figure expresses the effect of positive feed back mechanisms in two opposite directions and the resulting S-curve relationship between the likelihood for an individual to attain optimal development as depending on the average developmental health of the whole social environment.
What remains is the question at what % of self-actualizers the inflection point may be expected, where an extra addition of self-actualizers in the population will have an increasingly strong effect on the condition of the whole population.

=== 4) The usual [[Self-blindness_in_humans_as_prerequisite_for_the_evolution_of_advanced_intelligence|Upper Limit of Intelligence in Evolution]](**) ===
{{level|2}} The fourth finding is an issue that is rather novel and that thus far only once has been published at a scientific congress.

There is something peculiar going on in evolution as far as intelligence is concerned. In different phyla, in quite different eras of earthly evolution, species developed intelligence, which we define here as freely applicable information processing capacity.
What strikes the observer, is that in all those different phyla, and in all those different evolutionary eras, the level of intelligence acquired ends at more or less the same level.
That suggests that there exists a functional upper limit to freely applicable information processing capacity. Apparently, a too high level of intelligence in principle is not an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy).

Considering how behaviour evolves and is selected for in evolution, it is easily noticed that there is a certain, all-important relationship between the proximate causes of behaviour, the innate reflexes of liking and disliking, of approach and avoidance on the one hand and on the other hand the ultimate (evolutionary) reasons for certain behavioural reflexes, which are the ultimate procreational results. What is important here to note, is that selection forces exert their influence on the ultimate effects of the proximate behaviours, whereas only the proximate feelings and urges themselves are present in the awareness of the actors. The actors are not aware of the ultimate effects of their behaviour and they could not care less.
It can be argued that an intelligence that reaches the level where it can be applied to (re-)considering its own proximate urges and to finding short-cuts to attain desired results in non-traditional ways, is likely to discover new, different ways to fulfill short term proximate urges, but without the customary non-conscious ultimate effects at the level of reproduction and therefore also without paying the "price" for it, in terms of a lower proximate average level of satisfaction (which they are not aware of anyway).

Our hypothesis is therefore that in principle a too high intelligence will automatically weed itself out as soon as it enables the carrier of that intelligence to manipulate its own behaviour in order to fulfill proximate desires in novel and "clever" ways, different from the evolutionary "meaning" or "goal" of the original reflex-based behaviour.

[[File:Self-blindness_poster (2).png|800px]]

Only by developing a special characteristic, a specific blindness for the own behaviour, blocking the utilization of intelligence for finding different options for satisfying urges concerning the own behaviour and social behaviour, could the intelligence of our early ancestors rise above the ordinary upper level of intelligence.

=== 5) The [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#New_demands_and_requirements_since_the_agricultural_revolution|Evolution of Power Structures]](**) ===
{{level|1}} Since the agricultural revolution a different type of evolution started off. That is the evolution of sets of "memes" that form power structures. Labeling the ordinary evolution, based on DNA, as "hardware"-evolution, that evolution of power structures can be labeled as a "software"-evolution.
The point is that agriculture is technically impossible if there is not a military organization that secures the products of the agricultural efforts for the people who have made the investment in agricultural labour and work.
This development is very recent, just between 5.000 and 10.000 years old in most inhabited regions of the world.

=== 6) [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|Evolutionary Jet-Lag]](**) ===
{{level|1}} The evolution of power structures can proceed at a higher speed than the evolution of DNA. Software needs less time to evolve and change than does hardware.
Humans beings are the carriers of genes as well as of memes. Humanity is therefore suffering from [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|evolutionary "jet-lag"]](**) in that our primordial hardware is lagging behind as compared to the demands from the recently evolved software of the power structures. This evolutionary jet-lag produces mismatches between what we "really" want (primordial P-feelings) and what the power structures demand from us ("new" N-demands).

=== 7) [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|N-demands versus P-feelings]](**), their effect on Self-actualization in power structures ===
{{level|1}} Power structures need high quantities of malleable, docile slaves and military to man the agricultural mass projects and the warring machinery. One of the methods to produce high percentages of docile people is inducing neurotic states in as many of the human beings/carriers involved as possible. Neurotics may function sub-optimal as compared to their original congenital potential, but they can easier be manipulated into obeying the requirements of the power structures in charge. It is therefore not surprising that the data available to us indicate that indeed in the case of contemporary human societies the full actualization of the innate potentials is the exception, rather than the rule, which has always been applicable for other species.
The situation in Homo sapiens appears to be exceptional indeed (and not in a pleasant way).

=== 8) Means of subjugation ===
{{level|1}}

- We can recognize several mechanisms in the working of human societies that help to [[Impersonal_Power_Structures_ruling_our_world|keep the carriers of the power structures subdued]](*) and immersed in neuroticizing processes of control and deformation. We mention a few:

- We maintain schooling systems that "inject" knowledge but that block awareness of the CEL dynamics, which results in blocking self-actualization.

- We instill and maintain "working" ethics to the extent that it is detrimental for optimal frequencies of meta-motivational reversals (see the article about learning experiments with house mice) (see more details about the CEL here).

- We seduce captains of industry and captains of other systems of slavery to continue doing their job with exorbitant salaries.

- We always turn spiritual movements gradually into [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Good_and_Evil.2C_how_great_religions_consolidate_their_power|religions of superstition and blindness]](*).

- We maintain strict information privileges for the people in control of the masses that are kept stupid.

- The innate propensity for Self-Blindness in humans is amplified where possible.

- The Blindness for the own system of feelings and impulses is so elementary, that in all languages that I am familiar with, there is not even a word for the most elementary and most basic of all emotional and motivational switches in our behaviour. We have words for fear, love, hate, pleasure, panic, curiosity, hesitation, anger, etc., but a word for the telic motivational state or its antagonist, the paratelic state does not exist. Words for those most elementary aspects of the dynamics of motivation and emotion needed to be coined artificially, borrowing it from the greek word "telos" or goal/target.

- etc., etc.

=== 9) N-demands from the Power Structures ===
==== 9a) N-demands and the low level performance of human beings ====
{{level|1}} Taking the above findings and considerations together, a possible explanation of the strange rarity of self-actualization in the case of the human species emerges.
That explanation is that since the agricultural revolution our species has been pushed into systems of neurotization and subjugation. The [[Impersonal_Power_Structures_ruling_our_world|power structures]](*), that are in the lead since that time, take a strongly lowered useful output per person for granted in exchange for a much higher malleability and docility of their carriers. Thus the power structures that neuroticized best could outcompete power structures that were less effective in that sense.
If this view is correct, it would explain the at first sight incomprehensible phenomenon that the majority of the human species is functioning way below its congenital capacities and that in our species self-actualization is the exception rather than the rule, as it is in other species. Our species is in general considered as the pinnacle of (primate) evolution, but it almost exclusively consists of underperformers. How strange !

==== 9b) N-demands versus the two Basic Options of the Learning System ====
{{level|1}} However, knowing how the mechanism of learning and development works, it is also clear that from a purely technical point of view, the opposite option in principle also exists, the option of a critical % of the population being in a state of self-actualization and as a consequence a very high likelihood of also attaining self-actualization for any individual in that population. Technically speaking, both options exist, although large and by humanity has not experienced the favourable option for many thousands of years.

There are some exceptions that may be found in remote corners of the earth where the power structures have not - yet - managed to establish their power. For an eloquent description of how such groups of not yet corrupted and still self-actualized people view our complex, modern societies, one may read [[Further_reading#Scheurmann1927|The Papalagi, by Scheurmann (1927)]](*), a series of lectures by a Samoan chief, [[Further_reading#Tiavea1976|Tuiavii of Tiavea (1976)]](*), to his fellow-villagers about how things work in Europe, after he had been invited by the French government to experience civilization and tell about it at home.

=== 10) Modern developments undermining the customary subjugation props of the power structures ===
{{level|1}} Having researched the above mentioned mechanisms that help to keep the carriers of the power structures subdued and immersed in neuroticizing processes of control and deformation, we have reached the conclusion that many or most of these props as automatically and involuntarily (as evolution works) applied by power structures are quickly crumbling down under pressure of modern technical developments. We name a few of those developments that are ever more undermining the web of subjugation tricks that always served to keep us bound in slavery in whichever of the prevailing power structures: the information explosion, the democratization of information, the increasing transparency on all levels, family planning techniques, techniques for eugenic planning, unlimited availability of energy, technical innovations and machinery making slavery superfluous, etc., etc. (see [[Directives_for_after_Point_Omega|here]] for more information about these new developments).

=== Conclusion ===
{{level|1}} Our estimate is that not only are we in a situation where the above developments are in a process of speeding up, undermining the previously absolute power of the impersonal power structures ever faster, but also that we are in the phase of the exponential rise in the average chances for individuals to attain full actualization of their innate potential. That would imply that we are getting closer and closer to the inflection point that we have labeled as Point Omega.
The conclusion is not only that Homo sapiens does have the very realistic option to become immeasurably more effective, but that we are in fact very close to that shift, a shift that is likely to happen with unexpected suddennes and unexpected speed, similar to what happens with the above mentioned acid-base solution when we add the last drop of alkaline solution to the mixture, before it suddenly swaps to a couple of pH grades rise per drop, changing the indicator-colouring all of a sudden.

So, taking the 10 findings as mentioned above together, our conclusion is that a Point Omega transition is near. And that transition not only will launch humanity in its next evolutionary phase, but the whole planet Earth will enter a different phase in its evolutionary development because ............ intelligence will finally start to understand itself. And one of the consequences of that self-awareness of intelligence will be that human stewardship over the world will get a new and more serious connotation.

=== The Point Omega transition in Evolutionary Perspective ===
{{level|1}}To facilitate a proper understanding of where we stand in evolution and which evolutionary phases had to be completed before we ended up standing at the brink of "conscious evolution", we give here a listing of the steps of evolution that came before.

Let's start with the statement that what perceptibly exists, has a certain stability over time, more than alternative configurations.
Molecular configurations with higher chemical stability are therefore the configurations that are more common than their alternatives.
In fact, this description may be viewed as a tautology.
Basically, the whole of evolution may similarly be regarded as a tautological concept. Evolution exists, because that's how it works with matter. [[Further reading#Monod1971|(For a good argumentation for this line of thought see for instance Jackes Monod: Chance and Necessity, 1971]].(*))
But we will dive into the details a bit further, because it is of course the details of our own role in evolution that matter most to us.
Posing the "why" question in relation to these matters is therefore a token of "misunderstanding it all". The only reason why things exist is because those things are evolutionarily stable enough. And that's all. (Clinging to the "why" question instead of to the "how" question may be taken as a token of neuroticism and chronic unhappiness.)

- Conditions on our planet Earth have since a long time been suitable for the formation of large and eventually complex molecules.

- At some stage molecules were coincidentally formed, that had a novel property, which was that they acted as catalizers for the formation of more of these same types of molecules.

- Once this effect emerged, a type of evolution of as yet "non-living" matter got started, the self replicating molecules coming in more and more varieties. This process took vast amount of time.

- A next step in this sequence of evolutionary events is when different types of self-replicating molecules start a form of symbiosis, helping one another in each one's self-replicating effects, for instance by influencing the flow of certain chemical compounds to one another's advantage. Such combinations of different self-replicators already change in the direction of organelles or units that could also act as (still primitive) functional parts of a cel.

- At some stage in such a soup of self-replicating molecules and already more complex proto-organelles, organelles may combine and form a communal form of defense, an outer layer that is difficult to penetrate for other, competing, replicators. What emerges in that way can be considered a first approach to the phenomenon of cell walls. And all that is the beginning of what we tend to label as "life". The cells that start to emerge in that way each contain different structures that cooperate, each with their own specialization. Cells contain primitive organelles. This happened some 5.000 million to 3.500 million years ago (which is still less than the last 10% of the total period of life on planet Earth).

- Once that life phase has started, evolution can really start off at an ever increasing speed. Self-reduplication of course not always is perfect, mistakes do happen, so variation is paramount and the best varieties continue their lineage best. And that is what evolution is all about. Once cells inhabit a variety of places and conditions, different varieties, adapted to different circumstances emerge and that variation starts to lead a life of its own. Evolution proceeds.

- Multiplying cells need materials for the composition of the organelles and tissues that the cells need for their offspring. Also, collecting energy is one of the methods to improve the speed of reduplication. Energy can be used to move around matter that cells need to grow and multiply. Cells have found different methods to tap energy from the environment and utilize that energy for growth and multiplication.

- One of the energy-tapping methods is absorbing fotons from light sources. Plant cells can do that and they can use for instance chlorophyll molecules to "catch" fotons from the light. With chlorophyll they are fishing for energy, energy from light rays.

- Another method of tapping energy is by making use of great local differences in temperature, tapping the calory-flow. This happens for instance in the life forms that evolved around deep sea hot springs, where high pressure hot water continuously escapes from the volcanic rock structures under the sea floor. Here temperature flows are the fuel for a rather complete ecosystem and not the flow of light. Etc., etc.

- Plants are groups of cells, each with their specialization, that collect their energy from light, by means of chlorophyll.

- A next development was the emergence of entities that do not bother to collect energy from light themselves, but "eat" the energy as stored in the plant bodies. Such living entities we label as herbivores.

- And subsequently, also carnivores emerge, because it is relatively easy to consume and process living matter that is already very much composed as is the body of the predator itself. Converting flesh into animal matter takes less energy than converting plants. So, by then evolution has produced bacteria and other one-cell organisms, plants, herbivores, carnivores and of course also organisms who get their energy and basic building materials from dead or decaying plant- or animal bodies. Fungi are for instance of that class of living things.

- Microbes or plants that catch light for their growth are normally sedentary. They sit in their place and live from what is available in their immediate surrounding. Animals differ from plants in that they can move from place to place. But in order to move they need a system of perception and of generating a preference of where to go to. Animals are moving entities and they differ from plants in that they all have developed a perception system for assessing important aspects in the environment and a system that makes them move in the preferred direction. So, once animals have evolved, these entities do have a system of emotions and motivations. If not, they would just sit still and not move.
Being attracted by something and being repulsed by something else is therefore an indispensable characteristic of any animal, no matter how small. In higher, more complex, animals we tend to label these tendencies as emotions and or motivations.

- For processing incoming information and for translating that information into useful action, a nervous system is useful and so all higher, more complex, animals have a nervous system, a sort of controlling and coordination center.

- Once animal nervous systems have been developed in all sorts of variations and sizes, sooner or later more sophisticated systems of data processing evolve. We can call that intelligence. What we see in the animal kingdom, is that in many era's of evolution and in many phyla of animals, intelligence has developed. And those developments have emerged completely independently of one another.
What should be noted here, is that in all cases (except our own case) the evolved levels of intelligence are about of the same level, no matter how many millions of years the development of such an intelligence had time to evolve further. What also is striking, is that intelligence emerged in quite different nervous systems. The nervous systems of vertebrates, like monkeys or whales, birds or dogs, have a comparable set up. In each of those phyla one finds very dull, non-intelligent species as well as quite intelligent species. But similarly high intelligence has also developed in mollusks, like in various octopus species. Their composite nervous system is located in different parts of the body and this very different basic design nevertheless produced a comparable level of intelligence.
Elsewhere on this Wiki we have explained what is the reason of this same level of intelligence in so many different animal species.
That reason is that normally, basically and firstly, there is a functional upper limit to freely applicable intelligence. As soon as intelligence reaches a level where it can be utilized to find short cuts to proximate satisfaction, that higher intelligence will weed itself out automatically (see point 4 above).

- However, once that maximum level of freely applicable intelligence has emerged in a number of species, sooner or later one species will develop a way around that maximum. That is what happened in the ancestors of Homo, later - sapiens, where a trick was built into the system that was making sure that the intelligence could not any longer be utilized for finding short cuts for the fulfillment of proximate impulses. So, now we have a species saddled with Self-Blindness, and as a consequence the intelligence of Homo could rise further, way above the ordinary upper limit of intelligence. (We can describe this as a pun: we became so intelligent, because we are so incredibly stupid !)

- One of the consequences of such a rising intelligence is that gradually the species in question, us, will manage more and more to escape from the traditional dangers like predators, hunting accidents, etc. They get too clever to compete on an equal level with the competing species around. They become an ecologically dominant species. More than is the case in other related species, primates in our case, Homo sapiens became increasingly its own predator and competitor. It is not surprising therefore that [[Further reading#Gómez2016|recent research (see Gómez et al.(2016)]](***) has shown that Homo sapiens is by nature more violent towards conspecifics than are other primates. Homocidal tendencies are more prominent in us than in our relatives.

- When intelligence started to increase in Homo sapiens above its ordinary upper limit, freed by Self-Blindness, we were living in hunter-gatherer bands. This development started between 1 and 2 million years ago. During that time "Homo" really became "sapiens" and increasingly made use of tools and fire. Brain size increased, language developed further, but on the other hand giving birth became an increasing problem. The birth canal has not evolved to let such a big skull pass. The possibility to give birth to skulls as big as Human babies have, is a relatively recent evolutionary adaptation. And it is evidently an adaptation that could improve a lot more in due evolutionary time.

Nevertheless, in spite of being more violent to one another than were related primate species, at that point of evolution our innate tendencies and feelings were still well in balance with the niche we lived in. After becoming ecologically dominant, Homo sapiens, living in hunter gatherer bands during a period of about 1 million years, evolution had had plenty of time to bring our instincts in balance with our new niche. That behavioural balance would only be disturbed much later, only some 40.000 years ago, when some hunter-gatherer groups took up a life style of exploiting an exceptionally rich source of food in some particular location. Such a new focus would trigger the need for defending such a specific location with those extraordinary food-sources. And effective defense requires more hierarchical social relationships. On the other hand it also allowed for higher population densities locally. Finally, some 10.000 years ago, this tendency resulted in outright, full fledged agriculture.

And from that time on, also the meme-evolution started to gain momentum.

- The shift from hunter-gatherers to firstly "delayed return" hunter gatherers (or non-egalitarian or semi-sedentary hunter gatherers) and later to "real" agriculture, is in a very comprehensible way [[Further reading#Gray2009|summarized by Peter Gray]](**).
From that time on there was a need for an organization for defending the own food sources, but not all of the semi-sedentary tribes developed the skills for dealing with intraspecific adversaries.
And such military requirements would need more hierarchical structures. Research shows that bands of "simple" hunter gatherers used to predate on the resources of the "delayed return" hunter gatherers. Nevertheless, such "delayed return hunter-gatherers" started to emerge in more and more places and produced in general more offspring than their their "simple hunter-gatherer" conspecifics could manage.

- By that time Homo sapiens had entered the next step in human evolution, the "invention" of agriculture. Agriculture is the ultimate way to change the environment as to get as much food and needed materials from it as possible. There is however a heavy price to be paid inevitably for starting agriculture. And that is that agriculture is only possible in combination with an increased warring capacity to wage war on a massive scale.

- At that point in evolution, the evolution of software items, "memes" takes over, because meme level power structures can and do evolve much faster than do DNA based evolutionary processes. Power structures make use of us, intelligent carriers, and compete with one another, but always over the backs of their subjects. The power structure that is best in wielding masses of soldiers and masses of slaves, will outcompete other power structures.

- Because of the difference in speed of the evolution on the meme-level, as compared to the speed of evolution on the gene-level, we Humans, as carrier of the meme-level information as well as carriers of the gene-level information, have suffered, since the start of the agricultural revolution, from a sort of evolutionary Jet-lag. Such a situation, wherever in the universe, only will last as long as the power structures can abuse their carriers to maximize their chances in the competition with other power structures.
At some stage, the raised intelligence will, in combination with technological developments, start to look through and to understand the nature of the Jet-Lag and of the slavery aspects of living in the power structures. At that point there will occur a break down of the power structure configuration of human life on earth, triggered by an understanding that escapes from its ordinary cognitive shackles. Curiosity at that point wins over fear. We have labeled that point in time as Point Omega.

- The next stage, that is awaiting us now, is the start of conscious evolution. It will be understood how and why in the old situation it always was structurally impossible to organize a lasting societal structure that was supportive of human wishes and preferences, peaceful and agreeable. The influence of genetic pollution and of selection cycles in social structures will be understood and will be replaced by various forms of conscious evolution, then easily bypassing the classical sources of war, genocide and economic strangling techniques.
The issues that will be fought about will shift to discussions about which direction we prefer for our conscious evolution. But that is by far a luxury problem as compared to what mankind has been subjected to for the last 10.000 years.

The above listing of the different phases in evolution does not represent a regularly distributed time schedule. The different phases in the beginning of evolution are wide apart and each cover very long time periods, hundreds of millions of years. The more recent phases have taken ever less time. The latest evolutionary phases as described above follow each other in historical time, which means "within the blink of an eye" as compared to earlier epochs.
Our conclusion is that we, the human species, finds itself right now in a very special and unique situation. We are at the point of shifting into a totally different mode of evolution, "conscious evolution". It is only natural that for most people this shift, the most important shift in the whole of human history, is still inconceivable. The concepts that, together, are required for understanding this situation, are not yet part of our contemporary culture. That is still to come. Nevertheless, our (as yet private and personal) conclusion is that the Point Omega shift is very near and that the accelaration phase of the transition seems to have started already. The theory predicts that awareness of what is really going on, will tend to lag behind the flow of events. Therefore most probably mankind will completely be taken by surprise.

I hope that for the curious reader the evolutionary "reason" for, or rather the evolutionary "origin" of this development, this Point Omega transition, has been clarified a bit in these pages.

File:Acid base titration curve.png

2017-02-18T16:39:49Z

BigSmoke: BigSmoke uploaded a new version of File:Acid base titration curve.png

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2017-02-18T16:38:02Z

BigSmoke:

Why a Point Omega transition ?

2017-02-18T16:37:27Z

BigSmoke: /* 3a) Positive reinforcement loops in two directions */ figure

(nog toevoegen: 2 figuren )
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<big>Why we shortly can expect a sudden Point Omega transition:</big> 
the implication of antagonist mechanisms of positive reinforcement in processes of human learning and of human development

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{{level|2}}This article explains how the conclusion was reached that it is likely that humanity will shortly go through a transition that will change the life of us humans more than anything before in human history, yes even more than anything in human evolution.
If our deductions are correct, the coming transition will even be a novelty from the perspective of evolution itself. In that case it will in fact be the emergence of "conscious evolution" which we can safely consider as the culmination of life on earth.

What is more, if our deductions are right it should be considered as a basic law of nature that on any planet in the universe where life is possible, sooner or later "conscious evolution" will emerge. For our planet that moment in time is now, or rather, very soon. And we humans are the carriers of that pinnacle of evolution.

This conclusion, that we can indeed expect such a sudden rise in human potentials and in the quality of human functioning, is based on a combination of 10 findings.
We will mention these 10 findings very briefly below, and then indicate how taking these 10 findings together, leads us to quite surprising conclusions, conclusions that seem quite unbelievable at first sight.
About each of these findings more detailed information and argumentation can be found in other articles on this Wiki. Links are provided in the text, indicated with (*), (**) or (***), depending on the level of detail.
Some of these findings are well known, but are commonly not applied in a context as we apply it here.
Some other findings are also well established, but as yet only in circles of specialist researchers.
Finally, some of the findings that we utilize here, are novel in the sense that they have not yet been published before, or only very briefly. The latter findings have as yet not been the subject of a broad scientific discussion.

The first of these 10 findings is about the following.
=== 1) Unfolding of innate (congenital) potentials, yes or no ? ===
==== 1a) Self-actualization the exception, rather than the rule, in Homo sapiens ====
{{level|1}} Self-actualization, the coming to bloom of a rather complete collection of innate potentials in a human being is the exception, rather than the rule. That is very different from how it works in other species. How is that strange and unexpected situation possible and how could that be an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) ?

==== 1b) Maslow and the foundation of [[Behaviorism_versus_Humanism,_an_Integration;_Application_of_the_Cognition_Energy_Learning_Model_(CEL)_on_an_old_controversy|Humanistic Psychology]](**) ====
{{level|1}}- Maslow, the author who launched that concept, I could not discard as being mistaken. He appeared to have done his homework quite thoroughly, starting with his research on monkeys and subsequently investigating if and how his findings also pertained to humans. Although going quite strongly against anything that an evolutionary biologist would expect, Homo sapiens emerged from his research as an anomaly, an evolutionary contradiction, in the sense that we apparently are a species in which the majority of the members are functioning way below their inborn potentials and not the other way around, as is customary in any other species. So, not being able to discard Maslow's work as mistaken, I was left with contradictory and seemingly impossible information about the behaviour of ourselves, of Homo sapiens.

==== 1c) Is the foundation of Humanistic Psychology an Evolutionary Paradox ? ====
{{level|2}} However, at first sight it does make absolutely no sense that in Homo sapiens, considering itself as the evolutionary pinnacle of intelligence, it seems to work the other way around as what is the case in the rest of the animal kingdom. Just a minority of the human population seems to be actualizing the full innate behavioural repertoire, while the majority gets stuck in truncated behaviour patterns, neuroses and other fear clusters. How strange ! If the available data are correct and interpreted in the right way, there must be something quite extraordinary going on in our own species !

In what follows below we need to stay aware of this puzzling question mark.

The second finding we need to take into account is about:

=== 2) How we learn from experience ===
==== 2a) The CEL (Cognition-Energy-Learning model)====
{{level|2}} The development of the CEL [[Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (1)|(Cognition-Energy-Learning)]](***) model, my novel theory of learning, based on Apter and Smith's Reversal Theory, but then expanded with some evolutionary considerations, shows that the system of emotional and motivational reversals can be regarded as the behavioural engine that is needed to enable individuals to make optimum use of an open-ended capacity of learning. This model deals with the antagonist system of telic and paratelic (meta)motivational states that motors the processes of gathering relevant experiences. That implies that any species with the capacity to acquire a behavioural repertoire that is specifically geared to deal with different personal coincidental circumstances of living, does have such a reversal system in its behavioural organisation. Without such a reversal system, a capacity for situational adaptation is not possible.
It does not need much explanation that such a CEL, when it developed some hundred million years ago, was a major step forward in the evolution of flexible behaviour patterns that can adapt to changing circumstances.

Whereas the CEL, as a relatively new learning paradigm, is not widely in use yet among scientists, it is basically nothing very special. It is a behavioural asset that is available in many animal species from different evolutonary phyla.

==== 2b) The CEL and contagiousness====
{{level|2}}What is of importance here, is that this CEL model describes that learning and behavioural growth is not only flexible, but also [[The_evolutionary_stability_of_a_bi-stable_system_of_emotions_and_motivations_in_species_with_an_open-ended_capacity_for_learning#Positive_and_negative_learning_spirals|highly contagious]](***). In other words, badly processed experiences lead to emergency-oriented, rough and ready, behavioural avoidance responses, fear complexes and neuroticism, and such fear complexes diminish the likelihood of a proper processing of further experiences in the future. Reversely, well-processed experiences increase the likelihood of well processing further experiences and thus a further increase of skills and mastery.
From [[Learning_from_aversive_experiences;_the_effect_of_timing|experiments with mice]](**) I learned that the "timing" of experiences was a major determining factor for resulting in either high level skills, or just in clusters of rough and ready avoidance reflexes.

There is a basic "unfairness" to the whole learning mechanism, in that the already favoured individuals learn best and the misfits have the worst chances to further profit from their further experiences. The learning system tends to further amplify already existing differences in development.

But from an evolutionary point of view, the system works very efficient en economical.
Basically the CEL harbours two types of so called positive reinforcement loops, one in the direction of gaining skills and mastery, and the other in the direction of culminating avoidance reflexes and eventually neuroses. (see the figure below)

[[File:Dependence of positive and negative learning spirals on proper rhythms of telic paratelic alternations.png|none|framed|'''Figure 2b.1.''' Positive and negative learning spirals, showing alternations between telic and paratelic states]]

[[File:Positive and negative learning spirals.png|framed|none|'''Figure 2b.2.''' The relation between the reversal system of antagonistic motivations and processes of learning]]

''(Note that both the "positive learning spiral" as well as the "negative learning spiral" are, technically speaking, "positive feed back loops, loops with a positive reinforcement.)''

==== 2c) [[Energy_and_Strokes|Contagiousness between individuals]](***) ====
{{level|1}}Within an individual, well processing of experiences is contagious and badly processing of experiences also is contagious, but in the other direction.
Besides, on top of that, a similar contagiousness also exists between individuals of the same group, living together. The more skilled the other members of the group, the better the chances of an individual to also end up in learning spirals in the desired direction, towards more mastery and skills. And the more neurotics and fear ridden cowards around, the worse are the chances for an individual to learn optimally from his or her experiences.

==== 2d) Evolutionary efficiency of the CEL ====
{{level|1}}The CEL predicts that there are basically two optional outcomes of a sequence of experiences. The one option is the favorable one, leading to increasing skills and mastery and the other option is leading to increasing avoidance clusters and a truncated behavioural repertoire.
In other species, the unfavorable option mainly occurs in a minority of the specimens, in the minority of individuals who don't make it and in that way are "weeded out" more efficiently and more quickly than what would be the case without such a behavioural provision. The open ended learning capacity is that way boosting processes of natural selection, favoring the specimens with the highest learning capacity. This organization of behaviour and of the learning system thus obviously makes evolutionary sense. And that's why this mechanism of flexible learning spread so successfully in many phyla of animals, and what is more, independently of one another.

=== 3) Theory of the point of inflection ===

==== 3a) Positive reinforcement loops in two directions ====
{{level|2}} The positive reinforcement character of both the favourable and the unfavourable option of the process of learning and development does have similar results as comparable systems with a double mechanism of positive reinforcement. As an example we may consider what happens in a chemical solution with a strong acid and a strong basic component. In such a watery solution the water molecules react in an acidic or in a basic way, depending on which types of molecules constitute the majority. The way the water molecules behave is more or less in line with how the majority of the molecules in that watery solution behave in their direct surrounding. And that statistic bias in the behaviour of the water molecules reinforces the percentual bias in the chemical behaviour of the solution. The behaviour of the water molecules is subject to two antagonist positive reinforcement effects stemming from the acidic part and from the basic part of the components in the solution. The net result of these opposite but complementary reinforcement loops is that the acidity (pH) of the solution very rapidly changes if close to the chemical equilibrium between acid and base and that it only changes gradually if the solution is far away from the equilibrium point. The result is the well known S-curve of acidity as depending on the amount of acid or base added.

[[Image:Acid base titration curve.png]]

==== 3b) The inflection-point relationship between self-actualization of individuals and self-actualization in the population at large ====
{{level|2}}Individual chances for an optimal development depend on the percentage of individuals around who have emotional space and energy to hand out "strokes", also to the individual(s) in question. Let's change focus from learning animals in general to the situation in Homo sapiens. Attaining optimal frequencies of telic-paratelic switches, necessary for the best possible learning results, is [[Energy and Strokes|most likely to occur in a social environment of Self-actualizers]](***). And the other way around. It is clear that also here we are dealing with a system with self-strengthening feed back loops in two directions.

The contagiousness between people implies that the more Self-actualizers there are in a population, the better the chances for any individual in that population to also attain self-actualization / actualization of the innate potentials. And reversely, the more neurotic and fear ridden individuals there are in a population, the more likely it is that any individual in that population also will end up as fear ridden and neurotic.

From the perspective of process dynamics we are dealing here also with two antagonistic positive reinforcement loops, each with an opposite final result.
From a technical point of view, both options are stable in itself, because of the built in positive feed back loops.

Having seen above that in present day humans the learning process is in general miraculously impaired compared to what in principle would be possible from a congenital point of view, the question arises why the neuroticizing variety of the two options apparently has prevailed. We will return to that question further below.

***************
hier figuur van S-curve van kans op actualization as dependent on % of self-actualizers in the population

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The above figure expresses the effect of positive feed back mechanisms in two opposite directions and the resulting S-curve relationship between the likelihood for an individual to attain optimal development as depending on the average developmental health of the whole social environment.
What remains is the question at what % of self-actualizers the inflection point may be expected, where an extra addition of self-actualizers in the population will have an increasingly strong effect on the condition of the whole population.

=== 4) The usual [[Self-blindness_in_humans_as_prerequisite_for_the_evolution_of_advanced_intelligence|Upper Limit of Intelligence in Evolution]](**) ===
{{level|2}} The fourth finding is an issue that is rather novel and that thus far only once has been published at a scientific congress.

There is something peculiar going on in evolution as far as intelligence is concerned. In different phyla, in quite different eras of earthly evolution, species developed intelligence, which we define here as freely applicable information processing capacity.
What strikes the observer, is that in all those different phyla, and in all those different evolutionary eras, the level of intelligence acquired ends at more or less the same level.
That suggests that there exists a functional upper limit to freely applicable information processing capacity. Apparently, a too high level of intelligence in principle is not an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy).

Considering how behaviour evolves and is selected for in evolution, it is easily noticed that there is a certain, all-important relationship between the proximate causes of behaviour, the innate reflexes of liking and disliking, of approach and avoidance on the one hand and on the other hand the ultimate (evolutionary) reasons for certain behavioural reflexes, which are the ultimate procreational results. What is important here to note, is that selection forces exert their influence on the ultimate effects of the proximate behaviours, whereas only the proximate feelings and urges themselves are present in the awareness of the actors. The actors are not aware of the ultimate effects of their behaviour and they could not care less.
It can be argued that an intelligence that reaches the level where it can be applied to (re-)considering its own proximate urges and to finding short-cuts to attain desired results in non-traditional ways, is likely to discover new, different ways to fulfill short term proximate urges, but without the customary non-conscious ultimate effects at the level of reproduction and therefore also without paying the "price" for it, in terms of a lower proximate average level of satisfaction (which they are not aware of anyway).

Our hypothesis is therefore that in principle a too high intelligence will automatically weed itself out as soon as it enables the carrier of that intelligence to manipulate its own behaviour in order to fulfill proximate desires in novel and "clever" ways, different from the evolutionary "meaning" or "goal" of the original reflex-based behaviour.

[[File:Self-blindness_poster (2).png|800px]]

Only by developing a special characteristic, a specific blindness for the own behaviour, blocking the utilization of intelligence for finding different options for satisfying urges concerning the own behaviour and social behaviour, could the intelligence of our early ancestors rise above the ordinary upper level of intelligence.

=== 5) The [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#New_demands_and_requirements_since_the_agricultural_revolution|Evolution of Power Structures]](**) ===
{{level|1}} Since the agricultural revolution a different type of evolution started off. That is the evolution of sets of "memes" that form power structures. Labeling the ordinary evolution, based on DNA, as "hardware"-evolution, that evolution of power structures can be labeled as a "software"-evolution.
The point is that agriculture is technically impossible if there is not a military organization that secures the products of the agricultural efforts for the people who have made the investment in agricultural labour and work.
This development is very recent, just between 5.000 and 10.000 years old in most inhabited regions of the world.

=== 6) [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|Evolutionary Jet-Lag]](**) ===
{{level|1}} The evolution of power structures can proceed at a higher speed than the evolution of DNA. Software needs less time to evolve and change than does hardware.
Humans beings are the carriers of genes as well as of memes. Humanity is therefore suffering from [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|evolutionary "jet-lag"]](**) in that our primordial hardware is lagging behind as compared to the demands from the recently evolved software of the power structures. This evolutionary jet-lag produces mismatches between what we "really" want (primordial P-feelings) and what the power structures demand from us ("new" N-demands).

=== 7) [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Friction_between_P-feelings_and_N-demands.3B_.22Primordial.22_versus_.22New.22_.28the_evolutionary_Jet-Lag.29|N-demands versus P-feelings]](**), their effect on Self-actualization in power structures ===
{{level|1}} Power structures need high quantities of malleable, docile slaves and military to man the agricultural mass projects and the warring machinery. One of the methods to produce high percentages of docile people is inducing neurotic states in as many of the human beings/carriers involved as possible. Neurotics may function sub-optimal as compared to their original congenital potential, but they can easier be manipulated into obeying the requirements of the power structures in charge. It is therefore not surprising that the data available to us indicate that indeed in the case of contemporary human societies the full actualization of the innate potentials is the exception, rather than the rule, which has always been applicable for other species.
The situation in Homo sapiens appears to be exceptional indeed (and not in a pleasant way).

=== 8) Means of subjugation ===
{{level|1}}

- We can recognize several mechanisms in the working of human societies that help to [[Impersonal_Power_Structures_ruling_our_world|keep the carriers of the power structures subdued]](*) and immersed in neuroticizing processes of control and deformation. We mention a few:

- We maintain schooling systems that "inject" knowledge but that block awareness of the CEL dynamics, which results in blocking self-actualization.

- We instill and maintain "working" ethics to the extent that it is detrimental for optimal frequencies of meta-motivational reversals (see the article about learning experiments with house mice) (see more details about the CEL here).

- We seduce captains of industry and captains of other systems of slavery to continue doing their job with exorbitant salaries.

- We always turn spiritual movements gradually into [[Eating_from_the_Forbidden_Fruit#Good_and_Evil.2C_how_great_religions_consolidate_their_power|religions of superstition and blindness]](*).

- We maintain strict information privileges for the people in control of the masses that are kept stupid.

- The innate propensity for Self-Blindness in humans is amplified where possible.

- The Blindness for the own system of feelings and impulses is so elementary, that in all languages that I am familiar with, there is not even a word for the most elementary and most basic of all emotional and motivational switches in our behaviour. We have words for fear, love, hate, pleasure, panic, curiosity, hesitation, anger, etc., but a word for the telic motivational state or its antagonist, the paratelic state does not exist. Words for those most elementary aspects of the dynamics of motivation and emotion needed to be coined artificially, borrowing it from the greek word "telos" or goal/target.

- etc., etc.

=== 9) N-demands from the Power Structures ===
==== 9a) N-demands and the low level performance of human beings ====
{{level|1}} Taking the above findings and considerations together, a possible explanation of the strange rarity of self-actualization in the case of the human species emerges.
That explanation is that since the agricultural revolution our species has been pushed into systems of neurotization and subjugation. The [[Impersonal_Power_Structures_ruling_our_world|power structures]](*), that are in the lead since that time, take a strongly lowered useful output per person for granted in exchange for a much higher malleability and docility of their carriers. Thus the power structures that neuroticized best could outcompete power structures that were less effective in that sense.
If this view is correct, it would explain the at first sight incomprehensible phenomenon that the majority of the human species is functioning way below its congenital capacities and that in our species self-actualization is the exception rather than the rule, as it is in other species. Our species is in general considered as the pinnacle of (primate) evolution, but it almost exclusively consists of underperformers. How strange !

==== 9b) N-demands versus the two Basic Options of the Learning System ====
{{level|1}} However, knowing how the mechanism of learning and development works, it is also clear that from a purely technical point of view, the opposite option in principle also exists, the option of a critical % of the population being in a state of self-actualization and as a consequence a very high likelihood of also attaining self-actualization for any individual in that population. Technically speaking, both options exist, although large and by humanity has not experienced the favourable option for many thousands of years.

There are some exceptions that may be found in remote corners of the earth where the power structures have not - yet - managed to establish their power. For an eloquent description of how such groups of not yet corrupted and still self-actualized people view our complex, modern societies, one may read [[Further_reading#Scheurmann1927|The Papalagi, by Scheurmann (1927)]](*), a series of lectures by a Samoan chief, [[Further_reading#Tiavea1976|Tuiavii of Tiavea (1976)]](*), to his fellow-villagers about how things work in Europe, after he had been invited by the French government to experience civilization and tell about it at home.

=== 10) Modern developments undermining the customary subjugation props of the power structures ===
{{level|1}} Having researched the above mentioned mechanisms that help to keep the carriers of the power structures subdued and immersed in neuroticizing processes of control and deformation, we have reached the conclusion that many or most of these props as automatically and involuntarily (as evolution works) applied by power structures are quickly crumbling down under pressure of modern technical developments. We name a few of those developments that are ever more undermining the web of subjugation tricks that always served to keep us bound in slavery in whichever of the prevailing power structures: the information explosion, the democratization of information, the increasing transparency on all levels, family planning techniques, techniques for eugenic planning, unlimited availability of energy, technical innovations and machinery making slavery superfluous, etc., etc. (see [[Directives_for_after_Point_Omega|here]] for more information about these new developments).

=== Conclusion ===
{{level|1}} Our estimate is that not only are we in a situation where the above developments are in a process of speeding up, undermining the previously absolute power of the impersonal power structures ever faster, but also that we are in the phase of the exponential rise in the average chances for individuals to attain full actualization of their innate potential. That would imply that we are getting closer and closer to the inflection point that we have labeled as Point Omega.
The conclusion is not only that Homo sapiens does have the very realistic option to become immeasurably more effective, but that we are in fact very close to that shift, a shift that is likely to happen with unexpected suddennes and unexpected speed, similar to what happens with the above mentioned acid-base solution when we add the last drop of alkaline solution to the mixture, before it suddenly swaps to a couple of pH grades rise per drop, changing the indicator-colouring all of a sudden.

So, taking the 10 findings as mentioned above together, our conclusion is that a Point Omega transition is near. And that transition not only will launch humanity in its next evolutionary phase, but the whole planet Earth will enter a different phase in its evolutionary development because ............ intelligence will finally start to understand itself. And one of the consequences of that self-awareness of intelligence will be that human stewardship over the world will get a new and more serious connotation.

=== The Point Omega transition in Evolutionary Perspective ===
{{level|1}}To facilitate a proper understanding of where we stand in evolution and which evolutionary phases had to be completed before we ended up standing at the brink of "conscious evolution", we give here a listing of the steps of evolution that came before.

Let's start with the statement that what perceptibly exists, has a certain stability over time, more than alternative configurations.
Molecular configurations with higher chemical stability are therefore the configurations that are more common than their alternatives.
In fact, this description may be viewed as a tautology.
Basically, the whole of evolution may similarly be regarded as a tautological concept. Evolution exists, because that's how it works with matter. [[Further reading#Monod1971|(For a good argumentation for this line of thought see for instance Jackes Monod: Chance and Necessity, 1971]].(*))
But we will dive into the details a bit further, because it is of course the details of our own role in evolution that matter most to us.
Posing the "why" question in relation to these matters is therefore a token of "misunderstanding it all". The only reason why things exist is because those things are evolutionarily stable enough. And that's all. (Clinging to the "why" question instead of to the "how" question may be taken as a token of neuroticism and chronic unhappiness.)

- Conditions on our planet Earth have since a long time been suitable for the formation of large and eventually complex molecules.

- At some stage molecules were coincidentally formed, that had a novel property, which was that they acted as catalizers for the formation of more of these same types of molecules.

- Once this effect emerged, a type of evolution of as yet "non-living" matter got started, the self replicating molecules coming in more and more varieties. This process took vast amount of time.

- A next step in this sequence of evolutionary events is when different types of self-replicating molecules start a form of symbiosis, helping one another in each one's self-replicating effects, for instance by influencing the flow of certain chemical compounds to one another's advantage. Such combinations of different self-replicators already change in the direction of organelles or units that could also act as (still primitive) functional parts of a cel.

- At some stage in such a soup of self-replicating molecules and already more complex proto-organelles, organelles may combine and form a communal form of defense, an outer layer that is difficult to penetrate for other, competing, replicators. What emerges in that way can be considered a first approach to the phenomenon of cell walls. And all that is the beginning of what we tend to label as "life". The cells that start to emerge in that way each contain different structures that cooperate, each with their own specialization. Cells contain primitive organelles. This happened some 5.000 million to 3.500 million years ago (which is still less than the last 10% of the total period of life on planet Earth).

- Once that life phase has started, evolution can really start off at an ever increasing speed. Self-reduplication of course not always is perfect, mistakes do happen, so variation is paramount and the best varieties continue their lineage best. And that is what evolution is all about. Once cells inhabit a variety of places and conditions, different varieties, adapted to different circumstances emerge and that variation starts to lead a life of its own. Evolution proceeds.

- Multiplying cells need materials for the composition of the organelles and tissues that the cells need for their offspring. Also, collecting energy is one of the methods to improve the speed of reduplication. Energy can be used to move around matter that cells need to grow and multiply. Cells have found different methods to tap energy from the environment and utilize that energy for growth and multiplication.

- One of the energy-tapping methods is absorbing fotons from light sources. Plant cells can do that and they can use for instance chlorophyll molecules to "catch" fotons from the light. With chlorophyll they are fishing for energy, energy from light rays.

- Another method of tapping energy is by making use of great local differences in temperature, tapping the calory-flow. This happens for instance in the life forms that evolved around deep sea hot springs, where high pressure hot water continuously escapes from the volcanic rock structures under the sea floor. Here temperature flows are the fuel for a rather complete ecosystem and not the flow of light. Etc., etc.

- Plants are groups of cells, each with their specialization, that collect their energy from light, by means of chlorophyll.

- A next development was the emergence of entities that do not bother to collect energy from light themselves, but "eat" the energy as stored in the plant bodies. Such living entities we label as herbivores.

- And subsequently, also carnivores emerge, because it is relatively easy to consume and process living matter that is already very much composed as is the body of the predator itself. Converting flesh into animal matter takes less energy than converting plants. So, by then evolution has produced bacteria and other one-cell organisms, plants, herbivores, carnivores and of course also organisms who get their energy and basic building materials from dead or decaying plant- or animal bodies. Fungi are for instance of that class of living things.

- Microbes or plants that catch light for their growth are normally sedentary. They sit in their place and live from what is available in their immediate surrounding. Animals differ from plants in that they can move from place to place. But in order to move they need a system of perception and of generating a preference of where to go to. Animals are moving entities and they differ from plants in that they all have developed a perception system for assessing important aspects in the environment and a system that makes them move in the preferred direction. So, once animals have evolved, these entities do have a system of emotions and motivations. If not, they would just sit still and not move.
Being attracted by something and being repulsed by something else is therefore an indispensable characteristic of any animal, no matter how small. In higher, more complex, animals we tend to label these tendencies as emotions and or motivations.

- For processing incoming information and for translating that information into useful action, a nervous system is useful and so all higher, more complex, animals have a nervous system, a sort of controlling and coordination center.

- Once animal nervous systems have been developed in all sorts of variations and sizes, sooner or later more sophisticated systems of data processing evolve. We can call that intelligence. What we see in the animal kingdom, is that in many era's of evolution and in many phyla of animals, intelligence has developed. And those developments have emerged completely independently of one another.
What should be noted here, is that in all cases (except our own case) the evolved levels of intelligence are about of the same level, no matter how many millions of years the development of such an intelligence had time to evolve further. What also is striking, is that intelligence emerged in quite different nervous systems. The nervous systems of vertebrates, like monkeys or whales, birds or dogs, have a comparable set up. In each of those phyla one finds very dull, non-intelligent species as well as quite intelligent species. But similarly high intelligence has also developed in mollusks, like in various octopus species. Their composite nervous system is located in different parts of the body and this very different basic design nevertheless produced a comparable level of intelligence.
Elsewhere on this Wiki we have explained what is the reason of this same level of intelligence in so many different animal species.
That reason is that normally, basically and firstly, there is a functional upper limit to freely applicable intelligence. As soon as intelligence reaches a level where it can be utilized to find short cuts to proximate satisfaction, that higher intelligence will weed itself out automatically (see point 4 above).

- However, once that maximum level of freely applicable intelligence has emerged in a number of species, sooner or later one species will develop a way around that maximum. That is what happened in the ancestors of Homo, later - sapiens, where a trick was built into the system that was making sure that the intelligence could not any longer be utilized for finding short cuts for the fulfillment of proximate impulses. So, now we have a species saddled with Self-Blindness, and as a consequence the intelligence of Homo could rise further, way above the ordinary upper limit of intelligence. (We can describe this as a pun: we became so intelligent, because we are so incredibly stupid !)

- One of the consequences of such a rising intelligence is that gradually the species in question, us, will manage more and more to escape from the traditional dangers like predators, hunting accidents, etc. They get too clever to compete on an equal level with the competing species around. They become an ecologically dominant species. More than is the case in other related species, primates in our case, Homo sapiens became increasingly its own predator and competitor. It is not surprising therefore that [[Further reading#Gómez2016|recent research (see Gómez et al.(2016)]](***) has shown that Homo sapiens is by nature more violent towards conspecifics than are other primates. Homocidal tendencies are more prominent in us than in our relatives.

- When intelligence started to increase in Homo sapiens above its ordinary upper limit, freed by Self-Blindness, we were living in hunter-gatherer bands. This development started between 1 and 2 million years ago. During that time "Homo" really became "sapiens" and increasingly made use of tools and fire. Brain size increased, language developed further, but on the other hand giving birth became an increasing problem. The birth canal has not evolved to let such a big skull pass. The possibility to give birth to skulls as big as Human babies have, is a relatively recent evolutionary adaptation. And it is evidently an adaptation that could improve a lot more in due evolutionary time.

Nevertheless, in spite of being more violent to one another than were related primate species, at that point of evolution our innate tendencies and feelings were still well in balance with the niche we lived in. After becoming ecologically dominant, Homo sapiens, living in hunter gatherer bands during a period of about 1 million years, evolution had had plenty of time to bring our instincts in balance with our new niche. That behavioural balance would only be disturbed much later, only some 40.000 years ago, when some hunter-gatherer groups took up a life style of exploiting an exceptionally rich source of food in some particular location. Such a new focus would trigger the need for defending such a specific location with those extraordinary food-sources. And effective defense requires more hierarchical social relationships. On the other hand it also allowed for higher population densities locally. Finally, some 10.000 years ago, this tendency resulted in outright, full fledged agriculture.

And from that time on, also the meme-evolution started to gain momentum.

- The shift from hunter-gatherers to firstly "delayed return" hunter gatherers (or non-egalitarian or semi-sedentary hunter gatherers) and later to "real" agriculture, is in a very comprehensible way [[Further reading#Gray2009|summarized by Peter Gray]](**).
From that time on there was a need for an organization for defending the own food sources, but not all of the semi-sedentary tribes developed the skills for dealing with intraspecific adversaries.
And such military requirements would need more hierarchical structures. Research shows that bands of "simple" hunter gatherers used to predate on the resources of the "delayed return" hunter gatherers. Nevertheless, such "delayed return hunter-gatherers" started to emerge in more and more places and produced in general more offspring than their their "simple hunter-gatherer" conspecifics could manage.

- By that time Homo sapiens had entered the next step in human evolution, the "invention" of agriculture. Agriculture is the ultimate way to change the environment as to get as much food and needed materials from it as possible. There is however a heavy price to be paid inevitably for starting agriculture. And that is that agriculture is only possible in combination with an increased warring capacity to wage war on a massive scale.

- At that point in evolution, the evolution of software items, "memes" takes over, because meme level power structures can and do evolve much faster than do DNA based evolutionary processes. Power structures make use of us, intelligent carriers, and compete with one another, but always over the backs of their subjects. The power structure that is best in wielding masses of soldiers and masses of slaves, will outcompete other power structures.

- Because of the difference in speed of the evolution on the meme-level, as compared to the speed of evolution on the gene-level, we Humans, as carrier of the meme-level information as well as carriers of the gene-level information, have suffered, since the start of the agricultural revolution, from a sort of evolutionary Jet-lag. Such a situation, wherever in the universe, only will last as long as the power structures can abuse their carriers to maximize their chances in the competition with other power structures.
At some stage, the raised intelligence will, in combination with technological developments, start to look through and to understand the nature of the Jet-Lag and of the slavery aspects of living in the power structures. At that point there will occur a break down of the power structure configuration of human life on earth, triggered by an understanding that escapes from its ordinary cognitive shackles. Curiosity at that point wins over fear. We have labeled that point in time as Point Omega.

- The next stage, that is awaiting us now, is the start of conscious evolution. It will be understood how and why in the old situation it always was structurally impossible to organize a lasting societal structure that was supportive of human wishes and preferences, peaceful and agreeable. The influence of genetic pollution and of selection cycles in social structures will be understood and will be replaced by various forms of conscious evolution, then easily bypassing the classical sources of war, genocide and economic strangling techniques.
The issues that will be fought about will shift to discussions about which direction we prefer for our conscious evolution. But that is by far a luxury problem as compared to what mankind has been subjected to for the last 10.000 years.

The above listing of the different phases in evolution does not represent a regularly distributed time schedule. The different phases in the beginning of evolution are wide apart and each cover very long time periods, hundreds of millions of years. The more recent phases have taken ever less time. The latest evolutionary phases as described above follow each other in historical time, which means "within the blink of an eye" as compared to earlier epochs.
Our conclusion is that we, the human species, finds itself right now in a very special and unique situation. We are at the point of shifting into a totally different mode of evolution, "conscious evolution". It is only natural that for most people this shift, the most important shift in the whole of human history, is still inconceivable. The concepts that, together, are required for understanding this situation, are not yet part of our contemporary culture. That is still to come. Nevertheless, our (as yet private and personal) conclusion is that the Point Omega shift is very near and that the accelaration phase of the transition seems to have started already. The theory predicts that awareness of what is really going on, will tend to lag behind the flow of events. Therefore most probably mankind will completely be taken by surprise.

I hope that for the curious reader the evolutionary "reason" for, or rather the evolutionary "origin" of this development, this Point Omega transition, has been clarified a bit in these pages.

Omega Research:Site support

2017-02-11T13:58:54Z

BigSmoke: /* Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight') */ Link to newly uploaded export

<center><big>Donations and gifts: your support is important to us</big></center>

__TOC__

The '''Omega Research Foundation''' has been established to boost awareness of human possibilities and the future human potential. Therefore our foundation supports research in the area of human development and psychological and social functioning. Its focus is in particular on the possibility of a major transition of society as has been predicted and described in the course of history by many sources from many cultures. Such a transition has for instance been labeled by the paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin as “Point Omega”.

Apart from messages from historical prophets and clairvoyants there appears to be surprising scientific support for the idea that humanity is at the brink of a major evolutionary and developmental psychological shift. The Omega Research Foundation’s focus is on such (novel) scientific data regarding such a shift.

Besides supporting relevant scientific research, the foundation also stimulates and organizes the wide distribution of all relevant information regarding the psychological and social mechanisms involved in this transition, evoking the widest possible involvement and support.

For the realization of our goals we are fully dependent on contributions from third parties like gifts, donations, sponsoring and legacies.

You can support the Omega project by:

;[[#Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')|Copying this Wiki]] : Spread sober awareness widely

;[[#One time gift|A one time gift]] : The quickest way to support us just now.

;[[#Becoming a Donor / Benefactor|Becoming a Donor / Benefactor]] : Monthly or yearly support

;[[#Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits|Gifts at regular intervals]] : Support us with the best tax advantages

;[[#Legacies|A legacy]] : Register financial support by legacy to us through a notary public

{|border="1" cellpadding="4"
|+ Summary of possibilities for donating to Omega Research Foundation
|-
|
!One time gift
!Benefactor/Donor
!Series of Tax deductible Yearly Gifts
!Legacies
|-
!align="right"|Minimum amount
|any amount
|€ 5 /month or € 25 /year
|in case of € 250 /year or more: no costs for notary public
|
|-
!align="right"|Taxes
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible in total
|no inheritance tax
|-
!align="right"|Method of payment
|Paypal / credit card or bank transfer
|authorization of automatic transfers through Paypal
|through notary deed minimum of 5 years, in equal yearly gifts
|through notary public in last will
|-
!align="right"|To where and how
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|automatic through Paypal
|authorized automatic transfers and sent per mail, legalization by notary public of signature, + copy of passport
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 092 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|-
!align="right"|Quid pro quo
|colspan="4"|if over € 1.000 donated, option to be included in published list of benefactors
|-
!align="right"|Other
|
|
|
|expires automatically after decease
|}

== Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')==

We make regular dumps of the complete wiki as it is at certain points in time. You can download [[Media:Export-without-history.xml.bz2|this dump]]. Then, if ever this wiki is taken off-line by some angry third party, a recent copy of the entire Wiki is still available elsewhere and can continue its development from some other place. For that reason we advise you, after downloading this dump, to distribute it among your trusted friends who like to support you in this act of information-transparency-insurance, and who are capable of installing [http://www.mediawiki.org/ MediaWiki] and the dump to a mirror site. In that way you help to secure the indestructability of the information, assembled and developed on this Wiki and so to stabilize a lasting transparency of information about the root issues of human existence and survival. Thus you help to consolidate the emergence of point Omega and to secure the foundation of conscious human evolution. '''Help humanity to survive in a more agreeable way, [[Media:Export-without-history.xml.bz2|download now]] !
'''

== Tax deductable ==

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that gifts, donations and sponsoring from companies as well as from private persons are [[tax deductable]].

For private persons from The Netherlands there is a difference in tax deductablity between 1) a one time gift or donation and 2) a fixed series of donations (“periodieke schenking”).

== One time gift ==

The quickest way to support our project is a one time gift on line. Through this site you can transfer an amount of Euro 25 or any other amount. Give your support now !

[https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_donations&business=bigsmoke%40gmail%2ecom&item_name=One%20Time%20Gift%20to%20the%20Omega%20Research%20Foundation&item_number=Omega&amount=25%2e00&no_shipping=0&no_note=1&tax=0&currency_code=EUR&lc=NL&bn=PP%2dDonationsBF&charset=UTF%2d8 https://www.paypal.com/en_US/NL/i/btn/btn_donateCC_LG.gif]

You can also transfer your contribution to:

Bank acoount nr.: NL65ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 with ABN/AMRO Bank

of the Omega Research Foundation, declaring “Gift”.

(BIC code: ABNANL2A)

== Becoming a Donor / Benefactor ==

You can become a Donor or Benefactor of the foundation from €5 per month or €25 per year on. That way you support our work for the enhancement and the understanding of Point Omega.

The easiest and quickest method to become a monthly or yearly Donor is through PayPal.

You also can become a Donor by filling out the [[application form for monthly or yearly donations]]. In that case however, the minimum amounts are € 25 /month and € 100 /year because of extra administrative costs.

Change of address can be sent to us by e-mail. Cancellation of donorship can also be communicated by e-mail. Our e-mail address is [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits ==

In case you wish to support our work in the most tax deductable way, then you may decide for a periodic gift during a series of years through a notary deed.

The advantage of this method is that in The Netherlands the tax authorities will reimburse part of your gift by making the amounts involved fully deductible from income tax without any limit. The only requirement is that the gifts are being paid in equal yearly sums during at least five years.

In case you wish to utilize this method with at least €200 per year, we offer to arrange the notary deed in question, free of charge. In that case you proceed as follows:

* Fill out the [[proxy form for donations]] through a notary deed, signed by yourself and (in case applicable) your partner. Make a copy for yourselves;
* Have your signature legalized by a notary public of your choice;
* Send the proxy in an envelop to: Omega Research Foundation, Molenweg 15, 9761 VB Eelde, The Netherlands;
* Add a copy of your passport, driving licence or identity card and also of your partner (if applicable).

Within four weeks the official deed (act of donation) will be prepared by the notary public and will be sent to you through us.

The act of donation serves as proof for tax deductability (for The Netherlands under the heading of ‘periodieke giften’). We advise to also keep a copy of the bank transfer statement.

The act of donation expires after decease. Your descendants therefore do not inherit obligations.

For further information about donating you may contact us through e-mail: [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Legacies ==

It is possible to appoint the Omega Research Foundation as (one of) your inheritor(s) or to donate a specific amount as a legacy. That way you support our Omega Research Project also after your decease.

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that legacies are not due to taxation.

For further information about legacies you may contact us through e-mail: [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Registration of donorship ==

Donors may choose to be included in the published list of benefactors of the Omega Research Foundation. In case the total amount donated is € 1.000 or more, the donor's name can be included in the [[Benefactors of the Omega Research Foundation|list of benefactors]], which is published in order of donated amounts. Donors can have their names removed from the list at any time.

File:Export-without-history.xml.bz2

2017-02-11T13:57:12Z

BigSmoke: Created using: php dumpBackup.php --current --uploads --output=bzip2:export-without-history.xml

Created using: php dumpBackup.php --current --uploads --output=bzip2:export-without-history.xml

Omega Research:Site support

2017-02-11T13:52:34Z

BigSmoke: /* Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight') */

<center><big>Donations and gifts: your support is important to us</big></center>

__TOC__

The '''Omega Research Foundation''' has been established to boost awareness of human possibilities and the future human potential. Therefore our foundation supports research in the area of human development and psychological and social functioning. Its focus is in particular on the possibility of a major transition of society as has been predicted and described in the course of history by many sources from many cultures. Such a transition has for instance been labeled by the paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin as “Point Omega”.

Apart from messages from historical prophets and clairvoyants there appears to be surprising scientific support for the idea that humanity is at the brink of a major evolutionary and developmental psychological shift. The Omega Research Foundation’s focus is on such (novel) scientific data regarding such a shift.

Besides supporting relevant scientific research, the foundation also stimulates and organizes the wide distribution of all relevant information regarding the psychological and social mechanisms involved in this transition, evoking the widest possible involvement and support.

For the realization of our goals we are fully dependent on contributions from third parties like gifts, donations, sponsoring and legacies.

You can support the Omega project by:

;[[#Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')|Copying this Wiki]] : Spread sober awareness widely

;[[#One time gift|A one time gift]] : The quickest way to support us just now.

;[[#Becoming a Donor / Benefactor|Becoming a Donor / Benefactor]] : Monthly or yearly support

;[[#Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits|Gifts at regular intervals]] : Support us with the best tax advantages

;[[#Legacies|A legacy]] : Register financial support by legacy to us through a notary public

{|border="1" cellpadding="4"
|+ Summary of possibilities for donating to Omega Research Foundation
|-
|
!One time gift
!Benefactor/Donor
!Series of Tax deductible Yearly Gifts
!Legacies
|-
!align="right"|Minimum amount
|any amount
|€ 5 /month or € 25 /year
|in case of € 250 /year or more: no costs for notary public
|
|-
!align="right"|Taxes
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible in total
|no inheritance tax
|-
!align="right"|Method of payment
|Paypal / credit card or bank transfer
|authorization of automatic transfers through Paypal
|through notary deed minimum of 5 years, in equal yearly gifts
|through notary public in last will
|-
!align="right"|To where and how
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|automatic through Paypal
|authorized automatic transfers and sent per mail, legalization by notary public of signature, + copy of passport
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 092 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|-
!align="right"|Quid pro quo
|colspan="4"|if over € 1.000 donated, option to be included in published list of benefactors
|-
!align="right"|Other
|
|
|
|expires automatically after decease
|}

== Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')==

We make regular dumps of the complete wiki as it is at certain points in time. You can download [http://wiki.omega-research.org/images/dump-without-history.xml.bz2 this dump]. Then, if ever this wiki is taken off-line by some angry third party, a recent copy of the entire Wiki is still available elsewhere and can continue its development from some other place. For that reason we advise you, after downloading this dump, to distribute it among your trusted friends who like to support you in this act of information-transparency-insurance, and who are capable of installing [http://www.mediawiki.org/ MediaWiki] and the dump to a mirror site. In that way you help to secure the indestructability of the information, assembled and developed on this Wiki and so to stabilize a lasting transparency of information about the root issues of human existence and survival. Thus you help to consolidate the emergence of point Omega and to secure the foundation of conscious human evolution. '''Help humanity to survive in a more agreeable way, [http://wiki.omega-research.org/images/dump-without-history.xml.bz2 download now] !
'''

== Tax deductable ==

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that gifts, donations and sponsoring from companies as well as from private persons are [[tax deductable]].

For private persons from The Netherlands there is a difference in tax deductablity between 1) a one time gift or donation and 2) a fixed series of donations (“periodieke schenking”).

== One time gift ==

The quickest way to support our project is a one time gift on line. Through this site you can transfer an amount of Euro 25 or any other amount. Give your support now !

[https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_donations&business=bigsmoke%40gmail%2ecom&item_name=One%20Time%20Gift%20to%20the%20Omega%20Research%20Foundation&item_number=Omega&amount=25%2e00&no_shipping=0&no_note=1&tax=0&currency_code=EUR&lc=NL&bn=PP%2dDonationsBF&charset=UTF%2d8 https://www.paypal.com/en_US/NL/i/btn/btn_donateCC_LG.gif]

You can also transfer your contribution to:

Bank acoount nr.: NL65ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 with ABN/AMRO Bank

of the Omega Research Foundation, declaring “Gift”.

(BIC code: ABNANL2A)

== Becoming a Donor / Benefactor ==

You can become a Donor or Benefactor of the foundation from €5 per month or €25 per year on. That way you support our work for the enhancement and the understanding of Point Omega.

The easiest and quickest method to become a monthly or yearly Donor is through PayPal.

You also can become a Donor by filling out the [[application form for monthly or yearly donations]]. In that case however, the minimum amounts are € 25 /month and € 100 /year because of extra administrative costs.

Change of address can be sent to us by e-mail. Cancellation of donorship can also be communicated by e-mail. Our e-mail address is [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits ==

In case you wish to support our work in the most tax deductable way, then you may decide for a periodic gift during a series of years through a notary deed.

The advantage of this method is that in The Netherlands the tax authorities will reimburse part of your gift by making the amounts involved fully deductible from income tax without any limit. The only requirement is that the gifts are being paid in equal yearly sums during at least five years.

In case you wish to utilize this method with at least €200 per year, we offer to arrange the notary deed in question, free of charge. In that case you proceed as follows:

* Fill out the [[proxy form for donations]] through a notary deed, signed by yourself and (in case applicable) your partner. Make a copy for yourselves;
* Have your signature legalized by a notary public of your choice;
* Send the proxy in an envelop to: Omega Research Foundation, Molenweg 15, 9761 VB Eelde, The Netherlands;
* Add a copy of your passport, driving licence or identity card and also of your partner (if applicable).

Within four weeks the official deed (act of donation) will be prepared by the notary public and will be sent to you through us.

The act of donation serves as proof for tax deductability (for The Netherlands under the heading of ‘periodieke giften’). We advise to also keep a copy of the bank transfer statement.

The act of donation expires after decease. Your descendants therefore do not inherit obligations.

For further information about donating you may contact us through e-mail: [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Legacies ==

It is possible to appoint the Omega Research Foundation as (one of) your inheritor(s) or to donate a specific amount as a legacy. That way you support our Omega Research Project also after your decease.

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that legacies are not due to taxation.

For further information about legacies you may contact us through e-mail: [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Registration of donorship ==

Donors may choose to be included in the published list of benefactors of the Omega Research Foundation. In case the total amount donated is € 1.000 or more, the donor's name can be included in the [[Benefactors of the Omega Research Foundation|list of benefactors]], which is published in order of donated amounts. Donors can have their names removed from the list at any time.

Omega Research:Site support

2017-02-11T13:50:34Z

BigSmoke: /* Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight') */ Link to new export

<center><big>Donations and gifts: your support is important to us</big></center>

__TOC__

The '''Omega Research Foundation''' has been established to boost awareness of human possibilities and the future human potential. Therefore our foundation supports research in the area of human development and psychological and social functioning. Its focus is in particular on the possibility of a major transition of society as has been predicted and described in the course of history by many sources from many cultures. Such a transition has for instance been labeled by the paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin as “Point Omega”.

Apart from messages from historical prophets and clairvoyants there appears to be surprising scientific support for the idea that humanity is at the brink of a major evolutionary and developmental psychological shift. The Omega Research Foundation’s focus is on such (novel) scientific data regarding such a shift.

Besides supporting relevant scientific research, the foundation also stimulates and organizes the wide distribution of all relevant information regarding the psychological and social mechanisms involved in this transition, evoking the widest possible involvement and support.

For the realization of our goals we are fully dependent on contributions from third parties like gifts, donations, sponsoring and legacies.

You can support the Omega project by:

;[[#Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')|Copying this Wiki]] : Spread sober awareness widely

;[[#One time gift|A one time gift]] : The quickest way to support us just now.

;[[#Becoming a Donor / Benefactor|Becoming a Donor / Benefactor]] : Monthly or yearly support

;[[#Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits|Gifts at regular intervals]] : Support us with the best tax advantages

;[[#Legacies|A legacy]] : Register financial support by legacy to us through a notary public

{|border="1" cellpadding="4"
|+ Summary of possibilities for donating to Omega Research Foundation
|-
|
!One time gift
!Benefactor/Donor
!Series of Tax deductible Yearly Gifts
!Legacies
|-
!align="right"|Minimum amount
|any amount
|€ 5 /month or € 25 /year
|in case of € 250 /year or more: no costs for notary public
|
|-
!align="right"|Taxes
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible with a minimum
|deductible in total
|no inheritance tax
|-
!align="right"|Method of payment
|Paypal / credit card or bank transfer
|authorization of automatic transfers through Paypal
|through notary deed minimum of 5 years, in equal yearly gifts
|through notary public in last will
|-
!align="right"|To where and how
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|automatic through Paypal
|authorized automatic transfers and sent per mail, legalization by notary public of signature, + copy of passport
|to ABN/AMRO bank account number NL 65 ABNA 0 57 07 092 592 of Omega Research Foundation / "gift"
|-
!align="right"|Quid pro quo
|colspan="4"|if over € 1.000 donated, option to be included in published list of benefactors
|-
!align="right"|Other
|
|
|
|expires automatically after decease
|}

== Copy this wiki (our version of 'CopyRight')==

We make regular dumps of the complete wiki as it is at certain points in time. You can download [http://wiki.omega-research.org/dump-without-history.xml.bz2 this dump]. Then, if ever this wiki is taken off-line by some angry third party, a recent copy of the entire Wiki is still available elsewhere and can continue its development from some other place. For that reason we advise you, after downloading this dump, to distribute it among your trusted friends who like to support you in this act of information-transparency-insurance, and who are capable of installing [http://www.mediawiki.org/ MediaWiki] and the dump to a mirror site. In that way you help to secure the indestructability of the information, assembled and developed on this Wiki and so to stabilize a lasting transparency of information about the root issues of human existence and survival. Thus you help to consolidate the emergence of point Omega and to secure the foundation of conscious human evolution. '''Help humanity to survive in a more agreeable way, [http://wiki.omega-research.org/dump-without-history.xml.bz2 download now] !
'''

== Tax deductable ==

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that gifts, donations and sponsoring from companies as well as from private persons are [[tax deductable]].

For private persons from The Netherlands there is a difference in tax deductablity between 1) a one time gift or donation and 2) a fixed series of donations (“periodieke schenking”).

== One time gift ==

The quickest way to support our project is a one time gift on line. Through this site you can transfer an amount of Euro 25 or any other amount. Give your support now !

[https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_donations&business=bigsmoke%40gmail%2ecom&item_name=One%20Time%20Gift%20to%20the%20Omega%20Research%20Foundation&item_number=Omega&amount=25%2e00&no_shipping=0&no_note=1&tax=0&currency_code=EUR&lc=NL&bn=PP%2dDonationsBF&charset=UTF%2d8 https://www.paypal.com/en_US/NL/i/btn/btn_donateCC_LG.gif]

You can also transfer your contribution to:

Bank acoount nr.: NL65ABNA 0 57 07 92 592 with ABN/AMRO Bank

of the Omega Research Foundation, declaring “Gift”.

(BIC code: ABNANL2A)

== Becoming a Donor / Benefactor ==

You can become a Donor or Benefactor of the foundation from €5 per month or €25 per year on. That way you support our work for the enhancement and the understanding of Point Omega.

The easiest and quickest method to become a monthly or yearly Donor is through PayPal.

You also can become a Donor by filling out the [[application form for monthly or yearly donations]]. In that case however, the minimum amounts are € 25 /month and € 100 /year because of extra administrative costs.

Change of address can be sent to us by e-mail. Cancellation of donorship can also be communicated by e-mail. Our e-mail address is [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Gifts at regular intervals with maximum tax benefits ==

In case you wish to support our work in the most tax deductable way, then you may decide for a periodic gift during a series of years through a notary deed.

The advantage of this method is that in The Netherlands the tax authorities will reimburse part of your gift by making the amounts involved fully deductible from income tax without any limit. The only requirement is that the gifts are being paid in equal yearly sums during at least five years.

In case you wish to utilize this method with at least €200 per year, we offer to arrange the notary deed in question, free of charge. In that case you proceed as follows:

* Fill out the [[proxy form for donations]] through a notary deed, signed by yourself and (in case applicable) your partner. Make a copy for yourselves;
* Have your signature legalized by a notary public of your choice;
* Send the proxy in an envelop to: Omega Research Foundation, Molenweg 15, 9761 VB Eelde, The Netherlands;
* Add a copy of your passport, driving licence or identity card and also of your partner (if applicable).

Within four weeks the official deed (act of donation) will be prepared by the notary public and will be sent to you through us.

The act of donation serves as proof for tax deductability (for The Netherlands under the heading of ‘periodieke giften’). We advise to also keep a copy of the bank transfer statement.

The act of donation expires after decease. Your descendants therefore do not inherit obligations.

For further information about donating you may contact us through e-mail: [mailto:support@omega-research.org support@omega-research.org].

== Legacies ==

It is possible to appoint the Omega Research Foundation as (one of) your inheritor(s) or to donate a specific amount as a legacy. That way you support our Omega Research Project also after your decease.

The Omega Research Foundation is an organization for the common good. This implies that legacies are not due to taxation.

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File:Positive and negative learning spirals.png

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Vector drawing, adapted from Popko's scans (<tt>Document099.PDF</tt>, <tt>Document116.PDF</tt> and <tt>Document179.PDF</tt>), with some added InkScape juice.

Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model

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<center>
STATE UNIVERSITY GRONINGEN - HEYMANSBULLETIN - HB-91-1030-EX

<big>Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning model (C.E.L.) (2)</big>

Presented for the fifth international conference on 
Reversal Theory, June 21-25, 1991 at Kansas City, Missouri, U.S.A.
</center>

''' Introduction'''

{{Level|2}} This report describes the C.E.L. (Cognition-Energy-Learning model) which is based on a number of established psychological theories. This model is integrative in the sense that it describes different classes of behaviour, of personal insights and of experiences that are generally regarded as distinct areas of psychological research. Examples are: emotions, motivation, cognitive representation of experiences, coping behaviour and the ethological concept of the efficient allocation of energy. The importance of this model lies, therefore, firstly in the opportunity it provides to classify all those different psychological phenomena in a logically coherent and consistent way. In addition, the model provides a ''basic explanation'' of learning behaviour, as it refers back to the evolutionary basis of behaviour. In other words: it is possible to indicate ''why'' effective coping behaviour develops and also ''why'' this development may stagnate. Coping means here: behaviour that is geared to mastering a problem situation. Subsequently, the model explains on the one hand the connection between emotions and motivation and on the other hand the way in which the cognitive representation of experiences is laid down and how it gradually shifts and changes.

In each chapter of this treatise, one theoretic approach of a specific phenomenon will be discussed and any lacunae, gaps or specific problems of the theory concerned, will be identified. We shall then attempt to solve these problems in the next chapter, adding an additional piece of theory. This way, four theories will be discussed, all of which show hiatuses in some specific respects.

The basis of this treatise is Lazarus' classical theory. According to Lazarus (in Bond and Rosen, 1980), stress arises when a person notices that environmental requirements demand too much of his/her available resources.

Lazarus states that stress situations do not necessarily have to be experienced as negative. It is, however, often the case; when a person expects that his or her abilities and resources for dealing with specific environmental requirements are insufficient, he or she will probably expect damage or loss. Such situations may be experienced as extremely threatening. On the other hand, great demand may be exerted on a person in terms of adaptability while that person still thinks he or she can handle the situation well. Such situations might be regarded as challenges, regarding the opportunity to gain advantages or more control or is affecting personal growth. Adequate reactions in such situations may then influence that person's well-being very positively. Thus, stress situations are not always experienced as negative, but depend on the interpretation by the person in question. When a person experiences stress, he or she may develop strategies to limit damage, or even profit from the situation. In literature this is called coping.

With regard to the interpretation of stress situations, Lazarus (1980) states that it is a problem that too little is known about which situations are felt to be threatening or challenging, and when that happens and by whom. This hiatus can neatly be filled by Apter's Reversal theory (chapter 2). In this theory two so-called meta-motivational states are proposed. These metamotivational states determine how a person perceives a specific situation and the type of behaviour with which he of she will react to it.

However, one disadvantage of Apter's theory is its descriptive nature and the fact that it does not account for a connection between the dynamics of motivation and the learning processes mentioned above.

Van der Molen's learning model, described in chapter 3, does provide this connection and is thus able to explain how these learning processes are maintained. In this model the "contagious nature" of learning experiences is described too. That is, a learning experience that is badly dealt with, increases the likelihood that future learning experiences in similar areas of experience will also be badly dealt with which means that it is likely that the area concerned will stay and always will be problematical. (the reverse applies to learning experiences which are dealt with successfully). The cognitive interpretation or emotional "labelling" of similar areas of experience (for example "exciting" or "boring") always depends on a person's metamotivational condition. Van der Molen's model describes how metamotivational conditions affect learning processes. The model does not yet, however, adequately describe how these conditions influence cognitive contents.

Lewicka's model of antagonistic cognitive styles (chapter 4) does discuss this aspect. In this model two mechanisms are described which are alternately active in a person (comparable to Apter's theory). Which of the two mechanisms is active at a specific moment, determines what type of information a person will seek in the first place and also determines how cognitive information will be structured.
By combining and integrating the theories mentioned (chapter 5) we have been able to develop a model that not only explains the growth of coping strategies, but also explains the relation between the dynamics of emotions and motivation on the one hand and the way in which cognitive contents are effected and develop on the other hand. We have called this model the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (CEL).

This will be exemplified with empirical information about the coping behaviour of teachers (Romkes, 1988, chapter 6).

== Chapter 1: Lazarus' coping theory ==

{{Level|3}} In this chapter Lazarus' theory (e.g. 1980, 1984) of coping behaviour is discussed. The most important ideas of this theory are summarized and at the end of the chapter we show that the theory contains a number of gaps with regard to the process of learning and the development of coping skills.

=== Transactions between persons and their environment ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus (in Bond and Rosen,1980) calls his approach to stress and coping behaviour cognitive-phenomenological. Emotions and stress are regarded as products of cognitive activity, relating to the way in which a person assesses and evaluates his or her relation with the environment. Lazarus emphasizes that there is a continuous relationship between persons and their environment. On the one hand there are people with individual values, beliefs, skills, etc. On the other hand there are situations, with varying requirements, limitations and facilities. Together they form a dynamic system in which there is a continuous process of mutual influence and change. Lazarus states that there is a ''transaction'' between persons and their environment which changes (adapts / transforms) constantly in the course of time.

=== The concept of appraisal: assessment of the environment ===

{{Level|3}} In Lazarus' theory the term ''appraisal'', that is to say the cognitive assessment by a person of a (real, imaginary or expected) transaction, is central. Lazarus distinguishes between ''primary appraisal'', ''secondary appraisal'' and ''reappraisal''. "Primary appraisal" refers to the process in which a person assesses whether and how a particular transaction will influence his or her own well-being. Such assessments can take three forms, irrelevant, positive or stressful. A person considers a situation to be stressful when he or she perceives that there are situational
requirements that make a great demand on his or her adaptability and on the resources he or she possesses to respond to these demands. Appraisal of a situation as stressful can be divided into sub-types:
* '''damage/loss'''; for example when a partner dies, loss of physical functions, loss of self-respect.
* '''threat'''; expected or feared damage or loss which has not yet materialized.
* '''challenge'''; growth opportunity, acquisition of control or advantage.
Lazarus states that there is too little known about when and by what kind of people a situation is felt to be threatening rather than challenging (and vice versa). However, Lazarus does provide some information about these aspects:
:"A working hypothesis about the causal antecedents of threat and challenge is that the former is more likely when a person assumes that the specific environment is hostile and dangerous and that he or she lacks the resources for mastering it, while challenge arises when the environmental demands are seen as difficult, but not impossible to manage, and that drawing upon existing or acquired skills offers a genuine prospect for mastery." (in Bond and Rosen, 1980, p. 48).

This leads us to the second type of transaction assessment. The above quotation not only deals with appraisal of the situation and environmental demands, but also with a person's own possibilities to react adequately. Lazarus calls the latter "secondary appraisal", i.e. appraisal of the personal and social means a person has at his or her disposal, the effectiveness of a particular strategy of behaviour in the situation, as well as the possibility that new problems will be created as a result of one's own actions.

With regard to transactions in which persons and environment influence each other, we can see that primary and secondary appraisal also affect each other. A situation which was originally seen as threatening, can for example be seen as less threatening when a person realises that damage can probably be prevented by adopting a particular strategy of behaviour. Lazarus calls this "reappraisal": a change in the original appraisal of a transaction, resulting from feedback from effectuated outcomes from this transaction, as a result of the person's actions, or by a (mere) re-thinking of the nature of this transaction. So appraisal is also a dynamic process in which changes take place constantly in the course of time and in which appraisal of the situation and one's own possibilities is constantly adjusted.

Finally, we must observe that appraisal does not only mean rational assessment of the transaction, but also the quality and intensity of a person's emotional feedback on the transaction. For example, it is more likely that a positive assessment of a situation will cause a positive emotional reaction, such as joy or satisfaction. It is likely that a situation that is assessed as threatening will evoke negative emotions, such as fear or anger. In such cases a person feels that he/she is unable to react adequately to the demands that he or she are facing in a specific situation. In other words, he or she feels that they are beyond his or her coping activities. Let's pay some attention to the concept of ''coping''.

=== Coping ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus gives the following definition of the term coping:
:"We regard coping as problem-solving efforts made by an individual when the demands he faces are highly relevant to his welfare (that is, a situation of considerable jeopardy or promise), and when these demands tax his adaptive resourses." (in Coelho, 1974, p. 250-251).

Coping activities can have two functions. First, a person can try to improve the situation by changing his or her own behaviour or environment. Secondly, a person can try to control emotions evoked by stress, so that morale and social functioning will not be influenced. Lazarus calls this ''palliation'', using a temporary measure to alleviate stress, such as denying, intellectualising or avoiding negative thoughts; in this way the situation itself does not change, but the individual makes sure that he or she feels better. Thus coping activities are not always rational or realistic, but can also be very irrational, primitive or rigid. Lazarus states that both kinds of coping are important; according to him realistic problem solving and primitive defensive mechanisms are two sides of the same coin.

Lazarus distinguishes four types of coping activities:

(a) ''Information seeking'': investigating the characteristics of a stressful situation in order to gain the knowledge necessary to make a correct coping decision, or to be able to assess threat or damage differently. On the one hand, seeking information can form a firm basis for an individual's action, on the other hand it can make this person feel better, by rationalising or supporting a previous decision; this is called "palliation".

(b) ''Direct action'': action taken by an individual to handle a stressful situation, directed towards himself or herself or at the environment, depending on environmental demands and personal goals.

(c) ''Inhibition of action''; suppression of action impulses that may otherwise cause damage, for example because they are morally or socially not acceptable, or because they can cause physical damage.

(d) ''Intrapsychic modes'': cognitive processes aimed at regulating emotions which arise as a result of stressful situations. As with other coping activities, they can be aimed at incidents from the past (for example the reinterpretation of a traumatic experience), or at future events (for example denying that a particular situation may become dangerous). Usually they are aimed at increasing the feeling of well-being of this individual; therefore, succesful intrapsychic coping activities may restrict the number of active attempts an individual makes to control his of her environment.

Lazarus admits that his rather rough division of coping activities is a rudimentary classification system; and indeed, a number of significant aspects are lacking. For example, it does not include any details about possible coping feedback and any antecedent conditions or results of different types of coping behaviour. There is still too little known about which situations evoke which types of coping behaviour. Moreover, Lazarus states that motivational and emotional aspects of coping receive relatively little attention in psychological studies. The developmental aspects of coping behaviour are also still unclear, and according to Lazarus studies of these aspects are essential in order to be able to understand the coping process more clearly.

=== Gaps in Lazarus' theory ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus has developed a clear and understandable theory with regard to certain central concepts, such as the transaction between persons and their environment, the individual's appraisal of a transaction, emotional response on this appraisal and several types of coping activities. However, it is still not clear what exactly is the nature of the processes described. Some lack of clarity remains which Lazarus himself in fact also admits.

Lazarus states, for example, that it is not clear which situations are experienced as threatening and not as a challenge, and by which persons (and vice versa). In the theory little is said about what kind of factors are important for acquiring coping behaviour and how the behavioural repetoire a person has at his or her disposal to respond to environmental demands, may develop in the course of time.

In the next chapter we will show how Apter's Reversal theory can provide an answer to a number of the queries mentioned above.

== Chapter 2: Apter's Reversal Theory ==

=== A supplement to remedy Lazarus' theory ===

{{Level|3}} One of the deficiencies observed in Lazarus' theory can be remedied by supplementing it with Apter's Reversal theory. The Reversal theory provides a (descriptive) answer to the question relating to the various ways in which people react to the same, or similar, situations. The Reversal theory states that as far as human motivation is concerned people are in one of two metamotivational states. The way in which a situation is experienced depends on the state a person is in at a particular moment. The two states can be distinguished by the level of arousal that is preferred. ''Arousal'' is defined in this theory as being mentally and physically prepared for action.

=== The organisation of motivation according to Apter ===

{{Level|3}} The ''Reversal theory'' has been developed by Apter and Smith (1975; see also Apter, 1984). The theory deals with the way in which people experience motives for their actions and descibes the process of changes in motivation. In this theory an individual is regarded as a complex "machine" that uses the environment for his or her own aims. This "machine" can behave according to different "programs" which determine the way in which the environment is experienced. The idea that one action can be performed with different motives is central. For example, a person may ride a bicycle, because he or she has to attend a meeting. This is a determined action. Here, riding a bicycle represents the means by which a goal can be achieved. However a person can also ride a bicycle "just" for pleasure. In this case a person acts according to the program "wanting to be active", and cycling is a goal in itself. Thus, there are two possible states in which a person can be. These states are characteristic of the way in which an act, in this case "cycling", is experienced. In the case of the meeting this act is purposive. In this situation cycling is not an act undertaken to create stress or excitement; here the aim is to fulfill a particular task. In other words: to remove the tension that is caused by being obliged to fulfill this task. In the second case cycling is an action which in itself evokes particularly pleasant excitement.

For this reason the Reversal theory rejects a simplistic-homeostatic interpretation of human motivation in which there is just one optimal state of balance that individuals are seeking. This state of balance particularly refers to ''one optimal level'' of arousal. According to the homeostatic way of thinking, individuals will always try to achieve one optimal level of arousal and/or to remain at this level. However, the Reversal theory assumes that at times a low level of arousal is aimed and at other times, a high level of arousel. Therefore Apter introduces the concept of ''bi-stability''. This means, for example, that people may or may not feel fine at a low or a high level of arousal. As the examples mentioned above show, at times one's aim may simply be the performance of a particular task and the act is not meant to raise the level of arousal. At other times a person may seek excitement, in which case the same or a similar act can suddenly become exciting (arousal increasing).

To illustrate these ideas we can consider a number of situations in which different levels of arousal are experienced. Generally (but not necessarily), there is a high level of arousal when a person watches an exciting film. One can imagine that this excitement can be both pleasant and unpleasant. For example, when a person has been working all day and the work was very boring, a movie picture can provide a welcome state of excitement. On the other hand, when a person has just been threatened in the street, the tension caused by the movie may be too much for him or her. In this situation a hot bath may be preferred as it is more likely to provide relaxation. Thus, there is a desire for a low level of arousal. The same hot bath may evoke boredom (in Apter's terms) in someone who has not done anything all day long. Therefore, it is important here that a particular level of arousal is not inadvertently connected with the person's well-being.

These examples indicate that a person can feel good or not, depending on the level of arousal sought at that moment, in other words: depending on the metamotivational state a person is in at that moment. The level of arousal is always evoking a ''subjective experience''. In other words: an exciting experience for one person, may be boring to another.

=== Bi-stability of emotions and motivation ===

{{Level|3}} We have shown that there are two possible states of preference as far as the level of arousal is concerned. Firstly, there is the state in which a person aims at a low level of arousal and performs purposive action. This state is called arousal-avoidance or the ''telic state'' (telos is Greek for goal or purpose). In this state a low level of arousal is experienced as pleasant, Apter (1982) calls this "relaxation". A high level of arousal is experienced as unpleasant and is called "fear" by Apter. Secondly, there is the state in which a person aims at a high level of arousal and shows unpurposive action. This state is called the arousal-seeking or ''paratelic state'' (literally translated from Greek, paratelic means "without aim" or "goal-less"). In this state a high level of arousal will be experienced as pleasant "excitement", whereas a low level of arousal causes an unpleasant feeling: "boredom". These two states, telic and paratelic, differ as far as the experience of purpose, time and intensity is concerned (Apter, 1982; Murgatroyd, 1978, 1983). This is shown in table 2.1.

The telic or paratelic state is as it were a frame for particular behaviour (Goffman, 1975). The states mentioned refer to the way in which the motivation of behaviour is experienced. For this reason they are called ''metamotivational states''. These states determine how experiences are labelled (see table 2.2, following next page). At any moment in time a person is always in one of these two states. The period of time in which a person can be in a particular state varies from a few seconds to some days (Walters, Apter and Svebak, 1982).

<pre>
Table 2.1 Characteristics of the telic and paratelic states
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ In the telic state there are: ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ - purposive action ║
║ - imposed purposes ║
║ - attempts to complete actions ║
║ - secure and routine behaviour ║
║ - looking for experience and safety ║
║ - orientation to the outside world ║
║ - behaviour aimed at the future ║
║ - planned activities ║
║ - activities that are a means to a purpose ║
║ - preference for low intensity experiences ║
║ - a high level of realism ║
║ - preference for a low level of arousal ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ In the paratelic state there are: ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ - process behaviour ║
║ - avoidable and freely chosen "purposes" ║
║ - attempts to extend activities and to make them continue ║
║ - exploration ║
║ - experimenting with behaviour ║
║ - looking for news and excitement ║
║ - a here-and-now experience ║
║ - activities that are aims in themselves ║
║ - activities that are spontaneous and free ║
║ - a preference for high intensity experiences ║
║ - imagination and exaggeration ║
║ - preference for a high level of arousal ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
</pre>

[[Image:Pleasant and unpleasant experiences of high and low arousal.png|framed|none|Table 2.2 The variable meaning of the experienced level of arousal]]

=== The reversals to the different states ===

{{Level|3}} We will now describe how a reversal from one state to another can take place. Reversals take place involuntarily, although a person may be capable of getting into a situation in which a reversal into one or another direction becomes likely. The frequency with which reversals take place differs from person to person and is, moreover, dependent on the situation a person is in (Blackmore and Murgatroyd in Apter, 1980).

The Reversal theory describes several conditions that can lead to a reversal. Most important are "contingencies"; aspects of a person or of the environment change in such a way that a reversal is triggered. For example, if a particular drug is used, if a visitor arrives unexpectedly or in an emergency situation. The second condition that can lead to a reversal is called "satiation". It is assumed that a reversal becomes more likely when the period of time in which a person is in a particular metamotivational state increases. A person then becomes more sensitive to signals from the environment or from himself or herself that can lead to contingencies. The different conditions influence each other, and can make reversals more or less likely. Table 2.2 and figure 2.1 show that a reversal from one state to another changes the meaning given to the level of arousal experienced. A reversal from the paratelic to the telic state, while a person experiences a high level of arousal, will result in a change from excitement to anxiety. A reversal from telic to paratelic, while a person experiences a low level of arousal, will result in a change from relaxation to boredom.

[[Image:Reversal system of antagonistic motivations.png|framed|none|Figure 2.1. Apter's Reversal model (from: Apter, 1985)]] 

=== Other possible sequences ===

{{Level|3}} Figure 2.1 shows the way in which the process of interchanging emotions and motivation ''often'' takes place. However, another "direction" may be followed. For example, a person may remain in a state of anxiety for a long time, because he or she cannot relax sufficiently. This can happen to a person who is not completely in control of (a) particular situation(s). In this case it is unlikely that after some time a person will look for a state of excitement. It is also possible that the entire sequence of emotions (the butterfly figure) in figure 2.1 rises or falls along the vertical axis (Apter 1982). This indicates that a person feels mainly well or not well respectively. The first can take place when a person has many skills, and can handle all kinds of different situations well. This person will not experience boredom in the strict sense, because the unpleasant stage of the paratelic state will soon change into exploration or into other activities that cause excitement or/and which increase the hedonic tone. When, following a period of rest and/or relaxation a person reaches "satiation", he or she will not remain in a state of boredom (unpleasant), but will soon find opportunities to perform one or another paratelic action which will be experienced as pleasant.

The butterfly in the figure may be at a lower level when a person is often anxious, or when he or she is chronically bored. Referring to Apter's model this situation can be explained by an inability to reach relaxation. As this person is unable to relax sufficiently for example, owing to an absence of skills, he or she will soon become (once more) over-aroused and anxious when he or she is in an exciting situation. That is, such situations become more threatening when a person can experience fewer moments of relaxation (Apter 1982). Such a person will, therefore, sooner experience the reversal from the paratelic to the telic state. In other words: a person will relatively quickly get from the state in which the situation was exciting (paratelic) into the state in which the situation becomes frightening (telic). He or she will be relatively often in stages of low hedonic tone, while the periods of pleasant tension or pleasant excitement will be experienced less often. This person, therefore, will explore for shorter periods and less often. As we shall explain further in chapter 5, such situations have serious consequences for the development of the process of learning.

In our view, chronic boredom can be considered as a symptom of a situation in which mainly unpleasant moods alternate. As soon as there is satiation of the telic state, there will unconsciously be a reversal to the paratelic state. However, before arousal-searching, expansive behaviour gets going well, there will often be a reversal to the telic state. The (unconscious) fear of risky exploration has become so strong that the paratelic metamotivational condition itself has been affected and is experienced as threatening. As a result such a person changes constantly from anxiety (telic) to boredom (paratelic) and the other way round, while his or her mood does not improve in hedonic tone. The person finds it difficult to "really" relax, because he or she finds it difficult to make a "real" effort. For this reason, such a person will in general experience boredom, rather than relaxion.

=== Towards a completion of Apter's theory ===

{{Level|3}} Although Apter's theory provides more insight into the different ways in which people can react to the same, or similar situations, some questions are still left unanswered.

Firstly, the Reversal theory is only descriptive. It provides no insight into the underlying dynamics of the processes described. In other words: it is not clear how and why the reversals between the two states take place. Moreover, the theory does not provide a satisfactory causal explanation for the presence of the different states and reversals.

Secondly, Apter describes his model as a symmetric model. This means that reversals from telic to paratelic, and reversals from paratelic to telic can be the result of contingencies, but also of satiation. A non-symmetric model is however more likely. We will show this in the next chapter.

== Chapter 3: Van der Molen's Energy-Learning Model ==

=== A supplement to Lazarus and the Reversal theory ===

{{Level|3}} In chapter 1 we have pinpointed certain gaps in Lazarus' theory. One problem is that too little attention is paid to emotional and motivational aspects of human behaviour. As a result, there is still very little known about which kind of situations are experienced as threatening and which are seen as a challenge (and vice versa), and by whom. In chapter 2 we have further discussed this in a descriptive way. We have stated that telic and paratelic states are metamotivational frames of behaviour that also explain the connection between threat and challenge. In this chapter we shall discuss this further and highlight another gap in Lazarus' theory, namely the developmental aspects of coping behaviour. The metamotivational states (telic and paratelic) will be approached from an ethological perspective; the importance of an optimal allocation of energy is emphasized. The concept of "energy" may be defined here from a psychological as well as from a physiological viewpoint. We shall discuss this further in 3.2.

In chapter 2 we have also described two gaps in Apter's theory which will be filled in this chapter. Firstly, the mainly descriptive nature of Apter's theory will be given more explanatory power by focussing on the energy apects of metamotivational states. Secondly, the influence of contingencies and the influence of satiation on reversals in Van der Molen's model will be described as non-symmetric, whereas Apter describes his theory as a symmetric model.

=== An open-ended learning system ===

{{Level|3}} In his model ''Van der Molen'' (1983, 1984, 1985; Van der Molen, Van der Dennen, 1981) emphasizes that, basically, we have an "open-ended" learning system: "This is the ability to acquire a behavioural repertoire which is specifically tailored to the environmental situation an individual happens to live in" (Van der Molen, 1984, p. 1). The learning abilities of an individual are optimally utilized, when his or her behaviour is organised in such a way that a surplus of energy is directly invested into extending and refining his or her behavioural repertoire. From a psychological perspective, when there is a surplus of energy, there is readiness and gumption to enter new situations and to show explorative behaviour. Such behaviour may increase the survival value, particularly when certain experiences can subsequently be utilized in stressful situations and in emergencies. Therefore, skills have to be trained in situations with a high level of arousal. And situations which evoke a high level of arousal are particularly those in which risks will (have to) be taken.

Thus, an open-ended learning system will provide a maximum survival value when the following conditions are fulfilled: firstly, there should be a tendency to look for situations that involve a high level of arousal when there is a surplus of energy, and, secondly, there should be a tendency to look for situations that reduce the level of arousal as soon as the suplus of energy is exhausted, or when there is an emergency.

Although we will not discuss the neurophysiological aspects of human behaviour extensively in this report, it is sensible in this context to discuss the findings of Van Rooijen (1976), Archer (1978) and Laborit (1978) briefly. Their studies have shown that there is a neurophysiological "emergency-system" which is activated as soon there is a risky situation or an emergency. This system enables a person to show adequate reactions (very) promptly; alertness is temporarily increased and motor actions can be carried out very quickly. Evidence shows that long-lasting or frequent activation of this system has a negative influence on learning processes, because too much of the neural capacity will then be reserved for keeping this emergency system in action. In addition the energy supply is also heavily taxed in such situations. For this reason there will have to be a reversal to another, more relaxed state after some time which enables the person to refill the energy supply. This is only possible when there is (relatively) little physical or mental exertion. These characteristics imply a bi-stable system in which the preferred level of arousal depends on the metamotivational state (see chapter 2 and Apter 1982). In the paratelic state, i.e. when there is a surplus of energy, a person will prefer a high level of arousal. On the other hand, in the telic state, when the surplus of energy is exhausted, or when there is direct danger, the organism will seek relaxation. This will at first require energy output but the final and desired result is a lowered level of arousal. Figure 3.1 shows the reversals between the different states.

[[Image:Reversal system of antagonistic motivations.png|framed|none|Figure 3.1. Apter's reversal model]] 

By relating the learning system directly to the energy available, Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) describes the way in which the paratelic and telic states alternate ideally. In the period of relaxation, energy is supplemented and acquired. When the energy supply has increased sufficiently (in other words: when there is satiation of the telic state) the individual will become bored and will, (once more) seek an exciting situation. In this state a high degree of arousal will be experienced as pleasant. However, when the surplus of energy is exhausted, there will be a reversal from the paratelic to the telic state. In this way, by looking for an easier or a comforting situation or by controlling the fearful situation (i.e. after achieving relaxation), the person can replenish the energy supply. Given the tendency to look for situations which are accompanied by a high level of arousal, there will be experimentation in the paratelic state with new or otherwise arousal-increasing skills and situations. In this way the behavioural repertoire will be tested, extended and refined.

If the system functions well, the telic and the paratelic states will automatically and regularly alternate. Now the second gap in Apter's theory has been filled. The explanatory principle Van der Molen adds, is that a bi-stable system of motivation contributes directly to the chances of a learning organism to survive, by using its surplus of energy as efficiently as possible.

Bowlby (1977) has shown empirically that regular periods of relaxation are of crucial importance for the ability and readiness to explore new situations. In his studies he describes that a child, exploring an unknown situation, regularly returns for a moment to a trusted person (in Bowly's case the child's mother). In this way the child can relax and acquire energy for the next bout of exploration. Many types of behavioural deficiencies, such as chronic fear, can develop, when the periodic need for relaxation and reassurance cannot be met.

=== Learning spirals ===

{{Level|3}} On the basis of positive and negative learning spirals, Van der Molen (1984) explains how a behavioural repertoire develops. If the sequence relaxation - boredom - excitement - fear - relaxation and so on occurs often enough, this indicates that, generally speaking, there have been sufficient possibilities, whether or not self-created, to achieve relaxation in time and to replenish energy deficits. An individual will then develop an adequately functioning behavioural repertoire in which the various skills are integrated well. A person will then also be able to handel emergencies better and to relax easier and more quickly, so that after some time he or she will be able and ready again to explore, etc. This is called a ''positive learning spiral''.

[[Image:Dependence of positive and negative learning spirals on proper rhythms of telic paratelic alternations.png|framed|none|'''Figure 3.2.''' The two types of learning spirals (Van der Molen, 1984) according to which acquiring and refining the behavioural repertoire will be the result of positive learning spirals, and a rigid stereotyped way of reacting a consequence of negative learning spirals.]]

However, when there are not enough moments of relaxation, too little energy can be built up with the result that the individual will explore less and will show telic behaviour more frequently. In this way the person will acquire fewer new skills and practise "old" skills less often. This is called a negative learning spiral (see figure 3.2).

This model has a peculiar consequence. It predicts namely that skills tend to grow in clusters. Following Grof (1972, 1973, 1976), Van der Molen calls such clusters "clusters of condensed experience" or "COEX-systems" (see figure 3.3). Grof gives the following definition of a COEX-system: "A COEX-system can be defined as a specific constellation of memories consisting of condensed experience (and related phantasies) from different life periods of the individual. The memories belonging to a particular system have a similar basic theme or contain similar elements and are associated with a strong emotional charge of the same quality. The nature of these systems varies considerably from one COEX-system to another".

Grof distinguishes positive and negative COEX-systems, depending on the emotions related to the cluster. Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) explains the reason for such a clustering of areas of experience. When particular situations have been explored many times and the experiences have been dealt with and digested adequately, there is a positive COEX-system in which various types of skills are included. Often these skills can be applied to other, but similar and related situations, so that those situations too can be more easily controlled and managed. In this way positive experiences tend to catalize the positive experiencing of similar, comparable areas and thus cause a positive COEX-system to grow.

Experiences that have been dealt with badly tend to grow in clusters too. That is, when in a particular situation there is little exploration, and as a result little practise with particular relevant skills, it is difficult to get the situation under control, and thus to relax. The likelihood that new skills will be acquired is then also very low, so that the next time the individual is in the same, or in a similar situation, he or she will more likely have another problematic experience. This increases the likelihood of telic behaviour (flight or avoidance behaviour) in similar situations, which causes even less experimenting.

An example of a negative cluster is the behaviour of someone who does not dare to enter into contact with people anymore as a result of his or her shyness. This causes the fear for this kind of situation to grow, because the familiarity with these situations decreases continuously, and, moreover, the person is unable to adequately develop other skills for which he or she needs help from others (school assignments, for example). In this way it is likely that the individual will become caught up in a ''negative learning spiral'' in which new experiences are no longer used for learning but only intensify the existing, inadequate, avoidance behaviour. It is difficult to escape from such a spiral. The most important (and necessary) condition for this is the ability to achieve relaxation which is a prerequisite for dealing with experiences and for the replenishment of energy. Only then (careful) explorations of the frightening area can begin, with the possibility that this leads to fewer negative or even to positive experiences.

If a number of areas which have been dealt with succesfully, for which skills have been developed, are closely related to an area of experience that has been dealt with badly, they may sometimes serve as a "refuge" when situations threaten to become frightening. Through retiring into such a refuge the necessary relaxation can then be acquired. It is important to keep in mind that a positive COEX-system does not necessarily consist of pleasant experiences. Positive COEX-systems, and in particular ''important'' COEX-systems, develop through a proper reprocessing and digestion of formerly negative experiences. A negative COEX-system consists of negative experiences that ''have been dealt with badly'' and have been (re-)processed and digested insufficiently. The developmental aspects which play a role in acquiring and extending coping skills and which have not further been developed by Lazarus, are thus discussed and explainedd in detail by Van der Molen.

[[Image:Outcome of the growth of positive and negative COEX systems.png|framed|none|'''Figure 3.3.''' Hypothetical example of the growth of positive (+) and negative (-) systems of COndensed EXperience in the field of experiences (from: Van der Molen, 1984).]]

=== The asymmetry of the Reversal model ===

{{Level|3}} At the beginning of this chapter we have mentioned that Apter presents his theory as a symmetric model. Van der Molen (1984) indicates that contingencies in particular cause a reversal from paratelic to telic, and that satiation is one of the primary causes of a reversal from telic to paratelic. Van der Molen places emphasis on one particular sequence, that from relaxation to boredom, from boredom to excitement, from excitement to fear, and from fear back to relaxation. The reversal from telic to paratelic behaviour is here a reversal from relaxation to boredom.

According to Van der Molen, this reversal will usually be the result of satiation. The reason for this concerns energy; we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter, that the capacities of an open-ended learning system are optimally utilized if any surplus of energy is invested in gathering more experience.

A reversal from the paratelic to the telic state, on the other hand, is caused in particular by contingencies. With reversals from paratelic to telic, Van der Molen places emphasis on the sudden transition from excitement to fear. By looking for arousal-increasing situations in the paratelic state, risks are taken and a greater likelihood exists that a particular situation will suddenly get out of hand owing to contingencies which cause a reversal from paratelic to telic behaviour.

=== Conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} In this chapter we have described Van der Molen's learning model which provides us an insight into the way in which the learning system is unconsciously kept going as long as there is a regular surplus of energy. We have observed that energy levels form the basis for the telic and the paratelic states and considered the emotional and motivational aspects of coping behaviour. Moreover, the developmental aspect of coping behaviour is explicitly discussed in Van der Molen's model, in the form of descriptions of positive and negative learning spirals and the clustering of related areas of experience. The concept of positive and negative COEX-systems can also be regarded as a first initiative to roughly categorize cognitive contents. Finally, we have discussed why Van der Molen regards satiation as a prime reason for the reversals from telic to paratelic and contingencies as the main cause of reversals from paratelic to telic.

=== Gaps in the Energy-Learning model ===

{{Level|3}} What is still lacking in this model, is a more detailed description of the way in which emotional and motivational states are related to ''cognitive contents''. This aspect will be addressed in the next chapter as we discuss Lewicka's antagonist model of cognitive styles.

== Chapter 4: Lewicka's model of Antagonist Cognitive Modes ==

=== A supplement to Van der Molen's learning model ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 3 we have described Van der Molen's discussion of the emotional and motivational aspects of the learning process. Lewicka's model (1987, for example) in which there are two antagonistic modes of cognitive information processing, provides a description of the cognitive aspects. We will show how this model supplements Van der Molen's model.

Lewicka distinguishes two types of behavioural regulation, the mechanism of ''action-control'' and the mechanism of ''action-involvement'' respectively. Like Apter's theory, Lewicka's theory too states that an individual is always in one of the two regulationary modes; there are two antagonistic mechanisms of cognitive functioning which alternate in time.

=== Action-control and action-involvement ===

{{level|3}} The mechanism of action-control instigates actions, aiming at the achievement of a particular objective (comparable to the telic state). Lewicka states that there are particular "''activity-external comparison standards''" which means that the achievement of an external objective is central and that the activity itself is not the objective of the individual.

The mechanism of action-control is controlled by a ''principle of negative feedback''; thinking of a particular standard (the objective), the individual assesses his or her situation. A discrepancy between the actual and desired states is experienced as unpleasant and causes instrumental behaviour (correcting mistakes, if any, and minimalising the discrepancy), until the objective in view has been achieved. Lewicka calls this "''controlling''": the objective regulates the behaviour of the individual.

The most important function of the mechanism of action-control is to maintain the level of organisation the individual has achieved. However, if an organism is to be able to grow, he or she must be capable of creating entirely new objectives (by him or herself), for example in order to be able to adapt to changing or still unknown environmental demands. The mechanism of action control itself is therefore not sufficient. For this, the alternative or antagonist mechanism of ''action-involvement'' is essential.

The mechanism of action-involvement encourages the individual to take actions which are not instrumental or purposive: in fact the individual's activity is an aim in itself (comparable to the paratelic state). Although sometimes there seems to be a particular external objective, this is often random and more like an "excuse" for the activity, than that the person really tries to achieve that objective. The motivation for the activity is the activity itself.

The mechanism of action-involvement is controlled by a ''principle of positive feedback''. The factors that cause the behaviour and maintain it lie in the behaviour itself; this is a process of self-amplification: the behaviour intensifies itself.

The function of the mechanism of action-involvement is the production of new, so far unknown, results of behaviour, or the further exploration of activities that have been tried out before. In this way the individual will not only be able to obtain more information, but also indications about promising directions of future activities. Lewicka calls this "''directing''" which means that the behavioural results themselves are guidelines for future behaviour. Since the behaviour is not directed at established goals, the activities of the individual in the action-involvement mode are often very unpredictable.

Table 4.1 provides a summary in catchwords of the main differences between the two mechanisms of regulation described by Lewicka.

{|style="border: 1px solid; border-collapse: collapse;" cellpadding="2"
|+'''Table 4.1.''' A summary of the differences between the action-control mode and the action-involvement mode
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Action-Control
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Action-Involvement
|-
|Purposive action
|Activity "for the activity"
|-
|Controlled by a negative feedback principle
|Controlled by positive feedback principles
|-
|Controlling: purpose regulates the behaviour
|Directing: behavioural results themselves are guidelines for sub-sequent behaviour
|-
|Function: maintaining the achieved level of organisation (balance)
|Function: taking the individual to a higher level of organisation (development)
|}

Table 4.1 shows once more that there is much similarity between the mode of action-control and the telic state and between the mode of action-involvement and the paratelic state. According to both Lewicka and Apter, the motivation for activity is central: they distinguish between activity aimed at a particular external objective and activity as an "objective" in itself. The difference between Apter's and Lewicka's approaches lies in how they further work out this distinction into two modes of behaviour. Apter discusses in particular the motivational and emotional aspects concerned. Lewicka, on the other hand, discusses in particular the cognitive aspects. In our view both theories can be combined to form a more complete picture of the alternation of behavioural modes. This will be explained in the remainder of this chapter. First we will discuss what Lewicka calls evaluative standards which, according to her, are operative in the action-control mode.

=== Evaluative standards of comparison in the action-control mode ===

{{level|3}} In the mechanism of action-control there are two forms of evaluative standards of comparison: on the one hand positive standards which indicate what a person ought to do (for example particular assessment criteria an achievement has to meet), on the other hand negative standards which indicate which limits cannot be passed (for example particular social standards which indicate what types of behaviour cannot be regarded "decent"). Lewicka calls them "''standards of goodness''" and "''standards of badness''" respectively.

The two types of standards are not entirely symmetric which means that a categorisation of a result as "not good" does not imply that this result is regarded as "bad" (and vice versa). There is a third category possible which is "non-substantial" which means: neither good, nor bad (see fig. 4.1).

[[Image:Lewicka standards of goodness.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.1: Schematic reproduction of various categorizations of possible results''' 
(Explanation: In the field of possible results, area A represents the results that are categorized as "good", area B the results that are regarded as "bad". The remaining possible results, area C, are of the category "non-substantial".)]]

Lewicka (1985) states that if certain standards of goodness are difficult to attain (for example rigid social rules of behaviour or idealised criteria for achievements), it is hard for a person to reach that standard. An example of this is a person who is in a very rigid environment, such that he or she must continuously take part in particular activities in order to be appreciated. In such situations there is hardly any opportunity for non-purposive behaviour and a reversal to the mode of action-involvement is not very likely.

When there are rigid, strictly defined and narrowly limited standards of badness which means that there is a small number of categories appraised as "bad" and thus a large number of "non-substantial", a person can very easily avoid "bad" behaviour. At first this may bring about a feeling of relief, as it is very clear what is not "allowed", but this situation may eventually also lead to boredom which, according to Van der Molen's learning model, makes a reversal to the mode of action involvement more likely. An example is the story of Adam and Eve in Paradise; everything was allowed, except eating apples from the Tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil. The rest of the story we know.

Within the mode of action-control the activities an individual is engaged in are either instrumental actions of ''approach'' aimed at producing results categorised as "good" by positive standards of comparison, or instrumental actions of ''avoidance'' aimed at avoiding results categorised as "bad" by negative standards of comparison. The functional conditions are ''efficiency'' and ''minimization of mistakes''; the least effort and the least costs for achieving a positive, or for avoiding a negative result, the better.

=== Criteria of evaluation in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} According to Lewicka the criteria of evaluation in the action-involvement mode are quite different. Lewicka uses the informative contents of activities as criteria. The search for a maximum of information is then the guideline for the choice of behaviour. "A catagorisation as "good" applies to all those alternatives of behaviour that provide an individual with new information and reduce uncertainty", Lewicka states.

Apparently Lewicka somewhat contradicts herself here, because in the definition of the mechanism of action-involvement she states that actions are brought about which do not aim at a particular objective. However, later on, she states, as we have described above, that the individual in the action-involvement mode aims at obtaining new information and reducing uncertainty. So apparently there is postulated an aim for a particular objective.

In our view this problem can be solved when the parallel between the action-control mode and the telic state on the one hand and between the action-involvement mode and the paratelic state on the other hand is regarded more closely. As we have previously mentioned, behaviour in the action-involvement mode is maintained by factors stemming from the activity itself. It remains unclear, however, what kind of factors are involved here. Apter explains this by his assumption of striving for pleasant tension as a general motive for behaviour in the paratelic state. If this idea is accepted as a supplement to Lewicka's theory, we can say more about whether purposive behaviour does or does not exist in the mode of action-involvement.

=== Proximal and ultimal purposes in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} In our view, it is important to make a clear distinction between the ''proximal'' and the ''ultimal'' purposes of behaviour in the action-involvement mode. The term "proximal purpose" refers to the objective at which the person aims at the moment of the activity. Contrary to the mechanism of action-control, there is no external objective in the mechanism of action-involvement, but there is activity because of the activity itself; the (proximal) "objective" of the person is the behaviour that provides pleasant tension. The ultimal objective of similar activities corresponds with the function of Lewicka's mechanism of action-involvement: it enables the person to acquire new experiences, to learn from them and thus enhances growth which in turn means the achievement of a higher level of cognitive organisation. A person is not aware of this ultimal objective at the moment the very activities take place. When Lewicka mentions behavioural alternatives with a high informative value which are categorized as "good", this must be interpreted as "good" with regard to the ultimal objective of the mechanism of action-involvement. The criteria the person applies at the moment of the activity itself, will not have any bearing on the informative value of the activity, but on the importance of the activity for the person, that is on the possibily that it may provide pleasant tension. The ultimal advantages of action-involvement behaviour make it evolutionarily advantageous that this behavioural mode exists in which arousal-rising and pleasure in the action itself are the proximal "goals" (see Van der Molen, 1983).

We can perhaps go further than Lewicka in answering the question which kind of activities have the greatest informative value. On the one hand, these are of course activities in areas of experience that are new and unknown to a person. Exploration of such areas is less likely in the action-control mode because a person then rather prefers to rely on familiar objects. New and unknown areas involve the risk of unexpected, unpleasant things happening. This leads to tension which is experienced as unpleasant in the mode of action-control. According to Van der Molen's learning model however, it is exactly unfamiliarity that produces tension which makes exploration ''inviting'' in the action-involvement mode. Activities that are closely related to areas categorized as "bad" may in the action-involvement mode also be experienced as "interesting". In the action-control mode the person tries to avoid such areas as much as possible and aims at achieving results categorized as "good". In our view "good" areas are not interesting in the action-involvement mode: they are familiar and do not create any tension. Approaching the "bad", risky areas, on the other hand, is exciting and, what is more, it has the (ultimal) advantage that the limits of these risky areas are explored and thus become more distinctly defined for the person. This will ultimately be of advantage to his or her freedom of movement: if the borders between what "is possible" and what "is not possible" are clear, this will be of advantage to the person whenever the mechanism of action-control is activated again and he or she tries to prevent "bad" results.

As we have stated above, Lewicka's ideas concerning the informative content of activities can be extended and explained by adding the concepts "proximal" and "ultimal" goals. Following the informative content of activities, we shall discuss in the
next paragraph in more detail how such information is processed cognitively.

=== "How", "Why" and "What" questions, sufficient and necessary conditions ===

{{level|3}} Lewicka (1987) states that there are three basic questions a person can ask: the question "''How?''", the question "''Why?''" and the question "''What?''". As an example she gives a logical implication:

P ════> Q, in which P is seen as the action-premise (the condition) and Q as the action-outcome (the result). The three questions that may be asked with regard to this implication are:
# ''How'' can you make Q happen?
# ''Why'' did Q happen?
# ''What'' will happen if P?
According to Lewicka the first two questions are "closed-ended", because the result Q has already been specified. This specification can be based on a criterion of "goodness" or on a criterion of "badness". The appraisal of the expected result determines to a great extent which particular question the individual will ask in particular. The fact is that when the results have been appraised as positive, people are particularly interested in the question "how" these results may be achieved. If the results, on the other hand, have been appraised as negative, the "why"-question is especially interesting (Wong & Weiner, 1981; Weiner, 1984). Lewicka relates these questions to the concept of "sufficient" and "necessary" conditions. We will first explain what is meant by these "sufficient" and "necessary" conditions.

Sufficient conditions are those conditions that have to be met to achieve a particular result. When a person wants to boil an egg for breakfast, for example, a list of sufficient conditions could look like this:

# Fill a pan with water.
# Put in the egg.
# Put the pan onto the cooker and turn on the gas.
# When the water boils, wait another four minutes.
# Turn off the gas and pour off the water.

When these conditions have been met, the person will indeed get his egg boiled. However, this is not the only way to boil an egg. It could be boiled in an old can on a campfire, for example. A series of sufficient conditions, therefore, indicates how a particular result can be achieved, but this does not imply that when these conditions are not met, the result cannot possibly be achieved in another way.

A necessary condition is a condition that has to be met, because there is no other way in which a particular result can be achieved. The necessary condition in the example of boiling an egg could be: "Heat the egg to a temperature that is above the coagulation temperature of the egg white, until the heat has spread throughout the egg". The way in which the egg is heated is not specified, as in fact this is unimportant. Only the fact that the egg is heated for some time is important; otherwise it will never be boiled. Departing from the necessary conditions for a particular result, it is often possible to generate various series of sufficient conditions.

As mentioned above, when the results have been appraised as positive, people particularly aim at finding sufficient conditions to achieve this result which means that they are particularly interested in the question: "''How'' can I make sure the result will be achieved?". So there is a strategy of "approach", aiming to achieve desirable results.

When the results have been appraised as negative, on the other hand, people particularly aim at finding the necessary conditions for these results. Only if someone knows ''why'' an unpleasant result comes about, will he or she be best able to effectively avoid the necessary condition(s) for this result and thus to avoid the unpleasant result itself. This is in fact a strategy of avoidance, aimed at preventing undesirable results.

There is a great difference between these two types of information processing. To find ''sufficient'' conditions for a result, a "''sufficiency-oriented method''", it is in principle sufficient to know that a particular result will come about after meeting one particular condition or combination of conditions. Then the person will be able to remember this simplistic connection and knows that meeting those conditions again will be sufficient to get the same result again. Seeking ''necessary'' conditions, a "''necessity-oriented method''" implies a greater investment of time and energy. To distil the necessary conditions from the various sufficient conditions for a particular result, more experience and skill is needed, as well as a certain degree of experimenting and the cognitive processing of acquired experiences. Only by examining several conditions separately, will it be possible to find out whether they are essential for a particular result and, if so, why. This investment of time and energy (proximal costs) has, however, some (ultimal) advantage which is the possibility to make the cognitive structure concerned more economical, sparse and logically coherent. As it becomes clear "why" a particular result occurs, it can be obtained or avoided more effectively. The large quantity of sufficient conditions is then, in fact, reduced to a smaller number of necessary conditions. From these necessary conditions, relatively strong and efficient rules can be distilled, so that an individual does not need a separate list of sufficient conditions for each result. In this way a large number of answers to the "how"-question can be replaced by a single answer to the "why"-question.

=== The "what"-question in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} As we have stated, a certain amount of experimenting is needed to develop a necessity-oriented method. New, additional knowledge about the results of behaviour must be acquired. At this stage the "what"-question will be important. According to Lewicka the "what"-question is "open-ended", because there is no previously specified result. This question will in particular emerge during the exploration of novel areas; there will be experimenting with behavioural alternatives, without aiming at previously determined results. In other words: activities will be engaged in, just to investigate their effects. Referring to our learning model, it will be clear that the "what"-question will emerge in particular during the state of action-involvement (comparable to the paratelic state); experimenting is attractive in this state, because the unfamiliarity of the result will be seen as exciting and pleasant.

We have to observe that the appraisal of the expected results has a significant influence on whether the person does or does not put much effort into developing a necessity-oriented method. That is to say, the interests of the person on a proximal level play an important part here which means the interests the person is aware of at the moment of the activity itself. In the action-involvement mode those interests are the achievement of pleasant tension. Exploring of and experimenting with the limits of areas categorized as "bad" or problematic, causes considerable tension: after all there is a chance that there will be a less pleasant result. Exploring areas categorized as "good" (or well processed and digested) provides hardly any tension: the only thing that may happen is that an expected pleasant result will not take place. However as the person will generally have one or more sufficiency-oriented methods for achieving desirable results, he or she can always make sure those results will be achieved, should it be necessary when an emergency arises. When a person wants to explore things, seeking (pleasant) tension, these areas are rather unattractive and his or her attention will almost automatically be attracted to the more interesting, because unfamiliar, areas that may be related to an area that has been dealt with well, but at the very least are related to the more risky areas, categorized as "bad".

=== Pleasant and unpleasant results, necessary and sufficient conditions, acceptance of chances of mistakes and cognitive "bias" ===

{{level|3}} In the action-involvement (paratelic) mode, attention is automatically drawn to a further exploration of the conditions of results. When the results are pleasant, the consequences for the cognitive processing system are entirely different from if the results are unpleasant. As we have stated in paragraph 4.6, working with necessary conditions is the most efficient. Acquiring "sufficient" behavioural strategies is less complicated and quicker to realise, however. To that end the "why"-question does not have to be examined intensively. Any answer to the "how"-question will do. Therefore, if an additional investment in time and energy is made, needed to grow from sufficient behavioural strategies to knowledge of necessary conditions, it will in general be invested in the first place in ''un''pleasant results, in order to determine their conditions more accurately.

When examining pleasant results it is of course more efficient to know the necessary conditions, but in those cases it is less crucial, because there are fewer risks. Indeed, any sufficient conditions will meet the purpose, that is, to achieve pleasant results.

There is another problem, however. In practise it is in general impossible to make accurate predictions about behavioural results. The cognitive models of reality we create are just approaches. The higher the required degree of accuracy, the more experience and information has to be invested. All cognitive models have a particular degree of uncertainty. Which uncertainties will be minimized in the first place, depends to a great extent on the nature of the expected results. Table 4.2 gives a summary of the possible antecedents and results in the case of pleasant and in the case of unpleasant results. This table is a free modification of Lewicka's (1985). To be perfectly clear, we have made a separate table for pleasant and unpleasant results respectively. However, as far as terminology is concerned, these tables differ a little from Lewicka's. The fact is that it is not always clear what Lewicka means with the terms "positive" and "negative", because she uses them in two different ways. Lewicka uses, for instance, the terms "positive outcome" and "positive hit". In the first term "positive" means: positively appraised or appreciated. For clarity's sake we have chosen the term ''pleasant'' for positively appraised results and ''unpleasant'' for negatively appraised results. Of course we have not changed terms like "positive hit" and "negative hit", because these are established terms from the disciplines of logic and mathematics.

When departing from the idea that people generally try as hard as possible to avoid disappointments, the table makes clear why some specific cognitive strategies are more likely to occur in connection with some specific results than others. Each cognitive strategy of course also harbours its own chances of mistakes and "bias".

If any ''unpleasant'' results can occur, a person will generally try to avoid them. ''Disappointments'' arise when there are unpredicted unpleasant results (false negative, "type II" mistake). We know that when the probability of a Type II mistake is made as small as possible, the probability of a "Type I" mistake will, as a consequence, increase (see for example Nijdam & Van Buuren, 1983). In this case a "Type I" mistake is a ''pleasant surprise'' for the individual: an unpleasant result was predicted, but it did not take place. At the level of the behaviour of the individual this means, that during the action-control mode (in which unpleasant results are actively avoided), the individual will take a large "safety margin"; not only will the area be avoided for which there are clear negative standards of appraisal, but also the areas that are closely related. The chance of a Type II-mistake reduces this, but the area that has been avoided will usually be larger than is really necessary. This is shown in figure 4.2.

<pre>
Table 4.2: Survey of possible mistakes in information processing, depending on the evaluative appraisal of the result

╔══════════════════════╦════════════════════╗
Unpleasant ║ H ║ non-H ║
results ║ (unpleasant T ║ (unpleasant T ║
║ will occur) ║ will not occur) ║
╔══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ T ║(A) ║ (C) ║
║ ║ positive hit ║ false negative or ║
║ ║ ║ Type II-mistake ║
║(unpleasant T ║ (unpleasant as ║ (unpleasant, but ║
║ occurs) ║ predicted) ║ not predicted) ║
║ ║ p(H ∩ T) ║ p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╠══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ non-T ║ (B) ║ (D) ║
║ ║false positive or ║negative hit ║
║ ║Type I-mistake ║ ║
║(unpleasant T ║(not unpleasant, ║(not unpleasant, ║
║ does not ║although predict- ║as predicted) ║
║ occur) ║ed) p(H ∩ -non-T) ║p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╚══════════════╩══════════════════════╩════════════════════╝

╔══════════════════════╦════════════════════╗
Pleasant ║ H ║non-H ║
results ║ (pleasant T ║ (pleasant T ║
║ will occur) ║ will not occur) ║
╔══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ T ║ (A) ║(C) ║
║ ║positive hit ║false negative or ║
║ ║ ║Type II-mistake ║
║ (pleasant T ║ (pleasant as ║(pleasant, but not ║
║ occurs) ║ predicted) ║predicted) ║
║ ║p(H ∩ T) ║ p(non-H ∩ T) ║
╠══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ non-T ║(B) ║ (D) ║
║ ║false positive or ║negative hit ║
║ (pleasant T ║Type I-mistake ║ ║
║ does not ║ (not pleasant, al- ║not pleasant, ║
║ occur) ║though predicted ║as predicted ║
║ ║p(H ∩ non-T) ║p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╚══════════════╩══════════════════════╩════════════════════╝

"Necessity" of H for T: p(H|T) = A/ (A + C)
"Sufficiency" of H for T: p(T|H) = A / (A + B)
</pre>

One result of this safe strategy is, that during the action-control mode particular areas will remain unexplored and thus unfamiliar to the individual. Such large safety margins can only be rendered superfluous by a further elucidation of the necessary conditions for the unpleasant result. Its borders then become narrower, sharper and more accurately defined (see figure 4.2). In terms of figure 4.1: the acquisition of more necessity-oriented information reduces the size of the "no good" areas and increases the available behavioural manoeuvering space. On the other hand, as we have said before, vaguely defined borders provide pleasant tension in the action-involvement mode and such areas which were rather avoided in previous, action-control modes, will become more attractive and may be explored more closely.

[[Image:Avoidance of unpleasant results in the action-control mode.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.2: Avoidance of unpleasant results in the action-control mode''']]

When an individual may expect positive results he or she will follow quite a different strategy. A ''disappointment'' would mean here that a pleasant result is predicted, but does not take place (false positive, "Type I" mistake). The individual will try to avoid this as much as possible. Minimizing the probability of a Type I mistake implies that the probability of a Type II mistake will increase which is the chance that there will be a pleasant result, although it was not predicted; an ''unexpected surprise''. In the action-control (telic) mode the individual will probably choose for a safe strategy : starting from one or another familiar sufficient method the individual will aim at achieving the pleasant result, without taking risks. The area of behavioural options the individual then aims at is most likely to be smaller than is really necessary. This is shown in figure 4.3.

It is clear now that adhering to a single existing sufficient method in the action-control mode limits the behavioural repetoire of the individual; he or she will rarely experiment with other strategies of behaviour than the one that is familiar and tested, for fear of not achieving the expected, pleasant result. However, in the state of action-involvement experimenting with alternative strategies is attractive. Especially close to the areas categorized as "good", the individual can always benefit from the familiar sufficient method in case of an emergency. This means that there will probably be less tension than might arise close to an area categorized as "bad". After further exploration, the "safe" area can thus be extended by supplementing more sufficient methods. Should the individual eventually succeed in generating a necessity-oriented cognitive representation of this pleasant result, even more degrees of safety, as all sufficient conditions would also be defined by implication.

[[Image:Aiming at pleasant results in the action-control mode.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.3: Aiming at pleasant results in the action-control mode''']]

Both with pleasant and unpleasant results, necessity-oriented cognitive models will allow the greatest freedom of movement and behavioural efficiency. The area of unpleasant results (see figure 4.2) will be smaller and the area of pleasant results (see figure 4.3) will be larger. It is clear, however, that the need to invest more energy in obtaining "necessary" cognitive connections will be strongest in the case of unpleasant results.

In chapter 3 we have shown that in fact this is what really takes place. The problematical areas of experience produce most arousal (because of the possibly unpleasant results) which makes these areas more attractive in the action-involvement (paratelic) mode when there is enough energy to invest in exploration. As a consequence, in such problematical areas there will relatively quickly be enough experience and information available to achieve cognitive structures of "necessity" at a higher level of abstraction and integration.

=== Summary and conclusion ===

{{level|3}} In this chapter we have discussed how Lewicka's theory can supplement Van der Molen's learning model. The cognitive aspects of the learning process have been discussed and integrated, in order to create a more comprehensive model. We have discussed the difference between action-control and action-involvement and the parallels with the telic and paratelic states. Subsequently the evaluative criteria that are active in the action-control mode have been discussed. With regard to the evaluative criteria in the action-involvement mode it appeared that a relatively easy supplement (similarity with the paratelic state and the difference between proximal and ultimal objectives) sufficed to remove an apparent contradiction in Lewicka's theory. Finally we have discussed the way in which the evaluative appraisal of possible results determines the kind of information an individual seeks, the strategy of behaviour that will probably be chosen and the kind of cognitive mistakes that can be made in processing information.

In the next chapter we will show how these theories complement each other in such a way that a dynamic model emerges that includes the most important aspects of the learning process, that describes cognitive growth and which can be utilized in many areas of research and practical application.

By way of summary, table 4.3 shows the most important characteristics of the action-control and the action-involvement modes.

<pre>
Table 4.3: Survey of action-control and action-involvement
╔═══════════════════════════════╦═════════════════════════════╗
║ ACTION-CONTROL ║ ACTION-INVOLVEMENT ║
╠═══════════════════════════════╬═════════════════════════════╣
║ Purposive activity and ║ Activity as an "aim" in ║
║ instrumental behaviour ║ itself ║
║ ║ ║
║ Principle of negative ║ Principle of positive ║
║ feedback ║ feedback ║
║ "controlling" ║ "directing" ║
║ ║ ║
║ Function: maintaining the ║ Function: achieving a ║
║ level of organisation ║ higher level of organisa- ║
║ ║ tion ║
║ ║ ║
║ In particular in an environ- ║ In particular in an envi- ║
║ ment with stringent standards ║ ronment with stringent ║
║ of goodness ║ standards of badness ║
║ ║ ║
║ Approach-strategy towards ║ Exploration when pleasant ║
║ pleasant results ║ results occur less probable║
║ ║ ║
║ Stategy of avoidance towards ║ Exploration particularly ║
║ unpleasant or unknown ║ around unfamiliar or un- ║
║ results ║ pleasant results ║
║ ║ ║
║ For pleasant results: ║ Independent of the kind of ║
║ "How?"-question, ║ results: "What?"-question ║
║ For unpleasant results: ║ (exploration/experimenting)║
║ "Why?"-question ║ ║
║ ║ ║
║ Proximal and Ultimal goals ║ Proximal goal: obtaining ║
║ are the same: to bring and ║ pleasant tension; Ultimal ║
║ keep the environment under ║ goal: gaining entirely new ║
║ control (survival and restor- ║ experiences, as a condition║
║ ing the balance of energy) ║ for development ║
╚═══════════════════════════════╩═════════════════════════════╝
</pre>

== Chapter 5: An integration of Lazarus', Apter's, Van der Molen's and Lewicka's theories ==

In this chapter we will describe how one coherent model can be constructed from the theories discussed. This model describes and explains more than each theory separately. We have called this model the Cognition-Energy-Learning model (C.E.L). The model shows how development and learning can be examined from a perspective of energy potential. The cognitive and emotional aspects that play a part in the learning processes, are also accounted for in this model.

=== Energy dependence of motivation and emotions ===

{{level|3}} In the previous chapters we have shown that there is a distinction between telic and paratelic phase. In the telic phase, the behaviour is directed by a particular goal, avoiding fear and seeking safety, for example. In the paratelic phase, on the other hand, the behaviour is a goal in itself; behaviour takes place "just for fun". Thus, in this phase tension is experienced as pleasant and exciting, while in the telic phase it is experienced as frightening and unpleasant. A condition for paratelic behaviour is a surplus of energy which can be spent on exploring and on trying out new things. Telic behaviour takes place at the moment the surplus of energy becomes exhausted or when an emergency arises.

What has been stated above, makes clear that the energy dependent basis of motivation and emotion is extremely important; the motivational state of an individual depends strongly on the energy that a person has at its disposal. The consequence is a strongly dynamic character of the organization of motivation; motivation and emotion change constantly in the course of time. In the telic phase a person will try to get his or her situation under control. Bringing a situation under control will at first take energy, but once the situation is under control the individual can benefit from familiar skills which cost (relatively) little energy (see chapter 3). In this way the individual can relax and assemble new energy which can be spent in the following paratelic phase. In the telic phase rest and relaxation are aimed at. Once relaxation has been achieved and the individual has recuperated enough energy, there will be a motivational reversal; then rest is no longer regarded as pleasant, but rather as dull and boring. In this paratelic phase a high level of tension is aimed at, until a reversal to the telic state (owing to fatigue or to an emergency) occurs again and the person tries to get the situation under control in order to be able to relax subsequently.

This system of reversals can be understood by regarding the utilization of energy, which is the basis of the behaviour of the individual. There have to be reversals to the telic state; a person cannot constantly show paratelic behaviour, as the energy required will be exhausted at a certain moment. Moreover, endless explorative and arousal-seeking behaviour will cause difficulties sooner or later which in turn may cause an emergency situation which in turn will ''force'' a reversal. The trigger for these types of reversals has to be sought on a very proximal level. On the other hand, the evolutionary reason for the existence of this reversal system between telic and paratelic states has to be sought at the ultimate level; that is, an organism will have the best yield in terms of survival value when the energy, gained during phases of relaxation in the telic mode, will subsequently be spent in paratelic modes for acquiring novel, additional experiences, that serve for the extension of one's own behavioural repertoire (Van der Molen, 1984).

=== Problematical and non-problematical experiences ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 3 we have described Van der Molen's model and sequences in which the telic and paratelic modes should alternate ideally. This sequence is: boredom - (explorative behaviour) - excitement - fear - (reversal to the telic state and seeking rest) - relaxation - (with eventually a reversal to the paratelic state) -boredom - etc.

Should this sequence actually take place in a regular pattern, the result would be optimal; in the paratelic phase the individual explores the environment and that way he or she gains new experiences, using the skills acquired previously. When these skills prove insufficient and the situation threatens to get out of hand, there will be a reversal to the telic phase and the individual will seek control of the situation. On the one hand these periods of rest are necessary for recovery of the balance of energy and on the other hand newly acquired skills and experiences can be processed and integrated with earlier experiences during such periods of rest. This implies that after a series of reversal cycles the individual may be at a higher level of cognitive organisation than before. In this way the individual grows and learns from his or her experiences in the course of time.

There will not always occur such ideal sequences of telic and paratelic phases. A person may for instance not be able to relax optimally in the telic phase. This is often the case if he or she does not have the adequate skills or coping strategies to get the situation under control. In this way the situation remains frightening, the person does not relax sufficiently and thus does not get the opportunity to gain new energy which is a condition for another paratelic phase. The situation will probably be explored less quickly (paratelic) and there will be no experimenting with skills which would enable the individual to behave adequately in this situation. And since no new experiences are acquired in that area of experience from which the person could learn, he or she will remain at a lower level of functioning and there is a high probability of accumulations and fixations of simplistic avoidance behaviour. In that way a cluster of badly mastered areas of experience may grow.

What has been stated above makes clear that for the individual some specific areas of experience can be problematical, while at the same time other areas are non-problematical. Problematical areas of experience are those areas for which no, or only a few, adequate coping strategies have been developed; the area has not been dealt with well. For the non-problematical areas of experience, adequate coping strategies have indeed been created; these areas have been dealt with well. In chapter 3 (following Grof 1972, 1973), areas of experience that have been dealt with badly were called "negative COEX-systems", and areas that have been dealt with well were called "positive COEX-systems". Table 5.1 shows what these positive or negative COEX-systems imply.

{|style="border: 1px solid; border-collapse: collapse;" cellpadding="2"
|+'''Table 5.1.''' Characteristics of positive and negative COEX-systems (Systems of COndensed EXperience)
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Negative COEX-systems
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Positive COEX-systems
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Flight/fight responses
|Stay/play responses
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Behavioural rigidity
|Flexibility of reactions
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Stereotyped reflexes
|Creative responses
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Unskills
|Skills
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Phobias and neuroses
|Mastery of
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Consciousness block (unconscious repressions)
|Awareness of
|}

=== Emotional labeling of experiences as pleasant and unpleasant ===

{{level|3}} At the beginning of this chapter we stated that it depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of a person whether he or she experiences a situation as pleasant or unpleasant. Problematical areas of experience that have not been dealt with well will cause tension. In the telic state this will be experienced as unpleasant and frightening and there is a high likelihood of avoidance behaviour. The person will seek areas of experience that have been dealt with well; in those areas the person is able to control the situation and thus to relax. In the telic state, areas that have been dealt with well can be a "refuge" which is helpful when the person gets into a frightening situation. In the paratelic phase this is of course not the case. In this phase the areas that have been dealt with well are experienced as boring and thus as less pleasant because they do not longer provide arousal. It is the problematical areas that are attractive in this phase because there can still be some experimenting and an element of risk is involved; this provides pleasant arousal (compare chapter 4).
At the beginning of chapter 3 we have discussed the biological relevance of the telic and the paratelic states. From what has been stated above it becomes again clear that both phases are necessary in order to function well. In the telic state the individual is able to relax, once he or she has succeeded in getting the situation under control, and will thus be able to gain new energy and to integrate the newly gained experiences into his or her existing cognitive system. This system enables the individual to remain at a particular level of functioning. In the paratelic phase new or problematical situations (and in the telic phase situations that are experienced as fearful) will be explored and new situations can be investigated. By continuously exploring a situation that has not yet completely been digested and controlled, and by dealing with those experiences and digesting them, this situation will lose its connotation as frightening and the individual will learn which strategies are adeqate in that situation and which are not. Thus the paratelic phase is also an indispensable condition for the growth of the individual.

Thus, we can state that the proximal goal of the telic phase is: seeking rest and relaxation. The ultimal goal is: maintaining a certain level of functioning. The proximal "goal" of the paratelic phase is experiencing pleasant arousal (by way of non-direct purposive behaviour). However, the ultimal goal is creating the conditions for achieving a higher level of functioning.

At this point we can once more emphasize an important characteristic of the way in which the reversals from one phase to another come about. In chapter 2 we have stated that we must not hold fast to the idea of a symmetrical model. The reversals from paratelic to telic will mainly be the result of an emergency or of fatigue, while the reversals from telic to paratelic will particularly take place as a result of "satiation". In this respect Apter's theory has therefore also been supplemented.

=== Cognitive development ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 4 we have stated that there is much similarity between Lewicka's mode of action-control and Apter's telic state, and between the mode of action-involvement and the paratelic state. Apter emphasizes the motivational and emotional aspects of reversals in particular, while Lewicka places emphasis on the cognitive aspects. We shall now describe how the two theories can supplement each other and thus provide a more complete description of the processes involved.

Lewicka mentions "standards of goodness" and "standards of badness"; particular standards that indicate what kind of behaviour has to be aimed at and what kind of behaviour can better be avoided (see chapter 4). Czapinski (1986, 1987) completes this with his study of the appraisal of experiences which indicates that people generally show a mild "positivity bias". This means that generally experiences have a mildly positive connotation (except when they have a specific and very strong connotation). Therefore, according to Czapinski, there is a lightly positive background in the cognitive representation of experiences in which the negative areas of experience are particularly important. Departing from these ideas, we are now able to say more about cognitive development.
Figure 5.1 shows the combination of these ideas.

[[Image:Cognitive representation of areas of experience.png|framed|none|Figure 5.1: Cognitive representation of areas of experience <tt>(++)</tt> areas that have been digested well <tt>(--)</tt> problematic areas <tt> (+)</tt> mildly positive background]]



This figure strongly resembles the figure in which Van der Molen showed Grof's theory of COEX-systems (see chapter 3), but is more detailed. The development of the cognitive system can now be described as follows.

The areas of experience with the unpleasant connotations, that is the areas that have not yet been properly dealt with well and digested yet (- -), will be arousal-increasing and cause tension.

In the telic state the areas that have been digested well (+ +) are attractive because they are controlled in such a way, that in an emergency a state of relaxation can easily be achieved. We will refer to these areas with the term "refuges". In the paratelic state, it is particularly the areas that have not been digested properly yet which will be attractive because in that state tension is experienced as pleasant. We now make the assumption that in the paratelic state the borders of the exciting areas are explored, which means that those areas will be explored first, that are closer to the area for which there is a "standard of badness" and for which there is a relatively high probability of an unpleasant surprise. On a proximal level only (pleasant) tension and excitement are sought. However, as a result of such explorations, the limits of the areas that have been digested badly will gradually move; as a result of positive experiences parts of the problem area are nibbled away and are bit by bit turned into areas that have been dealt with and digested well. In this way the individual learns and is able to develop further. On an ultimal level the paratelic state certainly has a goal, namely the acquisition of the new experiences necessary for further development.

What finally happens in the optimal case on a logical-cognitive level, is that, based on the experiences gained from exploration, a comprehensive necessity-oriented method of a higher level of abstraction will be constructed out of and in place of the existing sufficiency methods (see chapter 4). One prerequisite is, however, that between the actions sufficient time and rest can be gained to digest new experiences and to integrate them. A simple example may clarify this.

Imagine: John is walking in the woods. He enjoys the scenery and relaxes completely. Occasionally he climbs a fence to walk a little in the pastures or in a part of fenced woodland. Suddenly, from behind the trees a horse gallops towards him and John does not even think, but runs as fast as he can. Somehow he manages to get away and not until later does he wonder what exactly has happened. First he does not dare to go into the woods again, but after some time, when he has calmed down, it does seem exciting to him (paratelic) and he decides to stay near the fences so that he will be able to escape by climbing a fence, should this be necessary (refuges in frightening situations). In this way John explores the situation and finds out in which area of the woods the horse is and which part of the woods and which pastures he must try to avoid. The tension of walking decreases more and more because he now knows exactly where to be on his guard. So, finally, having arrived at a complete picture of the forest and the pasture schedules, the motivation to explore the woods in the paratelic state is lost.

In this example John is unpleasantly surprised and is at first frightened in the woods. However, once he has explored the situation, a sufficiency-oriented method ("If I walk in the same area as I did before, a horse may gallop towards me at a given moment") will be changed into a necessary-oriented method ("Only if I climb that particular fence, will the horse gallop towards me"). As a result, John's freedom of movement has increased because it is obvious that the area to be avoided has been restricted. This is shown in figure 5.2.

[[Image:Avoidance exploration and reduction of an unpleasant area of experience.png|framed|none|'''Figure 5.2:''' Avoidance, exploration and reduction of an unpleasant area of experience (after positive experiences)]]

What happens is that an area of experience which is first experienced as problematical (unpleasant in the telic phase) is gradually reduced because its limits are explored (in the paratelic phase) and there may be positive experiences on that fringe. To speak in Grof's terms, the purpose of paratelic behaviour on an ultimate level is to change as many negative COEX-systems into positive COEX-sytems as possible. In other words, the target is to exchange less efficient sufficiency-oriented methods, related to experiences that have been dealt with and processed badly, for highly efficient necessity-oriented methods which are in particular related to experiences that have been digested well.

It now becomes clear why experiences tend to grow in clusters. When particular situations have been explored many times and the experiences have been dealt with and digested well, the COEX-system is a positive one in which all kinds of new skills have been acquired which can often also be applied to other, related situations. Generally, in such an area of experience the individual is in a ''positive learning spiral''.

Experiences that are dealt with and processed badly, also tend to grow in clusters in a similar way; in such cases there is a fair chance that the next time the individual gets into the same, or a similar or related situation, he or she will have another problematic experience. This increases the probability of telic behaviour in similar situations, with the result that there will be less experimenting. In this way the individual will easily get into a ''negative learning spiral'' in a similar area of experience. New experiences are no longer used for learning but only intensify and extend the existing, relatively inefficient behaviour.

[[Image:Safety margins in the telic state.png|framed|none|'''Figure 5.3:''' Safety margins in the telic state. The dotted lines mark the safety margins in the telic state. The risky areas become larger, the safe areas (or refuges) smaller.]]


In terms of figure 5.1 this means that, given such an accumulation of bad experiences, the cognitive representations of the refuges (+ +) will remain relatively restricted and small and for the cognitive representation of the problematical areas (- -) there are relatively increasing and less efficient margins.

In the case that there are no necessity-oriented methods of great precision and a high degree of abstraction, and thus relatively many methods are of the sufficiency type, the limits shown in figure 5.1 are less favourable in the telic state. The refuges of areas that are dealt with well will be limited, because the sufficiency-oriented methods are too much restricted, whereas for the areas that are dealt with badly, the safety margins are too large. Thus the individual has relatively little freedom of movement.

In such a negative learning spiral a negative COEX-system will expand increasingly, owing to an accumulation of avoidance reactions which are primarily based on methods of sufficiency. They can be generated relatively quickly but they also involve relatively large safety margins, with the consequence that a relatively great part of the area of experience will be considered as risky.

It is extremely difficult to escape from such a negative learning spiral. A prerequisite for this is the ability to attain the relaxation, necessary for the digestion of the accumulated experiences. Should a number of experiences that have been dealt with and digested well, verge on an area that has been dealt with badly, they may sometimes serve as refuges, when situations become too frightening. This may then provide the required escape, safety and rest.

It is now possible to relate all this to Lazarus' theory as described in chapter 1. In our view, the appraisal of a particular situation or transaction depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of an individual. A transaction that is appraised as stressful will often be regarded as threatening in the telic state, whereas in the paratelic state it is more likely that the same transaction will be seen as a challenge. When a person is in a positive learning spiral in which positive COEX-systems are acquired and extended, and new experiences and skills are digested well, new situations are likely to be experienced as positive and regarded as challenges. That is, the individual has noticed that owing to his or her arsenal of skills, he or she is very well capable to anticipate many kinds of situations and to get them under control. Not only is this a good basis for acquiring new skills but it also allows for relaxation and the conviction that novel situations can adequately be dealt with as well. However, in the case of a negative learning spiral in which negative COEX-systems expand and the individual gets trapped in his or her own inadequate behaviour, entirely new situations will rather be seen as threatening. This increases the likelihood that the individual will hold on more tenaciously to particular - inadequate - behavioural strategies, so that it becomes increasingly likely that he or she will fail again.

This makes clear that it is very difficult to make a distinction between an appraisal of the situation itself (Lazarus: ''primary appraisal'') and of one's own abilities to deal with that situation (''secondary appraisal''). These two aspects are strongly intertwined. The appraisal of a transaction always depends on previous experiences, on acquired skills, and on the metamotivational state of an individual. We have shown that this state may (sometimes quickly) change. This is called ''reappraisal''; the original appraisal of the transaction changes. According to Lazarus, such a change is caused by feedback about changes in the transaction because of actions taken by the individual, or by reconsidering the nature of the transaction. We are now able to supplement Lazarus' ideas. In our view the appraisal of a transaction depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of the individual at that very moment. A change of this appraisal means that there has been a meta-motivational reversal to another state. Such a reversal may take place because of "contingency" (a particular event takes place) or because of "satiation" (because a person has been in one and the same state for a long time). The two causes mentioned by Lazarus can be categorized under "contingency": the transaction changes as a result of actions taken by the individual and the changing situation forces a reversal, or the interpretation of the transaction changes because of cognitive processes (thinking), which may also cause a reversal. Hence, our cognition-energy- learning model does not only supplement Lazarus' ideas, in this respect adding reversals through "satiation", but it also provides a description and an explanation of the dynamics of the underlying cognitive processes.

=== Cognitive mistakes ===

{{Level|3}} Finally, we pinpoint and discuss a few systematic mistakes which can be made when a person cognitively processes information. Lewicka shows that the questions an individual asks, depend to a great extent on the appraisal of the possible outcome of a transaction. In the telic state (or action control mode) the individual tries at all costs to avoid unpleasant outcomes, and it then becomes very favourable and practical to have a necessity-oriented method available. If the outcome is pleasant, however, the realisation of that outcome is of primary importance; "the way in which" becomes less important and a sufficiency-oriented method generally suffices. However, this does not apply to the paratelic (action-involvement) mode.

Generally, an individual tries as hard as possible to prevent disappointments (see chapter 4, table 4.2). In the case of an unpleasant outcome, a disappointment means that it has previously been predicted that a particular unpleasant result will not take place, but that it happens anyway. It is important for the individual to keep the probability of this type of mistake (type II, or "false negative") as low as possible. However, we know from logic and statistics that when the probability of one type of mistake is kept as low as possible, another type of mistake will necessarily occur more often. Thus, when the probability of a Type II-mistake is minimized, Type I-mistakes will occur more often. When a Type I-mistake, or "false positive", occurs, it is predicted that the result will be unpleasant, but this is not the case. It is now likely that this type of mistake will be taken less seriously than the previous one, because this means that there is a pleasant surprise. Therefore, relatively little attention will be paid to this. As a result, good luck is virtually ignored in a problematic area of experience whereas disappointments are regarded as extremely important.

This pattern of cognitive processing takes place in particular when there are mainly telic states with a (too) low frequency of paratelic states. Not only is attention then fixed on possible negative results, but the (too) low frequency of paratelic states produces an excess of methods of sufficiency, with relatively large safety margins around the areas to be avoided, and relatively narrow limits of areas of experience that are safe and digested well (also as a result of safety margins that are wider than is strictly necessary; see figure 5.3). As a result, this pattern of experiencing and processing results in a strong (and in a sense "uncontrolled") growth of negative COEX-systems which may possibly even affect the already existing, positive COEX-systems. Should this pattern continue, then the probability of telic avoidance reactions in the area of experience concerned will become higher and the probability of paratelic exploration lower and lower. In the end, even the slightest confrontation with the area of experience concerned, even when outsiders do not consider this as threatening, will be experienced as frightening, the consequence of which will be a continued and uncontrolled growth of the negative COEX-system.

=== The neurotic paradox ===

{{Level|3}} A connection with the so-called '''neurotic paradox''' is evident here. Eysenck (1979, p. 185) provides the following description of this paradox:
:"In many neuroses we not only fail to observe the expected extinction of the uninforced "Conditoned Stimulus", but we find an incremental (enhancement) effect, such that the unreinforced Conditioned Stimulus actually produces more and more anxiety ("Conditioned Response") with each presentation of the Conditioned Stimulus. [...] In neuroses, [...] in the majority of cases there is some sort of insidious onset, without any single event that could be called "traumatic" even by lenient standards."

Paying too much attention to disappointments and virtually ignoring good luck is one of the reasons why the neurotic behaviour persists. Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) gives another reason (see also chapter 3). He explains how in the proximity of a negative COEX-system, tension increases very easily, while it is exactly in these areas that there are very few "refuges" in the form of adequate strategies of behaviour which may be utilized to keep the tension under control. In the telic state this increased tension is experienced as extremely unpleasant. What is more, the limits of an area that has been digested badly are still rather vague owing to the fact that little or no exploration has occured. The area is not clearly defined and restricted, has rather "fuzzy" boundaries, and may easily increase in size which further increases the probability of unpleasant experiences. When we bear in mind that disappointments tend to receive more attention than the occurences of good luck, it is clear that one easily becomes trapped in a negative learning spiral in which neurotic behaviour is intensified, negative experiences accumulate and little is learned from positive experiences.

=== Summary and conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} Having integrated Aper's, Van der Molen's an Lewicka's studies we have been able to provide in this chapter an overall picture of the dynamics of our learning processes. Based on these various theories, a Cognition-Energy-Learning model has been developed in which the most essential aspects of the learning process are explained.

First, the energy dependency of learning was discussed. The alternating preference for a high or a low level of arousal produces the motivation for two essential aspects of learning: on the one hand, the acquisition of novel and unfamiliar experiences, and on the other hand, reserving time and energy for the structuring and processing of this experience and information. The alternation of the telic and the paratelic states thus keeps the learning process going.

Experiences can be problematical or non-problematical. Depending on the metamotivational state a person is in, an area of experience can be experienced as pleasant and attractive, or as unpleasant. Problematical areas (that is to say, areas for which no adequate behavioural strategies have been developed) will be avoided as much as possible in the telic state: in the paratelic state, on the other hand, these areas can be a source of (pleasant) tension and thus be attractive for exploration. In this way the individual will be able to gain piecemeal experiences in areas that are (relatively) unfamiliar. Such experiences are a prerequisite for development to a higher level of organisation of the individual. Non-problematical areas of experience will not be sought in the paratelic state, as they do not provide any tension and are thus considered as "boring". However, in the telic state these areas are essential for relaxation. Only if a certain degree of rest is acquired regularly, will the individual will be able to digest his or her experiences optimally.

In certain situations an ideal sequence of telic-paratelic reversals is impossible for a person. When such a situations lasts too long and the person cannot reach more agreeable situations, this leads to a negative learning spiral in which the individual more and more resorts to stereotyped and less efficient ways of reacting. Then it becomes increasingly more likely that the negative, problematical experiences in a particular area of experience will extend to other areas as well. For this reason we speak about the "contagiousness" of experiences.

However, this contagiousness also applies to positive experiences that have been digested well and which are thus non-problematical. When an individual is in a positive learning spiral, he or she continuously acquires new skills which can also be applied in other areas of experience. In this way the likelyhood of positive experiences will generally increase. Contagiousness of the way in which learning experiences are processed, in the favourable and in the unfavourable sense, is applicable therefore in the first place in areas of experience that are functionally related. In the second place, the contagiousness is applicable in all areas of experience in their totality.

Finally, we have discussed in this chapter how the behavioural strategy a person is choosing depends on the appraisal of the possible outcome. When the outcome is pleasant, an approach strategy will be applied in the telic state to ensure the outcome will be achieved as effectively as possible. When the outcome is unpleasant, a strategy of avoidance will generally be applied. However, negative outcomes form a source of possibly pleasant tension in the paratelic state which produces the motivation to further explore them. In this way more information can be gathered and optimally processed in the course of time so that the already existing (easily obtained) '''sufficiency oriented methods''' can increasingly be replaced by a '''necessity-oriented method''' (which is more difficult to generate). This enables the individual to attain a '''higher level of cognitive organisation and efficiency''' and to function more effectively. However, should the ability to relax be absent (chronically), the person may become caught up in an accumulation of problematical experiences. This explains, for example, the often persistent growth of neuroses and phobias. The problem of the neurotic paradox, indicated by Eysenck, for example, can be easily explained when regarded from the point of view of our Cognition-Energy Learning model.

The Cognition-Energy-Learning model discussed thus far describes, in the first place, the influence of the energy state of a person on his or her motivational state. That motivational state is governed by emotions. It further states that the sequence of motivational states has implications for the way experiences are cognitively represented. Considering Csapinski's studies, we can expect that the majority of the experiences which are not directly interesting, are sedimented in a vague, slightly positive cognitive background. Only the experiences with an explicit emotional "color" are represented as areas that have been digested well or as problematical areas. The advantage of such systems of representation is that, as soon as there is a surplus of energy, a person can experiment in those areas which are registered as problematical. Those areas of experience are exactly the areas which can provide most new and relevant information. Both the way in which experiences are represented (in COEX-systems) and the gradual shifts in that representation are described, and, moreover, it is clarified, how a particular representation with concomitant procedural aspects (necessity- or sufficiency-oriented methods), leads to specific types of behaviour. However, all this still concerns a very rough classification into cognitive main categories. In fact it comes down to the difference between experiences that have been processed and digested well and experiences that have not been digested well, to the difference between experiencing this as pleasant and as unpleasant and between combinations of these two opposites.

The Cognitive-Energetic Learning model may also be supplemented with the influence of the quality of social interactions on the dynamic state of the learning process. This can render a considerable extension and specification of the cognitive main categories mentioned. Moreover, such an extension enables us to make predictions about the way in which social interactions may influence the growth of a person because they interfere with the way energy is invested in the learning process. However, this extension lies beyond the confines this report and will be described in another report (see Maarsingh, 1990).

In the next chapter we will give an example from practice of our Cognition-Energy-Learning model.

== Chapter 6: An illustration of the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model from a practical problem area ==

=== The didactical behavioural repertoire of the inexperienced teacher ===

{{Level|3}} In this chapter an illustration of the Cognition-Energy-Learning model will be given, based on experiences of teachers who have just started teaching (Romkes, 1988). This concerns exclusively inexperienced teachers who regard the learning process as problematical.

The state of learning of the inexperienced teacher, apart from personality, is closely related to the extent to which he or she has been able to deal with previous experiences from educational learning situations (training) and to gain an adequate didactical behavioural repertoire. However, it is important that this repertoire of coping skills develops and and that it can be modified as soon as problems arise in the classroom. According to Vonk (1983), the problems of table 6.1 are encountered most frequently.

=== The most commonly encountered problems that have to be dealt with by inexperienced teachers, in sequence of importance ===

# Keeping order
# Motivating pupils
# Dealing with differences between pupils
# Appraisal of learning performances
# Relations with parents
# Organisation of the class
# Too few/inadequate means for teaching
# Handling children with problems
# Too much working pressure (lack of time)
# Relations with colleagues
# Teaching plans
# Having command of various didactical skills
# Knowledge of school regulations and customs
# Determining the starting situations of pupils
# Inadequate professional skills

The problems mentioned in table 6.1 regularly produce a high level of arousal. A teacher will experience stress when this state of increased arousal lasts too long. The duration of stress depends on the didactical behavioural repertoire of a person. When this behavioural repertoire is inadequate, a person will be in a state of stress for a longer period of time. That is, it is difficult for such a person to achieve the phase of relaxation owing to the lack of well-controlled skills which are necessary for controlling stressful situations (see chapter 3). When such a situation (of stress) lasts too long and the stress experience is not digested well, a ''negative learning spiral'' may arise in which ''fear and avoidance behaviour'' accumulate (see chapter 5).

An example of a school situation in which there is a high level of arousal is given in the following report of a lesson given by an inexperienced teacher (Wubbels en Creton 1974):
:"The class enters noisily. It is cold. The pupils are jumping up and down in order to become a little warmer. You walk into the classroom and try to have the children take their seats. But before you have managed to do so, you are rummaging in your bag. A few moments later the same happens again. You tell a pupil to sit down, but before he sits down you walk back. You are in the centre in front of the class and look into the classroom. In the meantime everyone has sat down. The pupils are still shouting. You walk towards Fred, a troublemaker. You address a few pupils. It is becoming quieter now. "Will everyone take his books, please?" A number of pupils are shivering and making a noise. "I have marked the dictations and the results are very bad". They all laugh. "And what I further have to say about the dictation....", the pupils are talking again now and you have to shout very loudly to make yourself heard. You wait some time and address a few pupils: "Mark, Martin" and finish with "Do not throw them away immediately". You give everyone their work back. Everyone is shouting. "Damn I have got a D". "I have a C". "Hurray, I have a B". "And what do you have?" There are many unsatisfactory marks, many of them are D's. The pupils are indignant. Some pupils walk to your desk to complain, but you do not listen and send everyone back. A girl, who is really indignant, is sitting in front of you. For not writing a hyphen and for not writing one word as one word, you have deducted two whole points. They think it ridiculous. There is so much noise, that you can hardly make yourself heard. "Yes", you scream and turn red. They keep on protesting loudly. It is an enormous mess. You walk towards your desk and sit down demonstratively, as if you want to call it a day. "Can the ones with the insufficiency marks do the dictation again?". "No!", you shout back.

This example shows that this teacher does not command those types of behaviour (coping skills) which would make the situation more manageable for her. The result is that she tries to command respect. Managing the class and not being troubled by stress become main aim in all. This is shown by her preference for an authoritarian way of dealing with the class and her rigid attitute with regard to the educational responsibility. This behaviour implies an attitude in which achieving control of the situation is central. The teacher is now mostly in the ''telic'' state and has trouble to regularly reach ''paratelic'' states.

The way in which she (temporarily) achieves her goal, and is thus able to reduce her level of arousal, consists of showing aggressive or avoidance behaviour. Both agression and avoidance provide relaxation for a moment; when the teacher shouts, the class will be quiet for a moment and also when she adopts a reserved attitude and forgets her pedagogic responsibiliy for a moment, she experiences less stress for a short period of time. In both cases she has temporarily managed ''to get away'' from the threatening situation, but this situation is not ''controlled'', in other words: she has ''not developed adequate coping skills''. In the short term this avoidance behaviour is rewarding, but structurally the situation has not changed at all. As the teacher cannot relax sufficiently, her energy supply cannot easily be replenished. As a result she will be less often in the paratelic state, and so she will be unable to try the new, and (possibly) risky behaviour very frequently which could eventually lead to adopting useful new behavioural techniques and to acquiring new skills and flexibility. And it is precisely this lack of adequate skills which prevents her from controlling this situation. In such a situation there is a ''negative learning spiral'' in which behaviour becomes increasingly stereotyped and rigid (see chapter 3 and chapter 5). In such a spiral, more and more short-term solutions are found to deal with problematical situations and novel behaviour is not experimented with sufficiently. In such cases it is unlikely the behavioural repertoire will expand optimally.

=== Cognitive representations of problematical teaching situations of inexperienced teachers ===

{{Level|3}} In a problematical teaching situation, two types of ''cognitive representation'' may arise (the remarks mentioned were reported in subsequent interviews). First: extreme and fixed negative thoughts about oneself: "I do not have sufficient command of the profession", "I am not good at organizing", "I am not good at managing children", etc. Secondly: extreme and fixed negative thoughts concerning others: "The pupils are annoying", "The colleagues are not nice", etc.

From interviews with inexperienced teachers with problems it appeared that the following types of ''bias'' in the cognitive and perceptive representation of the teaching situation may occur (Romkes 1988). First: ''generalisation'', for example: 'all pupils are annoying'. This exemplifies that the teacher uses sufficient conditions, rather than necessary conditions at such a moment (see chapter 4); i.e. the teacher does not attempt to discover the exact cause of the problems, but is satisfied with simplistic and stereotyped rules of thumb. Secondly: ''deletion'', for example when one's own role is left aside: "the pupils are so annoying". In the third place: ''transformation'', when the teacher no longer notices the individual differences between pupils, and regards the class undifferentiated.

These cognitive "mistakes" can also be described in terms of Lazarus' theory (see chapter 1). That is, problems with ''primary and secondary appraisal'' are concerned here and as a result a related lack of coping strategies.

As far as the primary appraisal is concerned, the first instinctive appraisal of the situation is important. When the teacher is too tense in dealing with the situation, he or she will tend to use a rough and ready recipe, such as aggressive behaviour, when dealing with problems.

=== Changes in the behaviour of the inexperienced teacher ===

{{Level|3}} It is now clear that unless the pupils do not change their behaviour, the situation will not improve unless the teacher behaves differently. According to our learning model this is only possible once she has sufficient energy surplus to reconsider the class situation and to experiment with other kinds of behaviour. In other words, the teacher has to develop other skills that enable herself to relax and/or she has to teach less frequently and to organize more breaks and time off for relaxation and recovery. In this way she will be able to invest a surplus of energy in paratelic, and thus experimental and explorative, behaviour. When a particular type of behaviour proves succesful, this can be integrated in the repertoire of skills already at her command. This may, for example, include taking the needs of pupils into account more often which may produce moments of relaxation during the lessons, both for teacher and pupils, and also time for explanations, questions, etc. For example, the supervisor could instruct the teacher to pay less attention to the pupils' command of the language, and to pay more attention to topics not directly related to the subject. This could involve conversations about experiences in the weekend, for example. Such behaviour can be rewarded in the form of good teamwork with the pupils which in turn can provide relaxation (and thus energy) for both the teacher and the pupils. As a result both teacher and pupils will be able to manifest paratelic behaviour and hence will be able to experiment in order to find the best way of teaching, and of being taught.

The phase of relaxation is extremely important for replenishing energy supplies and for the integration of experiences. It is essential that the inexperienced teacher has enough moments of relaxation during, or after work. According to the learning model only through a regular alternation of the telic and the paratelic states an adequate didactic behavioural repertoire can develop.

=== A positive learning spiral ===

{{Level|3}} There is a ''positive learning spiral'' (see also 3.3) when behaviour of control and manipulation (telic) and behaviour relating to challenges and exploration (paratelic), alternate. The telic state aims at achieving goals (for example to teach from a particular chapter). In the paratelic state there is space to handle the pupils differently and to try out novel approaches. When the teacher is alternately in the telic state and the paratelic state, he or she is able to gain experiences which are necessary in order to discover and elucidate the necessary conditions for negative incidents, so that these incidents can be avoided or solved more easily the next time (see chapter 4 and chapter 5). On a proximal level, paratelic behaviour consumes large amounts of energy, but the ultimal result is that it saves energy later on. The inexperienced teacher is then able to develop more adequate coping strategies which enable her to be in a state of relaxation more regularly. This makes it possible for her to replenish the energy supply more often and more thoroughly.

Romkes (1988) has shown that successful teachers are not always aware of the coping strategies they use. This is not surprising when you realise that it is not necessarily desirable to act consciously or to seek the necessary conditions for negative incidents consciously as long as the teaching responsibility is met satisfactorily. If the learning process proceeds well, much of the experience and information needed for a further expansion and refinement of the behavioural repertoire is collected unvoluntarily and automatically.

=== Conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} From this illustration it may be clear that the Cognition-Energy-Learning model can be applied well to situations such as teaching. The model provides insight into the way in which inexperienced teachers can become trapped in a negative learning spiral when there are too few moments of relaxation. This implies that in teaching situations, less attention should be paid to teaching the content of the subject as thoroughly as possible by drumming it in repeatedly, and that more attention should be paid to finding ways of achieving enough moments of relaxation. This relaxation is essential for replenishing the energy supply, and it is the surplus of energy that allows experimental and explorative behaviour in manifest. Such behaviour brings a flexible attitude towards the teaching situation with it. And this flexibility enables the teacher to discover which teachingstrategy (at which moment) is the most satisfactory and effective.

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== Other publications on this subject ==

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contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: A Novel Conceptual Model of Coping Skills |
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year=1982 |
contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: A Novel Conceptual Model of Coping Skills |
periodical=Psychological Abstracts |
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
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title=Bi-stability of emotions and motivations: An evolutionary consequence of the open-ended capacity for learning |
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last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
title=Reversal Theory, Learning and Self-Actualization (abstract of paper, given at the International Symposium on Reversal Theory, Powys, Wales, Sept, 1983) |
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issue=37 |
pages=46
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
year=1985 |
chapter=Learning, self-actualization and psychotherapy |
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editor2-first=D. | editor2-last=Fontana |
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title=Reversal Theory: Applications and Developments |
pages=103-116 |
place=Cardiff, U.K. | publisher=University College Cardiff Press
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{{Citation |
last=Molen, van der | first=P.P. |
chapter=[[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacit
y for learning]] |
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title=Essays in human social biology |
volume=2 | pages=189-211 |
year=1983 |
place=Brussels | publisher=V.U.B. Study Series
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{{Citation |
last=Molen, van der | first=P.P. |
contribution=Anxiety and Pleasure: Application of Reversal Theory to Learning (abstract) |
year=1985 |
periodical=Reversal Theory Society Newsletter |
issue=1(1) | pages=20
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
year=1986 |
contribution=Reversal Theory, Learning and Psychotherapy |
periodical=British Journal of Guidance and Counselling |
issue=14(2) | pages=125-139
}}

== Research Reports and Prepublications on this subject ==

{{Citation |
last1=Dennen, v.d. | first1=J.M.G. |
last2=Molen, v.d. | first2=P.P. |
year=1981 |
title=Violent Aggression as a Social Unskill: Notes on the Psychopathology of Everyday Life |
place=Polemological Institute, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.) |

}}

{{Citation |
last1=Molen, v.d. | first1=P.P. |
last2=Dennen, v.d. | first2=J.M.G. |
year=1981 |
contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: An Ethologists View on Aggression and the Dynamics of Learning in the Play and Struggle called "Life" |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-81-551-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}} 

{{Citation |
last1=Maarsingh | first1=B. |
last2=Molen, v.d. | first2=P.P. |
year=1990 |
contribution=Energie en Strokes: de Wisselwerking tussen de kwaliteit van sociale relaties en de individuele ontwikkeling |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-90-1004-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}}

{{Citation |
last1=Molen, v.d. | first1=P.P. |
last2=Dijk, v. | first2=C. |
last3=Maarsingh | first3=B. |
last4=Stoelhorst | first4=P. |
year=1990 |
contribution=Naar een Cognetief-Energetisch Leermodel; over de bi-stabiele organisatie van emoties en het effect daarvan op de ontwikkeling van copingvaardigheden en cognitie; een integratie van de theorieën van Lazarus, Apter, Van der Molen en Lewicka |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-90-1012-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}}

Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning Model

2017-01-17T13:01:36Z

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<center>
STATE UNIVERSITY GRONINGEN - HEYMANSBULLETIN - HB-91-1030-EX

<big>Towards a Cognition-Energy-Learning model (C.E.L.) (2)</big>

Presented for the fifth international conference on 
Reversal Theory, June 21-25, 1991 at Kansas City, Missouri, U.S.A.
</center>

''' Introduction'''

{{Level|2}} This report describes the C.E.L. (Cognition-Energy-Learning model) which is based on a number of established psychological theories. This model is integrative in the sense that it describes different classes of behaviour, of personal insights and of experiences that are generally regarded as distinct areas of psychological research. Examples are: emotions, motivation, cognitive representation of experiences, coping behaviour and the ethological concept of the efficient allocation of energy. The importance of this model lies, therefore, firstly in the opportunity it provides to classify all those different psychological phenomena in a logically coherent and consistent way. In addition, the model provides a ''basic explanation'' of learning behaviour, as it refers back to the evolutionary basis of behaviour. In other words: it is possible to indicate ''why'' effective coping behaviour develops and also ''why'' this development may stagnate. Coping means here: behaviour that is geared to mastering a problem situation. Subsequently, the model explains on the one hand the connection between emotions and motivation and on the other hand the way in which the cognitive representation of experiences is laid down and how it gradually shifts and changes.

In each chapter of this treatise, one theoretic approach of a specific phenomenon will be discussed and any lacunae, gaps or specific problems of the theory concerned, will be identified. We shall then attempt to solve these problems in the next chapter, adding an additional piece of theory. This way, four theories will be discussed, all of which show hiatuses in some specific respects.

The basis of this treatise is Lazarus' classical theory. According to Lazarus (in Bond and Rosen, 1980), stress arises when a person notices that environmental requirements demand too much of his/her available resources.

Lazarus states that stress situations do not necessarily have to be experienced as negative. It is, however, often the case; when a person expects that his or her abilities and resources for dealing with specific environmental requirements are insufficient, he or she will probably expect damage or loss. Such situations may be experienced as extremely threatening. On the other hand, great demand may be exerted on a person in terms of adaptability while that person still thinks he or she can handle the situation well. Such situations might be regarded as challenges, regarding the opportunity to gain advantages or more control or is affecting personal growth. Adequate reactions in such situations may then influence that person's well-being very positively. Thus, stress situations are not always experienced as negative, but depend on the interpretation by the person in question. When a person experiences stress, he or she may develop strategies to limit damage, or even profit from the situation. In literature this is called coping.

With regard to the interpretation of stress situations, Lazarus (1980) states that it is a problem that too little is known about which situations are felt to be threatening or challenging, and when that happens and by whom. This hiatus can neatly be filled by Apter's Reversal theory (chapter 2). In this theory two so-called meta-motivational states are proposed. These metamotivational states determine how a person perceives a specific situation and the type of behaviour with which he of she will react to it.

However, one disadvantage of Apter's theory is its descriptive nature and the fact that it does not account for a connection between the dynamics of motivation and the learning processes mentioned above.

Van der Molen's learning model, described in chapter 3, does provide this connection and is thus able to explain how these learning processes are maintained. In this model the "contagious nature" of learning experiences is described too. That is, a learning experience that is badly dealt with, increases the likelihood that future learning experiences in similar areas of experience will also be badly dealt with which means that it is likely that the area concerned will stay and always will be problematical. (the reverse applies to learning experiences which are dealt with successfully). The cognitive interpretation or emotional "labelling" of similar areas of experience (for example "exciting" or "boring") always depends on a person's metamotivational condition. Van der Molen's model describes how metamotivational conditions affect learning processes. The model does not yet, however, adequately describe how these conditions influence cognitive contents.

Lewicka's model of antagonistic cognitive styles (chapter 4) does discuss this aspect. In this model two mechanisms are described which are alternately active in a person (comparable to Apter's theory). Which of the two mechanisms is active at a specific moment, determines what type of information a person will seek in the first place and also determines how cognitive information will be structured.
By combining and integrating the theories mentioned (chapter 5) we have been able to develop a model that not only explains the growth of coping strategies, but also explains the relation between the dynamics of emotions and motivation on the one hand and the way in which cognitive contents are effected and develop on the other hand. We have called this model the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model (CEL).

This will be exemplified with empirical information about the coping behaviour of teachers (Romkes, 1988, chapter 6).

== Chapter 1: Lazarus' coping theory ==

{{Level|3}} In this chapter Lazarus' theory (e.g. 1980, 1984) of coping behaviour is discussed. The most important ideas of this theory are summarized and at the end of the chapter we show that the theory contains a number of gaps with regard to the process of learning and the development of coping skills.

=== Transactions between persons and their environment ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus (in Bond and Rosen,1980) calls his approach to stress and coping behaviour cognitive-phenomenological. Emotions and stress are regarded as products of cognitive activity, relating to the way in which a person assesses and evaluates his or her relation with the environment. Lazarus emphasizes that there is a continuous relationship between persons and their environment. On the one hand there are people with individual values, beliefs, skills, etc. On the other hand there are situations, with varying requirements, limitations and facilities. Together they form a dynamic system in which there is a continuous process of mutual influence and change. Lazarus states that there is a ''transaction'' between persons and their environment which changes (adapts / transforms) constantly in the course of time.

=== The concept of appraisal: assessment of the environment ===

{{Level|3}} In Lazarus' theory the term ''appraisal'', that is to say the cognitive assessment by a person of a (real, imaginary or expected) transaction, is central. Lazarus distinguishes between ''primary appraisal'', ''secondary appraisal'' and ''reappraisal''. "Primary appraisal" refers to the process in which a person assesses whether and how a particular transaction will influence his or her own well-being. Such assessments can take three forms, irrelevant, positive or stressful. A person considers a situation to be stressful when he or she perceives that there are situational
requirements that make a great demand on his or her adaptability and on the resources he or she possesses to respond to these demands. Appraisal of a situation as stressful can be divided into sub-types:
* '''damage/loss'''; for example when a partner dies, loss of physical functions, loss of self-respect.
* '''threat'''; expected or feared damage or loss which has not yet materialized.
* '''challenge'''; growth opportunity, acquisition of control or advantage.
Lazarus states that there is too little known about when and by what kind of people a situation is felt to be threatening rather than challenging (and vice versa). However, Lazarus does provide some information about these aspects:
:"A working hypothesis about the causal antecedents of threat and challenge is that the former is more likely when a person assumes that the specific environment is hostile and dangerous and that he or she lacks the resources for mastering it, while challenge arises when the environmental demands are seen as difficult, but not impossible to manage, and that drawing upon existing or acquired skills offers a genuine prospect for mastery." (in Bond and Rosen, 1980, p. 48).

This leads us to the second type of transaction assessment. The above quotation not only deals with appraisal of the situation and environmental demands, but also with a person's own possibilities to react adequately. Lazarus calls the latter "secondary appraisal", i.e. appraisal of the personal and social means a person has at his or her disposal, the effectiveness of a particular strategy of behaviour in the situation, as well as the possibility that new problems will be created as a result of one's own actions.

With regard to transactions in which persons and environment influence each other, we can see that primary and secondary appraisal also affect each other. A situation which was originally seen as threatening, can for example be seen as less threatening when a person realises that damage can probably be prevented by adopting a particular strategy of behaviour. Lazarus calls this "reappraisal": a change in the original appraisal of a transaction, resulting from feedback from effectuated outcomes from this transaction, as a result of the person's actions, or by a (mere) re-thinking of the nature of this transaction. So appraisal is also a dynamic process in which changes take place constantly in the course of time and in which appraisal of the situation and one's own possibilities is constantly adjusted.

Finally, we must observe that appraisal does not only mean rational assessment of the transaction, but also the quality and intensity of a person's emotional feedback on the transaction. For example, it is more likely that a positive assessment of a situation will cause a positive emotional reaction, such as joy or satisfaction. It is likely that a situation that is assessed as threatening will evoke negative emotions, such as fear or anger. In such cases a person feels that he/she is unable to react adequately to the demands that he or she are facing in a specific situation. In other words, he or she feels that they are beyond his or her coping activities. Let's pay some attention to the concept of ''coping''.

=== Coping ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus gives the following definition of the term coping:
:"We regard coping as problem-solving efforts made by an individual when the demands he faces are highly relevant to his welfare (that is, a situation of considerable jeopardy or promise), and when these demands tax his adaptive resourses." (in Coelho, 1974, p. 250-251).

Coping activities can have two functions. First, a person can try to improve the situation by changing his or her own behaviour or environment. Secondly, a person can try to control emotions evoked by stress, so that morale and social functioning will not be influenced. Lazarus calls this ''palliation'', using a temporary measure to alleviate stress, such as denying, intellectualising or avoiding negative thoughts; in this way the situation itself does not change, but the individual makes sure that he or she feels better. Thus coping activities are not always rational or realistic, but can also be very irrational, primitive or rigid. Lazarus states that both kinds of coping are important; according to him realistic problem solving and primitive defensive mechanisms are two sides of the same coin.

Lazarus distinguishes four types of coping activities:

(a) ''Information seeking'': investigating the characteristics of a stressful situation in order to gain the knowledge necessary to make a correct coping decision, or to be able to assess threat or damage differently. On the one hand, seeking information can form a firm basis for an individual's action, on the other hand it can make this person feel better, by rationalising or supporting a previous decision; this is called "palliation".

(b) ''Direct action'': action taken by an individual to handle a stressful situation, directed towards himself or herself or at the environment, depending on environmental demands and personal goals.

(c) ''Inhibition of action''; suppression of action impulses that may otherwise cause damage, for example because they are morally or socially not acceptable, or because they can cause physical damage.

(d) ''Intrapsychic modes'': cognitive processes aimed at regulating emotions which arise as a result of stressful situations. As with other coping activities, they can be aimed at incidents from the past (for example the reinterpretation of a traumatic experience), or at future events (for example denying that a particular situation may become dangerous). Usually they are aimed at increasing the feeling of well-being of this individual; therefore, succesful intrapsychic coping activities may restrict the number of active attempts an individual makes to control his of her environment.

Lazarus admits that his rather rough division of coping activities is a rudimentary classification system; and indeed, a number of significant aspects are lacking. For example, it does not include any details about possible coping feedback and any antecedent conditions or results of different types of coping behaviour. There is still too little known about which situations evoke which types of coping behaviour. Moreover, Lazarus states that motivational and emotional aspects of coping receive relatively little attention in psychological studies. The developmental aspects of coping behaviour are also still unclear, and according to Lazarus studies of these aspects are essential in order to be able to understand the coping process more clearly.

=== Gaps in Lazarus' theory ===

{{Level|3}} Lazarus has developed a clear and understandable theory with regard to certain central concepts, such as the transaction between persons and their environment, the individual's appraisal of a transaction, emotional response on this appraisal and several types of coping activities. However, it is still not clear what exactly is the nature of the processes described. Some lack of clarity remains which Lazarus himself in fact also admits.

Lazarus states, for example, that it is not clear which situations are experienced as threatening and not as a challenge, and by which persons (and vice versa). In the theory little is said about what kind of factors are important for acquiring coping behaviour and how the behavioural repetoire a person has at his or her disposal to respond to environmental demands, may develop in the course of time.

In the next chapter we will show how Apter's Reversal theory can provide an answer to a number of the queries mentioned above.

== Chapter 2: Apter's Reversal Theory ==

=== A supplement to remedy Lazarus' theory ===

{{Level|3}} One of the deficiencies observed in Lazarus' theory can be remedied by supplementing it with Apter's Reversal theory. The Reversal theory provides a (descriptive) answer to the question relating to the various ways in which people react to the same, or similar, situations. The Reversal theory states that as far as human motivation is concerned people are in one of two metamotivational states. The way in which a situation is experienced depends on the state a person is in at a particular moment. The two states can be distinguished by the level of arousal that is preferred. ''Arousal'' is defined in this theory as being mentally and physically prepared for action.

=== The organisation of motivation according to Apter ===

{{Level|3}} The ''Reversal theory'' has been developed by Apter and Smith (1975; see also Apter, 1984). The theory deals with the way in which people experience motives for their actions and descibes the process of changes in motivation. In this theory an individual is regarded as a complex "machine" that uses the environment for his or her own aims. This "machine" can behave according to different "programs" which determine the way in which the environment is experienced. The idea that one action can be performed with different motives is central. For example, a person may ride a bicycle, because he or she has to attend a meeting. This is a determined action. Here, riding a bicycle represents the means by which a goal can be achieved. However a person can also ride a bicycle "just" for pleasure. In this case a person acts according to the program "wanting to be active", and cycling is a goal in itself. Thus, there are two possible states in which a person can be. These states are characteristic of the way in which an act, in this case "cycling", is experienced. In the case of the meeting this act is purposive. In this situation cycling is not an act undertaken to create stress or excitement; here the aim is to fulfill a particular task. In other words: to remove the tension that is caused by being obliged to fulfill this task. In the second case cycling is an action which in itself evokes particularly pleasant excitement.

For this reason the Reversal theory rejects a simplistic-homeostatic interpretation of human motivation in which there is just one optimal state of balance that individuals are seeking. This state of balance particularly refers to ''one optimal level'' of arousal. According to the homeostatic way of thinking, individuals will always try to achieve one optimal level of arousal and/or to remain at this level. However, the Reversal theory assumes that at times a low level of arousal is aimed and at other times, a high level of arousel. Therefore Apter introduces the concept of ''bi-stability''. This means, for example, that people may or may not feel fine at a low or a high level of arousal. As the examples mentioned above show, at times one's aim may simply be the performance of a particular task and the act is not meant to raise the level of arousal. At other times a person may seek excitement, in which case the same or a similar act can suddenly become exciting (arousal increasing).

To illustrate these ideas we can consider a number of situations in which different levels of arousal are experienced. Generally (but not necessarily), there is a high level of arousal when a person watches an exciting film. One can imagine that this excitement can be both pleasant and unpleasant. For example, when a person has been working all day and the work was very boring, a movie picture can provide a welcome state of excitement. On the other hand, when a person has just been threatened in the street, the tension caused by the movie may be too much for him or her. In this situation a hot bath may be preferred as it is more likely to provide relaxation. Thus, there is a desire for a low level of arousal. The same hot bath may evoke boredom (in Apter's terms) in someone who has not done anything all day long. Therefore, it is important here that a particular level of arousal is not inadvertently connected with the person's well-being.

These examples indicate that a person can feel good or not, depending on the level of arousal sought at that moment, in other words: depending on the metamotivational state a person is in at that moment. The level of arousal is always evoking a ''subjective experience''. In other words: an exciting experience for one person, may be boring to another.

=== Bi-stability of emotions and motivation ===

{{Level|3}} We have shown that there are two possible states of preference as far as the level of arousal is concerned. Firstly, there is the state in which a person aims at a low level of arousal and performs purposive action. This state is called arousal-avoidance or the ''telic state'' (telos is Greek for goal or purpose). In this state a low level of arousal is experienced as pleasant, Apter (1982) calls this "relaxation". A high level of arousal is experienced as unpleasant and is called "fear" by Apter. Secondly, there is the state in which a person aims at a high level of arousal and shows unpurposive action. This state is called the arousal-seeking or ''paratelic state'' (literally translated from Greek, paratelic means "without aim" or "goal-less"). In this state a high level of arousal will be experienced as pleasant "excitement", whereas a low level of arousal causes an unpleasant feeling: "boredom". These two states, telic and paratelic, differ as far as the experience of purpose, time and intensity is concerned (Apter, 1982; Murgatroyd, 1978, 1983). This is shown in table 2.1.

The telic or paratelic state is as it were a frame for particular behaviour (Goffman, 1975). The states mentioned refer to the way in which the motivation of behaviour is experienced. For this reason they are called ''metamotivational states''. These states determine how experiences are labelled (see table 2.2, following next page). At any moment in time a person is always in one of these two states. The period of time in which a person can be in a particular state varies from a few seconds to some days (Walters, Apter and Svebak, 1982).

<pre>
Table 2.1 Characteristics of the telic and paratelic states
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ In the telic state there are: ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ - purposive action ║
║ - imposed purposes ║
║ - attempts to complete actions ║
║ - secure and routine behaviour ║
║ - looking for experience and safety ║
║ - orientation to the outside world ║
║ - behaviour aimed at the future ║
║ - planned activities ║
║ - activities that are a means to a purpose ║
║ - preference for low intensity experiences ║
║ - a high level of realism ║
║ - preference for a low level of arousal ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ In the paratelic state there are: ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ - process behaviour ║
║ - avoidable and freely chosen "purposes" ║
║ - attempts to extend activities and to make them continue ║
║ - exploration ║
║ - experimenting with behaviour ║
║ - looking for news and excitement ║
║ - a here-and-now experience ║
║ - activities that are aims in themselves ║
║ - activities that are spontaneous and free ║
║ - a preference for high intensity experiences ║
║ - imagination and exaggeration ║
║ - preference for a high level of arousal ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
</pre>

[[Image:Pleasant and unpleasant experiences of high and low arousal.png|framed|none|Table 2.2 The variable meaning of the experienced level of arousal]]

=== The reversals to the different states ===

{{Level|3}} We will now describe how a reversal from one state to another can take place. Reversals take place involuntarily, although a person may be capable of getting into a situation in which a reversal into one or another direction becomes likely. The frequency with which reversals take place differs from person to person and is, moreover, dependent on the situation a person is in (Blackmore and Murgatroyd in Apter, 1980).

The Reversal theory describes several conditions that can lead to a reversal. Most important are "contingencies"; aspects of a person or of the environment change in such a way that a reversal is triggered. For example, if a particular drug is used, if a visitor arrives unexpectedly or in an emergency situation. The second condition that can lead to a reversal is called "satiation". It is assumed that a reversal becomes more likely when the period of time in which a person is in a particular metamotivational state increases. A person then becomes more sensitive to signals from the environment or from himself or herself that can lead to contingencies. The different conditions influence each other, and can make reversals more or less likely. Table 2.2 and figure 2.1 show that a reversal from one state to another changes the meaning given to the level of arousal experienced. A reversal from the paratelic to the telic state, while a person experiences a high level of arousal, will result in a change from excitement to anxiety. A reversal from telic to paratelic, while a person experiences a low level of arousal, will result in a change from relaxation to boredom.

[[Image:Reversal system of antagonistic motivations.png|framed|none|Figure 2.1. Apter's Reversal model (from: Apter, 1985)]] 

=== Other possible sequences ===

{{Level|3}} Figure 2.1 shows the way in which the process of interchanging emotions and motivation ''often'' takes place. However, another "direction" may be followed. For example, a person may remain in a state of anxiety for a long time, because he or she cannot relax sufficiently. This can happen to a person who is not completely in control of (a) particular situation(s). In this case it is unlikely that after some time a person will look for a state of excitement. It is also possible that the entire sequence of emotions (the butterfly figure) in figure 2.1 rises or falls along the vertical axis (Apter 1982). This indicates that a person feels mainly well or not well respectively. The first can take place when a person has many skills, and can handle all kinds of different situations well. This person will not experience boredom in the strict sense, because the unpleasant stage of the paratelic state will soon change into exploration or into other activities that cause excitement or/and which increase the hedonic tone. When, following a period of rest and/or relaxation a person reaches "satiation", he or she will not remain in a state of boredom (unpleasant), but will soon find opportunities to perform one or another paratelic action which will be experienced as pleasant.

The butterfly in the figure may be at a lower level when a person is often anxious, or when he or she is chronically bored. Referring to Apter's model this situation can be explained by an inability to reach relaxation. As this person is unable to relax sufficiently for example, owing to an absence of skills, he or she will soon become (once more) over-aroused and anxious when he or she is in an exciting situation. That is, such situations become more threatening when a person can experience fewer moments of relaxation (Apter 1982). Such a person will, therefore, sooner experience the reversal from the paratelic to the telic state. In other words: a person will relatively quickly get from the state in which the situation was exciting (paratelic) into the state in which the situation becomes frightening (telic). He or she will be relatively often in stages of low hedonic tone, while the periods of pleasant tension or pleasant excitement will be experienced less often. This person, therefore, will explore for shorter periods and less often. As we shall explain further in chapter 5, such situations have serious consequences for the development of the process of learning.

In our view, chronic boredom can be considered as a symptom of a situation in which mainly unpleasant moods alternate. As soon as there is satiation of the telic state, there will unconsciously be a reversal to the paratelic state. However, before arousal-searching, expansive behaviour gets going well, there will often be a reversal to the telic state. The (unconscious) fear of risky exploration has become so strong that the paratelic metamotivational condition itself has been affected and is experienced as threatening. As a result such a person changes constantly from anxiety (telic) to boredom (paratelic) and the other way round, while his or her mood does not improve in hedonic tone. The person finds it difficult to "really" relax, because he or she finds it difficult to make a "real" effort. For this reason, such a person will in general experience boredom, rather than relaxion.

=== Towards a completion of Apter's theory ===

{{Level|3}} Although Apter's theory provides more insight into the different ways in which people can react to the same, or similar situations, some questions are still left unanswered.

Firstly, the Reversal theory is only descriptive. It provides no insight into the underlying dynamics of the processes described. In other words: it is not clear how and why the reversals between the two states take place. Moreover, the theory does not provide a satisfactory causal explanation for the presence of the different states and reversals.

Secondly, Apter describes his model as a symmetric model. This means that reversals from telic to paratelic, and reversals from paratelic to telic can be the result of contingencies, but also of satiation. A non-symmetric model is however more likely. We will show this in the next chapter.

== Chapter 3: Van der Molen's Energy-Learning Model ==

=== A supplement to Lazarus and the Reversal theory ===

{{Level|3}} In chapter 1 we have pinpointed certain gaps in Lazarus' theory. One problem is that too little attention is paid to emotional and motivational aspects of human behaviour. As a result, there is still very little known about which kind of situations are experienced as threatening and which are seen as a challenge (and vice versa), and by whom. In chapter 2 we have further discussed this in a descriptive way. We have stated that telic and paratelic states are metamotivational frames of behaviour that also explain the connection between threat and challenge. In this chapter we shall discuss this further and highlight another gap in Lazarus' theory, namely the developmental aspects of coping behaviour. The metamotivational states (telic and paratelic) will be approached from an ethological perspective; the importance of an optimal allocation of energy is emphasized. The concept of "energy" may be defined here from a psychological as well as from a physiological viewpoint. We shall discuss this further in 3.2.

In chapter 2 we have also described two gaps in Apter's theory which will be filled in this chapter. Firstly, the mainly descriptive nature of Apter's theory will be given more explanatory power by focussing on the energy apects of metamotivational states. Secondly, the influence of contingencies and the influence of satiation on reversals in Van der Molen's model will be described as non-symmetric, whereas Apter describes his theory as a symmetric model.

=== An open-ended learning system ===

{{Level|3}} In his model ''Van der Molen'' (1983, 1984, 1985; Van der Molen, Van der Dennen, 1981) emphasizes that, basically, we have an "open-ended" learning system: "This is the ability to acquire a behavioural repertoire which is specifically tailored to the environmental situation an individual happens to live in" (Van der Molen, 1984, p. 1). The learning abilities of an individual are optimally utilized, when his or her behaviour is organised in such a way that a surplus of energy is directly invested into extending and refining his or her behavioural repertoire. From a psychological perspective, when there is a surplus of energy, there is readiness and gumption to enter new situations and to show explorative behaviour. Such behaviour may increase the survival value, particularly when certain experiences can subsequently be utilized in stressful situations and in emergencies. Therefore, skills have to be trained in situations with a high level of arousal. And situations which evoke a high level of arousal are particularly those in which risks will (have to) be taken.

Thus, an open-ended learning system will provide a maximum survival value when the following conditions are fulfilled: firstly, there should be a tendency to look for situations that involve a high level of arousal when there is a surplus of energy, and, secondly, there should be a tendency to look for situations that reduce the level of arousal as soon as the suplus of energy is exhausted, or when there is an emergency.

Although we will not discuss the neurophysiological aspects of human behaviour extensively in this report, it is sensible in this context to discuss the findings of Van Rooijen (1976), Archer (1978) and Laborit (1978) briefly. Their studies have shown that there is a neurophysiological "emergency-system" which is activated as soon there is a risky situation or an emergency. This system enables a person to show adequate reactions (very) promptly; alertness is temporarily increased and motor actions can be carried out very quickly. Evidence shows that long-lasting or frequent activation of this system has a negative influence on learning processes, because too much of the neural capacity will then be reserved for keeping this emergency system in action. In addition the energy supply is also heavily taxed in such situations. For this reason there will have to be a reversal to another, more relaxed state after some time which enables the person to refill the energy supply. This is only possible when there is (relatively) little physical or mental exertion. These characteristics imply a bi-stable system in which the preferred level of arousal depends on the metamotivational state (see chapter 2 and Apter 1982). In the paratelic state, i.e. when there is a surplus of energy, a person will prefer a high level of arousal. On the other hand, in the telic state, when the surplus of energy is exhausted, or when there is direct danger, the organism will seek relaxation. This will at first require energy output but the final and desired result is a lowered level of arousal. Figure 3.1 shows the reversals between the different states.

[[Image:Reversal system of antagonistic motivations.png|framed|none|Figure 3.1. Apter's reversal model]] 

By relating the learning system directly to the energy available, Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) describes the way in which the paratelic and telic states alternate ideally. In the period of relaxation, energy is supplemented and acquired. When the energy supply has increased sufficiently (in other words: when there is satiation of the telic state) the individual will become bored and will, (once more) seek an exciting situation. In this state a high degree of arousal will be experienced as pleasant. However, when the surplus of energy is exhausted, there will be a reversal from the paratelic to the telic state. In this way, by looking for an easier or a comforting situation or by controlling the fearful situation (i.e. after achieving relaxation), the person can replenish the energy supply. Given the tendency to look for situations which are accompanied by a high level of arousal, there will be experimentation in the paratelic state with new or otherwise arousal-increasing skills and situations. In this way the behavioural repertoire will be tested, extended and refined.

If the system functions well, the telic and the paratelic states will automatically and regularly alternate. Now the second gap in Apter's theory has been filled. The explanatory principle Van der Molen adds, is that a bi-stable system of motivation contributes directly to the chances of a learning organism to survive, by using its surplus of energy as efficiently as possible.

Bowlby (1977) has shown empirically that regular periods of relaxation are of crucial importance for the ability and readiness to explore new situations. In his studies he describes that a child, exploring an unknown situation, regularly returns for a moment to a trusted person (in Bowly's case the child's mother). In this way the child can relax and acquire energy for the next bout of exploration. Many types of behavioural deficiencies, such as chronic fear, can develop, when the periodic need for relaxation and reassurance cannot be met.

=== Learning spirals ===

{{Level|3}} On the basis of positive and negative learning spirals, Van der Molen (1984) explains how a behavioural repertoire develops. If the sequence relaxation - boredom - excitement - fear - relaxation and so on occurs often enough, this indicates that, generally speaking, there have been sufficient possibilities, whether or not self-created, to achieve relaxation in time and to replenish energy deficits. An individual will then develop an adequately functioning behavioural repertoire in which the various skills are integrated well. A person will then also be able to handel emergencies better and to relax easier and more quickly, so that after some time he or she will be able and ready again to explore, etc. This is called a ''positive learning spiral''.

[[Image:Dependence of positive and negative learning spirals on proper rhythms of telic paratelic alternations.png|framed|none|'''Figure 3.2.''' The two types of learning spirals (Van der Molen, 1984) according to which acquiring and refining the behavioural repertoire will be the result of positive learning spirals, and a rigid stereotyped way of reacting a consequence of negative learning spirals.]]

However, when there are not enough moments of relaxation, too little energy can be built up with the result that the individual will explore less and will show telic behaviour more frequently. In this way the person will acquire fewer new skills and practise "old" skills less often. This is called a negative learning spiral (see figure 3.2).

This model has a peculiar consequence. It predicts namely that skills tend to grow in clusters. Following Grof (1972, 1973, 1976), Van der Molen calls such clusters "clusters of condensed experience" or "COEX-systems" (see figure 3.3). Grof gives the following definition of a COEX-system: "A COEX-system can be defined as a specific constellation of memories consisting of condensed experience (and related phantasies) from different life periods of the individual. The memories belonging to a particular system have a similar basic theme or contain similar elements and are associated with a strong emotional charge of the same quality. The nature of these systems varies considerably from one COEX-system to another".

Grof distinguishes positive and negative COEX-systems, depending on the emotions related to the cluster. Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) explains the reason for such a clustering of areas of experience. When particular situations have been explored many times and the experiences have been dealt with and digested adequately, there is a positive COEX-system in which various types of skills are included. Often these skills can be applied to other, but similar and related situations, so that those situations too can be more easily controlled and managed. In this way positive experiences tend to catalize the positive experiencing of similar, comparable areas and thus cause a positive COEX-system to grow.

Experiences that have been dealt with badly tend to grow in clusters too. That is, when in a particular situation there is little exploration, and as a result little practise with particular relevant skills, it is difficult to get the situation under control, and thus to relax. The likelihood that new skills will be acquired is then also very low, so that the next time the individual is in the same, or in a similar situation, he or she will more likely have another problematic experience. This increases the likelihood of telic behaviour (flight or avoidance behaviour) in similar situations, which causes even less experimenting.

An example of a negative cluster is the behaviour of someone who does not dare to enter into contact with people anymore as a result of his or her shyness. This causes the fear for this kind of situation to grow, because the familiarity with these situations decreases continuously, and, moreover, the person is unable to adequately develop other skills for which he or she needs help from others (school assignments, for example). In this way it is likely that the individual will become caught up in a ''negative learning spiral'' in which new experiences are no longer used for learning but only intensify the existing, inadequate, avoidance behaviour. It is difficult to escape from such a spiral. The most important (and necessary) condition for this is the ability to achieve relaxation which is a prerequisite for dealing with experiences and for the replenishment of energy. Only then (careful) explorations of the frightening area can begin, with the possibility that this leads to fewer negative or even to positive experiences.

If a number of areas which have been dealt with succesfully, for which skills have been developed, are closely related to an area of experience that has been dealt with badly, they may sometimes serve as a "refuge" when situations threaten to become frightening. Through retiring into such a refuge the necessary relaxation can then be acquired. It is important to keep in mind that a positive COEX-system does not necessarily consist of pleasant experiences. Positive COEX-systems, and in particular ''important'' COEX-systems, develop through a proper reprocessing and digestion of formerly negative experiences. A negative COEX-system consists of negative experiences that ''have been dealt with badly'' and have been (re-)processed and digested insufficiently. The developmental aspects which play a role in acquiring and extending coping skills and which have not further been developed by Lazarus, are thus discussed and explainedd in detail by Van der Molen.

[[Image:Outcome of the growth of positive and negative COEX systems.png|framed|none|'''Figure 3.3.''' Hypothetical example of the growth of positive (+) and negative (-) systems of COndensed EXperience in the field of experiences (from: Van der Molen, 1984).]]

=== The asymmetry of the Reversal model ===

{{Level|3}} At the beginning of this chapter we have mentioned that Apter presents his theory as a symmetric model. Van der Molen (1984) indicates that contingencies in particular cause a reversal from paratelic to telic, and that satiation is one of the primary causes of a reversal from telic to paratelic. Van der Molen places emphasis on one particular sequence, that from relaxation to boredom, from boredom to excitement, from excitement to fear, and from fear back to relaxation. The reversal from telic to paratelic behaviour is here a reversal from relaxation to boredom.

According to Van der Molen, this reversal will usually be the result of satiation. The reason for this concerns energy; we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter, that the capacities of an open-ended learning system are optimally utilized if any surplus of energy is invested in gathering more experience.

A reversal from the paratelic to the telic state, on the other hand, is caused in particular by contingencies. With reversals from paratelic to telic, Van der Molen places emphasis on the sudden transition from excitement to fear. By looking for arousal-increasing situations in the paratelic state, risks are taken and a greater likelihood exists that a particular situation will suddenly get out of hand owing to contingencies which cause a reversal from paratelic to telic behaviour.

=== Conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} In this chapter we have described Van der Molen's learning model which provides us an insight into the way in which the learning system is unconsciously kept going as long as there is a regular surplus of energy. We have observed that energy levels form the basis for the telic and the paratelic states and considered the emotional and motivational aspects of coping behaviour. Moreover, the developmental aspect of coping behaviour is explicitly discussed in Van der Molen's model, in the form of descriptions of positive and negative learning spirals and the clustering of related areas of experience. The concept of positive and negative COEX-systems can also be regarded as a first initiative to roughly categorize cognitive contents. Finally, we have discussed why Van der Molen regards satiation as a prime reason for the reversals from telic to paratelic and contingencies as the main cause of reversals from paratelic to telic.

=== Gaps in the Energy-Learning model ===

{{Level|3}} What is still lacking in this model, is a more detailed description of the way in which emotional and motivational states are related to ''cognitive contents''. This aspect will be addressed in the next chapter as we discuss Lewicka's antagonist model of cognitive styles.

== Chapter 4: Lewicka's model of Antagonist Cognitive Modes ==

=== A supplement to Van der Molen's learning model ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 3 we have described Van der Molen's discussion of the emotional and motivational aspects of the learning process. Lewicka's model (1987, for example) in which there are two antagonistic modes of cognitive information processing, provides a description of the cognitive aspects. We will show how this model supplements Van der Molen's model.

Lewicka distinguishes two types of behavioural regulation, the mechanism of ''action-control'' and the mechanism of ''action-involvement'' respectively. Like Apter's theory, Lewicka's theory too states that an individual is always in one of the two regulationary modes; there are two antagonistic mechanisms of cognitive functioning which alternate in time.

=== Action-control and action-involvement ===

{{level|3}} The mechanism of action-control instigates actions, aiming at the achievement of a particular objective (comparable to the telic state). Lewicka states that there are particular "''activity-external comparison standards''" which means that the achievement of an external objective is central and that the activity itself is not the objective of the individual.

The mechanism of action-control is controlled by a ''principle of negative feedback''; thinking of a particular standard (the objective), the individual assesses his or her situation. A discrepancy between the actual and desired states is experienced as unpleasant and causes instrumental behaviour (correcting mistakes, if any, and minimalising the discrepancy), until the objective in view has been achieved. Lewicka calls this "''controlling''": the objective regulates the behaviour of the individual.

The most important function of the mechanism of action-control is to maintain the level of organisation the individual has achieved. However, if an organism is to be able to grow, he or she must be capable of creating entirely new objectives (by him or herself), for example in order to be able to adapt to changing or still unknown environmental demands. The mechanism of action control itself is therefore not sufficient. For this, the alternative or antagonist mechanism of ''action-involvement'' is essential.

The mechanism of action-involvement encourages the individual to take actions which are not instrumental or purposive: in fact the individual's activity is an aim in itself (comparable to the paratelic state). Although sometimes there seems to be a particular external objective, this is often random and more like an "excuse" for the activity, than that the person really tries to achieve that objective. The motivation for the activity is the activity itself.

The mechanism of action-involvement is controlled by a ''principle of positive feedback''. The factors that cause the behaviour and maintain it lie in the behaviour itself; this is a process of self-amplification: the behaviour intensifies itself.

The function of the mechanism of action-involvement is the production of new, so far unknown, results of behaviour, or the further exploration of activities that have been tried out before. In this way the individual will not only be able to obtain more information, but also indications about promising directions of future activities. Lewicka calls this "''directing''" which means that the behavioural results themselves are guidelines for future behaviour. Since the behaviour is not directed at established goals, the activities of the individual in the action-involvement mode are often very unpredictable.

Table 4.1 provides a summary in catchwords of the main differences between the two mechanisms of regulation described by Lewicka.

{|style="border: 1px solid; border-collapse: collapse;" cellpadding="2"
|+'''Table 4.1.''' A summary of the differences between the action-control mode and the action-involvement mode
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Action-Control
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Action-Involvement
|-
|Purposive action
|Activity "for the activity"
|-
|Controlled by a negative feedback principle
|Controlled by positive feedback principles
|-
|Controlling: purpose regulates the behaviour
|Directing: behavioural results themselves are guidelines for sub-sequent behaviour
|-
|Function: maintaining the achieved level of organisation (balance)
|Function: taking the individual to a higher level of organisation (development)
|}

Table 4.1 shows once more that there is much similarity between the mode of action-control and the telic state and between the mode of action-involvement and the paratelic state. According to both Lewicka and Apter, the motivation for activity is central: they distinguish between activity aimed at a particular external objective and activity as an "objective" in itself. The difference between Apter's and Lewicka's approaches lies in how they further work out this distinction into two modes of behaviour. Apter discusses in particular the motivational and emotional aspects concerned. Lewicka, on the other hand, discusses in particular the cognitive aspects. In our view both theories can be combined to form a more complete picture of the alternation of behavioural modes. This will be explained in the remainder of this chapter. First we will discuss what Lewicka calls evaluative standards which, according to her, are operative in the action-control mode.

=== Evaluative standards of comparison in the action-control mode ===

{{level|3}} In the mechanism of action-control there are two forms of evaluative standards of comparison: on the one hand positive standards which indicate what a person ought to do (for example particular assessment criteria an achievement has to meet), on the other hand negative standards which indicate which limits cannot be passed (for example particular social standards which indicate what types of behaviour cannot be regarded "decent"). Lewicka calls them "''standards of goodness''" and "''standards of badness''" respectively.

The two types of standards are not entirely symmetric which means that a categorisation of a result as "not good" does not imply that this result is regarded as "bad" (and vice versa). There is a third category possible which is "non-substantial" which means: neither good, nor bad (see fig. 4.1).

[[Image:Lewicka standards of goodness.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.1: Schematic reproduction of various categorizations of possible results''' 
(Explanation: In the field of possible results, area A represents the results that are categorized as "good", area B the results that are regarded as "bad". The remaining possible results, area C, are of the category "non-substantial".)]]

Lewicka (1985) states that if certain standards of goodness are difficult to attain (for example rigid social rules of behaviour or idealised criteria for achievements), it is hard for a person to reach that standard. An example of this is a person who is in a very rigid environment, such that he or she must continuously take part in particular activities in order to be appreciated. In such situations there is hardly any opportunity for non-purposive behaviour and a reversal to the mode of action-involvement is not very likely.

When there are rigid, strictly defined and narrowly limited standards of badness which means that there is a small number of categories appraised as "bad" and thus a large number of "non-substantial", a person can very easily avoid "bad" behaviour. At first this may bring about a feeling of relief, as it is very clear what is not "allowed", but this situation may eventually also lead to boredom which, according to Van der Molen's learning model, makes a reversal to the mode of action involvement more likely. An example is the story of Adam and Eve in Paradise; everything was allowed, except eating apples from the Tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil. The rest of the story we know.

Within the mode of action-control the activities an individual is engaged in are either instrumental actions of ''approach'' aimed at producing results categorised as "good" by positive standards of comparison, or instrumental actions of ''avoidance'' aimed at avoiding results categorised as "bad" by negative standards of comparison. The functional conditions are ''efficiency'' and ''minimization of mistakes''; the least effort and the least costs for achieving a positive, or for avoiding a negative result, the better.

=== Criteria of evaluation in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} According to Lewicka the criteria of evaluation in the action-involvement mode are quite different. Lewicka uses the informative contents of activities as criteria. The search for a maximum of information is then the guideline for the choice of behaviour. "A catagorisation as "good" applies to all those alternatives of behaviour that provide an individual with new information and reduce uncertainty", Lewicka states.

Apparently Lewicka somewhat contradicts herself here, because in the definition of the mechanism of action-involvement she states that actions are brought about which do not aim at a particular objective. However, later on, she states, as we have described above, that the individual in the action-involvement mode aims at obtaining new information and reducing uncertainty. So apparently there is postulated an aim for a particular objective.

In our view this problem can be solved when the parallel between the action-control mode and the telic state on the one hand and between the action-involvement mode and the paratelic state on the other hand is regarded more closely. As we have previously mentioned, behaviour in the action-involvement mode is maintained by factors stemming from the activity itself. It remains unclear, however, what kind of factors are involved here. Apter explains this by his assumption of striving for pleasant tension as a general motive for behaviour in the paratelic state. If this idea is accepted as a supplement to Lewicka's theory, we can say more about whether purposive behaviour does or does not exist in the mode of action-involvement.

=== Proximal and ultimal purposes in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} In our view, it is important to make a clear distinction between the ''proximal'' and the ''ultimal'' purposes of behaviour in the action-involvement mode. The term "proximal purpose" refers to the objective at which the person aims at the moment of the activity. Contrary to the mechanism of action-control, there is no external objective in the mechanism of action-involvement, but there is activity because of the activity itself; the (proximal) "objective" of the person is the behaviour that provides pleasant tension. The ultimal objective of similar activities corresponds with the function of Lewicka's mechanism of action-involvement: it enables the person to acquire new experiences, to learn from them and thus enhances growth which in turn means the achievement of a higher level of cognitive organisation. A person is not aware of this ultimal objective at the moment the very activities take place. When Lewicka mentions behavioural alternatives with a high informative value which are categorized as "good", this must be interpreted as "good" with regard to the ultimal objective of the mechanism of action-involvement. The criteria the person applies at the moment of the activity itself, will not have any bearing on the informative value of the activity, but on the importance of the activity for the person, that is on the possibily that it may provide pleasant tension. The ultimal advantages of action-involvement behaviour make it evolutionarily advantageous that this behavioural mode exists in which arousal-rising and pleasure in the action itself are the proximal "goals" (see Van der Molen, 1983).

We can perhaps go further than Lewicka in answering the question which kind of activities have the greatest informative value. On the one hand, these are of course activities in areas of experience that are new and unknown to a person. Exploration of such areas is less likely in the action-control mode because a person then rather prefers to rely on familiar objects. New and unknown areas involve the risk of unexpected, unpleasant things happening. This leads to tension which is experienced as unpleasant in the mode of action-control. According to Van der Molen's learning model however, it is exactly unfamiliarity that produces tension which makes exploration ''inviting'' in the action-involvement mode. Activities that are closely related to areas categorized as "bad" may in the action-involvement mode also be experienced as "interesting". In the action-control mode the person tries to avoid such areas as much as possible and aims at achieving results categorized as "good". In our view "good" areas are not interesting in the action-involvement mode: they are familiar and do not create any tension. Approaching the "bad", risky areas, on the other hand, is exciting and, what is more, it has the (ultimal) advantage that the limits of these risky areas are explored and thus become more distinctly defined for the person. This will ultimately be of advantage to his or her freedom of movement: if the borders between what "is possible" and what "is not possible" are clear, this will be of advantage to the person whenever the mechanism of action-control is activated again and he or she tries to prevent "bad" results.

As we have stated above, Lewicka's ideas concerning the informative content of activities can be extended and explained by adding the concepts "proximal" and "ultimal" goals. Following the informative content of activities, we shall discuss in the
next paragraph in more detail how such information is processed cognitively.

=== "How", "Why" and "What" questions, sufficient and necessary conditions ===

{{level|3}} Lewicka (1987) states that there are three basic questions a person can ask: the question "''How?''", the question "''Why?''" and the question "''What?''". As an example she gives a logical implication:

P ════> Q, in which P is seen as the action-premise (the condition) and Q as the action-outcome (the result). The three questions that may be asked with regard to this implication are:
# ''How'' can you make Q happen?
# ''Why'' did Q happen?
# ''What'' will happen if P?
According to Lewicka the first two questions are "closed-ended", because the result Q has already been specified. This specification can be based on a criterion of "goodness" or on a criterion of "badness". The appraisal of the expected result determines to a great extent which particular question the individual will ask in particular. The fact is that when the results have been appraised as positive, people are particularly interested in the question "how" these results may be achieved. If the results, on the other hand, have been appraised as negative, the "why"-question is especially interesting (Wong & Weiner, 1981; Weiner, 1984). Lewicka relates these questions to the concept of "sufficient" and "necessary" conditions. We will first explain what is meant by these "sufficient" and "necessary" conditions.

Sufficient conditions are those conditions that have to be met to achieve a particular result. When a person wants to boil an egg for breakfast, for example, a list of sufficient conditions could look like this:

# Fill a pan with water.
# Put in the egg.
# Put the pan onto the cooker and turn on the gas.
# When the water boils, wait another four minutes.
# Turn off the gas and pour off the water.

When these conditions have been met, the person will indeed get his egg boiled. However, this is not the only way to boil an egg. It could be boiled in an old can on a campfire, for example. A series of sufficient conditions, therefore, indicates how a particular result can be achieved, but this does not imply that when these conditions are not met, the result cannot possibly be achieved in another way.

A necessary condition is a condition that has to be met, because there is no other way in which a particular result can be achieved. The necessary condition in the example of boiling an egg could be: "Heat the egg to a temperature that is above the coagulation temperature of the egg white, until the heat has spread throughout the egg". The way in which the egg is heated is not specified, as in fact this is unimportant. Only the fact that the egg is heated for some time is important; otherwise it will never be boiled. Departing from the necessary conditions for a particular result, it is often possible to generate various series of sufficient conditions.

As mentioned above, when the results have been appraised as positive, people particularly aim at finding sufficient conditions to achieve this result which means that they are particularly interested in the question: "''How'' can I make sure the result will be achieved?". So there is a strategy of "approach", aiming to achieve desirable results.

When the results have been appraised as negative, on the other hand, people particularly aim at finding the necessary conditions for these results. Only if someone knows ''why'' an unpleasant result comes about, will he or she be best able to effectively avoid the necessary condition(s) for this result and thus to avoid the unpleasant result itself. This is in fact a strategy of avoidance, aimed at preventing undesirable results.

There is a great difference between these two types of information processing. To find ''sufficient'' conditions for a result, a "''sufficiency-oriented method''", it is in principle sufficient to know that a particular result will come about after meeting one particular condition or combination of conditions. Then the person will be able to remember this simplistic connection and knows that meeting those conditions again will be sufficient to get the same result again. Seeking ''necessary'' conditions, a "''necessity-oriented method''" implies a greater investment of time and energy. To distil the necessary conditions from the various sufficient conditions for a particular result, more experience and skill is needed, as well as a certain degree of experimenting and the cognitive processing of acquired experiences. Only by examining several conditions separately, will it be possible to find out whether they are essential for a particular result and, if so, why. This investment of time and energy (proximal costs) has, however, some (ultimal) advantage which is the possibility to make the cognitive structure concerned more economical, sparse and logically coherent. As it becomes clear "why" a particular result occurs, it can be obtained or avoided more effectively. The large quantity of sufficient conditions is then, in fact, reduced to a smaller number of necessary conditions. From these necessary conditions, relatively strong and efficient rules can be distilled, so that an individual does not need a separate list of sufficient conditions for each result. In this way a large number of answers to the "how"-question can be replaced by a single answer to the "why"-question.

=== The "what"-question in the action-involvement mode ===

{{level|3}} As we have stated, a certain amount of experimenting is needed to develop a necessity-oriented method. New, additional knowledge about the results of behaviour must be acquired. At this stage the "what"-question will be important. According to Lewicka the "what"-question is "open-ended", because there is no previously specified result. This question will in particular emerge during the exploration of novel areas; there will be experimenting with behavioural alternatives, without aiming at previously determined results. In other words: activities will be engaged in, just to investigate their effects. Referring to our learning model, it will be clear that the "what"-question will emerge in particular during the state of action-involvement (comparable to the paratelic state); experimenting is attractive in this state, because the unfamiliarity of the result will be seen as exciting and pleasant.

We have to observe that the appraisal of the expected results has a significant influence on whether the person does or does not put much effort into developing a necessity-oriented method. That is to say, the interests of the person on a proximal level play an important part here which means the interests the person is aware of at the moment of the activity itself. In the action-involvement mode those interests are the achievement of pleasant tension. Exploring of and experimenting with the limits of areas categorized as "bad" or problematic, causes considerable tension: after all there is a chance that there will be a less pleasant result. Exploring areas categorized as "good" (or well processed and digested) provides hardly any tension: the only thing that may happen is that an expected pleasant result will not take place. However as the person will generally have one or more sufficiency-oriented methods for achieving desirable results, he or she can always make sure those results will be achieved, should it be necessary when an emergency arises. When a person wants to explore things, seeking (pleasant) tension, these areas are rather unattractive and his or her attention will almost automatically be attracted to the more interesting, because unfamiliar, areas that may be related to an area that has been dealt with well, but at the very least are related to the more risky areas, categorized as "bad".

=== Pleasant and unpleasant results, necessary and sufficient conditions, acceptance of chances of mistakes and cognitive "bias" ===

{{level|3}} In the action-involvement (paratelic) mode, attention is automatically drawn to a further exploration of the conditions of results. When the results are pleasant, the consequences for the cognitive processing system are entirely different from if the results are unpleasant. As we have stated in paragraph 4.6, working with necessary conditions is the most efficient. Acquiring "sufficient" behavioural strategies is less complicated and quicker to realise, however. To that end the "why"-question does not have to be examined intensively. Any answer to the "how"-question will do. Therefore, if an additional investment in time and energy is made, needed to grow from sufficient behavioural strategies to knowledge of necessary conditions, it will in general be invested in the first place in ''un''pleasant results, in order to determine their conditions more accurately.

When examining pleasant results it is of course more efficient to know the necessary conditions, but in those cases it is less crucial, because there are fewer risks. Indeed, any sufficient conditions will meet the purpose, that is, to achieve pleasant results.

There is another problem, however. In practise it is in general impossible to make accurate predictions about behavioural results. The cognitive models of reality we create are just approaches. The higher the required degree of accuracy, the more experience and information has to be invested. All cognitive models have a particular degree of uncertainty. Which uncertainties will be minimized in the first place, depends to a great extent on the nature of the expected results. Table 4.2 gives a summary of the possible antecedents and results in the case of pleasant and in the case of unpleasant results. This table is a free modification of Lewicka's (1985). To be perfectly clear, we have made a separate table for pleasant and unpleasant results respectively. However, as far as terminology is concerned, these tables differ a little from Lewicka's. The fact is that it is not always clear what Lewicka means with the terms "positive" and "negative", because she uses them in two different ways. Lewicka uses, for instance, the terms "positive outcome" and "positive hit". In the first term "positive" means: positively appraised or appreciated. For clarity's sake we have chosen the term ''pleasant'' for positively appraised results and ''unpleasant'' for negatively appraised results. Of course we have not changed terms like "positive hit" and "negative hit", because these are established terms from the disciplines of logic and mathematics.

When departing from the idea that people generally try as hard as possible to avoid disappointments, the table makes clear why some specific cognitive strategies are more likely to occur in connection with some specific results than others. Each cognitive strategy of course also harbours its own chances of mistakes and "bias".

If any ''unpleasant'' results can occur, a person will generally try to avoid them. ''Disappointments'' arise when there are unpredicted unpleasant results (false negative, "type II" mistake). We know that when the probability of a Type II mistake is made as small as possible, the probability of a "Type I" mistake will, as a consequence, increase (see for example Nijdam & Van Buuren, 1983). In this case a "Type I" mistake is a ''pleasant surprise'' for the individual: an unpleasant result was predicted, but it did not take place. At the level of the behaviour of the individual this means, that during the action-control mode (in which unpleasant results are actively avoided), the individual will take a large "safety margin"; not only will the area be avoided for which there are clear negative standards of appraisal, but also the areas that are closely related. The chance of a Type II-mistake reduces this, but the area that has been avoided will usually be larger than is really necessary. This is shown in figure 4.2.

<pre>
Table 4.2: Survey of possible mistakes in information processing, depending on the evaluative appraisal of the result

╔══════════════════════╦════════════════════╗
Unpleasant ║ H ║ non-H ║
results ║ (unpleasant T ║ (unpleasant T ║
║ will occur) ║ will not occur) ║
╔══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ T ║(A) ║ (C) ║
║ ║ positive hit ║ false negative or ║
║ ║ ║ Type II-mistake ║
║(unpleasant T ║ (unpleasant as ║ (unpleasant, but ║
║ occurs) ║ predicted) ║ not predicted) ║
║ ║ p(H ∩ T) ║ p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╠══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ non-T ║ (B) ║ (D) ║
║ ║false positive or ║negative hit ║
║ ║Type I-mistake ║ ║
║(unpleasant T ║(not unpleasant, ║(not unpleasant, ║
║ does not ║although predict- ║as predicted) ║
║ occur) ║ed) p(H ∩ -non-T) ║p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╚══════════════╩══════════════════════╩════════════════════╝

╔══════════════════════╦════════════════════╗
Pleasant ║ H ║non-H ║
results ║ (pleasant T ║ (pleasant T ║
║ will occur) ║ will not occur) ║
╔══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ T ║ (A) ║(C) ║
║ ║positive hit ║false negative or ║
║ ║ ║Type II-mistake ║
║ (pleasant T ║ (pleasant as ║(pleasant, but not ║
║ occurs) ║ predicted) ║predicted) ║
║ ║p(H ∩ T) ║ p(non-H ∩ T) ║
╠══════════════╬══════════════════════╬════════════════════╣
║ non-T ║(B) ║ (D) ║
║ ║false positive or ║negative hit ║
║ (pleasant T ║Type I-mistake ║ ║
║ does not ║ (not pleasant, al- ║not pleasant, ║
║ occur) ║though predicted ║as predicted ║
║ ║p(H ∩ non-T) ║p(non-H ∩ non-T) ║
╚══════════════╩══════════════════════╩════════════════════╝

"Necessity" of H for T: p(H|T) = A/ (A + C)
"Sufficiency" of H for T: p(T|H) = A / (A + B)
</pre>

One result of this safe strategy is, that during the action-control mode particular areas will remain unexplored and thus unfamiliar to the individual. Such large safety margins can only be rendered superfluous by a further elucidation of the necessary conditions for the unpleasant result. Its borders then become narrower, sharper and more accurately defined (see figure 4.2). In terms of figure 4.1: the acquisition of more necessity-oriented information reduces the size of the "no good" areas and increases the available behavioural manoeuvering space. On the other hand, as we have said before, vaguely defined borders provide pleasant tension in the action-involvement mode and such areas which were rather avoided in previous, action-control modes, will become more attractive and may be explored more closely.

[[Image:Avoidance of unpleasant results in the action-control mode.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.2: Avoidance of unpleasant results in the action-control mode''']]

When an individual may expect positive results he or she will follow quite a different strategy. A ''disappointment'' would mean here that a pleasant result is predicted, but does not take place (false positive, "Type I" mistake). The individual will try to avoid this as much as possible. Minimizing the probability of a Type I mistake implies that the probability of a Type II mistake will increase which is the chance that there will be a pleasant result, although it was not predicted; an ''unexpected surprise''. In the action-control (telic) mode the individual will probably choose for a safe strategy : starting from one or another familiar sufficient method the individual will aim at achieving the pleasant result, without taking risks. The area of behavioural options the individual then aims at is most likely to be smaller than is really necessary. This is shown in figure 4.3.

It is clear now that adhering to a single existing sufficient method in the action-control mode limits the behavioural repetoire of the individual; he or she will rarely experiment with other strategies of behaviour than the one that is familiar and tested, for fear of not achieving the expected, pleasant result. However, in the state of action-involvement experimenting with alternative strategies is attractive. Especially close to the areas categorized as "good", the individual can always benefit from the familiar sufficient method in case of an emergency. This means that there will probably be less tension than might arise close to an area categorized as "bad". After further exploration, the "safe" area can thus be extended by supplementing more sufficient methods. Should the individual eventually succeed in generating a necessity-oriented cognitive representation of this pleasant result, even more degrees of safety, as all sufficient conditions would also be defined by implication.

[[Image:Aiming at pleasant results in the action-control mode.png|framed|none|'''Figure 4.3: Aiming at pleasant results in the action-control mode''']]

Both with pleasant and unpleasant results, necessity-oriented cognitive models will allow the greatest freedom of movement and behavioural efficiency. The area of unpleasant results (see figure 4.2) will be smaller and the area of pleasant results (see figure 4.3) will be larger. It is clear, however, that the need to invest more energy in obtaining "necessary" cognitive connections will be strongest in the case of unpleasant results.

In chapter 3 we have shown that in fact this is what really takes place. The problematical areas of experience produce most arousal (because of the possibly unpleasant results) which makes these areas more attractive in the action-involvement (paratelic) mode when there is enough energy to invest in exploration. As a consequence, in such problematical areas there will relatively quickly be enough experience and information available to achieve cognitive structures of "necessity" at a higher level of abstraction and integration.

=== Summary and conclusion ===

{{level|3}} In this chapter we have discussed how Lewicka's theory can supplement Van der Molen's learning model. The cognitive aspects of the learning process have been discussed and integrated, in order to create a more comprehensive model. We have discussed the difference between action-control and action-involvement and the parallels with the telic and paratelic states. Subsequently the evaluative criteria that are active in the action-control mode have been discussed. With regard to the evaluative criteria in the action-involvement mode it appeared that a relatively easy supplement (similarity with the paratelic state and the difference between proximal and ultimal objectives) sufficed to remove an apparent contradiction in Lewicka's theory. Finally we have discussed the way in which the evaluative appraisal of possible results determines the kind of information an individual seeks, the strategy of behaviour that will probably be chosen and the kind of cognitive mistakes that can be made in processing information.

In the next chapter we will show how these theories complement each other in such a way that a dynamic model emerges that includes the most important aspects of the learning process, that describes cognitive growth and which can be utilized in many areas of research and practical application.

By way of summary, table 4.3 shows the most important characteristics of the action-control and the action-involvement modes.

<pre>
Table 4.3: Survey of action-control and action-involvement
╔═══════════════════════════════╦═════════════════════════════╗
║ ACTION-CONTROL ║ ACTION-INVOLVEMENT ║
╠═══════════════════════════════╬═════════════════════════════╣
║ Purposive activity and ║ Activity as an "aim" in ║
║ instrumental behaviour ║ itself ║
║ ║ ║
║ Principle of negative ║ Principle of positive ║
║ feedback ║ feedback ║
║ "controlling" ║ "directing" ║
║ ║ ║
║ Function: maintaining the ║ Function: achieving a ║
║ level of organisation ║ higher level of organisa- ║
║ ║ tion ║
║ ║ ║
║ In particular in an environ- ║ In particular in an envi- ║
║ ment with stringent standards ║ ronment with stringent ║
║ of goodness ║ standards of badness ║
║ ║ ║
║ Approach-strategy towards ║ Exploration when pleasant ║
║ pleasant results ║ results occur less probable║
║ ║ ║
║ Stategy of avoidance towards ║ Exploration particularly ║
║ unpleasant or unknown ║ around unfamiliar or un- ║
║ results ║ pleasant results ║
║ ║ ║
║ For pleasant results: ║ Independent of the kind of ║
║ "How?"-question, ║ results: "What?"-question ║
║ For unpleasant results: ║ (exploration/experimenting)║
║ "Why?"-question ║ ║
║ ║ ║
║ Proximal and Ultimal goals ║ Proximal goal: obtaining ║
║ are the same: to bring and ║ pleasant tension; Ultimal ║
║ keep the environment under ║ goal: gaining entirely new ║
║ control (survival and restor- ║ experiences, as a condition║
║ ing the balance of energy) ║ for development ║
╚═══════════════════════════════╩═════════════════════════════╝
</pre>

== Chapter 5: An integration of Lazarus', Apter's, Van der Molen's and Lewicka's theories ==

In this chapter we will describe how one coherent model can be constructed from the theories discussed. This model describes and explains more than each theory separately. We have called this model the Cognition-Energy-Learning model (C.E.L). The model shows how development and learning can be examined from a perspective of energy potential. The cognitive and emotional aspects that play a part in the learning processes, are also accounted for in this model.

=== Energy dependence of motivation and emotions ===

{{level|3}} In the previous chapters we have shown that there is a distinction between telic and paratelic phase. In the telic phase, the behaviour is directed by a particular goal, avoiding fear and seeking safety, for example. In the paratelic phase, on the other hand, the behaviour is a goal in itself; behaviour takes place "just for fun". Thus, in this phase tension is experienced as pleasant and exciting, while in the telic phase it is experienced as frightening and unpleasant. A condition for paratelic behaviour is a surplus of energy which can be spent on exploring and on trying out new things. Telic behaviour takes place at the moment the surplus of energy becomes exhausted or when an emergency arises.

What has been stated above, makes clear that the energy dependent basis of motivation and emotion is extremely important; the motivational state of an individual depends strongly on the energy that a person has at its disposal. The consequence is a strongly dynamic character of the organization of motivation; motivation and emotion change constantly in the course of time. In the telic phase a person will try to get his or her situation under control. Bringing a situation under control will at first take energy, but once the situation is under control the individual can benefit from familiar skills which cost (relatively) little energy (see chapter 3). In this way the individual can relax and assemble new energy which can be spent in the following paratelic phase. In the telic phase rest and relaxation are aimed at. Once relaxation has been achieved and the individual has recuperated enough energy, there will be a motivational reversal; then rest is no longer regarded as pleasant, but rather as dull and boring. In this paratelic phase a high level of tension is aimed at, until a reversal to the telic state (owing to fatigue or to an emergency) occurs again and the person tries to get the situation under control in order to be able to relax subsequently.

This system of reversals can be understood by regarding the utilization of energy, which is the basis of the behaviour of the individual. There have to be reversals to the telic state; a person cannot constantly show paratelic behaviour, as the energy required will be exhausted at a certain moment. Moreover, endless explorative and arousal-seeking behaviour will cause difficulties sooner or later which in turn may cause an emergency situation which in turn will ''force'' a reversal. The trigger for these types of reversals has to be sought on a very proximal level. On the other hand, the evolutionary reason for the existence of this reversal system between telic and paratelic states has to be sought at the ultimate level; that is, an organism will have the best yield in terms of survival value when the energy, gained during phases of relaxation in the telic mode, will subsequently be spent in paratelic modes for acquiring novel, additional experiences, that serve for the extension of one's own behavioural repertoire (Van der Molen, 1984).

=== Problematical and non-problematical experiences ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 3 we have described Van der Molen's model and sequences in which the telic and paratelic modes should alternate ideally. This sequence is: boredom - (explorative behaviour) - excitement - fear - (reversal to the telic state and seeking rest) - relaxation - (with eventually a reversal to the paratelic state) -boredom - etc.

Should this sequence actually take place in a regular pattern, the result would be optimal; in the paratelic phase the individual explores the environment and that way he or she gains new experiences, using the skills acquired previously. When these skills prove insufficient and the situation threatens to get out of hand, there will be a reversal to the telic phase and the individual will seek control of the situation. On the one hand these periods of rest are necessary for recovery of the balance of energy and on the other hand newly acquired skills and experiences can be processed and integrated with earlier experiences during such periods of rest. This implies that after a series of reversal cycles the individual may be at a higher level of cognitive organisation than before. In this way the individual grows and learns from his or her experiences in the course of time.

There will not always occur such ideal sequences of telic and paratelic phases. A person may for instance not be able to relax optimally in the telic phase. This is often the case if he or she does not have the adequate skills or coping strategies to get the situation under control. In this way the situation remains frightening, the person does not relax sufficiently and thus does not get the opportunity to gain new energy which is a condition for another paratelic phase. The situation will probably be explored less quickly (paratelic) and there will be no experimenting with skills which would enable the individual to behave adequately in this situation. And since no new experiences are acquired in that area of experience from which the person could learn, he or she will remain at a lower level of functioning and there is a high probability of accumulations and fixations of simplistic avoidance behaviour. In that way a cluster of badly mastered areas of experience may grow.

What has been stated above makes clear that for the individual some specific areas of experience can be problematical, while at the same time other areas are non-problematical. Problematical areas of experience are those areas for which no, or only a few, adequate coping strategies have been developed; the area has not been dealt with well. For the non-problematical areas of experience, adequate coping strategies have indeed been created; these areas have been dealt with well. In chapter 3 (following Grof 1972, 1973), areas of experience that have been dealt with badly were called "negative COEX-systems", and areas that have been dealt with well were called "positive COEX-systems". Table 5.1 shows what these positive or negative COEX-systems imply.

{|style="border: 1px solid; border-collapse: collapse;" cellpadding="2"
|+'''Table 5.1.''' Characteristics of positive and negative COEX-systems (Systems of COndensed EXperience)
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Negative COEX-systems
!style="border: 1px solid;" |Positive COEX-systems
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Flight/fight responses
|Stay/play responses
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Behavioural rigidity
|Flexibility of reactions
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Stereotyped reflexes
|Creative responses
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Unskills
|Skills
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Phobias and neuroses
|Mastery of
|-
|style="border-right: 1px solid;" |Consciousness block (unconscious repressions)
|Awareness of
|}

=== Emotional labeling of experiences as pleasant and unpleasant ===

{{level|3}} At the beginning of this chapter we stated that it depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of a person whether he or she experiences a situation as pleasant or unpleasant. Problematical areas of experience that have not been dealt with well will cause tension. In the telic state this will be experienced as unpleasant and frightening and there is a high likelihood of avoidance behaviour. The person will seek areas of experience that have been dealt with well; in those areas the person is able to control the situation and thus to relax. In the telic state, areas that have been dealt with well can be a "refuge" which is helpful when the person gets into a frightening situation. In the paratelic phase this is of course not the case. In this phase the areas that have been dealt with well are experienced as boring and thus as less pleasant because they do not longer provide arousal. It is the problematical areas that are attractive in this phase because there can still be some experimenting and an element of risk is involved; this provides pleasant arousal (compare chapter 4).
At the beginning of chapter 3 we have discussed the biological relevance of the telic and the paratelic states. From what has been stated above it becomes again clear that both phases are necessary in order to function well. In the telic state the individual is able to relax, once he or she has succeeded in getting the situation under control, and will thus be able to gain new energy and to integrate the newly gained experiences into his or her existing cognitive system. This system enables the individual to remain at a particular level of functioning. In the paratelic phase new or problematical situations (and in the telic phase situations that are experienced as fearful) will be explored and new situations can be investigated. By continuously exploring a situation that has not yet completely been digested and controlled, and by dealing with those experiences and digesting them, this situation will lose its connotation as frightening and the individual will learn which strategies are adeqate in that situation and which are not. Thus the paratelic phase is also an indispensable condition for the growth of the individual.

Thus, we can state that the proximal goal of the telic phase is: seeking rest and relaxation. The ultimal goal is: maintaining a certain level of functioning. The proximal "goal" of the paratelic phase is experiencing pleasant arousal (by way of non-direct purposive behaviour). However, the ultimal goal is creating the conditions for achieving a higher level of functioning.

At this point we can once more emphasize an important characteristic of the way in which the reversals from one phase to another come about. In chapter 2 we have stated that we must not hold fast to the idea of a symmetrical model. The reversals from paratelic to telic will mainly be the result of an emergency or of fatigue, while the reversals from telic to paratelic will particularly take place as a result of "satiation". In this respect Apter's theory has therefore also been supplemented.

=== Cognitive development ===

{{level|3}} In chapter 4 we have stated that there is much similarity between Lewicka's mode of action-control and Apter's telic state, and between the mode of action-involvement and the paratelic state. Apter emphasizes the motivational and emotional aspects of reversals in particular, while Lewicka places emphasis on the cognitive aspects. We shall now describe how the two theories can supplement each other and thus provide a more complete description of the processes involved.

Lewicka mentions "standards of goodness" and "standards of badness"; particular standards that indicate what kind of behaviour has to be aimed at and what kind of behaviour can better be avoided (see chapter 4). Czapinski (1986, 1987) completes this with his study of the appraisal of experiences which indicates that people generally show a mild "positivity bias". This means that generally experiences have a mildly positive connotation (except when they have a specific and very strong connotation). Therefore, according to Czapinski, there is a lightly positive background in the cognitive representation of experiences in which the negative areas of experience are particularly important. Departing from these ideas, we are now able to say more about cognitive development.
Figure 5.1 shows the combination of these ideas.

[[Image:Cognitive representation of areas of experience.png|framed|none|Figure 5.1: Cognitive representation of areas of experience <tt>(++)</tt> areas that have been digested well <tt>(--)</tt> problematic areas <tt> (+)</tt> mildly positive background]]



This figure strongly resembles the figure in which Van der Molen showed Grof's theory of COEX-systems (see chapter 3), but is more detailed. The development of the cognitive system can now be described as follows.

The areas of experience with the unpleasant connotations, that is the areas that have not yet been properly dealt with well and digested yet (- -), will be arousal-increasing and cause tension.

In the telic state the areas that have been digested well (+ +) are attractive because they are controlled in such a way, that in an emergency a state of relaxation can easily be achieved. We will refer to these areas with the term "refuges". In the paratelic state, it is particularly the areas that have not been digested properly yet which will be attractive because in that state tension is experienced as pleasant. We now make the assumption that in the paratelic state the borders of the exciting areas are explored, which means that those areas will be explored first, that are closer to the area for which there is a "standard of badness" and for which there is a relatively high probability of an unpleasant surprise. On a proximal level only (pleasant) tension and excitement are sought. However, as a result of such explorations, the limits of the areas that have been digested badly will gradually move; as a result of positive experiences parts of the problem area are nibbled away and are bit by bit turned into areas that have been dealt with and digested well. In this way the individual learns and is able to develop further. On an ultimal level the paratelic state certainly has a goal, namely the acquisition of the new experiences necessary for further development.

What finally happens in the optimal case on a logical-cognitive level, is that, based on the experiences gained from exploration, a comprehensive necessity-oriented method of a higher level of abstraction will be constructed out of and in place of the existing sufficiency methods (see chapter 4). One prerequisite is, however, that between the actions sufficient time and rest can be gained to digest new experiences and to integrate them. A simple example may clarify this.

Imagine: John is walking in the woods. He enjoys the scenery and relaxes completely. Occasionally he climbs a fence to walk a little in the pastures or in a part of fenced woodland. Suddenly, from behind the trees a horse gallops towards him and John does not even think, but runs as fast as he can. Somehow he manages to get away and not until later does he wonder what exactly has happened. First he does not dare to go into the woods again, but after some time, when he has calmed down, it does seem exciting to him (paratelic) and he decides to stay near the fences so that he will be able to escape by climbing a fence, should this be necessary (refuges in frightening situations). In this way John explores the situation and finds out in which area of the woods the horse is and which part of the woods and which pastures he must try to avoid. The tension of walking decreases more and more because he now knows exactly where to be on his guard. So, finally, having arrived at a complete picture of the forest and the pasture schedules, the motivation to explore the woods in the paratelic state is lost.

In this example John is unpleasantly surprised and is at first frightened in the woods. However, once he has explored the situation, a sufficiency-oriented method ("If I walk in the same area as I did before, a horse may gallop towards me at a given moment") will be changed into a necessary-oriented method ("Only if I climb that particular fence, will the horse gallop towards me"). As a result, John's freedom of movement has increased because it is obvious that the area to be avoided has been restricted. This is shown in figure 5.2.

[[Image:Avoidance exploration and reduction of an unpleasant area of experience.png|framed|none|'''Figure 5.2:''' Avoidance, exploration and reduction of an unpleasant area of experience (after positive experiences)]]

What happens is that an area of experience which is first experienced as problematical (unpleasant in the telic phase) is gradually reduced because its limits are explored (in the paratelic phase) and there may be positive experiences on that fringe. To speak in Grof's terms, the purpose of paratelic behaviour on an ultimate level is to change as many negative COEX-systems into positive COEX-sytems as possible. In other words, the target is to exchange less efficient sufficiency-oriented methods, related to experiences that have been dealt with and processed badly, for highly efficient necessity-oriented methods which are in particular related to experiences that have been digested well.

It now becomes clear why experiences tend to grow in clusters. When particular situations have been explored many times and the experiences have been dealt with and digested well, the COEX-system is a positive one in which all kinds of new skills have been acquired which can often also be applied to other, related situations. Generally, in such an area of experience the individual is in a ''positive learning spiral''.

Experiences that are dealt with and processed badly, also tend to grow in clusters in a similar way; in such cases there is a fair chance that the next time the individual gets into the same, or a similar or related situation, he or she will have another problematic experience. This increases the probability of telic behaviour in similar situations, with the result that there will be less experimenting. In this way the individual will easily get into a ''negative learning spiral'' in a similar area of experience. New experiences are no longer used for learning but only intensify and extend the existing, relatively inefficient behaviour.

[[Image:Safety margins in the telic state.png|framed|none|'''Figure 5.3:''' Safety margins in the telic state. The dotted lines mark the safety margins in the telic state. The risky areas become larger, the safe areas (or refuges) smaller.]]


In terms of figure 5.1 this means that, given such an accumulation of bad experiences, the cognitive representations of the refuges (+ +) will remain relatively restricted and small and for the cognitive representation of the problematical areas (- -) there are relatively increasing and less efficient margins.

In the case that there are no necessity-oriented methods of great precision and a high degree of abstraction, and thus relatively many methods are of the sufficiency type, the limits shown in figure 5.1 are less favourable in the telic state. The refuges of areas that are dealt with well will be limited, because the sufficiency-oriented methods are too much restricted, whereas for the areas that are dealt with badly, the safety margins are too large. Thus the individual has relatively little freedom of movement.

In such a negative learning spiral a negative COEX-system will expand increasingly, owing to an accumulation of avoidance reactions which are primarily based on methods of sufficiency. They can be generated relatively quickly but they also involve relatively large safety margins, with the consequence that a relatively great part of the area of experience will be considered as risky.

It is extremely difficult to escape from such a negative learning spiral. A prerequisite for this is the ability to attain the relaxation, necessary for the digestion of the accumulated experiences. Should a number of experiences that have been dealt with and digested well, verge on an area that has been dealt with badly, they may sometimes serve as refuges, when situations become too frightening. This may then provide the required escape, safety and rest.

It is now possible to relate all this to Lazarus' theory as described in chapter 1. In our view, the appraisal of a particular situation or transaction depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of an individual. A transaction that is appraised as stressful will often be regarded as threatening in the telic state, whereas in the paratelic state it is more likely that the same transaction will be seen as a challenge. When a person is in a positive learning spiral in which positive COEX-systems are acquired and extended, and new experiences and skills are digested well, new situations are likely to be experienced as positive and regarded as challenges. That is, the individual has noticed that owing to his or her arsenal of skills, he or she is very well capable to anticipate many kinds of situations and to get them under control. Not only is this a good basis for acquiring new skills but it also allows for relaxation and the conviction that novel situations can adequately be dealt with as well. However, in the case of a negative learning spiral in which negative COEX-systems expand and the individual gets trapped in his or her own inadequate behaviour, entirely new situations will rather be seen as threatening. This increases the likelihood that the individual will hold on more tenaciously to particular - inadequate - behavioural strategies, so that it becomes increasingly likely that he or she will fail again.

This makes clear that it is very difficult to make a distinction between an appraisal of the situation itself (Lazarus: ''primary appraisal'') and of one's own abilities to deal with that situation (''secondary appraisal''). These two aspects are strongly intertwined. The appraisal of a transaction always depends on previous experiences, on acquired skills, and on the metamotivational state of an individual. We have shown that this state may (sometimes quickly) change. This is called ''reappraisal''; the original appraisal of the transaction changes. According to Lazarus, such a change is caused by feedback about changes in the transaction because of actions taken by the individual, or by reconsidering the nature of the transaction. We are now able to supplement Lazarus' ideas. In our view the appraisal of a transaction depends to a great extent on the metamotivational state of the individual at that very moment. A change of this appraisal means that there has been a meta-motivational reversal to another state. Such a reversal may take place because of "contingency" (a particular event takes place) or because of "satiation" (because a person has been in one and the same state for a long time). The two causes mentioned by Lazarus can be categorized under "contingency": the transaction changes as a result of actions taken by the individual and the changing situation forces a reversal, or the interpretation of the transaction changes because of cognitive processes (thinking), which may also cause a reversal. Hence, our cognition-energy- learning model does not only supplement Lazarus' ideas, in this respect adding reversals through "satiation", but it also provides a description and an explanation of the dynamics of the underlying cognitive processes.

=== Cognitive mistakes ===

{{Level|3}} Finally, we pinpoint and discuss a few systematic mistakes which can be made when a person cognitively processes information. Lewicka shows that the questions an individual asks, depend to a great extent on the appraisal of the possible outcome of a transaction. In the telic state (or action control mode) the individual tries at all costs to avoid unpleasant outcomes, and it then becomes very favourable and practical to have a necessity-oriented method available. If the outcome is pleasant, however, the realisation of that outcome is of primary importance; "the way in which" becomes less important and a sufficiency-oriented method generally suffices. However, this does not apply to the paratelic (action-involvement) mode.

Generally, an individual tries as hard as possible to prevent disappointments (see chapter 4, table 4.2). In the case of an unpleasant outcome, a disappointment means that it has previously been predicted that a particular unpleasant result will not take place, but that it happens anyway. It is important for the individual to keep the probability of this type of mistake (type II, or "false negative") as low as possible. However, we know from logic and statistics that when the probability of one type of mistake is kept as low as possible, another type of mistake will necessarily occur more often. Thus, when the probability of a Type II-mistake is minimized, Type I-mistakes will occur more often. When a Type I-mistake, or "false positive", occurs, it is predicted that the result will be unpleasant, but this is not the case. It is now likely that this type of mistake will be taken less seriously than the previous one, because this means that there is a pleasant surprise. Therefore, relatively little attention will be paid to this. As a result, good luck is virtually ignored in a problematic area of experience whereas disappointments are regarded as extremely important.

This pattern of cognitive processing takes place in particular when there are mainly telic states with a (too) low frequency of paratelic states. Not only is attention then fixed on possible negative results, but the (too) low frequency of paratelic states produces an excess of methods of sufficiency, with relatively large safety margins around the areas to be avoided, and relatively narrow limits of areas of experience that are safe and digested well (also as a result of safety margins that are wider than is strictly necessary; see figure 5.3). As a result, this pattern of experiencing and processing results in a strong (and in a sense "uncontrolled") growth of negative COEX-systems which may possibly even affect the already existing, positive COEX-systems. Should this pattern continue, then the probability of telic avoidance reactions in the area of experience concerned will become higher and the probability of paratelic exploration lower and lower. In the end, even the slightest confrontation with the area of experience concerned, even when outsiders do not consider this as threatening, will be experienced as frightening, the consequence of which will be a continued and uncontrolled growth of the negative COEX-system.

=== The neurotic paradox ===

{{Level|3}} A connection with the so-called '''neurotic paradox''' is evident here. Eysenck (1979, p. 185) provides the following description of this paradox:
:"In many neuroses we not only fail to observe the expected extinction of the uninforced "Conditoned Stimulus", but we find an incremental (enhancement) effect, such that the unreinforced Conditioned Stimulus actually produces more and more anxiety ("Conditioned Response") with each presentation of the Conditioned Stimulus. [...] In neuroses, [...] in the majority of cases there is some sort of insidious onset, without any single event that could be called "traumatic" even by lenient standards."

Paying too much attention to disappointments and virtually ignoring good luck is one of the reasons why the neurotic behaviour persists. Van der Molen (1983, 1984, 1985) gives another reason (see also chapter 3). He explains how in the proximity of a negative COEX-system, tension increases very easily, while it is exactly in these areas that there are very few "refuges" in the form of adequate strategies of behaviour which may be utilized to keep the tension under control. In the telic state this increased tension is experienced as extremely unpleasant. What is more, the limits of an area that has been digested badly are still rather vague owing to the fact that little or no exploration has occured. The area is not clearly defined and restricted, has rather "fuzzy" boundaries, and may easily increase in size which further increases the probability of unpleasant experiences. When we bear in mind that disappointments tend to receive more attention than the occurences of good luck, it is clear that one easily becomes trapped in a negative learning spiral in which neurotic behaviour is intensified, negative experiences accumulate and little is learned from positive experiences.

=== Summary and conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} Having integrated Aper's, Van der Molen's an Lewicka's studies we have been able to provide in this chapter an overall picture of the dynamics of our learning processes. Based on these various theories, a Cognition-Energy-Learning model has been developed in which the most essential aspects of the learning process are explained.

First, the energy dependency of learning was discussed. The alternating preference for a high or a low level of arousal produces the motivation for two essential aspects of learning: on the one hand, the acquisition of novel and unfamiliar experiences, and on the other hand, reserving time and energy for the structuring and processing of this experience and information. The alternation of the telic and the paratelic states thus keeps the learning process going.

Experiences can be problematical or non-problematical. Depending on the metamotivational state a person is in, an area of experience can be experienced as pleasant and attractive, or as unpleasant. Problematical areas (that is to say, areas for which no adequate behavioural strategies have been developed) will be avoided as much as possible in the telic state: in the paratelic state, on the other hand, these areas can be a source of (pleasant) tension and thus be attractive for exploration. In this way the individual will be able to gain piecemeal experiences in areas that are (relatively) unfamiliar. Such experiences are a prerequisite for development to a higher level of organisation of the individual. Non-problematical areas of experience will not be sought in the paratelic state, as they do not provide any tension and are thus considered as "boring". However, in the telic state these areas are essential for relaxation. Only if a certain degree of rest is acquired regularly, will the individual will be able to digest his or her experiences optimally.

In certain situations an ideal sequence of telic-paratelic reversals is impossible for a person. When such a situations lasts too long and the person cannot reach more agreeable situations, this leads to a negative learning spiral in which the individual more and more resorts to stereotyped and less efficient ways of reacting. Then it becomes increasingly more likely that the negative, problematical experiences in a particular area of experience will extend to other areas as well. For this reason we speak about the "contagiousness" of experiences.

However, this contagiousness also applies to positive experiences that have been digested well and which are thus non-problematical. When an individual is in a positive learning spiral, he or she continuously acquires new skills which can also be applied in other areas of experience. In this way the likelyhood of positive experiences will generally increase. Contagiousness of the way in which learning experiences are processed, in the favourable and in the unfavourable sense, is applicable therefore in the first place in areas of experience that are functionally related. In the second place, the contagiousness is applicable in all areas of experience in their totality.

Finally, we have discussed in this chapter how the behavioural strategy a person is choosing depends on the appraisal of the possible outcome. When the outcome is pleasant, an approach strategy will be applied in the telic state to ensure the outcome will be achieved as effectively as possible. When the outcome is unpleasant, a strategy of avoidance will generally be applied. However, negative outcomes form a source of possibly pleasant tension in the paratelic state which produces the motivation to further explore them. In this way more information can be gathered and optimally processed in the course of time so that the already existing (easily obtained) '''sufficiency oriented methods''' can increasingly be replaced by a '''necessity-oriented method''' (which is more difficult to generate). This enables the individual to attain a '''higher level of cognitive organisation and efficiency''' and to function more effectively. However, should the ability to relax be absent (chronically), the person may become caught up in an accumulation of problematical experiences. This explains, for example, the often persistent growth of neuroses and phobias. The problem of the neurotic paradox, indicated by Eysenck, for example, can be easily explained when regarded from the point of view of our Cognition-Energy Learning model.

The Cognition-Energy-Learning model discussed thus far describes, in the first place, the influence of the energy state of a person on his or her motivational state. That motivational state is governed by emotions. It further states that the sequence of motivational states has implications for the way experiences are cognitively represented. Considering Csapinski's studies, we can expect that the majority of the experiences which are not directly interesting, are sedimented in a vague, slightly positive cognitive background. Only the experiences with an explicit emotional "color" are represented as areas that have been digested well or as problematical areas. The advantage of such systems of representation is that, as soon as there is a surplus of energy, a person can experiment in those areas which are registered as problematical. Those areas of experience are exactly the areas which can provide most new and relevant information. Both the way in which experiences are represented (in COEX-systems) and the gradual shifts in that representation are described, and, moreover, it is clarified, how a particular representation with concomitant procedural aspects (necessity- or sufficiency-oriented methods), leads to specific types of behaviour. However, all this still concerns a very rough classification into cognitive main categories. In fact it comes down to the difference between experiences that have been processed and digested well and experiences that have not been digested well, to the difference between experiencing this as pleasant and as unpleasant and between combinations of these two opposites.

The Cognitive-Energetic Learning model may also be supplemented with the influence of the quality of social interactions on the dynamic state of the learning process. This can render a considerable extension and specification of the cognitive main categories mentioned. Moreover, such an extension enables us to make predictions about the way in which social interactions may influence the growth of a person because they interfere with the way energy is invested in the learning process. However, this extension lies beyond the confines this report and will be described in another report (see Maarsingh, 1990).

In the next chapter we will give an example from practice of our Cognition-Energy-Learning model.

== Chapter 6: An illustration of the Cognition-Energy-Learning Model from a practical problem area ==

=== The didactical behavioural repertoire of the inexperienced teacher ===

{{Level|3}} In this chapter an illustration of the Cognition-Energy-Learning model will be given, based on experiences of teachers who have just started teaching (Romkes, 1988). This concerns exclusively inexperienced teachers who regard the learning process as problematical.

The state of learning of the inexperienced teacher, apart from personality, is closely related to the extent to which he or she has been able to deal with previous experiences from educational learning situations (training) and to gain an adequate didactical behavioural repertoire. However, it is important that this repertoire of coping skills develops and and that it can be modified as soon as problems arise in the classroom. According to Vonk (1983), the problems of table 6.1 are encountered most frequently.

=== The most commonly encountered problems that have to be dealt with by inexperienced teachers, in sequence of importance ===

# Keeping order
# Motivating pupils
# Dealing with differences between pupils
# Appraisal of learning performances
# Relations with parents
# Organisation of the class
# Too few/inadequate means for teaching
# Handling children with problems
# Too much working pressure (lack of time)
# Relations with colleagues
# Teaching plans
# Having command of various didactical skills
# Knowledge of school regulations and customs
# Determining the starting situations of pupils
# Inadequate professional skills

The problems mentioned in table 6.1 regularly produce a high level of arousal. A teacher will experience stress when this state of increased arousal lasts too long. The duration of stress depends on the didactical behavioural repertoire of a person. When this behavioural repertoire is inadequate, a person will be in a state of stress for a longer period of time. That is, it is difficult for such a person to achieve the phase of relaxation owing to the lack of well-controlled skills which are necessary for controlling stressful situations (see chapter 3). When such a situation (of stress) lasts too long and the stress experience is not digested well, a ''negative learning spiral'' may arise in which ''fear and avoidance behaviour'' accumulate (see chapter 5).

An example of a school situation in which there is a high level of arousal is given in the following report of a lesson given by an inexperienced teacher (Wubbels en Creton 1974):
:"The class enters noisily. It is cold. The pupils are jumping up and down in order to become a little warmer. You walk into the classroom and try to have the children take their seats. But before you have managed to do so, you are rummaging in your bag. A few moments later the same happens again. You tell a pupil to sit down, but before he sits down you walk back. You are in the centre in front of the class and look into the classroom. In the meantime everyone has sat down. The pupils are still shouting. You walk towards Fred, a troublemaker. You address a few pupils. It is becoming quieter now. "Will everyone take his books, please?" A number of pupils are shivering and making a noise. "I have marked the dictations and the results are very bad". They all laugh. "And what I further have to say about the dictation....", the pupils are talking again now and you have to shout very loudly to make yourself heard. You wait some time and address a few pupils: "Mark, Martin" and finish with "Do not throw them away immediately". You give everyone their work back. Everyone is shouting. "Damn I have got a D". "I have a C". "Hurray, I have a B". "And what do you have?" There are many unsatisfactory marks, many of them are D's. The pupils are indignant. Some pupils walk to your desk to complain, but you do not listen and send everyone back. A girl, who is really indignant, is sitting in front of you. For not writing a hyphen and for not writing one word as one word, you have deducted two whole points. They think it ridiculous. There is so much noise, that you can hardly make yourself heard. "Yes", you scream and turn red. They keep on protesting loudly. It is an enormous mess. You walk towards your desk and sit down demonstratively, as if you want to call it a day. "Can the ones with the insufficiency marks do the dictation again?". "No!", you shout back.

This example shows that this teacher does not command those types of behaviour (coping skills) which would make the situation more manageable for her. The result is that she tries to command respect. Managing the class and not being troubled by stress become main aim in all. This is shown by her preference for an authoritarian way of dealing with the class and her rigid attitute with regard to the educational responsibility. This behaviour implies an attitude in which achieving control of the situation is central. The teacher is now mostly in the ''telic'' state and has trouble to regularly reach ''paratelic'' states.

The way in which she (temporarily) achieves her goal, and is thus able to reduce her level of arousal, consists of showing aggressive or avoidance behaviour. Both agression and avoidance provide relaxation for a moment; when the teacher shouts, the class will be quiet for a moment and also when she adopts a reserved attitude and forgets her pedagogic responsibiliy for a moment, she experiences less stress for a short period of time. In both cases she has temporarily managed ''to get away'' from the threatening situation, but this situation is not ''controlled'', in other words: she has ''not developed adequate coping skills''. In the short term this avoidance behaviour is rewarding, but structurally the situation has not changed at all. As the teacher cannot relax sufficiently, her energy supply cannot easily be replenished. As a result she will be less often in the paratelic state, and so she will be unable to try the new, and (possibly) risky behaviour very frequently which could eventually lead to adopting useful new behavioural techniques and to acquiring new skills and flexibility. And it is precisely this lack of adequate skills which prevents her from controlling this situation. In such a situation there is a ''negative learning spiral'' in which behaviour becomes increasingly stereotyped and rigid (see chapter 3 and chapter 5). In such a spiral, more and more short-term solutions are found to deal with problematical situations and novel behaviour is not experimented with sufficiently. In such cases it is unlikely the behavioural repertoire will expand optimally.

=== Cognitive representations of problematical teaching situations of inexperienced teachers ===

{{Level|3}} In a problematical teaching situation, two types of ''cognitive representation'' may arise (the remarks mentioned were reported in subsequent interviews). First: extreme and fixed negative thoughts about oneself: "I do not have sufficient command of the profession", "I am not good at organizing", "I am not good at managing children", etc. Secondly: extreme and fixed negative thoughts concerning others: "The pupils are annoying", "The colleagues are not nice", etc.

From interviews with inexperienced teachers with problems it appeared that the following types of ''bias'' in the cognitive and perceptive representation of the teaching situation may occur (Romkes 1988). First: ''generalisation'', for example: 'all pupils are annoying'. This exemplifies that the teacher uses sufficient conditions, rather than necessary conditions at such a moment (see chapter 4); i.e. the teacher does not attempt to discover the exact cause of the problems, but is satisfied with simplistic and stereotyped rules of thumb. Secondly: ''deletion'', for example when one's own role is left aside: "the pupils are so annoying". In the third place: ''transformation'', when the teacher no longer notices the individual differences between pupils, and regards the class undifferentiated.

These cognitive "mistakes" can also be described in terms of Lazarus' theory (see chapter 1). That is, problems with ''primary and secondary appraisal'' are concerned here and as a result a related lack of coping strategies.

As far as the primary appraisal is concerned, the first instinctive appraisal of the situation is important. When the teacher is too tense in dealing with the situation, he or she will tend to use a rough and ready recipe, such as aggressive behaviour, when dealing with problems.

=== Changes in the behaviour of the inexperienced teacher ===

{{Level|3}} It is now clear that unless the pupils do not change their behaviour, the situation will not improve unless the teacher behaves differently. According to our learning model this is only possible once she has sufficient energy surplus to reconsider the class situation and to experiment with other kinds of behaviour. In other words, the teacher has to develop other skills that enable herself to relax and/or she has to teach less frequently and to organize more breaks and time off for relaxation and recovery. In this way she will be able to invest a surplus of energy in paratelic, and thus experimental and explorative, behaviour. When a particular type of behaviour proves succesful, this can be integrated in the repertoire of skills already at her command. This may, for example, include taking the needs of pupils into account more often which may produce moments of relaxation during the lessons, both for teacher and pupils, and also time for explanations, questions, etc. For example, the supervisor could instruct the teacher to pay less attention to the pupils' command of the language, and to pay more attention to topics not directly related to the subject. This could involve conversations about experiences in the weekend, for example. Such behaviour can be rewarded in the form of good teamwork with the pupils which in turn can provide relaxation (and thus energy) for both the teacher and the pupils. As a result both teacher and pupils will be able to manifest paratelic behaviour and hence will be able to experiment in order to find the best way of teaching, and of being taught.

The phase of relaxation is extremely important for replenishing energy supplies and for the integration of experiences. It is essential that the inexperienced teacher has enough moments of relaxation during, or after work. According to the learning model only through a regular alternation of the telic and the paratelic states an adequate didactic behavioural repertoire can develop.

=== A positive learning spiral ===

{{Level|3}} There is a ''positive learning spiral'' (see also 3.3) when behaviour of control and manipulation (telic) and behaviour relating to challenges and exploration (paratelic), alternate. The telic state aims at achieving goals (for example to teach from a particular chapter). In the paratelic state there is space to handle the pupils differently and to try out novel approaches. When the teacher is alternately in the telic state and the paratelic state, he or she is able to gain experiences which are necessary in order to discover and elucidate the necessary conditions for negative incidents, so that these incidents can be avoided or solved more easily the next time (see chapter 4 and chapter 5). On a proximal level, paratelic behaviour consumes large amounts of energy, but the ultimal result is that it saves energy later on. The inexperienced teacher is then able to develop more adequate coping strategies which enable her to be in a state of relaxation more regularly. This makes it possible for her to replenish the energy supply more often and more thoroughly.

Romkes (1988) has shown that successful teachers are not always aware of the coping strategies they use. This is not surprising when you realise that it is not necessarily desirable to act consciously or to seek the necessary conditions for negative incidents consciously as long as the teaching responsibility is met satisfactorily. If the learning process proceeds well, much of the experience and information needed for a further expansion and refinement of the behavioural repertoire is collected unvoluntarily and automatically.

=== Conclusions ===

{{Level|3}} From this illustration it may be clear that the Cognition-Energy-Learning model can be applied well to situations such as teaching. The model provides insight into the way in which inexperienced teachers can become trapped in a negative learning spiral when there are too few moments of relaxation. This implies that in teaching situations, less attention should be paid to teaching the content of the subject as thoroughly as possible by drumming it in repeatedly, and that more attention should be paid to finding ways of achieving enough moments of relaxation. This relaxation is essential for replenishing the energy supply, and it is the surplus of energy that allows experimental and explorative behaviour in manifest. Such behaviour brings a flexible attitude towards the teaching situation with it. And this flexibility enables the teacher to discover which teachingstrategy (at which moment) is the most satisfactory and effective.

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== Other publications on this subject ==

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contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: A Novel Conceptual Model of Coping Skills |
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year=1982 |
contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: A Novel Conceptual Model of Coping Skills |
periodical=Psychological Abstracts |
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
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title=Bi-stability of emotions and motivations: An evolutionary consequence of the open-ended capacity for learning |
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last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
title=Reversal Theory, Learning and Self-Actualization (abstract of paper, given at the International Symposium on Reversal Theory, Powys, Wales, Sept, 1983) |
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issue=37 |
pages=46
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
year=1985 |
chapter=Learning, self-actualization and psychotherapy |
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editor2-first=D. | editor2-last=Fontana |
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title=Reversal Theory: Applications and Developments |
pages=103-116 |
place=Cardiff, U.K. | publisher=University College Cardiff Press
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{{Citation |
last=Molen, van der | first=P.P. |
chapter=[[The evolutionary stability of a bi-stable system of emotions and motivations in species with an open-ended capacit
y for learning]] |
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title=Essays in human social biology |
volume=2 | pages=189-211 |
year=1983 |
place=Brussels | publisher=V.U.B. Study Series
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{{Citation |
last=Molen, van der | first=P.P. |
contribution=Anxiety and Pleasure: Application of Reversal Theory to Learning (abstract) |
year=1985 |
periodical=Reversal Theory Society Newsletter |
issue=1(1) | pages=20
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{{Citation |
last=Molen | first=P.P. van der |
year=1986 |
contribution=Reversal Theory, Learning and Psychotherapy |
periodical=British Journal of Guidance and Counselling |
issue=14(2) | pages=125-139
}}

== Research Reports and Prepublications on this subject ==

{{Citation |
last1=Dennen, v.d. | first1=J.M.G. |
last2=Molen, v.d. | first2=P.P. |
year=1981 |
title=Violent Aggression as a Social Unskill: Notes on the Psychopathology of Everyday Life |
place=Polemological Institute, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.) |

}}

{{Citation |
last1=Molen, v.d. | first1=P.P. |
last2=Dennen, v.d. | first2=J.M.G. |
year=1981 |
contribution=Striving, Playing and Learning: An Ethologists View on Aggression and the Dynamics of Learning in the Play and Struggle called "Life" |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-81-551-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}} 

{{Citation |
last1=Maarsingh | first1=B. |
last2=Molen, v.d. | first2=P.P. |
year=1990 |
contribution=Energie en Strokes: de Wisselwerking tussen de kwaliteit van sociale relaties en de individuele ontwikkeling |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-90-1004-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}}

{{Citation |
last1=Molen, v.d. | first1=P.P. |
last2=Dijk, v. | first2=C. |
last3=Maarsingh | first3=B. |
last4=Stoelhorst | first4=P. |
year=1990 |
contribution=Naar een Cognetief-Energetisch Leermodel; over de bi-stabiele organisatie van emoties en het effect daarvan op de ontwikkeling van copingvaardigheden en cognitie; een integratie van de theorieën van Lazarus, Apter, Van der Molen en Lewicka |
periodical=Heymansbulletin |
id=HB-90-1012-EX |
place=Dept. of Psychology, Rijks Universiteit Groningen (R.U.G.)
}}

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2017-01-17T12:59:43Z

BigSmoke: Make the pretentious slogan bigger, on BabyBoy's request

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* [[The biological instability of social equilibria]]
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* Article in Dutch on the innate human disposition for religion (see: Religie en Spiritualiteit - het Religieuze Brein) [http://www.skepsis.nl/s-frames.html]
* List of Cognitive Biases in Humans [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases (from Wikipedia)]

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__NOTOC__

The biological instability of social equilibria

2016-03-24T17:05:09Z

BigSmoke:

'''(Subtitle: Social-Role Blindness and the periodic emergence of conflict and disaster; on Population Cycles precluding the establishment of lasting social equilibria)'''

'''[[Popko Peter van der Molen|by P.P. van der Molen]]'''

'''In: Evolutionary perspectives on competition, cooperation, violence and warfare''' (Chapter 4)

'''Edited by J. van der Dennen and V. Falger'''

Published in Sociobiology and Conflict, 1st ed. 1990, ISBN 0 412 33770 3 (HB)

See also the separate [[The biological instability of social equilibria (abstract)|abstract]] of this article.

== Acknowledgements ==

{{level|3}} The writing of this chapter has been supported by a grant of the ANO foundation. Comments and criticism from [[Michael Kirton]], [[Vernon Reynolds]] and [[Robin Dunbar]] were of great help to improve this text, which is not to imply that they are responsible for any flaws in the basic line of argumentation defended here. The help of [[Ben Hoffschulte]] in refining and presenting this text is also gratefully acknowledged. --- PPvdM

''The Sociobiology of Conflict'' was the topic of the ninth meeting of the European Sociobiology Society, held on January 10 and 11, 1987. It was Michael Hopp's initiative to organize this conference in Jerusalem, Israel, a symbolic place in many respects. Thanks to the scientific and personal qualities of Professor Amotz Zahavi, from Tel-Aviv University, many non-Israeli participants were able to experience the naturalistic, geographical and political history of the country in an impressive guided tour which influenced clearly the presentations and discussion in the conference.

Without the hospitality and financial support of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute the meeting would not have been possible. The Institute's director, Professor Yehuda Elkana, and Mrs Rivka Ra'am, member of the Executive Board of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, in close cooperation with local organizer Michael Hopp, contributed very much to the success of the meeting itself. The Board of the European Sociobiological Society expresses its gratitude for this vital support.

In the conference itself Vincent Falger, Lea Gavish, Johan Goudsblom, Anne Rasa, Avi Shmida, Jan Wind and Amotz Zahavi presented papers next to those elaborated and collected in this volume. ESS Board members Jan Wind, Hans van der Dennen and Vincent Falger organized those aspects of the conference not immediately connected with the meeting in Jerusalem.

== Outline ==

{{level|3}} This chapter deals with a behavioural mechanism which thwarts any systematic attempts to prevent and put a permanent end to conflicts between social groups and organizations. Essential in this mechanism is a certain kind of social-role blindness, a peculiar unawareness of what we are doing on the level of social-role interactions, whereby attraction or repulsion are effectuated. As in Tiger's contribution (Chapter 5), special provisions in our behavioural system are discussed which prevent us from utilizing our intellectual and cognitive faculties for investigation of our innermost social tendencies. We shall return to these 'no entrance' signs built into our cognitive system below.

Other elements of this mechanism are involuntary incrowd–outcast selection reflexes and a 'trait dimension', which may be described as a `readiness to comply with a submissive role'. This dimension is correlated with a great amount of social behaviour and a small amount of thing-oriented, individualistic and explorative behaviour. It is, by definition, of great importance for the distribution of social roles and for the social structure in a group; it determines, for example, the likelihood of drifting into an outcast position versus the likelihood of assuming or maintaining a compliant and socially accepted subordinate position. Knowledge of this personality trait dimension and of its effects in social groups and structures may increase our understanding of a wide range of intriguing and sometimes disquieting phenomena. These phenomena range from educational and organizational strategies to the often catastrophe-like collapses and turn-over phenomena in companies and other social structures, and from the way social roles and positions tend to be distributed up to the resulting evolutionary consequences.

First I will explain why, from a purely biological point of view, differences between individuals are to be expected in any socially living mammalian species in the following situations: readiness to comply with a submissive role; sociability versus thing-orientedness; compliance versus self-will. It will be argued that the underlying biological organization must, from an evolutionary standpoint, be very old and elementary. We will investigate then the consequences of these behavioural differences on the level of social interaction. A life span theory of social structures and organizations will be introduced as one of the implications.

The first sections of this chapter comprise a concise outline of these mechanisms, omitting at this point experimental data and illustrations. The basic assumptions made will, however, be stated explicitly. In the following sections we will check these assumptions against experimental and empirical data from biological and psychological research. Finally, it will be pointed out why understanding of the way these interpersonal differences are behaviourally organized (and the way our awareness tends to be blocked in these respects) have such far reaching consequences; an increase in our understanding of the life cycles of social structures might be by far their most important result. Such understanding would enable us to map the processes underlying periodic catastrophe-like turn-over phenomena and to learn how to control their decreasing efficiency and violent backlashing on any level of organization.

== Some consequences of living socially ==

{{level|3}} Among socially living mammals, each individual is by necessity saddled with a conspicuous bi-polarity in behavioural urges. First, being a socially living animal, drives for social contact and interaction are an important part of its behavioural–genetic endowment; but secondly, it has a set of perhaps even more basic drives to ensure the fulfilment of a range of non-social personal needs, e.g., water, food, cover, warmth, sex, territory, etc. As far as these latter needs are concerned, the amount of resources is often limited, thus causing competition and social conflict. For that reason a very basic functional conflict does exist in every social individual: between the urges to fulfil a great variety of personal basic (physical) non-social needs and the urge to maintain social contact and interaction. A socially living mammal inescapably has to shift between these two sets of urges much of the time.

Whenever some of the needed resources are scarce, the ensuing competition will put a strain on social relations. Under such conditions an individual frequently has to choose between continuation of peaceful social relations and receiving an appropriate share of the resources, eventually at the cost of social peace and harmony. Most of the time this dilemma boils down to the question of whether or not to submit to the initiative of other individuals at the cost of fulfilling personal urges and desires. In any socially living species this conflict of needs is inescapably present in each individual day after day, the average outcome determining how the individual will deal by and large with the social situation at hand. It is most desirable to have one's own way most of the time and still maintain close social contact and interaction, but that is more or less identical to what is generally understood by a dominant social role, and such roles are rather scarce.

[[Image:Two dimensions of social-role behaviour.png|framed|'''Fig. 4.1.''' Two dimensions of social-role behaviour.]]

It is, therefore, of theoretical interest to know what happens to the majority of individuals, the various types of subordinates (see Fig. 4.1), who are under regular pressure to comply and postpone or even abandon part of their individual desires and initiatives. For such non-dominant individuals, the balance between the strength of the desire for social contact and interaction, and the strength of the desires to fulfil other biological needs, determine the outcome of this continuous process of balancing one need against the other. Given a certain pressure to comply, it largely depends on this equilibrium of basic sensitivities within the subordinate individual as to what the behavioural outcome will be, either drifting gradually into an outcast position or assuming a compliant and socially accepted subordinate position. Such differences between subordinates have indeed frequently been observed in mammals (refer to section 4.7).

What is important for us to note here is that for any socially living mammalian species the competing sets of needs under discussion are very general and basic. We must therefore assume that the variance in the balance between those sets of basic needs has strong genetic roots. (After all, for many species, the behavioural organization is so simple that learning processes can only play a minor role in establishing behavioural variation. The equilibrium discussed above is therefore also an equilibrium between functionally competing parts of the genetic programme. As such we may consider this equilibrium, varying over individuals, as a trait in the classical sense. We could express this set of behavioural polarities as a set of (inter alia genetically based) trait differences which do have a clearly defined impact on the distribution of social roles.

Up to this point, three basic assumptions have been made about the behaviour of socially living mammals in general:

'''1.''' There is a strong functional link, on the level of behavioural orientation, between the frequency of social behaviour versus thing-oriented individualistic behaviour, and, on the level of distribution of social roles, between conformity and compliance with authority versus a self-willed attitude. These two polarities cannot be separated; they have the same behavioural basis. Therefore a range of personality characteristics have to be strongly intercorrelated, e.g., self-will, thing-orientedness, individualism and innovative creativity on the one pole, and compliance, person-orientedness, sociability, conformity, and adaptiveness to rules and traditions on the other pole.

'''2.''' Individuals differ from one another as far as the balance between these polarities is concerned.

'''3.''' This variation between individuals must have genetic components.

In the next part of this chapter we will check these assumptions against experimental data, but first we will investigate their logical consequences.

At this point one might justly retort: 'why so much ado about nothing? It seems self-evident that these polarities in behaviour are interconnected, and since for most broad behavioural characteristics it is likely that differences in behaviour are partly caused by genetic differences, in particular if they are of very old phylogenetic origin, which these behaviours apparently are, it is rather tautological to state that they have genetic roots.' The point is, first, that this notion of a biological basis of certain behaviours may be self-evident to behaviour biologists, but it is certainly not for large groups of sociologists and psychologists. Secondly, these three assumptions do have peculiar and important consequences if applied to the sociology of group structures — the incrowd–outcast dynamism and the concomitant behavioural reflexes in particular.

In order to discuss these consequences we have to add one more assumption, which is rather a definition, namely:

'''4.''' In what follows, social groups will mean groups over which individuals are distributed discretely. In other words, individuals can be recognized by one another as either belonging to the social group in question or not – and are treated accordingly.

<center><big>Hypothesis</big></center>

== Life cycles of social groups and structures ==

{{level|3}} If social groups are defined as above, the previous four assumptions imply that within such social groups there is exercised a more or less continuous selection pressure in favour of compliance and sociability. It is such because the most compliant – and thus most socially-oriented and rule-adaptive –individuals are most likely to establish long lasting accommodation within the group. Self-willed individualists on the other hand (also being innovative and thing-oriented according to assumption 1), are most likely to run into trouble and disagreement with the dominant individuals and/or habits and rules in the group. They are least prepared to pay the price of postponing or giving up personal urges and initiatives in order to keep up peace and social harmony. As a consequence, such individuals are the ones who are most likely to either fight hard for attaining a dominant position, or, if failing, to drift into marginal omega-like social positions and eventually become outcasts and leave the social structure. For any eventual influx of individuals into the social group or structure, the opposite holds. Individuals will be most readily accepted if they do not pose a threat to the individuals and/or habits ruling group life, which of course favours rule-adaptive compliants.

The effect of such a continuous selection pressure is that the average behavioural make-up of a group will shift gradually towards compliance and sociable rule-adaptiveness. Due to assumption 1, this also implies a shift towards less and less independent creativity and thing-oriented innovativeness; because of assumption 3, this shifting of group characteristics is (genetically) consolidated. What automatically happens then with every social group (structure) is a gradual loss of innovativeness and behavioural flexibility. In the end such a gradual ossification reduces the effectiveness of the group (structure), whether its function be the preservation of a territorial area with sufficient resources to keep a deme of mice alive, or, in man, the enhancement of some sport, the maintenance of political ideals, the aim to get a better share of the market, or the preservation of a political state. Such ossification especially matters whenever novel challenges turn up in the form of environmental changes or the emergence of competing groups. The disadvantages of a lowered flexibility and innovative creativity weigh most when, because of changing circumstances, innovations and a change of habits are urgently required. In such circumstances the advantages of the old social system in terms of experience, solidly established routines, compliance, malleability of all members, and sheer size, may easily be outdone by the innovativeness, flexibility and efficiency of a younger, and often much smaller, social group (structure) on which these selection pressures have not, as yet, been working for such a long period of time. At such a moment the old structure will yield to the younger structure in a relatively sudden way.

Therefore, provided the above mentioned assumptions are valid, social groups and structures only have a limited life span, and, as I shall try to show below, these assumptions indeed seem to fit most socially living mammal species with discrete group structures, including man. The life cycle of a social institution in human society then, can be indicated roughly as:

:foundation → consolidation → internal selection pressure → increasing ossification and a reduction of flexibility of the social structure → eventual attempts to compensate these effects by means of more striving for growth and power → further increase of rigidity and ossification → catastrophic collapse by sudden environmental changes or competition (Fig. 4.2).

[[Image:Changes in time of social group structures.png|none|framed|'''Fig. 4.2.''' Change in time of the average characteristics of the prevalent social group structures and their incrowd members.]]

Our model implies a departure from notions of mere gradual changes in societal structures. The probability of sudden catastrophic turn-over events increasing in time with cumulating selection effects can be graphically represented and mathematically described with help of the bi-stable models from the mathematical branch of catastrophe theory (Thom and Zeeman, 1974; Zeeman, 1976; Woodcock and Davis, 1978). Figure 4.3 shows a cusp catastrophe, visualizing the relation between the continuous and the discontinuous part of the cycle. After foundation of a social structure, the level of overt challenges tends to decrease and the stability of the structure tends to increase until the inefficiency begins to take its toll, after which the stability of the structure decreases again. During this process the average level of self-will decreases. An increase in the level of experienced challenges may then sooner or later lead to a catastrophic turn-over event. In the new structure the percentage of innovators (average level of self-will) starts again at a high level.

[[Image:Social turn-over cycles.png|framed|none|'''Fig. 4.3.''' Turn-over cycles in terms of personality characteristics and institutional functioning.]]

The selection rate determines the speed of ossification; the life expectancy of a social structure is, therefore, roughly inversely proportional to the internal selection pressure. Such sudden turn-overs of social structures are therefore bound to happen at any level at which discrete social group structures are operating, as long as individuals can be recognized by one another as either belonging or not belonging to that group, and as long as there is some outflow or neutralization (and eventually a selected influx) of individuals. Depending on the level of organization, such a turn-over goes by the labels conquest, close-down, discontinuance, bankruptcy, revolution, subjugation or extermination.

Once the old, ossified social structure has been replaced by one or more younger competitor-structures, the individuals from the population as a whole have been reshuffled in favour of resourceful self-willed innovators who now occupy the 'incrowd' positions. The rule-adaptive compliants who formed the bulk of the establishment of the former social structure in power, have drifted into marginal positions and now run the worst risks. Thus the previous internal shift in genetic make-up has been undone, and a new selection cycle is started in these new structures.

The selective advantages for individuals are therefore different within and outside of social groups and structures, and are also different depending on the stage of the life cycle an institution is in. A compliant, adaptive and sociable temperament gives a selective advantage within a large, and especially older, social system, whereas a thing-oriented, innovative and self-willed temperament is selectively advantageous outside of the protective maze of established structures, or within small, young systems.

== Evolutionary advantages ==

{{level|3}} Notwithstanding the above mentioned unpleasant aspects of the turn-over catastrophes themselves (in the case of man labelled bankruptcy, revolution, etc.), such a scheme of automatic and unavoidable cyclical changes in social-behavioural structures does also have evolutionary advantages. It is, for instance, clear that this mechanism keeps everything moving: structures, individuals and finally genes. After every turn-over event (or catastrophe) there is a thorough re-shuffling of individuals and when in the ensuing chaos new combinations of individuals reassemble in the newly emerging social group structures, novel combinations of gene sets are eventually formed also.

Apart from this advantage at the level of interpersonal social reorganization and consequently of ensuing recombination of gene sets, there is also an advantage at the level of migration, exploration and colonization of the environment (e.g., Lancaster, 1986). Most mammals are reluctant to go beyond the limits of familiar territory – their home range – and generally must be forced one way or the other to do so (Christian, 1970). Every time an old structure breaks down, a large number of individuals is forced to move and is therefore added to the extra-group surplus population. This will produce a sudden increase in interindividual competition outside of the group (structures) and will produce, therefore, a sudden increase in the pressure on other established (group) structures. This will catalyse the impending catastrophic collapse of more systems, thus locally adding to the already existing chaos. This spatial synchronization causes migratory and related pressures to occur spasmodically and strongly instead of continuously and rather weakly. This may be an advantage where, for example, geographical barriers need to be overcome in order to enable further migratory moves of the population or species as a whole. Many authors have commented on the importance of surplus individuals in producing strong pressures for dispersal (Darlington, 1957) and from the model discussed above it may be clear that social hierarchies constitute by themselves a major force for dispersion. This is also stressed by Christian (1970) in a review of population dynamics research in mammals. He concludes that it is in general primarily the low-ranking individuals that are forced to emigrate from their birthplace (often maturing young animals), and whereas they have an extremely high rate of mortality, it also follows that by their expulsion increasingly more marginal and submarginal habitats should become occupied as density and migration pressures increase. Moreover, this process facilitates speciation:

:... once in a great while a dispersing individual may, one would suppose, harbour a mutation or genetic change that increases its ability to adapt to the new surroundings and improves its chance of survival. It is such individuals that should be the basis for evolutionary changes. A sub-optimum area could be invaded repeatedly by countless numbers of individuals before a genetic change permitting adaptation occurred. Thus, the dispersal of large numbers of socially subordinate individuals into new environments may provide the wherewithal for natural selection, in contrast to the relative conservatism of dominant individuals in an optimum habitat. (Christian, 1970, p. 86)

The implication is that the Darwinian 'struggle for life' is in fact a process with much irony and relativity, since those individuals with, apparently, maximum reproductive success (the dominants) create by the very violence of their success the outcasts that carry on the process which we call evolution (Hoffschulte, 1986). Likewise, the ethologist and social psychologist Calhoun (1974), p. 302-3) comments on our own origins:

:The strong remain where conditions are most salubrious to preserving the old life-style. The weak must emigrate – bodily, behaviourally or intellectually. Our more distant ancestors swung from trees. Slightly less distant ones lost that race and won another. Population pressure forced them out of forest islands to wander across the African plains in search of another patch of forest where they could renew the old ways. Successive losses and successive demands for adjusting culminated in upright walking creatures much like ourselves. So it has been through all of evolution; the weak [eventually] survive, changed, to open new routes into the future. The meek do inherit the earth.

The evolutionary advantages described here are of course most important in species inhabiting niches of a temporary character, which require the regular invasion and colonization of new environments. Christian (1970) reports that the above mentioned strong fluctuations in population density and migration pressure are indeed most conspicuous in species living in habitats which are ecologically transitory and thus of a strongly temporary and changing character. A species dependent on that type of habitat depends more on regular migratory moves for survival than species living in extensive and stable habitats. In this light it is noteworthy that the human species, by colonizing the most extreme sorts of habitats, has, in its recent evolutionary history, managed to inhabit virtually all of the earth's surface. The mechanism of social selection pressure and expulsion of outcasts should, therefore, have been of great importance in man's evolution.

This is also implied by Coser's (e.g., 1956, 1978) and Girard's (e.g., 1982) comprehensive works on scapegoating in man. Girard describes how throughout human history the distribution of social role positions has been brought about by means of violent acts of social repression. Not only is the dramatic shifting of non-average, deviant subordinate persons into outcast positions just as common as in lower mammals, but, according to Girard, the very development of our culture even depended on it. Only through acts of violence and the collective commemoration of the victim-outcast or scapegoat do human groups find the social-cognitive norms and unanimity from which culture can develop. Culture in our species is not to be considered, therefore, as an immaculate attainment with which we have overcome primitive forms of violence. On the contrary, it is precisely through the violent social collisions themselves that human culture emerged from the animal background. The threatening circle around victims who are found guilty of social disorders is, so to say, the daily bread of social cultural order (Hoffschulte, 1986, on Girard).

In summary, the mechanism of population- and group-cycles, as postulated above, would facilitate speciation through genetic adaptation to marginal habitats, would help to overcome migratory bottlenecks and would, in the case of man, serve to motor the evolution of culture. The actual turn-over catastrophes themselves may not be pleasant for the participants at all, but that is irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective. On this grand scale it is not the feeling and suffering of the individual involved that counts, but the long-term behavioural and behavioural—genetic output that does.

Having outlined these intriguing and also somewhat disquieting consequences of the four assumptions made, I will now present some data from ethological and psychological research that may help us assess the validity of those assumptions.

<center><big>Data</big></center>

== Experiments with behavioural differences in house mice ==

{{level|3}} Some 33 groups, each containing 4 male and 2 female housemice of the same age, having grown up together from the same litter, were each placed in large observation cages in order to investigate interindividual differences in behaviour and the way these differences come about (van der Molen, 1981, 1988). The study investigated:

# how social role differences within such groups could be manipulated;

# which part of the behavioural differences had to be ascribed to those role differences;

# which part of the behavioural differences was due to innate trait-factors.

Dominance appeared to determine the behaviour of an individual to a great extent, thus being an indispensable tool for ethological descriptions of interindividual differences. It could also be shown experimentally that becoming dominant or subordinate was mainly dependent on coincidence and contingencies, and only to a limited extent on individual characteristics such as body-weight, social- and fighting-experience, self-will, ferocity, etc.

Within the categories of dominants and subordinates there appeared large differences in tolerance for other individuals. Some dominant mice behaved far more aggressively towards their subordinates than did others and these differences determined to a large extent the number of subordinates eventually holding out with such a dominant.

Another role-difference which could rather easily be manipulated experimentally was the Incrowd/Outcast difference, or rather, the difference between beta and omega-subordinates (the usual terms in mouse research).

Detailed ethological data on the behavioural characteristics of 36 individuals were factor-analysed, using factor rotation with the experimentally found social-role differences as anchoring points. The remaining factors of (within-role) differences in behaviour were interpreted as active versus non-active and as self-willed versus compliant As far as the latter dimension is concerned, self-willed conflict-proneness was found to be strongly correlated with a high frequency of exploratory and thing-oriented behaviour, whereas compliance was found to be strongly correlated with a high frequency of social and partner- oriented behaviour.

Every time a group of four males and two females was placed in a large observation cage for the first time, there were at first no clear alpha-, beta-, or omega-roles. In the course of the following days (or weeks) an alpha male would emerge and the differences in behaviour between the subordinate males would still be rather vague. Subsequently, differences would gradually evolve between the behaviour patterns of the subordinates. These differences occurred in the amount of resistance to the initiatives and the manipulations of the alpha, the number of fights they had with the alpha, and the amount of patrolling and exploration by themselves through the territory. Some subordinates sat still and allowed the alpha to groom them whenever he chose to do so and in return groomed the alpha if he offered himself by 'crawling under', which is the mouse way of saying something like 'please scratch my back'. Other subordinates tended to walk away more often when the alpha started to groom or to crawl under. The latter type of subordinate eventually appeared to be attacked by the alpha more regularly and subsequently showed more 'fleeing'. Such individuals then remained for increasingly longer periods of time in their hiding places, especially when the alpha was walking around, and eventually they ended up as inhabitants of an uncomfortable and, for the alpha, rather inaccessible hiding place.

The subordinate mice who adapted to the initiatives of the alpha behaved
submissively more regularly and underwent the maipulations of the alpha more
often. They were however less often disturbed by aggressive attacks from the
alpha, and did not much care whether the alpha was awake or asleep. The
subordinates who put up more resistance towards the alpha showed on the other
hand a conversely adjusted type of activity pattern; they kept silent for as
long as they sensed that the alpha was active, and walked around when he was
asleep. These gradually developing behavioural differences between
subordinates can be described as differences in staying (beta types) and
fleeing (omega types), since the latter type showed a tendency to flee the
territory if possible. It should be noted here that the emergence of extreme
omega behaviour patterns was an artifact of the experimental setting, owing to
the fact that the mice were unable to escape. In natural settings they would
probably have disappeared from the territory before showing such clear omega
type reaction patterns. Indeed, in experimental situations in which
opportunities for fleeing are provided, a large proportion of the (young)
subordinate males do indeed flee the territory (Van Zegeren, personal
communication). This is similar in many other rodent species (for example
refer to Healey, 1967; Ewer, 1971; Wilson, 1975a, p. 278; Barash,
1977).<ref>In human societies there are also many occasions when a fleeing
pattern is as difficult to achieve as it is with the artificially restricted
mice in these experiments. Ghettos must consist of groups unwilling or unable
to integrate fully and unable or unwilling to disappear. And whereas enforced
ghettos are an extreme case, it exemplifies the general thresholds existing in
any social structure, were it alone for overcoming the psychological bonds of
habituation and attachment to the old situation and the extra risks and
feelings of insecurity concomitant with breaking out.</ref>

In the process of a subordinate gradually becoming an omega, the behaviour of the alpha gradually changes towards treating the omega ever more as a stranger. What is important to note here however, is that the behavioural differences between betas and omegas seemed to develop before the alpha'began to treat the subordinates in a different way. This suggests that these beta/omega differences are caused by differences between the individual subordinates themselves. It could, in principle, also be explained by assuming that an alpha male initiates these differences by having a dislike for one of the subordinates, and that this subordinate thereupon avoids the alpha more than the other subordinates do. These differences in treatment by the alpha might initially be of such a subtle nature that even though the subordinate in question reacts promptly with increased avoidance behaviour, these differences have escaped our attention. It could however be shown in a cross-breeding experiment that the differences between omegas and betas originate primarily from the subordinates themselves (see van der Molen, 1987; 1989). (Of course these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; they may both be valid, supporting each other's effect.)

== Experiments with beta- and omega-roles ==

{{level|3}} In 30 populations (or groups of 4 males and 2 females in a large observation cage, as described above) observations were undertaken to determine whether or not the subordinate males did indeed develop into 2 distinct classes of betas and omegas. We used groups from the inbred C-57-black strain and the inbred CPB's-bagg albino strain and also from their F-1 and F-2 hybrids. These two inbred strains were chosen because of the conspicuous differences in the patterns of their aggressive behaviour and in their level of inter-individual tolerance. Two similar populations of wild mice were also incorporated in the experiment. Ethologically verifiable and clearly recognizable differences between betas and omegas developed in:

* 1 out of 9 CPB's populations
* 1 out of 8 C-57 populations
* 4 out of 8 F-1 hybrid populations
* 3 out of 3 F-2 hybrid populations
* 2 out of 2 wild populations

In the CPB's populations subordinate males tended to take up an (outcast-like) omega position, whereas in the C-57 populations the subordinates tended to take up a (compliant) beta position. The development of distinct classes of subordinates occurred quite clearly in half of the F-1 populations, and seemed to be normal in the F-2 as in the wild mice.

The hypothesis that subordinates from F-1 populations showed less individual differences in this respect than subordinates from F-2 and wild populations was tested by means of Fisher's exact test for independence. The statistic in question, having a discrete, hypergeometric distribution when the zero-hypothesis is true, rendered a significant value for stat.alpha = 0.10. This is in fact the most significant result that can be obtained with these numbers of populations.

These results suggest<ref>See, for example, East and Nilsson-Ehle in Srb, Owen and Edgar, 1965, pp. 450-74; or any other handbook on the basics of population genetics.</ref> a segregation and recombination in the F-2 generation of the genetic factors that determine the likelihood of subordinates becoming omega versus the likelihood of becoming a beta. An explanation of these effects in terms of differences in behaviour of the alpha mice does not make sense because in these data, subordinates were distinguished in behaviour only in relation to the alpha. Apart from this, an increase in behavioural variance of alpha males in the F-2 generation would imply more populations of the F-2 lacking either omegas or betas. This is contrary to what was found; thus the differences between omegas and betas stem, at least for a greater part, from genetic differences between the subordinate individuals. We label these differences accordingly as self-will, intolerance, tendency to have one's own way, or for that matter, tendency to dominate.

In these experiments it was found furthermore, that tolerant, compliant males, apt to take up a beta role instead of an omega role when in a subordinate position, were tolerant of the subordinates when performing an alpha role, contrary to males with a high level of self-will or tendency to dominate.

== Other ethological research data ==

{{level|3}} In many species differences between individuals have been found which resemble the above mentioned differences in male mice. From ethological field research it appears to be a general characteristic of social mammals that some individuals exert a lot of aggressive dominance, bullying their subordinates much of the time, whereas other dominants act as a sort of controller, governing the social relations in the group by social skill, sustained by the appreciation from companions rather than by aggressive intimidation. These differences are, for instance, reported from ethological research on mountain gorillas by Fossey (1972), on chimpanzees by Reynolds and Luscombe (1969), on a number of species including man by Chance and Jolly (1970) and Wilson (1977a, pp. 311-13) and exclusively on man by, for example, Lippit and White (1958), Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962, Chapter 12), Gibb (1969), Strayer and Strayer (1976), Hold (1976), and Sluckin and Smith (1977). Wilson (1975a) comments on these differences (p. 294):

It is not wholly imprecise to speak of much of the residual variance in dominance behaviour as being due to personality. The dominance system of e.g., the Nilgiri langur (Presbytis johnii) is weakly developed and highly variable from troop to troop. Alliances are present or absent, there is a single adult male or else several animals coexist uneasily, and the patterns of interaction differ from one troop to another. Much of this variation depends on idiosyncratic behavioural traits of individuals, especially of the dominant males (Poirier, 1970).

Itani et aL (1963) and Yamada (1966) describe the behaviour of extreme beta-type males in Japanese monkeys (Macaca Mcata) and indicate that a compliant temperament seems to be conditional for assuming such a role. Yamada further points out that, when such individuals eventually achieve a dominant position, a tendency for independence sometimes seems to exclude a tolerant attitude towards subordinates.

Differences of this sort between dominant males have also been described in stumptail macaques (Macaca speciosa) by Bertrand (1969), who describes both 'bullies' and 'fair alpha males' and stresses that aggressiveness is not always a necessary factor for dominance. She states that stumptail macaques differ considerably in the amount of intolerance and aggression displayed, and that in certain cases the sustained aggressiveness of some individuals, who were followed up for several years, seemed a personality trait that appeared early in childhood. Furthermore she concluded that the amount of investigative behaviour shown by an individual also depended upon the predisposition of each monkey, apart from social rank, age and conditions of captivity. Some individuals were far more adventurous than others. This personality dependence of investigative behaviour overruled age and rank dependent behaviour in particular when the stimuli were frightening or ambivalent.

In animal and social psychological research alike, variation in tolerance and
acceptedness is reported between individual subordinate role styles. In
general, it appears that individuals who do not manage to attain a dominant
role (a-position in Fig. 4.1) may either stay in a subordinate position while
(incrowd-)subordinates are often observed to gradually grow into a
semi(incrowd-) subordinates are often observed to gradually grow into a
semi-outcast or outcast position. Such outcast-like subordinates are then the
potential migratory, running all the risks implied, whereas the better
accepted incrowd-type subordinates, who show a better adaptation to existing
hierarchical pressures, may eventually succeed the present dominant(s) if the
latter should become incapacitated or even die. Such differences in
social-role types have been observed frequently in relation to dispersal
mechanisms operating through young individuals in particular (Wilson, 1977a;
Barash, 1977).<ref>Similar descriptions have been given for e.g., deermice
(Healey, 1967), free-living populations of black rats (Ewer, 1971, pp.
135-137), free-living lions (Bertram, 1975), rhesus monkeys (Vandenbergh,
1966), free-living Japanese monkeys (Irani et aL, 1963; Yamada, 1966) and by
Eisenberg et al. (1972) for a number of primate species.</ref> Bertrand (1969) reports the occurrence of scapegoats in stumptail macaques and de Waal (1975) in Java monkeys. The latter reports that high-ranking individuals often formed alliances against the lowest ranking adults or adolescents, notwithstanding the fact that each of the high-ranking monkeys clearly dominated the scapegoat in question also without any help of others.

== Human behaviour ==

{{level|3}} The significance of the self-will versus compliance or individualistic, thing-oriented versus social dimension in the domain of temperament traits is not only corroborated by a substantial amount of ethological research data on animals, but also by ethological as well as personality–psychological literature on human behaviour.

Gibb (1969), Strayer and Strayer (1976), Hold (1976) and Sluckin and Smith (1977) report differences in dominance-styles of children, and of adolescents (Savin-Williams, 1977a,b, 1979, 1980); they are similar to those described above for mammalian behaviour. Gibb (1969) calls the two antagonist styles leadership and domination. With leadership, authority is spontaneously accorded by fellow group members whereas with domination there is little or no shared feeling or joint action and authority derives from some extra-group power.

Turning from dominance styles to more general differences in behavioural style, Abrams and Neubauer (1976) report that human infants differ considerably in the way they divide their attention between persons and objects. This trait dimension, which they called thing- versus human orientedness, was manifest as early as in the second month of life. They found that the more thing-oriented child shows a greater freedom in exploration. Therefore we might label this dimension of thing- versus human orientedness (or sociability) also as explorative versus social, parallel to the vocabulary in Bertrand's (1969) longitudinal research on macaques. Abrams and Neubauer (1976) furthermore report that learning processes are shaped in a way which is different for each type of child:

:Training issues are characterized essentially as 'tasks' for the more thing-oriented child; for the human-disposed infant, they are characterized as acts in the spectrum of approval or disapproval ... If earlier impressions were that the more thing-oriented children are more outer-directed, by the third year of life they appeared more inclined to be motivated by inner determinants and resources, a distinction which seems to persist thereafter ... The dispositions of infants are re-inforced in the milieu, as implements in evolving strategies are cycled back into the psychological system and thus inevitably emerge as traits of character.

From her long range ethological research, Hold (1976) reports that children who rank high in the attention structure tend to set initiatives instead of complying to the initiatives of other children and that they

:. . . prefer to play alone when the leading role was already taken by another high-ranking child. It seems that these children do not like to be commanded by other children.

This runs essentially parallel to what has been said in the introduction in that self-willed, thing-oriented individuals are more prone to become either dominants or loners than to become beta-type compliant subordinates. A similar trait contrast is employed by Edwin McClain (1978, 1979) in his detailed longitudinal study on the behaviour of adult women. He distinguishes between women who are dominated by a need for independence and women who are dominated by a need for affiliation. McClain, like Ausubel (1952), points out that two basically opposing patterns of maturation already occur in the parent—child relationship during a youngster's early years. He terms the resulting personality types as satellizers who tend to adapt to existing rules, versus nonsatellizers who tend to behave more individualistically.

:The satellizing child establishes her life orbit about her parents, whom she perceives as the benign source of all that is good in her life. In contrast, the nonsatellizing child rejects this kind of dependency because she believes that her welfare lies in her freedom to choose her own course. (McClain, 1978, p. 436)

The material of McClain's study was derived from the behaviour of women. Kirton (1976, 1978b, 1987a) investigated a somewhat related dimension, namely the balance between adaptiveness and innovativeness in adults in general. The K.A.I. (Kirton Adaption–Innovation Inventory) was developed as a psychometric instrument for these investigations. Kirton based his instrument on the notion that a person confronted with a problem has a choice: he/she can do things 'better' or 'more' to solve the problem (adapt; the social-oriented approach) or he/she can do things 'differently' (innovate; the thing-oriented approach). Doing things better implies the acceptance of the old framework, while doing things differently means breaking accepted patterns. As Kirton says:

:The Adaptor is right at home in bureaucracies, which tend to become more adaptor-oriented as time goes on ... whereas . . . the natural position of high Innovators seems to be out on a limb.

Kirton's work is of special significance for the performance of leaders (Kirton, 1961, 1977, 1987a; Thomson, 1980; De Ciantis, 1987). He shows that innovators tend to become initiating and directing task-leaders whereas adaptors tend to become consideration- oriented maintenance-specialists of social relations. This is in line with the differences between leader types as described by, for example, Bales (1953), Halpin and Winer (1957), Thibaut and Kelly (1959), Krech et al, (1962) and Reddin (1970, 1987). From a conceptual point of view, innovativeness may be considered, furthermore, as a positively appreciated creative variant of non-conformism and disobedience.

Conformity as defined by Krech et al. (1962) in their research on the dimensions of social interactive behaviour, is also related to the trait dimension thing-oriented and self-willed versus social and compliant. They found that some people are more resistant to group pressures and demands (the hard-core independents and the deviants) than are others (the easy conformists). Their research offers strong support for the proposition that conformity tendencies are significantly related to enduring personality factors in the individual. The relevance for our model becomes especially clear where they define conformity as a 'trait of the person' as opposed to conformity as a `trait of the situation' (or social role dimension in our words).

:. . . conformity might be thought of as a 'trait of the situation'. [but] There are also marked individual differences in general readiness to conform, over a wide variety of situations. These differences . . ., reflect conformity as a 'trait of the person'. This distinction between conformity as reflecting the conformity-inducing properties of a situation and as reflecting the conforming propensity of a person should be kept well in mind. Much of the controversy and misunderstanding about the facts and theories of conformity stems from a confusion of these two aspects of conformity. (Krech et at, 1962)

[[Image:Extraversion and sensation seeking dimensions.png|framed|none|'''Fig. 4.4.''' Feij's dimensions 'extraversion' and 'sensation seeking', the balance between them – our dimension adaptive – and their relation with 'general activity level'.]]

Of particular interest is the existence of a similar dimension in Factoranalytic Personality Trait Research. Feij (1978) compares the trait models of Heymann (1932), Eysenck (1953), Zuckerman (1974), Strelau (1974a, b), Buss, Plomin and Willerman (1973), and Buss and Plomin (1975), amongst others. Although these authors often use different classes of subjects and prefer different final rotations of their resulting factorial models, some of their dimensions appear closely related to our dimension self-willed and individualistic and thing-oriented and explorative versus compliant and social (Fig. 4.4).

For instance, a high score on Zuckerman's (1974) and Feij's (1978; Feij et at, 1979, 1981) trait dimension of sensation seeking indicates a strong need for change, exploration and new experiences, a tendency towards independence of other people and an anti-authoritarian attitude, while low sensation seeking implies a tendency to comply with conventional values and rules. Feij (1978) stresses that extreme sensation seekers may on the one hand be antisocial, drop-out delinquents, but may on the other hand be unconventional but fully accepted creative innovators. This is in agreement with what was postulated above, namely that highly self-willed individuals tend to become either drop-outs (omega-role) or accepted innovators in the focus of attention (alpha-role), and that individuals with a low self-will tend to assume beta-roles compliantly.

Buss and Plomin's (1975) trait dimension sociability, indicates a strong need to be together with others, a high responsiveness toward others and a predilection for social interaction above non-social reinforcers (Feij, 1978).

In Cattell's sixteen-personality-factor set, the dimension labelled as `liberalism' (Qj) is supposed to measure an underlying tendency toward nonconformity and independence versus a need for affiliation (Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoko, 1970; Karson and O'Dell, 1976; McClain, 1978). At least three other dimensions from his 16PF battery also relate to concepts discussed here, namely Cattell's higher order factor IV, indicating subduedness versus independence, the factor assertiveness (E), indicating cautious humbleness versus abrasive assertiveness, and the factor superego (G), indicating conscientiousness versus expedience (Kirton and de Ciantis, 1986; Kirton, 1987b).

In most other factoranalytic classification systems one or more dimensions may be discerned which are related to our concept of self-willed and thing-oriented versus compliant and social. Moreover, the empirical work of inter alia Goldsmith (1984, 1986, 1989; see also Kirton, 1987b, 1989) shows that the concepts emerging in all these factoranalytic dimensions from the various authors on personality are indeed statistically correlated, while forming a coherent web of conceptually intertwined behavioural characteristics.

== Genetics ==

{{level|3}} The above mentioned data from factoranalytic personality research are the more relevant because various writers point out that a genetic basis of these dimensions has repeatedly been firmly established (Eysenck, 1967; Vandenberg, 1967; Buss et al., 1973; Buss and Plomin, 1975; Feij, 1978; Claridge, Canter and Hume, 1973; Eaves and Eysenck, 1975; Wilson, 1975a; Plomin and Rowe, 1977, 1979).

The empirical findings of Kirton (1976, 1978a, 1987c) and Ettlie and O'Keefe (1982) are also in line with the notion of a biological basis. They report that differences in innovativeness versus adaptiveness are not significantly related to IQ, to level of education, or to previous experiences, but are apparently of a more basic (personality-trait) nature (Kirton, 1978a, 1987b, 1989; Kirton and De Ciantis, 1986). In this respect innovativeness, indicating the type of creativity differs from instruments which measure the level of creativity (Kirton, 1978a; Torrance and Horng, 1980).

In section 4.2 it was pointed out that in socially living mammals at least two sets of basic urges have to be postulated, which, independently from one another, vary over individuals, thus producing inter alia the adaptor/ innovator differences. The first set contains drives for social contact and interaction, leading to gregarious types of behaviour; the second set contains the drives for thing-oriented behaviour.

From recent neuroanatomical and endocrinological research it appears that there is probably a strong link between these two distinct sets of drives on the one hand, and specific neuro-endocrine systems on the other. Cloninger (1986, 1987) presented a biosocial theory of personality, based on a synthesis of information from family studies, studies of personality structure, as well as neuropharmacologic and neuroanatomical studies of behavioural conditioning and learning in man and other animals. He describes three dimensions of personality that are genetically independent, two of which, the novelty seeking dimension and the reward dependence dimension, relate to the two distinct sets of basic drives mentioned above.

One of his dimensions of personality trait differences is principally ruled by the monoamine neuromodulator dopamine. This system determines the heritable tendency towards intense exhilaration and excitement, leading to frequent exploratory activity (novelty seeking) and avoidance of monotony. Individuals high on this dimension are generally also characterized as impulsive, quick-tempered and disorderly. They tend to neglect details and are quickly distracted or bored. They are also easily provoked to prepare for fight or flight. The other dimension is principally ruled by the monoamine neuromodulator norepinephrine. This system determines the heritable tendency to respond intensely to signals of social reward and approval, sentiment and succour. Individuals high on this dimension are generally characterized as eager to help and please others, persistent, industrious, warmly sympathetic, sentimental, and sensitive to social cues, praise and personal succour, but also able to delay gratification with the expectation of eventually being – socially –rewarded.

According to Cloninger, a person high on novelty seeking (the dopamine system) and low on reward dependence (the norepinephrine system) is characterized as: seeking thrilling adventures and exploration; disorderly and unpredictable; intolerant of structure and monotony, regardless of the consequences; frequently trying to break rules and to introduce change; quick tempered and strongly engaged with new ideas and activities; socially detached; independent nonconformist; content to be alone; minimal ambition and motivation to please others; insensitive to social cues and pressures. Conversely, a person low on novelty seeking (dopamine) and high on reward dependence (norepinephrine) is characterized as: dependent on emotional support and intimacy with others; sensitive to social cues and responsive to social pressure; sentimental; crying easily; rigid; orderly and well organized; trying to impose stable structure and consistent routine; rarely becoming angry or excited; an analytic decision maker who always requires detailed analysis of complete information; slow to form and change interests and social attachments. The striking similarity of this polarity with descriptions of Kirton's innovator vs. adaptor dimension is obvious.

In summary, the available data, including data from neuro-endocrinological research, support the view that a biologically based trait dimension thing-oriented, explorative versus social or, in different terms, self-willed versus compliant is indeed conspicuously present, and does have genetic roots.

== Selection within human social structures ==

{{level|3}} The first three assumptions made at the beginning of this chapter apparently find ample support in ethological and psychological literature. Therefore, in any class of social (group) systems in which there are clear differences between members and non-members (prerequisite 4), cyclic changes should occur in the sense that each separate social group or structure only has a limited life-span, which is inversely proportional to the effectiveness of the selection pressure within the (group) structure in favour of compliance. The life cycles are then separated by turn-over catastrophes which go by various names, depending on the level of organization: territorial conquest; closedown; discontinuance; bankruptcy; revolution; subjugation; extermination; etc.

In the literature on animal ecology and population dynamics, the research data on population explosions and emigration waves, at more or less regular time intervals, are renowned (for example, Christian, 1970, on various species of lemmings, mice and voles). Whereas Christian points to the importance for evolution of these periodic changes in density and migration activity, the proximal causation of these conspicuous phenomena has up to this moment not been explained satisfactorily. It shall be clear that the present model constitutes, among other things, an attempt to fill this gap.

That selection forces do indeed operate within social groups against noncompliant, non-adapted individuals and other deviants, has experimentally been shown in various social mammals and birds (Neumann, 1981), in nonhuman primates (Kling and Steklis, 1976) and also in man (Schachter, 1951; Scherer, Abeles and Fischer, 1975; see van der Dennen, 1987, pp. 28 ff. and Flohr, 1987, pp. 200-2, for a discussion).

In the psychological literature we can also find many comments referring to
the relevance of the discussed selection processes for the way our human
society is run,<ref>(See, apart from the authors quoted here, also e.g., Snow, 1961; Etzioni, 1964; Weick, 1969; and Tiger, Chapter 5).</ref> including data on the personality dimensions these selection processes operate upon.

White and Lippitt (1960) and Scheflen and Scheflen (1972) give detailed behavioural descriptions of the process of creating chronic scapegoats as a fundamental process in the functioning of human social groups. They describe the physical as well as the cognitive and communicative aspects of the processes that lead either to getting stuck in a superdependent immobilized scapegoat-role or to becoming outcast (co-type). In their opinion there is a conspicuous contrast between, on the one hand, chronic superdependent immobilized persons who tend to neuroticism by accepting guilt and assuming the scapegoat role and thus getting stuck in cumulating 'double-binds' (Laing, 1967, 1970; Watzlawick and Fish, 1973), and on the other hand anti-social types who tend to deny guilt, generally refuse to be immobilized in a scapegoat role and tend to stay socially mobile, although in peripheral social roles. This is indeed what would be expected from our theory.

Parallel to what de Waal (1975) suggests in the case of Java monkeys, Scheflen and Scheflen (1972) explain how in their opinion every human social group or society generates automatically its own neurotic scapegoats, deviates and outcasts as a necessary by-product of continuous consolidation and reaffirmation of internal (cognitive) values and social order. Such marginal social roles serve for the society in question as a necessary external frame against which the internal social values and role criteria may be projected and by which the `shoulds' and 'should nots' for all its members are continuously exemplified (Erikson, 1966).

Milgram's (1974) famous experiments in which he asked subjects to administer heavy and supposedly life endangering electric shocks to stooges `for the sake of scientific progress', are also enlightening in this respect. According to Milgram, this general readiness to obey and even to torture fellow men, if urged and backed up by the authority of common opinion....

:... is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of authority. Facts of recent history and observation in daily life suggest that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behaviour tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy, and moral conduct.

This dependence of strongly repressive systems on a strong and dependable compliance of its employees and agents, explains what is often considered a paradox in the literature on holocausts. What is, for example, surprising is that the people who in 'das Dritte Reich' were in charge of the extermination machinery, quite generally appeared to be extremely docile, middle-class, adapted, morally rigid and reliable house-fathers and exemplary husbands, with an aversion to adventure and violence, and who more often than not were friendly and kind to children and pets in their daily social interactions, with an overtone of sentimentality. As shall be clear from the present theory, this is indeed the only type of person – the highly compliant, non-innovative, non-self-willed adaptor – that can be relied upon to carry through orders ('Befehl ist Befehl!') in situations where obedience strongly conflicts with morals and ethics. Under such extreme circumstances the selection pressure on personality characteristics, therefore, is extreme also, the not-socompliant individuals trying to avoid such ghastly agentic responsibilities. As Koestler (1967, in van der Dennen, 1987) eloquently stated:

:It is not the murderers, the criminals, the delinquents and the wildly nonconformists who have embarked on the really significant rampages of killing, torture and mayhem. Rather it is the conformist, virtuous citizens, acting in the name of righteous causes and intensely held beliefs who throughout history have perpetrated the fiery holocausts of war, the religious persecutions, the sacks of cities, the wholesale rape of women, the dismemberment of the old and the young and the other unspeakable horrors ... The crimes of violence committed for selfish, personal motives are historically insignificant compared to those committed ad majorem glonam Dei, out of a self-sacrificing devotion to flag, a leader, a religious faith, or a political conviction.

Milgram (1974) labels this compliant, subordinate style of functioning the agentic mode, which expresses that somebody in that mode functions as the agent of some (personal or impersonal) authority. He points out that individuals tend to function in any one situation in either this mode or in its opposite, the autonomous mode. Milgram explains that the readiness to shift from the agentic mode into the autonomous mode in certain conflict situations differs considerably between adults, that people differ in the amount of time they spend in either mode, and that there is a complex personality basis to obedience and disobedience.

These differences between individuals in their tendencies either to comply with social standards most of the time, or to act autonomously and independently most of the time, are also of crucial importance for the way in which bureaucratic structures and other social institutions are run (Kirton, 1978b, 1987a):

:... the 'adaptor' personality ... who can be relied upon to carry out a thorough, disciplined search for ways to eliminate problems by 'doing things better' with a minimum of risk and a maximum of continuity and stability ... [whereas] ... innovative change ... leads to increased risk and less conformity to rules and accepted work patterns (Bright, 1964), and for this reason it rarely occurs in institutions on a large scale ... (Kirton, 1978b, p. 611)

:It is said that organisations in general (Whyte, 1957; Bakke, 1965; Weber, 1948 (published in 1970); Mulkay, 1972) and especially organisations which are large in size and budget (Veblen, 1928; Swatez, 1970) have a tendency to encourage bureaucracy and adaptation in order to minimise risk. Weber (1948), Merton (1957) and Parsons (1951) wrote that the aims of a bureaucratic structure are precision, reliability, and efficiency. The bureaucratic structure in its nature exerts constant pressure on officials to be methodical, prudent, and disciplined, resulting in an unusual degree of individual conformity in that situation. (Kirton, 1987a)

Therefore institutions tend to become more adaptor-oriented as time goes on
because of selection, training and promoting policies which are in line with
those aims (Drucker, 1969; Schumacher, 1975, p. 243). A negative selection
pressure is continuously exerted against innovators.<ref>A similar process of
selective isolation was seen by Rogers (1959), and reported in his account of
the 'creative loner'.</ref> Even when an innovator finds badly needed novel solutions for pressing problems, it will often fail to render him social approval, inter alia because of inherent (sometimes insurmountable) communication problems with his more adaption-oriented colleagues. Instead of winning social approval when coming up with such solutions, the innovator finds that tolerance for his innovative style of approach is at its lowest ebb when his adaptor-type colleagues feel under pressure from the need for quick and radical change (Kirton, 1987b). Even when the novel solutions in question are accepted, it does not generally lead to a suspension of the above discussed selective forces. In an empirical study to investigate the ways by which ideas leading to radical changes in some companies were developed and implemented, Kirton (1987a) found that:

:There was a marked tendency for the majority of ideas which encountered opposition and delays to have been put forward by managers who were themselves on the fringe, or were even unacceptable to the 'establishment' group. This negativism occurred not only before, but after the ideas had not only become accepted, but had even been rated as highly successful. At the same time other managers putting forward the more palatable (i.e., conventional) ideas were themselves not only initially acceptable, but remained so even if their ideas were later rejected or failed.

It can thus be seen how, much unlike the fate of innovators, failure of ideas is less damaging to the adaptor, since any erroneous assumptions upon which the ideas were based were also shared with colleagues and other influential people (Kirton, 1984).

As a consequence of these differences in selective pressure, ageing institutions suffer from the disadvantages of not having innovator type creative output available in times of change when policy and methods are required to change as well. Such necessary changes, therefore, are often brought about only when a precipitating event, or a crisis, occurs when at last the adaptor needs, and so collaborates with, the innovator (Kirton, 1961).

== Ossification ==

{{level|3}} Science is an outstanding example of a branch where these considerations about systematic intra-group selection pressures seem relevant. The very goal of scientific research is to find even better conceptual and instrumental frameworks, but, as Kuhn (1970) points out, changing the paradigms which are hitherto accepted without question by an entire scientific community requires a breakdown of previously accepted rules. Such breakdowns are the very process of scientific revolution and this revolutionary process is fundamental to scientific advance; thus, as a social institution, science stands out as an extraordinary oddity (Tiger, 1985). The consolidation and preservation of group cohesion and established rules are not its primary goal, but the creative expansion of conceptual boundaries. In scientific institutions, the innovator type input is not only needed at the rare times of inevitable change, but very regularly, since precipitating events or conceptual crises are the very thing that scientific efforts are supposed to be aimed at.

When ageing institutions become too adaptor- and compliance-oriented by the resulting unconscious bias in selection and in promotion policies, it may not be initially very disastrous in the case of factories or bureaucratic units. For as long as no drastic external challenges turn up, they can just go on producing their output as they formerly used to do with excellent results. But in research units it is eventually disastrous if the cognitive climate becomes more and more adaptor-oriented. The innovator type creative output, consisting of (often disquieting) conceptual challenges and explorations of the unknown and unthought, will in that case gradually be replaced by compliant adaptor type output consisting of puzzle-solving and quasi-discoveries without any conceptual threats. This means that scientific units finally reach an efficiency close to zero when becoming more adaptor-oriented with increasing age. After an initially fruitful phase of consolidation, the prevailing paradigms will become rigid and dogmatic. It is clear moreover, that in a government-protected scientific community competition does not operate freely. This may postpone organization—structural turn-over catastrophes considerably, and thus the timely rejuvenation science continually needs. As a result, . . . 'The Church of Reason [science] like all [ageing] institutions, is based not on individual strength, but on individual weakness. What's really demanded is inability. Then you are considered teachable: a truly able person is always a threat' (Pirsig, 1974).

This description of the process of ossification also fits perfectly for most of the established and institutional religions, as has been recognized by many philosophers and other scientists. Kierkegaard for instance, heavily criticized the organized churches, pointing out that in our society authentic existential religiosity nowadays has two great enemies: philosophers indulging in mere abstract speculations of a strict and limited rationality on the one hand, and church-going fundamentalists and uncritical believers on the other. Kierkegaard believed that the Church has degenerated into a bunch of unthinking fanatics, or even worse, a flock of passionless and anemic herd-mentalities, who dutifully walk into church for no other reason than that was the direction most others were walking. He resented that the church does not have the decency to recognize that whatever its teaching of watered-down, polite moral humanism has become, it isn't Christianity any more (Wilber, 1983).

Christianity may have been founded for the enlightenment of mankind, as an attempt to raise people to a higher level of autonomy and socio-psychic health, and for overcoming the frequent social tendency towards hateful and revengeful cultivation of deviants, scapegoats and other presumed enemies by institutionalized practices of denunciation and mobbing (Coser, 1956, 1978; Girard, 1982; Hoffschulte, 1986). But, like any other social institution, the Church has gradually deteriorated into a system, preoccupied with its own propagation as a system, and thus – contrary to its original goals – with power and the binding-in-dependency of its members in uncritical docility (Toynbee, 1972). The Church does not invite, any more, to mysticism or to experiencing the 'void', instead it imposes 'belief in God and promotes conformity and respect for 'respectability' (Laing, 1967). Similar considerations hold for other traditional religions and belief systems.

== Social-role blindness ==

{{level|3}} Apart from these specific ossification phenomena, many more areas in human society can be found where such effects of the selection mechanisms, as discussed in section 4.10, are manifest. Since these selection mechanisms are operative in lower social mammals as well as in man, they must be anchored quite solidly in the behavioural system. This is not surprising because this mechanism does have considerable evolutionary advantages, not only in animals, but, at least up to recent times, also in the case of man. As mentioned in section 4.4, it facilitates speciation through genetic adaptation to marginal habitats, helps in many species to overcome migratory bottlenecks, and even serves to motor the evolution of culture in the case of man.

It seems plausible therefore, that if in the case of man, our superior capacity for learning plays a modifying role in these matters, then the organization of our intellectual capacities will have evolved in such a way, as to enhance the occurrence of selection cycles, rather than to thwart them. The mechanism of selection cycles and periodic turn-over catastrophes is basically powered by the involuntary forces of attraction and repulsion between individuals within social groups and structures. It must have been evolutionarily advantageous, therefore, for behavioural and cognitive `masterprogrammes' to develop, serving to prevent the newly evolved intellectual capacities from interfering with the (phylogenetically very old) involuntary biases in social interactions.

This is indeed what can be found. Human beings appear to be peculiarly unable to assess objectively the quality of their own social-role behaviour and the behaviour of other people they are dealing with in the social group. There is a sort of 'social-role blindness', of specific blind spots in our cognitive capacities, safeguarding primitive, elementary tendencies of being either attracted or repulsed by other people, depending on the own and on the other's social role and position. As in the experiments with mice described in sections 4.5 and 4.6, the omega-like subordinates, the peripheral nonconforming types, are also in man most likely to be disliked by the established leaders as well as by the conforming and compliant subordinates. This is, in fact, a tautological statement, since drifting into a marginal or an outcast position ((o-type in Fig. 4.1) is just another way of saying that one is less acceptable to the in-group.

As a tool for this mechanism, a considerable part of human communication consists not of transferring pure information, but of more or less involuntary emotional expressions of praise, admiration, criticism, ridicule and insults, as is shown for instance in the ethological work of Weisfeld (1980) on social-role behaviour in adolescent boys, or in the sociological investigations by Segerstrale (1986; Chapter 14) into the Wilson–Lewontin scientific debate as part of the sociobiological controversy. To a large extent the use of language serves to support or to camouflage non-verbal actions, actions for manipulating other people and for staking out and sustaining social roles (Scheflen and Scheflen, 1972; Mehrabian, 1972; Argyle, 1976a,b).

In factoranalytic research on the social interactions between people, the
first and by far the most conspicuous principal component is the so called
evaluation of positive–negative (Good–Bad) dimension, describing to what
extent one appreciates or disappreciates the rated other. In questionnaire
research where elucidation of the actual social behavioural attitudes and
social-role distributions is the primary goal, the raw data are, in general,
firstly corrected for the positive–negative evaluation or social desirability
dimension by partialling out its influence (Benjamin, 1974, p. 419). Those who
rate other persons or questionnaires in general colour their judgements with
appreciation or disapproval to indicate, explain and consolidate the social
relations between themselves and the rated person.<ref>In the case of
dominating individuals this cognitive distortion of the own and the other
person's qualities is labelled by Kipnis 'the Metamorphic Effects of Power'
(1976, ch. 9).</ref>

The importance of this negative or positive bias in the way we think about our companions is also expressed by the fact that most behavioural attitudes and personality characteristics can be expressed in positive as well as in negative terms. We virtually have, therefore, a double set of conceptual labels for other people's actions and behavioural attitudes; a positive set and a negative set. This cumbersome and at first sight inefficient cognitive organization, in which the pure assessment of other people's behavioural qualities is blurred to a great extent by the strong involuntary bias of appreciation or disappreciation, can only be evolutionarily advantageous if it serves an essential purpose. From the above, it may be concluded that this purpose may be found in protecting the involuntary attraction and repulsion reflexes, which direct our social behaviour, against our intelligent faculties. Indeed, human individuals are hardly aware that the way they assess the other person's qualities is to a large extent coloured by their positive or negative feelings towards that other person, resulting from the involuntary forces of social attraction and repulsion in operation. People do not realize that their, say negative, labelling of (the behaviour of) an important other can easily be changed into its positive counterpart by simply regarding the same behaviour from the point of view of a supporter, and vice versa. They tend instead to attach a sense of permanence and absoluteness to their (categorically negative or positive) judgement, and in particular they are not aware of the relativity of the judgement in terms of its dependence on the mutual social positions of the rater and the ratee.

In summary, the postulated blind spots and no entry signs in our intellectual faculties apparently do indeed exist. Despite our vaunted intellects and our protestations of rational and scientific know-how, we humans show a disturbing tendency to reserve our intellectual powers strictly for certain specific tasks. In other specific areas of functioning, like the mechanisms of social attraction and repulsion mentioned above, we tend to rely on involuntary biases while allowing the intellectual faculties to be effectively blocked. Therefore, ironically and paradoxically, this specific stupidness, this social-role blindness in us humans, should probably be regarded as a special adaptation to our great cleverness.

In daily life, the result of these cognitive biases is that, in many instances, we cannot help but foster, involuntarily, a lower esteem for other persons if they happen to be less 'in-crowd' than ourselves. In more extreme cases, we cannot help tending to join others in mobbing or in scapegoating. We tend to justify the actions taken through our (biased) evaluations of the outcast's or scapegoat's qualities, attitudes and behaviour (unless we incidentally happen to be one of the outcast's supporters). Being in the agentic or systemic (Milgram, 1974) or compliant (Apter and Smith, 1976, 1985) motivational mode while dealing with a victim, we involuntarily tend to see the person in question to a larger or lesser extent as inferior, or even repulsive, detestable or evil. This cognitive distortion can in fact be considered the behavioural basis of torture. Without this psychological effect, the role of torturer would be impossible (Amnesty International, 1973), various built-in inhibitions on aggression would then in most cases take precedence. What happened in the extermination camps of 'das Dritte Reich' is an extreme – though unfortunately not very rare – type of event, exemplifying what this human faculty for selective blindness may facilitate.

The Nazis called their victims 'Untermenschen', but likewise, we ourselves have in turn a strong tendency to label the people who were in charge of the Nazi extermination projects as incorporations of evil, as devils incarnate. As was stressed in section 4.10 however, they were, if they can be characterized at all, rather the opposite, or they would not have been fit for a task where ethics and personal norms would most likely conflict with obedience. Like the spectator-subjects in Milgram's experiments, we cannot imagine ourselves doing the same in similar circumstances, but the facts are that most of those Nazis were not beasts, but very quiet middle-class, social-oriented adaptors, and we are no saints, but ordinary people, who in similar circumstances are rather likely to do similar sorts of things. The difficulty we have with acknowledging that those Nazi employees were not so very different from ourselves, and the other way around, exemplifies the all overruling strength of this type of social-role blindness within ourselves.

All in all, it seems that we cannot help but hate our (self-created) enemies and that we cannot help but love primarily just those individuals which the described selection-cycle mechanism urges us to appreciate. The effects of this same blinding mechanism can also be recognized in less extreme contexts, like for example, the social interactions between scientists or between managers. The contribution by Segerstrale gives us a very illustrative and piquant example of how this mechanism works out in the case of scientific colleagues with strikingly different cognitive styles. In her account of Wilson's and Lewontin's respective contributions to the sociobiology debate, Lewontin plays the part of the thorough and careful adaptor whereas Wilson plays the part of the creative, speculative and daring innovator, and the subsequent mutual denunciation of each others scientific qualities is prototypical.

Thus, the turn-over catastrophes keep happening unhampered, in the case of man just disguised in cognitive ornaments which we, erringly, take for true. Whenever a turn-over catastrophe is at hand, there is still another type of social-role blindness in operation which ties in with the cognitive biases discussed above. It is discussed in more detail in the contribution by Tiger (see also e. g., Janis' book Group-think, 1982; Tiger, 1985). According to Tiger the evolution of the human intellect must of necessity have been accompanied by a simultaneous development of a set of awareness blocks, safeguarding groupthink tendencies and safeguarding the unhampered compliance with social habits and prejudices. He argues that the human intellect has primarily evolved as a tool for enhancing coordinated social action, not for independence and for critically observing the social processes one is involved in. Reason was designed to improve consent with the overriding purposes of kinship, not to challenge them. The effect of these particular blocks is that eventual intelligent attempts by any non-conforming individuals, trying to stop the precipitating catastrophe from happening, are likely to be futile. In most persons involved, this particular limitation to the use of intellectual faculties will overrule any capacity to rationally assess the personal risks and general consequences of the turn-over catastrophe at hand, and that will impel them to join compliantly in concerted mobbing or warring actions, not unlike lower social mammals.

It is clear from the aforesaid that the former type of social-role blindness ties in here seamlessly. The concerted actions of animosity towards scapegoats, outcasts or enemies are of course greatly facilitated by the involuntary and uncritical denouncement of the supposed opponent's qualities. And at higher levels of organization, for example political states, the degrees of blindness of the collective are even more disquieting, not only with respect to the systematic and collective denunciation of supposed enemies, but also with respect to what are desirable and effective political courses of action (Janis, 1982), in particular as soon as the ideals and goals chosen become fixed and rigid (Talmon, 1980). As Popper says: 'The attempt to make Heaven on earth invariably produces hell'. The most extensive, quixotic and disgusting violence is justified with the invocation of an Utopian ideology, a paradisaic myth, a superiority doctrine, an eschatological or millenarian ideal state, or other highly abstract political/ethical categories, metaphysical values, and quasi-metaphysical mental monstrosities: national security; raison d'Etat; freedom; democracy; God; Volk und Heimat; Blut und Boden; peace; progress; empire; historical imperative; sacred order; natural necessity; divine will; and so on and so forth (van der Dennen, 1987). In view of their tasks, the stream of information governments take in is even more biased and unbalanced, and their tools are even less effective, than they are in the case of individuals (Deutsch and Senghaas, 1971). This unbalance has become particularly precarious under the present 21st century conditions.

<center><big>Discussion</big></center>

== Nature and nurture ==

{{level|3}} It can be argued that, at least in the case of man, the same social structure cycles with their turn-over catastrophes might occur merely because of mechanisms on the cognitive psychological level. In that case one would not need to postulate a genetic background for these gradual shifts in social structures to occur.

Indeed, as we saw above, social-role blindness and related cognitive biases are a very powerful influence in man. Moreover, we can also find a wealth of empirical and experimental data on the various constraints on learning in man, on habit forming, traditions and the transfer of cultural information, on perceptual biases like the cognitive dissonance theory, etc., all showing that our behaviour is organized in such a way that a great inertia of ideas, concepts and habits is safeguarded in spite of our capacity to keep learning. These data would suggest that enough mechanisms, at a purely cognitive and cultural level, can be traced as to make social-structural cycles likely to occur. Admittedly, the basic requirement for the postulated selection cycles to occur is not so much that there is a genetic basis to it, but rather that individuals, once their phenotypes in these areas of functioning have established themselves, can not be reshaped into their opposites. As we saw above, this inflexibility aspect, irrespective of its causes, has been firmly established by psychological research. However, the evidence for genetic influence cannot be neglected. These mechanisms therefore are most probably implemented on the genetic as well as on the learning level. It goes without saying that in man, the learning animal par excellence, the influence of learning will be relatively important in that case.

Another, related, critique is the argument that where a multi-gene basis of these differences should be expected, a strong enough selection pressure and a quick selection response are difficult to imagine. However, no high mortality, low fecundity or whatever on the part of the declining morph needs to be assumed at all. Basic to the model rather is the existence of differences between incrowd- and outcast-individuals. No physical elimination whatsoever needs to be assumed to let the cycles run. The only thing which needs to be postulated is that the in-group/out-group and the incrowd/outcast distribution of social roles and positions is subject to reshuffling; it depends on the level of organization we are talking about whether the postulate of a genetic effect needs to be included in a description of the cycles or not. In man this will, in my view, probably only be indispensable in the case of very longterm cycles on a very large scale. On most levels of human social structures the individuals selected against just need to be shifted into outgroup or outcast positions, relative to the unit(s) of organization in question, for the selection process to proceed. The very presence of the removed individuals in the organizational periphery then increases the likelihood of a turn-over catastrophe.

== Perspective ==

{{level|3}} As was pointed out above, the duration of social-structural cycles is
predicted to be roughly inversely proportional to speed and intensity of
selection for the trait under discussion. In an industrial company the
intensity of selection and the take-on/dismissal percentages are much higher
than for example, the selection intensity and the immigration/emigration
percentages in the much larger units of political states. Therefore the
average cycle periods are likely to vary from a few decades in companies (for
illustrative material refer to e.g., Schumpeter, 1939; Kirton, 1961, 1976) or
in political parties (e.g., Ostrogorski, 1982), to a few centuries in
political states (e.g., Olson, 1982), or even to one or two millennia in whole
civilizations (refer to e.g., Spengler, 1918; Toynbee, 1972;<ref>Toynbee
disagrees with what he calls Spengler's 'determinism'. Though he (Toynbee)
gives abundant material to illustrate the point made here, he emphasizes that
one cannot convincingly speak of some or other predetermined and fixed life
span of societies. The present theory would support Spengler's view. But it
would also give room for something that Toynbee stresses, namely that, as far
as their life span and their spin-off in terms of disseminative effect towards
other societies is concerned, societies differ greatly from one another.
According to the present theory, it very much depends on incidental
environmental factors how effective selective emigration can be, and how
strong the differential propagation within the structures themselves. And it
depends on the actual presence of competing structures how quickly the effects
of the internal selection processes will precipitate an eventual turn-over
catastrophe.</ref> Darlington, 1969; Davis, 1974). The small-scale turn-over cycles with a relatively stronger and quicker selection effect are superimposed, therefore, on the larger-scale turn-over cycles with a longer life span. Thus, individuals may be outcasts in terms of some small-scale social structure while at the same time being totally accepted incrowd members in terms of some larger-scale social structure. The small-scale cycles may be seen as the ripples on the surface of the long range waves of the large-scale cycles, What happens with a person at the social-role level of a sports club is not necessarily parallel to what happens to him at home or at the level of the village community, and what happens to a person at the level of a company does not at all need to be parallel to what happens to him on the level of the political state. In fact, being an incrowd group member on some small-scale level of organization may be vital for a person to keep functioning properly in case of struggling with an outcast position on a larger-scale level of organization.

If it were possible to manipulate these – hitherto involuntary – selection mechanisms, it would be possible to stop or to speed up population cycles at will. This might for instance be relevant for personnel management in industrial companies or for measures at the level of political nations. The latter might be of particular significance in our nuclear age, since population cycles at this broad level tend to be worked out and consolidated by means of war and other economic strangling techniques. Mankind as a whole, up until now, has been able to afford this luxury of genocidal praxis, but war and economic asphyxia, nowadays, threatens to come close to total nuclear destruction. It might be worthwhile, therefore, to take the pressure off the dynamic population cycles kettle and to search for a way to replace or short-circuit nature's hitherto applied selection tricks with which it powered our evolution and our spatial spreading. It seems about time to substitute alternative and less dangerous mechanisms for it.

It will be clear however from section 4.12 that such is easier said than done. The mechanisms in question apparently are anchored in our behavioural system quite solidly. Many authors are however of the opinion that this is no reason to sit down in utter despair. Girard (1982) for instance, points out that in some respects social-role blindness is gradually losing its grip on our behaviour. He calls attention to the exemplary function of Christianity. On the one hand, Christianity has its roots in ancient Jewish traditions, suffused with admonitions towards and justifications of revenge and genocide (see e.g., Deuteronomy, 20, 17, 7, 12; Joshua, 1-3, 6, 8, 10; Kings, 3, 22, 23; Isaiah, 61). The Old Testament can in fact serve as a school example of militant- ethnocentric delusions of racial superiority. On the other hand, a novel phenomenon has emerged from the Jewish tradition, and even more so in Christianity, which is the attempt to replace organized spite, hate and revenge by love and compassion. This scheme may not have been completely successful as yet – were it only for the systematically organized violent blindness in and through the Christian religious organizations themselves –but it certainly has had some effect in overcoming the all-out violent tendencies towards deviants and scapegoats. Christ's example and admonitions like 'love your enemies', and the attempts to break the old tradition of revenge and the resulting vicious spirals of violence and counter-violence, counteract the ordinary selective forces within social groups we have discussed here. They put the primordial tradition upside down by denying the guilt of the victims and scapegoats and by putting the blame on the persecuting society. They de-sanctionize social violence; but what is most important, this tradition, though not reversing our behaviour instantaneously, has opened our awareness to what is actually going on at the social-cognitive level. It has opened our awareness for the fact that we do not like to give up our scapegoats, that we are attached to them and find it utterly difficult to refrain from denouncing and persecuting them (Girard, 1982). It constitutes therefore a massive attack on certain blind spots, on aspects of social-role blindness that, since aeons, have been the cornerstone of the cyclic selection processes themselves.

That is surely not the only glimmer of hope that may be discerned. The involuntary selection forces discussed are under attack from more sides. On the level of personnel management Kirton's work – as described in the previous paragraphs – may also be interpreted as an attempt to extend our awareness beyond its age-old confines into the realm of the dynamics of social attraction and repulsion, and what is more, his approach provides practical scientific tools to undercut the involuntary selection effects, tools that are likely to be utilized more and more because of their profitable effects on the output of the social structures (industrial companies) involved.

It is my hope that this chapter may also add to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying periodic turn-over catastrophes. Admittedly, the present theory, in part, is still tentative, but its relevance for our very existence might urge us to search for further experimental evidence against or in favour of its basic assumptions.

== Notes ==

<references />

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The biological instability of social equilibria

2016-03-24T17:04:36Z

BigSmoke: Work around bug in __NONUMBEREDHEADINGS__

'''(Subtitle: Social-Role Blindness and the periodic emergence of conflict and disaster; on Population Cycles precluding the establishment of lasting social equilibria)'''

'''[[Popko Peter van der Molen|by P.P. van der Molen]]''' __NOTOCNUM__

'''In: Evolutionary perspectives on competition, cooperation, violence and warfare''' (Chapter 4)

'''Edited by J. van der Dennen and V. Falger'''

Published in Sociobiology and Conflict, 1st ed. 1990, ISBN 0 412 33770 3 (HB)

See also the separate [[The biological instability of social equilibria (abstract)|abstract]] of this article.

== Acknowledgements ==

{{level|3}} The writing of this chapter has been supported by a grant of the ANO foundation. Comments and criticism from [[Michael Kirton]], [[Vernon Reynolds]] and [[Robin Dunbar]] were of great help to improve this text, which is not to imply that they are responsible for any flaws in the basic line of argumentation defended here. The help of [[Ben Hoffschulte]] in refining and presenting this text is also gratefully acknowledged. --- PPvdM

''The Sociobiology of Conflict'' was the topic of the ninth meeting of the European Sociobiology Society, held on January 10 and 11, 1987. It was Michael Hopp's initiative to organize this conference in Jerusalem, Israel, a symbolic place in many respects. Thanks to the scientific and personal qualities of Professor Amotz Zahavi, from Tel-Aviv University, many non-Israeli participants were able to experience the naturalistic, geographical and political history of the country in an impressive guided tour which influenced clearly the presentations and discussion in the conference.

Without the hospitality and financial support of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute the meeting would not have been possible. The Institute's director, Professor Yehuda Elkana, and Mrs Rivka Ra'am, member of the Executive Board of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, in close cooperation with local organizer Michael Hopp, contributed very much to the success of the meeting itself. The Board of the European Sociobiological Society expresses its gratitude for this vital support.

In the conference itself Vincent Falger, Lea Gavish, Johan Goudsblom, Anne Rasa, Avi Shmida, Jan Wind and Amotz Zahavi presented papers next to those elaborated and collected in this volume. ESS Board members Jan Wind, Hans van der Dennen and Vincent Falger organized those aspects of the conference not immediately connected with the meeting in Jerusalem.

== Outline ==

{{level|3}} This chapter deals with a behavioural mechanism which thwarts any systematic attempts to prevent and put a permanent end to conflicts between social groups and organizations. Essential in this mechanism is a certain kind of social-role blindness, a peculiar unawareness of what we are doing on the level of social-role interactions, whereby attraction or repulsion are effectuated. As in Tiger's contribution (Chapter 5), special provisions in our behavioural system are discussed which prevent us from utilizing our intellectual and cognitive faculties for investigation of our innermost social tendencies. We shall return to these 'no entrance' signs built into our cognitive system below.

Other elements of this mechanism are involuntary incrowd–outcast selection reflexes and a 'trait dimension', which may be described as a `readiness to comply with a submissive role'. This dimension is correlated with a great amount of social behaviour and a small amount of thing-oriented, individualistic and explorative behaviour. It is, by definition, of great importance for the distribution of social roles and for the social structure in a group; it determines, for example, the likelihood of drifting into an outcast position versus the likelihood of assuming or maintaining a compliant and socially accepted subordinate position. Knowledge of this personality trait dimension and of its effects in social groups and structures may increase our understanding of a wide range of intriguing and sometimes disquieting phenomena. These phenomena range from educational and organizational strategies to the often catastrophe-like collapses and turn-over phenomena in companies and other social structures, and from the way social roles and positions tend to be distributed up to the resulting evolutionary consequences.

First I will explain why, from a purely biological point of view, differences between individuals are to be expected in any socially living mammalian species in the following situations: readiness to comply with a submissive role; sociability versus thing-orientedness; compliance versus self-will. It will be argued that the underlying biological organization must, from an evolutionary standpoint, be very old and elementary. We will investigate then the consequences of these behavioural differences on the level of social interaction. A life span theory of social structures and organizations will be introduced as one of the implications.

The first sections of this chapter comprise a concise outline of these mechanisms, omitting at this point experimental data and illustrations. The basic assumptions made will, however, be stated explicitly. In the following sections we will check these assumptions against experimental and empirical data from biological and psychological research. Finally, it will be pointed out why understanding of the way these interpersonal differences are behaviourally organized (and the way our awareness tends to be blocked in these respects) have such far reaching consequences; an increase in our understanding of the life cycles of social structures might be by far their most important result. Such understanding would enable us to map the processes underlying periodic catastrophe-like turn-over phenomena and to learn how to control their decreasing efficiency and violent backlashing on any level of organization.

== Some consequences of living socially ==

{{level|3}} Among socially living mammals, each individual is by necessity saddled with a conspicuous bi-polarity in behavioural urges. First, being a socially living animal, drives for social contact and interaction are an important part of its behavioural–genetic endowment; but secondly, it has a set of perhaps even more basic drives to ensure the fulfilment of a range of non-social personal needs, e.g., water, food, cover, warmth, sex, territory, etc. As far as these latter needs are concerned, the amount of resources is often limited, thus causing competition and social conflict. For that reason a very basic functional conflict does exist in every social individual: between the urges to fulfil a great variety of personal basic (physical) non-social needs and the urge to maintain social contact and interaction. A socially living mammal inescapably has to shift between these two sets of urges much of the time.

Whenever some of the needed resources are scarce, the ensuing competition will put a strain on social relations. Under such conditions an individual frequently has to choose between continuation of peaceful social relations and receiving an appropriate share of the resources, eventually at the cost of social peace and harmony. Most of the time this dilemma boils down to the question of whether or not to submit to the initiative of other individuals at the cost of fulfilling personal urges and desires. In any socially living species this conflict of needs is inescapably present in each individual day after day, the average outcome determining how the individual will deal by and large with the social situation at hand. It is most desirable to have one's own way most of the time and still maintain close social contact and interaction, but that is more or less identical to what is generally understood by a dominant social role, and such roles are rather scarce.

[[Image:Two dimensions of social-role behaviour.png|framed|'''Fig. 4.1.''' Two dimensions of social-role behaviour.]]

It is, therefore, of theoretical interest to know what happens to the majority of individuals, the various types of subordinates (see Fig. 4.1), who are under regular pressure to comply and postpone or even abandon part of their individual desires and initiatives. For such non-dominant individuals, the balance between the strength of the desire for social contact and interaction, and the strength of the desires to fulfil other biological needs, determine the outcome of this continuous process of balancing one need against the other. Given a certain pressure to comply, it largely depends on this equilibrium of basic sensitivities within the subordinate individual as to what the behavioural outcome will be, either drifting gradually into an outcast position or assuming a compliant and socially accepted subordinate position. Such differences between subordinates have indeed frequently been observed in mammals (refer to section 4.7).

What is important for us to note here is that for any socially living mammalian species the competing sets of needs under discussion are very general and basic. We must therefore assume that the variance in the balance between those sets of basic needs has strong genetic roots. (After all, for many species, the behavioural organization is so simple that learning processes can only play a minor role in establishing behavioural variation. The equilibrium discussed above is therefore also an equilibrium between functionally competing parts of the genetic programme. As such we may consider this equilibrium, varying over individuals, as a trait in the classical sense. We could express this set of behavioural polarities as a set of (inter alia genetically based) trait differences which do have a clearly defined impact on the distribution of social roles.

Up to this point, three basic assumptions have been made about the behaviour of socially living mammals in general:

'''1.''' There is a strong functional link, on the level of behavioural orientation, between the frequency of social behaviour versus thing-oriented individualistic behaviour, and, on the level of distribution of social roles, between conformity and compliance with authority versus a self-willed attitude. These two polarities cannot be separated; they have the same behavioural basis. Therefore a range of personality characteristics have to be strongly intercorrelated, e.g., self-will, thing-orientedness, individualism and innovative creativity on the one pole, and compliance, person-orientedness, sociability, conformity, and adaptiveness to rules and traditions on the other pole.

'''2.''' Individuals differ from one another as far as the balance between these polarities is concerned.

'''3.''' This variation between individuals must have genetic components.

In the next part of this chapter we will check these assumptions against experimental data, but first we will investigate their logical consequences.

At this point one might justly retort: 'why so much ado about nothing? It seems self-evident that these polarities in behaviour are interconnected, and since for most broad behavioural characteristics it is likely that differences in behaviour are partly caused by genetic differences, in particular if they are of very old phylogenetic origin, which these behaviours apparently are, it is rather tautological to state that they have genetic roots.' The point is, first, that this notion of a biological basis of certain behaviours may be self-evident to behaviour biologists, but it is certainly not for large groups of sociologists and psychologists. Secondly, these three assumptions do have peculiar and important consequences if applied to the sociology of group structures — the incrowd–outcast dynamism and the concomitant behavioural reflexes in particular.

In order to discuss these consequences we have to add one more assumption, which is rather a definition, namely:

'''4.''' In what follows, social groups will mean groups over which individuals are distributed discretely. In other words, individuals can be recognized by one another as either belonging to the social group in question or not – and are treated accordingly.

<center><big>Hypothesis</big></center>

== Life cycles of social groups and structures ==

{{level|3}} If social groups are defined as above, the previous four assumptions imply that within such social groups there is exercised a more or less continuous selection pressure in favour of compliance and sociability. It is such because the most compliant – and thus most socially-oriented and rule-adaptive –individuals are most likely to establish long lasting accommodation within the group. Self-willed individualists on the other hand (also being innovative and thing-oriented according to assumption 1), are most likely to run into trouble and disagreement with the dominant individuals and/or habits and rules in the group. They are least prepared to pay the price of postponing or giving up personal urges and initiatives in order to keep up peace and social harmony. As a consequence, such individuals are the ones who are most likely to either fight hard for attaining a dominant position, or, if failing, to drift into marginal omega-like social positions and eventually become outcasts and leave the social structure. For any eventual influx of individuals into the social group or structure, the opposite holds. Individuals will be most readily accepted if they do not pose a threat to the individuals and/or habits ruling group life, which of course favours rule-adaptive compliants.

The effect of such a continuous selection pressure is that the average behavioural make-up of a group will shift gradually towards compliance and sociable rule-adaptiveness. Due to assumption 1, this also implies a shift towards less and less independent creativity and thing-oriented innovativeness; because of assumption 3, this shifting of group characteristics is (genetically) consolidated. What automatically happens then with every social group (structure) is a gradual loss of innovativeness and behavioural flexibility. In the end such a gradual ossification reduces the effectiveness of the group (structure), whether its function be the preservation of a territorial area with sufficient resources to keep a deme of mice alive, or, in man, the enhancement of some sport, the maintenance of political ideals, the aim to get a better share of the market, or the preservation of a political state. Such ossification especially matters whenever novel challenges turn up in the form of environmental changes or the emergence of competing groups. The disadvantages of a lowered flexibility and innovative creativity weigh most when, because of changing circumstances, innovations and a change of habits are urgently required. In such circumstances the advantages of the old social system in terms of experience, solidly established routines, compliance, malleability of all members, and sheer size, may easily be outdone by the innovativeness, flexibility and efficiency of a younger, and often much smaller, social group (structure) on which these selection pressures have not, as yet, been working for such a long period of time. At such a moment the old structure will yield to the younger structure in a relatively sudden way.

Therefore, provided the above mentioned assumptions are valid, social groups and structures only have a limited life span, and, as I shall try to show below, these assumptions indeed seem to fit most socially living mammal species with discrete group structures, including man. The life cycle of a social institution in human society then, can be indicated roughly as:

:foundation → consolidation → internal selection pressure → increasing ossification and a reduction of flexibility of the social structure → eventual attempts to compensate these effects by means of more striving for growth and power → further increase of rigidity and ossification → catastrophic collapse by sudden environmental changes or competition (Fig. 4.2).

[[Image:Changes in time of social group structures.png|none|framed|'''Fig. 4.2.''' Change in time of the average characteristics of the prevalent social group structures and their incrowd members.]]

Our model implies a departure from notions of mere gradual changes in societal structures. The probability of sudden catastrophic turn-over events increasing in time with cumulating selection effects can be graphically represented and mathematically described with help of the bi-stable models from the mathematical branch of catastrophe theory (Thom and Zeeman, 1974; Zeeman, 1976; Woodcock and Davis, 1978). Figure 4.3 shows a cusp catastrophe, visualizing the relation between the continuous and the discontinuous part of the cycle. After foundation of a social structure, the level of overt challenges tends to decrease and the stability of the structure tends to increase until the inefficiency begins to take its toll, after which the stability of the structure decreases again. During this process the average level of self-will decreases. An increase in the level of experienced challenges may then sooner or later lead to a catastrophic turn-over event. In the new structure the percentage of innovators (average level of self-will) starts again at a high level.

[[Image:Social turn-over cycles.png|framed|none|'''Fig. 4.3.''' Turn-over cycles in terms of personality characteristics and institutional functioning.]]

The selection rate determines the speed of ossification; the life expectancy of a social structure is, therefore, roughly inversely proportional to the internal selection pressure. Such sudden turn-overs of social structures are therefore bound to happen at any level at which discrete social group structures are operating, as long as individuals can be recognized by one another as either belonging or not belonging to that group, and as long as there is some outflow or neutralization (and eventually a selected influx) of individuals. Depending on the level of organization, such a turn-over goes by the labels conquest, close-down, discontinuance, bankruptcy, revolution, subjugation or extermination.

Once the old, ossified social structure has been replaced by one or more younger competitor-structures, the individuals from the population as a whole have been reshuffled in favour of resourceful self-willed innovators who now occupy the 'incrowd' positions. The rule-adaptive compliants who formed the bulk of the establishment of the former social structure in power, have drifted into marginal positions and now run the worst risks. Thus the previous internal shift in genetic make-up has been undone, and a new selection cycle is started in these new structures.

The selective advantages for individuals are therefore different within and outside of social groups and structures, and are also different depending on the stage of the life cycle an institution is in. A compliant, adaptive and sociable temperament gives a selective advantage within a large, and especially older, social system, whereas a thing-oriented, innovative and self-willed temperament is selectively advantageous outside of the protective maze of established structures, or within small, young systems.

== Evolutionary advantages ==

{{level|3}} Notwithstanding the above mentioned unpleasant aspects of the turn-over catastrophes themselves (in the case of man labelled bankruptcy, revolution, etc.), such a scheme of automatic and unavoidable cyclical changes in social-behavioural structures does also have evolutionary advantages. It is, for instance, clear that this mechanism keeps everything moving: structures, individuals and finally genes. After every turn-over event (or catastrophe) there is a thorough re-shuffling of individuals and when in the ensuing chaos new combinations of individuals reassemble in the newly emerging social group structures, novel combinations of gene sets are eventually formed also.

Apart from this advantage at the level of interpersonal social reorganization and consequently of ensuing recombination of gene sets, there is also an advantage at the level of migration, exploration and colonization of the environment (e.g., Lancaster, 1986). Most mammals are reluctant to go beyond the limits of familiar territory – their home range – and generally must be forced one way or the other to do so (Christian, 1970). Every time an old structure breaks down, a large number of individuals is forced to move and is therefore added to the extra-group surplus population. This will produce a sudden increase in interindividual competition outside of the group (structures) and will produce, therefore, a sudden increase in the pressure on other established (group) structures. This will catalyse the impending catastrophic collapse of more systems, thus locally adding to the already existing chaos. This spatial synchronization causes migratory and related pressures to occur spasmodically and strongly instead of continuously and rather weakly. This may be an advantage where, for example, geographical barriers need to be overcome in order to enable further migratory moves of the population or species as a whole. Many authors have commented on the importance of surplus individuals in producing strong pressures for dispersal (Darlington, 1957) and from the model discussed above it may be clear that social hierarchies constitute by themselves a major force for dispersion. This is also stressed by Christian (1970) in a review of population dynamics research in mammals. He concludes that it is in general primarily the low-ranking individuals that are forced to emigrate from their birthplace (often maturing young animals), and whereas they have an extremely high rate of mortality, it also follows that by their expulsion increasingly more marginal and submarginal habitats should become occupied as density and migration pressures increase. Moreover, this process facilitates speciation:

:... once in a great while a dispersing individual may, one would suppose, harbour a mutation or genetic change that increases its ability to adapt to the new surroundings and improves its chance of survival. It is such individuals that should be the basis for evolutionary changes. A sub-optimum area could be invaded repeatedly by countless numbers of individuals before a genetic change permitting adaptation occurred. Thus, the dispersal of large numbers of socially subordinate individuals into new environments may provide the wherewithal for natural selection, in contrast to the relative conservatism of dominant individuals in an optimum habitat. (Christian, 1970, p. 86)

The implication is that the Darwinian 'struggle for life' is in fact a process with much irony and relativity, since those individuals with, apparently, maximum reproductive success (the dominants) create by the very violence of their success the outcasts that carry on the process which we call evolution (Hoffschulte, 1986). Likewise, the ethologist and social psychologist Calhoun (1974), p. 302-3) comments on our own origins:

:The strong remain where conditions are most salubrious to preserving the old life-style. The weak must emigrate – bodily, behaviourally or intellectually. Our more distant ancestors swung from trees. Slightly less distant ones lost that race and won another. Population pressure forced them out of forest islands to wander across the African plains in search of another patch of forest where they could renew the old ways. Successive losses and successive demands for adjusting culminated in upright walking creatures much like ourselves. So it has been through all of evolution; the weak [eventually] survive, changed, to open new routes into the future. The meek do inherit the earth.

The evolutionary advantages described here are of course most important in species inhabiting niches of a temporary character, which require the regular invasion and colonization of new environments. Christian (1970) reports that the above mentioned strong fluctuations in population density and migration pressure are indeed most conspicuous in species living in habitats which are ecologically transitory and thus of a strongly temporary and changing character. A species dependent on that type of habitat depends more on regular migratory moves for survival than species living in extensive and stable habitats. In this light it is noteworthy that the human species, by colonizing the most extreme sorts of habitats, has, in its recent evolutionary history, managed to inhabit virtually all of the earth's surface. The mechanism of social selection pressure and expulsion of outcasts should, therefore, have been of great importance in man's evolution.

This is also implied by Coser's (e.g., 1956, 1978) and Girard's (e.g., 1982) comprehensive works on scapegoating in man. Girard describes how throughout human history the distribution of social role positions has been brought about by means of violent acts of social repression. Not only is the dramatic shifting of non-average, deviant subordinate persons into outcast positions just as common as in lower mammals, but, according to Girard, the very development of our culture even depended on it. Only through acts of violence and the collective commemoration of the victim-outcast or scapegoat do human groups find the social-cognitive norms and unanimity from which culture can develop. Culture in our species is not to be considered, therefore, as an immaculate attainment with which we have overcome primitive forms of violence. On the contrary, it is precisely through the violent social collisions themselves that human culture emerged from the animal background. The threatening circle around victims who are found guilty of social disorders is, so to say, the daily bread of social cultural order (Hoffschulte, 1986, on Girard).

In summary, the mechanism of population- and group-cycles, as postulated above, would facilitate speciation through genetic adaptation to marginal habitats, would help to overcome migratory bottlenecks and would, in the case of man, serve to motor the evolution of culture. The actual turn-over catastrophes themselves may not be pleasant for the participants at all, but that is irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective. On this grand scale it is not the feeling and suffering of the individual involved that counts, but the long-term behavioural and behavioural—genetic output that does.

Having outlined these intriguing and also somewhat disquieting consequences of the four assumptions made, I will now present some data from ethological and psychological research that may help us assess the validity of those assumptions.

<center><big>Data</big></center>

== Experiments with behavioural differences in house mice ==

{{level|3}} Some 33 groups, each containing 4 male and 2 female housemice of the same age, having grown up together from the same litter, were each placed in large observation cages in order to investigate interindividual differences in behaviour and the way these differences come about (van der Molen, 1981, 1988). The study investigated:

# how social role differences within such groups could be manipulated;

# which part of the behavioural differences had to be ascribed to those role differences;

# which part of the behavioural differences was due to innate trait-factors.

Dominance appeared to determine the behaviour of an individual to a great extent, thus being an indispensable tool for ethological descriptions of interindividual differences. It could also be shown experimentally that becoming dominant or subordinate was mainly dependent on coincidence and contingencies, and only to a limited extent on individual characteristics such as body-weight, social- and fighting-experience, self-will, ferocity, etc.

Within the categories of dominants and subordinates there appeared large differences in tolerance for other individuals. Some dominant mice behaved far more aggressively towards their subordinates than did others and these differences determined to a large extent the number of subordinates eventually holding out with such a dominant.

Another role-difference which could rather easily be manipulated experimentally was the Incrowd/Outcast difference, or rather, the difference between beta and omega-subordinates (the usual terms in mouse research).

Detailed ethological data on the behavioural characteristics of 36 individuals were factor-analysed, using factor rotation with the experimentally found social-role differences as anchoring points. The remaining factors of (within-role) differences in behaviour were interpreted as active versus non-active and as self-willed versus compliant As far as the latter dimension is concerned, self-willed conflict-proneness was found to be strongly correlated with a high frequency of exploratory and thing-oriented behaviour, whereas compliance was found to be strongly correlated with a high frequency of social and partner- oriented behaviour.

Every time a group of four males and two females was placed in a large observation cage for the first time, there were at first no clear alpha-, beta-, or omega-roles. In the course of the following days (or weeks) an alpha male would emerge and the differences in behaviour between the subordinate males would still be rather vague. Subsequently, differences would gradually evolve between the behaviour patterns of the subordinates. These differences occurred in the amount of resistance to the initiatives and the manipulations of the alpha, the number of fights they had with the alpha, and the amount of patrolling and exploration by themselves through the territory. Some subordinates sat still and allowed the alpha to groom them whenever he chose to do so and in return groomed the alpha if he offered himself by 'crawling under', which is the mouse way of saying something like 'please scratch my back'. Other subordinates tended to walk away more often when the alpha started to groom or to crawl under. The latter type of subordinate eventually appeared to be attacked by the alpha more regularly and subsequently showed more 'fleeing'. Such individuals then remained for increasingly longer periods of time in their hiding places, especially when the alpha was walking around, and eventually they ended up as inhabitants of an uncomfortable and, for the alpha, rather inaccessible hiding place.

The subordinate mice who adapted to the initiatives of the alpha behaved
submissively more regularly and underwent the maipulations of the alpha more
often. They were however less often disturbed by aggressive attacks from the
alpha, and did not much care whether the alpha was awake or asleep. The
subordinates who put up more resistance towards the alpha showed on the other
hand a conversely adjusted type of activity pattern; they kept silent for as
long as they sensed that the alpha was active, and walked around when he was
asleep. These gradually developing behavioural differences between
subordinates can be described as differences in staying (beta types) and
fleeing (omega types), since the latter type showed a tendency to flee the
territory if possible. It should be noted here that the emergence of extreme
omega behaviour patterns was an artifact of the experimental setting, owing to
the fact that the mice were unable to escape. In natural settings they would
probably have disappeared from the territory before showing such clear omega
type reaction patterns. Indeed, in experimental situations in which
opportunities for fleeing are provided, a large proportion of the (young)
subordinate males do indeed flee the territory (Van Zegeren, personal
communication). This is similar in many other rodent species (for example
refer to Healey, 1967; Ewer, 1971; Wilson, 1975a, p. 278; Barash,
1977).<ref>In human societies there are also many occasions when a fleeing
pattern is as difficult to achieve as it is with the artificially restricted
mice in these experiments. Ghettos must consist of groups unwilling or unable
to integrate fully and unable or unwilling to disappear. And whereas enforced
ghettos are an extreme case, it exemplifies the general thresholds existing in
any social structure, were it alone for overcoming the psychological bonds of
habituation and attachment to the old situation and the extra risks and
feelings of insecurity concomitant with breaking out.</ref>

In the process of a subordinate gradually becoming an omega, the behaviour of the alpha gradually changes towards treating the omega ever more as a stranger. What is important to note here however, is that the behavioural differences between betas and omegas seemed to develop before the alpha'began to treat the subordinates in a different way. This suggests that these beta/omega differences are caused by differences between the individual subordinates themselves. It could, in principle, also be explained by assuming that an alpha male initiates these differences by having a dislike for one of the subordinates, and that this subordinate thereupon avoids the alpha more than the other subordinates do. These differences in treatment by the alpha might initially be of such a subtle nature that even though the subordinate in question reacts promptly with increased avoidance behaviour, these differences have escaped our attention. It could however be shown in a cross-breeding experiment that the differences between omegas and betas originate primarily from the subordinates themselves (see van der Molen, 1987; 1989). (Of course these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; they may both be valid, supporting each other's effect.)

== Experiments with beta- and omega-roles ==

{{level|3}} In 30 populations (or groups of 4 males and 2 females in a large observation cage, as described above) observations were undertaken to determine whether or not the subordinate males did indeed develop into 2 distinct classes of betas and omegas. We used groups from the inbred C-57-black strain and the inbred CPB's-bagg albino strain and also from their F-1 and F-2 hybrids. These two inbred strains were chosen because of the conspicuous differences in the patterns of their aggressive behaviour and in their level of inter-individual tolerance. Two similar populations of wild mice were also incorporated in the experiment. Ethologically verifiable and clearly recognizable differences between betas and omegas developed in:

* 1 out of 9 CPB's populations
* 1 out of 8 C-57 populations
* 4 out of 8 F-1 hybrid populations
* 3 out of 3 F-2 hybrid populations
* 2 out of 2 wild populations

In the CPB's populations subordinate males tended to take up an (outcast-like) omega position, whereas in the C-57 populations the subordinates tended to take up a (compliant) beta position. The development of distinct classes of subordinates occurred quite clearly in half of the F-1 populations, and seemed to be normal in the F-2 as in the wild mice.

The hypothesis that subordinates from F-1 populations showed less individual differences in this respect than subordinates from F-2 and wild populations was tested by means of Fisher's exact test for independence. The statistic in question, having a discrete, hypergeometric distribution when the zero-hypothesis is true, rendered a significant value for stat.alpha = 0.10. This is in fact the most significant result that can be obtained with these numbers of populations.

These results suggest<ref>See, for example, East and Nilsson-Ehle in Srb, Owen and Edgar, 1965, pp. 450-74; or any other handbook on the basics of population genetics.</ref> a segregation and recombination in the F-2 generation of the genetic factors that determine the likelihood of subordinates becoming omega versus the likelihood of becoming a beta. An explanation of these effects in terms of differences in behaviour of the alpha mice does not make sense because in these data, subordinates were distinguished in behaviour only in relation to the alpha. Apart from this, an increase in behavioural variance of alpha males in the F-2 generation would imply more populations of the F-2 lacking either omegas or betas. This is contrary to what was found; thus the differences between omegas and betas stem, at least for a greater part, from genetic differences between the subordinate individuals. We label these differences accordingly as self-will, intolerance, tendency to have one's own way, or for that matter, tendency to dominate.

In these experiments it was found furthermore, that tolerant, compliant males, apt to take up a beta role instead of an omega role when in a subordinate position, were tolerant of the subordinates when performing an alpha role, contrary to males with a high level of self-will or tendency to dominate.

== Other ethological research data ==

{{level|3}} In many species differences between individuals have been found which resemble the above mentioned differences in male mice. From ethological field research it appears to be a general characteristic of social mammals that some individuals exert a lot of aggressive dominance, bullying their subordinates much of the time, whereas other dominants act as a sort of controller, governing the social relations in the group by social skill, sustained by the appreciation from companions rather than by aggressive intimidation. These differences are, for instance, reported from ethological research on mountain gorillas by Fossey (1972), on chimpanzees by Reynolds and Luscombe (1969), on a number of species including man by Chance and Jolly (1970) and Wilson (1977a, pp. 311-13) and exclusively on man by, for example, Lippit and White (1958), Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962, Chapter 12), Gibb (1969), Strayer and Strayer (1976), Hold (1976), and Sluckin and Smith (1977). Wilson (1975a) comments on these differences (p. 294):

It is not wholly imprecise to speak of much of the residual variance in dominance behaviour as being due to personality. The dominance system of e.g., the Nilgiri langur (Presbytis johnii) is weakly developed and highly variable from troop to troop. Alliances are present or absent, there is a single adult male or else several animals coexist uneasily, and the patterns of interaction differ from one troop to another. Much of this variation depends on idiosyncratic behavioural traits of individuals, especially of the dominant males (Poirier, 1970).

Itani et aL (1963) and Yamada (1966) describe the behaviour of extreme beta-type males in Japanese monkeys (Macaca Mcata) and indicate that a compliant temperament seems to be conditional for assuming such a role. Yamada further points out that, when such individuals eventually achieve a dominant position, a tendency for independence sometimes seems to exclude a tolerant attitude towards subordinates.

Differences of this sort between dominant males have also been described in stumptail macaques (Macaca speciosa) by Bertrand (1969), who describes both 'bullies' and 'fair alpha males' and stresses that aggressiveness is not always a necessary factor for dominance. She states that stumptail macaques differ considerably in the amount of intolerance and aggression displayed, and that in certain cases the sustained aggressiveness of some individuals, who were followed up for several years, seemed a personality trait that appeared early in childhood. Furthermore she concluded that the amount of investigative behaviour shown by an individual also depended upon the predisposition of each monkey, apart from social rank, age and conditions of captivity. Some individuals were far more adventurous than others. This personality dependence of investigative behaviour overruled age and rank dependent behaviour in particular when the stimuli were frightening or ambivalent.

In animal and social psychological research alike, variation in tolerance and
acceptedness is reported between individual subordinate role styles. In
general, it appears that individuals who do not manage to attain a dominant
role (a-position in Fig. 4.1) may either stay in a subordinate position while
(incrowd-)subordinates are often observed to gradually grow into a
semi(incrowd-) subordinates are often observed to gradually grow into a
semi-outcast or outcast position. Such outcast-like subordinates are then the
potential migratory, running all the risks implied, whereas the better
accepted incrowd-type subordinates, who show a better adaptation to existing
hierarchical pressures, may eventually succeed the present dominant(s) if the
latter should become incapacitated or even die. Such differences in
social-role types have been observed frequently in relation to dispersal
mechanisms operating through young individuals in particular (Wilson, 1977a;
Barash, 1977).<ref>Similar descriptions have been given for e.g., deermice
(Healey, 1967), free-living populations of black rats (Ewer, 1971, pp.
135-137), free-living lions (Bertram, 1975), rhesus monkeys (Vandenbergh,
1966), free-living Japanese monkeys (Irani et aL, 1963; Yamada, 1966) and by
Eisenberg et al. (1972) for a number of primate species.</ref> Bertrand (1969) reports the occurrence of scapegoats in stumptail macaques and de Waal (1975) in Java monkeys. The latter reports that high-ranking individuals often formed alliances against the lowest ranking adults or adolescents, notwithstanding the fact that each of the high-ranking monkeys clearly dominated the scapegoat in question also without any help of others.

== Human behaviour ==

{{level|3}} The significance of the self-will versus compliance or individualistic, thing-oriented versus social dimension in the domain of temperament traits is not only corroborated by a substantial amount of ethological research data on animals, but also by ethological as well as personality–psychological literature on human behaviour.

Gibb (1969), Strayer and Strayer (1976), Hold (1976) and Sluckin and Smith (1977) report differences in dominance-styles of children, and of adolescents (Savin-Williams, 1977a,b, 1979, 1980); they are similar to those described above for mammalian behaviour. Gibb (1969) calls the two antagonist styles leadership and domination. With leadership, authority is spontaneously accorded by fellow group members whereas with domination there is little or no shared feeling or joint action and authority derives from some extra-group power.

Turning from dominance styles to more general differences in behavioural style, Abrams and Neubauer (1976) report that human infants differ considerably in the way they divide their attention between persons and objects. This trait dimension, which they called thing- versus human orientedness, was manifest as early as in the second month of life. They found that the more thing-oriented child shows a greater freedom in exploration. Therefore we might label this dimension of thing- versus human orientedness (or sociability) also as explorative versus social, parallel to the vocabulary in Bertrand's (1969) longitudinal research on macaques. Abrams and Neubauer (1976) furthermore report that learning processes are shaped in a way which is different for each type of child:

:Training issues are characterized essentially as 'tasks' for the more thing-oriented child; for the human-disposed infant, they are characterized as acts in the spectrum of approval or disapproval ... If earlier impressions were that the more thing-oriented children are more outer-directed, by the third year of life they appeared more inclined to be motivated by inner determinants and resources, a distinction which seems to persist thereafter ... The dispositions of infants are re-inforced in the milieu, as implements in evolving strategies are cycled back into the psychological system and thus inevitably emerge as traits of character.

From her long range ethological research, Hold (1976) reports that children who rank high in the attention structure tend to set initiatives instead of complying to the initiatives of other children and that they

:. . . prefer to play alone when the leading role was already taken by another high-ranking child. It seems that these children do not like to be commanded by other children.

This runs essentially parallel to what has been said in the introduction in that self-willed, thing-oriented individuals are more prone to become either dominants or loners than to become beta-type compliant subordinates. A similar trait contrast is employed by Edwin McClain (1978, 1979) in his detailed longitudinal study on the behaviour of adult women. He distinguishes between women who are dominated by a need for independence and women who are dominated by a need for affiliation. McClain, like Ausubel (1952), points out that two basically opposing patterns of maturation already occur in the parent—child relationship during a youngster's early years. He terms the resulting personality types as satellizers who tend to adapt to existing rules, versus nonsatellizers who tend to behave more individualistically.

:The satellizing child establishes her life orbit about her parents, whom she perceives as the benign source of all that is good in her life. In contrast, the nonsatellizing child rejects this kind of dependency because she believes that her welfare lies in her freedom to choose her own course. (McClain, 1978, p. 436)

The material of McClain's study was derived from the behaviour of women. Kirton (1976, 1978b, 1987a) investigated a somewhat related dimension, namely the balance between adaptiveness and innovativeness in adults in general. The K.A.I. (Kirton Adaption–Innovation Inventory) was developed as a psychometric instrument for these investigations. Kirton based his instrument on the notion that a person confronted with a problem has a choice: he/she can do things 'better' or 'more' to solve the problem (adapt; the social-oriented approach) or he/she can do things 'differently' (innovate; the thing-oriented approach). Doing things better implies the acceptance of the old framework, while doing things differently means breaking accepted patterns. As Kirton says:

:The Adaptor is right at home in bureaucracies, which tend to become more adaptor-oriented as time goes on ... whereas . . . the natural position of high Innovators seems to be out on a limb.

Kirton's work is of special significance for the performance of leaders (Kirton, 1961, 1977, 1987a; Thomson, 1980; De Ciantis, 1987). He shows that innovators tend to become initiating and directing task-leaders whereas adaptors tend to become consideration- oriented maintenance-specialists of social relations. This is in line with the differences between leader types as described by, for example, Bales (1953), Halpin and Winer (1957), Thibaut and Kelly (1959), Krech et al, (1962) and Reddin (1970, 1987). From a conceptual point of view, innovativeness may be considered, furthermore, as a positively appreciated creative variant of non-conformism and disobedience.

Conformity as defined by Krech et al. (1962) in their research on the dimensions of social interactive behaviour, is also related to the trait dimension thing-oriented and self-willed versus social and compliant. They found that some people are more resistant to group pressures and demands (the hard-core independents and the deviants) than are others (the easy conformists). Their research offers strong support for the proposition that conformity tendencies are significantly related to enduring personality factors in the individual. The relevance for our model becomes especially clear where they define conformity as a 'trait of the person' as opposed to conformity as a `trait of the situation' (or social role dimension in our words).

:. . . conformity might be thought of as a 'trait of the situation'. [but] There are also marked individual differences in general readiness to conform, over a wide variety of situations. These differences . . ., reflect conformity as a 'trait of the person'. This distinction between conformity as reflecting the conformity-inducing properties of a situation and as reflecting the conforming propensity of a person should be kept well in mind. Much of the controversy and misunderstanding about the facts and theories of conformity stems from a confusion of these two aspects of conformity. (Krech et at, 1962)

[[Image:Extraversion and sensation seeking dimensions.png|framed|none|'''Fig. 4.4.''' Feij's dimensions 'extraversion' and 'sensation seeking', the balance between them – our dimension adaptive – and their relation with 'general activity level'.]]

Of particular interest is the existence of a similar dimension in Factoranalytic Personality Trait Research. Feij (1978) compares the trait models of Heymann (1932), Eysenck (1953), Zuckerman (1974), Strelau (1974a, b), Buss, Plomin and Willerman (1973), and Buss and Plomin (1975), amongst others. Although these authors often use different classes of subjects and prefer different final rotations of their resulting factorial models, some of their dimensions appear closely related to our dimension self-willed and individualistic and thing-oriented and explorative versus compliant and social (Fig. 4.4).

For instance, a high score on Zuckerman's (1974) and Feij's (1978; Feij et at, 1979, 1981) trait dimension of sensation seeking indicates a strong need for change, exploration and new experiences, a tendency towards independence of other people and an anti-authoritarian attitude, while low sensation seeking implies a tendency to comply with conventional values and rules. Feij (1978) stresses that extreme sensation seekers may on the one hand be antisocial, drop-out delinquents, but may on the other hand be unconventional but fully accepted creative innovators. This is in agreement with what was postulated above, namely that highly self-willed individuals tend to become either drop-outs (omega-role) or accepted innovators in the focus of attention (alpha-role), and that individuals with a low self-will tend to assume beta-roles compliantly.

Buss and Plomin's (1975) trait dimension sociability, indicates a strong need to be together with others, a high responsiveness toward others and a predilection for social interaction above non-social reinforcers (Feij, 1978).

In Cattell's sixteen-personality-factor set, the dimension labelled as `liberalism' (Qj) is supposed to measure an underlying tendency toward nonconformity and independence versus a need for affiliation (Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoko, 1970; Karson and O'Dell, 1976; McClain, 1978). At least three other dimensions from his 16PF battery also relate to concepts discussed here, namely Cattell's higher order factor IV, indicating subduedness versus independence, the factor assertiveness (E), indicating cautious humbleness versus abrasive assertiveness, and the factor superego (G), indicating conscientiousness versus expedience (Kirton and de Ciantis, 1986; Kirton, 1987b).

In most other factoranalytic classification systems one or more dimensions may be discerned which are related to our concept of self-willed and thing-oriented versus compliant and social. Moreover, the empirical work of inter alia Goldsmith (1984, 1986, 1989; see also Kirton, 1987b, 1989) shows that the concepts emerging in all these factoranalytic dimensions from the various authors on personality are indeed statistically correlated, while forming a coherent web of conceptually intertwined behavioural characteristics.

== Genetics ==

{{level|3}} The above mentioned data from factoranalytic personality research are the more relevant because various writers point out that a genetic basis of these dimensions has repeatedly been firmly established (Eysenck, 1967; Vandenberg, 1967; Buss et al., 1973; Buss and Plomin, 1975; Feij, 1978; Claridge, Canter and Hume, 1973; Eaves and Eysenck, 1975; Wilson, 1975a; Plomin and Rowe, 1977, 1979).

The empirical findings of Kirton (1976, 1978a, 1987c) and Ettlie and O'Keefe (1982) are also in line with the notion of a biological basis. They report that differences in innovativeness versus adaptiveness are not significantly related to IQ, to level of education, or to previous experiences, but are apparently of a more basic (personality-trait) nature (Kirton, 1978a, 1987b, 1989; Kirton and De Ciantis, 1986). In this respect innovativeness, indicating the type of creativity differs from instruments which measure the level of creativity (Kirton, 1978a; Torrance and Horng, 1980).

In section 4.2 it was pointed out that in socially living mammals at least two sets of basic urges have to be postulated, which, independently from one another, vary over individuals, thus producing inter alia the adaptor/ innovator differences. The first set contains drives for social contact and interaction, leading to gregarious types of behaviour; the second set contains the drives for thing-oriented behaviour.

From recent neuroanatomical and endocrinological research it appears that there is probably a strong link between these two distinct sets of drives on the one hand, and specific neuro-endocrine systems on the other. Cloninger (1986, 1987) presented a biosocial theory of personality, based on a synthesis of information from family studies, studies of personality structure, as well as neuropharmacologic and neuroanatomical studies of behavioural conditioning and learning in man and other animals. He describes three dimensions of personality that are genetically independent, two of which, the novelty seeking dimension and the reward dependence dimension, relate to the two distinct sets of basic drives mentioned above.

One of his dimensions of personality trait differences is principally ruled by the monoamine neuromodulator dopamine. This system determines the heritable tendency towards intense exhilaration and excitement, leading to frequent exploratory activity (novelty seeking) and avoidance of monotony. Individuals high on this dimension are generally also characterized as impulsive, quick-tempered and disorderly. They tend to neglect details and are quickly distracted or bored. They are also easily provoked to prepare for fight or flight. The other dimension is principally ruled by the monoamine neuromodulator norepinephrine. This system determines the heritable tendency to respond intensely to signals of social reward and approval, sentiment and succour. Individuals high on this dimension are generally characterized as eager to help and please others, persistent, industrious, warmly sympathetic, sentimental, and sensitive to social cues, praise and personal succour, but also able to delay gratification with the expectation of eventually being – socially –rewarded.

According to Cloninger, a person high on novelty seeking (the dopamine system) and low on reward dependence (the norepinephrine system) is characterized as: seeking thrilling adventures and exploration; disorderly and unpredictable; intolerant of structure and monotony, regardless of the consequences; frequently trying to break rules and to introduce change; quick tempered and strongly engaged with new ideas and activities; socially detached; independent nonconformist; content to be alone; minimal ambition and motivation to please others; insensitive to social cues and pressures. Conversely, a person low on novelty seeking (dopamine) and high on reward dependence (norepinephrine) is characterized as: dependent on emotional support and intimacy with others; sensitive to social cues and responsive to social pressure; sentimental; crying easily; rigid; orderly and well organized; trying to impose stable structure and consistent routine; rarely becoming angry or excited; an analytic decision maker who always requires detailed analysis of complete information; slow to form and change interests and social attachments. The striking similarity of this polarity with descriptions of Kirton's innovator vs. adaptor dimension is obvious.

In summary, the available data, including data from neuro-endocrinological research, support the view that a biologically based trait dimension thing-oriented, explorative versus social or, in different terms, self-willed versus compliant is indeed conspicuously present, and does have genetic roots.

== Selection within human social structures ==

{{level|3}} The first three assumptions made at the beginning of this chapter apparently find ample support in ethological and psychological literature. Therefore, in any class of social (group) systems in which there are clear differences between members and non-members (prerequisite 4), cyclic changes should occur in the sense that each separate social group or structure only has a limited life-span, which is inversely proportional to the effectiveness of the selection pressure within the (group) structure in favour of compliance. The life cycles are then separated by turn-over catastrophes which go by various names, depending on the level of organization: territorial conquest; closedown; discontinuance; bankruptcy; revolution; subjugation; extermination; etc.

In the literature on animal ecology and population dynamics, the research data on population explosions and emigration waves, at more or less regular time intervals, are renowned (for example, Christian, 1970, on various species of lemmings, mice and voles). Whereas Christian points to the importance for evolution of these periodic changes in density and migration activity, the proximal causation of these conspicuous phenomena has up to this moment not been explained satisfactorily. It shall be clear that the present model constitutes, among other things, an attempt to fill this gap.

That selection forces do indeed operate within social groups against noncompliant, non-adapted individuals and other deviants, has experimentally been shown in various social mammals and birds (Neumann, 1981), in nonhuman primates (Kling and Steklis, 1976) and also in man (Schachter, 1951; Scherer, Abeles and Fischer, 1975; see van der Dennen, 1987, pp. 28 ff. and Flohr, 1987, pp. 200-2, for a discussion).

In the psychological literature we can also find many comments referring to
the relevance of the discussed selection processes for the way our human
society is run,<ref>(See, apart from the authors quoted here, also e.g., Snow, 1961; Etzioni, 1964; Weick, 1969; and Tiger, Chapter 5).</ref> including data on the personality dimensions these selection processes operate upon.

White and Lippitt (1960) and Scheflen and Scheflen (1972) give detailed behavioural descriptions of the process of creating chronic scapegoats as a fundamental process in the functioning of human social groups. They describe the physical as well as the cognitive and communicative aspects of the processes that lead either to getting stuck in a superdependent immobilized scapegoat-role or to becoming outcast (co-type). In their opinion there is a conspicuous contrast between, on the one hand, chronic superdependent immobilized persons who tend to neuroticism by accepting guilt and assuming the scapegoat role and thus getting stuck in cumulating 'double-binds' (Laing, 1967, 1970; Watzlawick and Fish, 1973), and on the other hand anti-social types who tend to deny guilt, generally refuse to be immobilized in a scapegoat role and tend to stay socially mobile, although in peripheral social roles. This is indeed what would be expected from our theory.

Parallel to what de Waal (1975) suggests in the case of Java monkeys, Scheflen and Scheflen (1972) explain how in their opinion every human social group or society generates automatically its own neurotic scapegoats, deviates and outcasts as a necessary by-product of continuous consolidation and reaffirmation of internal (cognitive) values and social order. Such marginal social roles serve for the society in question as a necessary external frame against which the internal social values and role criteria may be projected and by which the `shoulds' and 'should nots' for all its members are continuously exemplified (Erikson, 1966).

Milgram's (1974) famous experiments in which he asked subjects to administer heavy and supposedly life endangering electric shocks to stooges `for the sake of scientific progress', are also enlightening in this respect. According to Milgram, this general readiness to obey and even to torture fellow men, if urged and backed up by the authority of common opinion....

:... is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of authority. Facts of recent history and observation in daily life suggest that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behaviour tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy, and moral conduct.

This dependence of strongly repressive systems on a strong and dependable compliance of its employees and agents, explains what is often considered a paradox in the literature on holocausts. What is, for example, surprising is that the people who in 'das Dritte Reich' were in charge of the extermination machinery, quite generally appeared to be extremely docile, middle-class, adapted, morally rigid and reliable house-fathers and exemplary husbands, with an aversion to adventure and violence, and who more often than not were friendly and kind to children and pets in their daily social interactions, with an overtone of sentimentality. As shall be clear from the present theory, this is indeed the only type of person – the highly compliant, non-innovative, non-self-willed adaptor – that can be relied upon to carry through orders ('Befehl ist Befehl!') in situations where obedience strongly conflicts with morals and ethics. Under such extreme circumstances the selection pressure on personality characteristics, therefore, is extreme also, the not-socompliant individuals trying to avoid such ghastly agentic responsibilities. As Koestler (1967, in van der Dennen, 1987) eloquently stated:

:It is not the murderers, the criminals, the delinquents and the wildly nonconformists who have embarked on the really significant rampages of killing, torture and mayhem. Rather it is the conformist, virtuous citizens, acting in the name of righteous causes and intensely held beliefs who throughout history have perpetrated the fiery holocausts of war, the religious persecutions, the sacks of cities, the wholesale rape of women, the dismemberment of the old and the young and the other unspeakable horrors ... The crimes of violence committed for selfish, personal motives are historically insignificant compared to those committed ad majorem glonam Dei, out of a self-sacrificing devotion to flag, a leader, a religious faith, or a political conviction.

Milgram (1974) labels this compliant, subordinate style of functioning the agentic mode, which expresses that somebody in that mode functions as the agent of some (personal or impersonal) authority. He points out that individuals tend to function in any one situation in either this mode or in its opposite, the autonomous mode. Milgram explains that the readiness to shift from the agentic mode into the autonomous mode in certain conflict situations differs considerably between adults, that people differ in the amount of time they spend in either mode, and that there is a complex personality basis to obedience and disobedience.

These differences between individuals in their tendencies either to comply with social standards most of the time, or to act autonomously and independently most of the time, are also of crucial importance for the way in which bureaucratic structures and other social institutions are run (Kirton, 1978b, 1987a):

:... the 'adaptor' personality ... who can be relied upon to carry out a thorough, disciplined search for ways to eliminate problems by 'doing things better' with a minimum of risk and a maximum of continuity and stability ... [whereas] ... innovative change ... leads to increased risk and less conformity to rules and accepted work patterns (Bright, 1964), and for this reason it rarely occurs in institutions on a large scale ... (Kirton, 1978b, p. 611)

:It is said that organisations in general (Whyte, 1957; Bakke, 1965; Weber, 1948 (published in 1970); Mulkay, 1972) and especially organisations which are large in size and budget (Veblen, 1928; Swatez, 1970) have a tendency to encourage bureaucracy and adaptation in order to minimise risk. Weber (1948), Merton (1957) and Parsons (1951) wrote that the aims of a bureaucratic structure are precision, reliability, and efficiency. The bureaucratic structure in its nature exerts constant pressure on officials to be methodical, prudent, and disciplined, resulting in an unusual degree of individual conformity in that situation. (Kirton, 1987a)

Therefore institutions tend to become more adaptor-oriented as time goes on
because of selection, training and promoting policies which are in line with
those aims (Drucker, 1969; Schumacher, 1975, p. 243). A negative selection
pressure is continuously exerted against innovators.<ref>A similar process of
selective isolation was seen by Rogers (1959), and reported in his account of
the 'creative loner'.</ref> Even when an innovator finds badly needed novel solutions for pressing problems, it will often fail to render him social approval, inter alia because of inherent (sometimes insurmountable) communication problems with his more adaption-oriented colleagues. Instead of winning social approval when coming up with such solutions, the innovator finds that tolerance for his innovative style of approach is at its lowest ebb when his adaptor-type colleagues feel under pressure from the need for quick and radical change (Kirton, 1987b). Even when the novel solutions in question are accepted, it does not generally lead to a suspension of the above discussed selective forces. In an empirical study to investigate the ways by which ideas leading to radical changes in some companies were developed and implemented, Kirton (1987a) found that:

:There was a marked tendency for the majority of ideas which encountered opposition and delays to have been put forward by managers who were themselves on the fringe, or were even unacceptable to the 'establishment' group. This negativism occurred not only before, but after the ideas had not only become accepted, but had even been rated as highly successful. At the same time other managers putting forward the more palatable (i.e., conventional) ideas were themselves not only initially acceptable, but remained so even if their ideas were later rejected or failed.

It can thus be seen how, much unlike the fate of innovators, failure of ideas is less damaging to the adaptor, since any erroneous assumptions upon which the ideas were based were also shared with colleagues and other influential people (Kirton, 1984).

As a consequence of these differences in selective pressure, ageing institutions suffer from the disadvantages of not having innovator type creative output available in times of change when policy and methods are required to change as well. Such necessary changes, therefore, are often brought about only when a precipitating event, or a crisis, occurs when at last the adaptor needs, and so collaborates with, the innovator (Kirton, 1961).

== Ossification ==

{{level|3}} Science is an outstanding example of a branch where these considerations about systematic intra-group selection pressures seem relevant. The very goal of scientific research is to find even better conceptual and instrumental frameworks, but, as Kuhn (1970) points out, changing the paradigms which are hitherto accepted without question by an entire scientific community requires a breakdown of previously accepted rules. Such breakdowns are the very process of scientific revolution and this revolutionary process is fundamental to scientific advance; thus, as a social institution, science stands out as an extraordinary oddity (Tiger, 1985). The consolidation and preservation of group cohesion and established rules are not its primary goal, but the creative expansion of conceptual boundaries. In scientific institutions, the innovator type input is not only needed at the rare times of inevitable change, but very regularly, since precipitating events or conceptual crises are the very thing that scientific efforts are supposed to be aimed at.

When ageing institutions become too adaptor- and compliance-oriented by the resulting unconscious bias in selection and in promotion policies, it may not be initially very disastrous in the case of factories or bureaucratic units. For as long as no drastic external challenges turn up, they can just go on producing their output as they formerly used to do with excellent results. But in research units it is eventually disastrous if the cognitive climate becomes more and more adaptor-oriented. The innovator type creative output, consisting of (often disquieting) conceptual challenges and explorations of the unknown and unthought, will in that case gradually be replaced by compliant adaptor type output consisting of puzzle-solving and quasi-discoveries without any conceptual threats. This means that scientific units finally reach an efficiency close to zero when becoming more adaptor-oriented with increasing age. After an initially fruitful phase of consolidation, the prevailing paradigms will become rigid and dogmatic. It is clear moreover, that in a government-protected scientific community competition does not operate freely. This may postpone organization—structural turn-over catastrophes considerably, and thus the timely rejuvenation science continually needs. As a result, . . . 'The Church of Reason [science] like all [ageing] institutions, is based not on individual strength, but on individual weakness. What's really demanded is inability. Then you are considered teachable: a truly able person is always a threat' (Pirsig, 1974).

This description of the process of ossification also fits perfectly for most of the established and institutional religions, as has been recognized by many philosophers and other scientists. Kierkegaard for instance, heavily criticized the organized churches, pointing out that in our society authentic existential religiosity nowadays has two great enemies: philosophers indulging in mere abstract speculations of a strict and limited rationality on the one hand, and church-going fundamentalists and uncritical believers on the other. Kierkegaard believed that the Church has degenerated into a bunch of unthinking fanatics, or even worse, a flock of passionless and anemic herd-mentalities, who dutifully walk into church for no other reason than that was the direction most others were walking. He resented that the church does not have the decency to recognize that whatever its teaching of watered-down, polite moral humanism has become, it isn't Christianity any more (Wilber, 1983).

Christianity may have been founded for the enlightenment of mankind, as an attempt to raise people to a higher level of autonomy and socio-psychic health, and for overcoming the frequent social tendency towards hateful and revengeful cultivation of deviants, scapegoats and other presumed enemies by institutionalized practices of denunciation and mobbing (Coser, 1956, 1978; Girard, 1982; Hoffschulte, 1986). But, like any other social institution, the Church has gradually deteriorated into a system, preoccupied with its own propagation as a system, and thus – contrary to its original goals – with power and the binding-in-dependency of its members in uncritical docility (Toynbee, 1972). The Church does not invite, any more, to mysticism or to experiencing the 'void', instead it imposes 'belief in God and promotes conformity and respect for 'respectability' (Laing, 1967). Similar considerations hold for other traditional religions and belief systems.

== Social-role blindness ==

{{level|3}} Apart from these specific ossification phenomena, many more areas in human society can be found where such effects of the selection mechanisms, as discussed in section 4.10, are manifest. Since these selection mechanisms are operative in lower social mammals as well as in man, they must be anchored quite solidly in the behavioural system. This is not surprising because this mechanism does have considerable evolutionary advantages, not only in animals, but, at least up to recent times, also in the case of man. As mentioned in section 4.4, it facilitates speciation through genetic adaptation to marginal habitats, helps in many species to overcome migratory bottlenecks, and even serves to motor the evolution of culture in the case of man.

It seems plausible therefore, that if in the case of man, our superior capacity for learning plays a modifying role in these matters, then the organization of our intellectual capacities will have evolved in such a way, as to enhance the occurrence of selection cycles, rather than to thwart them. The mechanism of selection cycles and periodic turn-over catastrophes is basically powered by the involuntary forces of attraction and repulsion between individuals within social groups and structures. It must have been evolutionarily advantageous, therefore, for behavioural and cognitive `masterprogrammes' to develop, serving to prevent the newly evolved intellectual capacities from interfering with the (phylogenetically very old) involuntary biases in social interactions.

This is indeed what can be found. Human beings appear to be peculiarly unable to assess objectively the quality of their own social-role behaviour and the behaviour of other people they are dealing with in the social group. There is a sort of 'social-role blindness', of specific blind spots in our cognitive capacities, safeguarding primitive, elementary tendencies of being either attracted or repulsed by other people, depending on the own and on the other's social role and position. As in the experiments with mice described in sections 4.5 and 4.6, the omega-like subordinates, the peripheral nonconforming types, are also in man most likely to be disliked by the established leaders as well as by the conforming and compliant subordinates. This is, in fact, a tautological statement, since drifting into a marginal or an outcast position ((o-type in Fig. 4.1) is just another way of saying that one is less acceptable to the in-group.

As a tool for this mechanism, a considerable part of human communication consists not of transferring pure information, but of more or less involuntary emotional expressions of praise, admiration, criticism, ridicule and insults, as is shown for instance in the ethological work of Weisfeld (1980) on social-role behaviour in adolescent boys, or in the sociological investigations by Segerstrale (1986; Chapter 14) into the Wilson–Lewontin scientific debate as part of the sociobiological controversy. To a large extent the use of language serves to support or to camouflage non-verbal actions, actions for manipulating other people and for staking out and sustaining social roles (Scheflen and Scheflen, 1972; Mehrabian, 1972; Argyle, 1976a,b).

In factoranalytic research on the social interactions between people, the
first and by far the most conspicuous principal component is the so called
evaluation of positive–negative (Good–Bad) dimension, describing to what
extent one appreciates or disappreciates the rated other. In questionnaire
research where elucidation of the actual social behavioural attitudes and
social-role distributions is the primary goal, the raw data are, in general,
firstly corrected for the positive–negative evaluation or social desirability
dimension by partialling out its influence (Benjamin, 1974, p. 419). Those who
rate other persons or questionnaires in general colour their judgements with
appreciation or disapproval to indicate, explain and consolidate the social
relations between themselves and the rated person.<ref>In the case of
dominating individuals this cognitive distortion of the own and the other
person's qualities is labelled by Kipnis 'the Metamorphic Effects of Power'
(1976, ch. 9).</ref>

The importance of this negative or positive bias in the way we think about our companions is also expressed by the fact that most behavioural attitudes and personality characteristics can be expressed in positive as well as in negative terms. We virtually have, therefore, a double set of conceptual labels for other people's actions and behavioural attitudes; a positive set and a negative set. This cumbersome and at first sight inefficient cognitive organization, in which the pure assessment of other people's behavioural qualities is blurred to a great extent by the strong involuntary bias of appreciation or disappreciation, can only be evolutionarily advantageous if it serves an essential purpose. From the above, it may be concluded that this purpose may be found in protecting the involuntary attraction and repulsion reflexes, which direct our social behaviour, against our intelligent faculties. Indeed, human individuals are hardly aware that the way they assess the other person's qualities is to a large extent coloured by their positive or negative feelings towards that other person, resulting from the involuntary forces of social attraction and repulsion in operation. People do not realize that their, say negative, labelling of (the behaviour of) an important other can easily be changed into its positive counterpart by simply regarding the same behaviour from the point of view of a supporter, and vice versa. They tend instead to attach a sense of permanence and absoluteness to their (categorically negative or positive) judgement, and in particular they are not aware of the relativity of the judgement in terms of its dependence on the mutual social positions of the rater and the ratee.

In summary, the postulated blind spots and no entry signs in our intellectual faculties apparently do indeed exist. Despite our vaunted intellects and our protestations of rational and scientific know-how, we humans show a disturbing tendency to reserve our intellectual powers strictly for certain specific tasks. In other specific areas of functioning, like the mechanisms of social attraction and repulsion mentioned above, we tend to rely on involuntary biases while allowing the intellectual faculties to be effectively blocked. Therefore, ironically and paradoxically, this specific stupidness, this social-role blindness in us humans, should probably be regarded as a special adaptation to our great cleverness.

In daily life, the result of these cognitive biases is that, in many instances, we cannot help but foster, involuntarily, a lower esteem for other persons if they happen to be less 'in-crowd' than ourselves. In more extreme cases, we cannot help tending to join others in mobbing or in scapegoating. We tend to justify the actions taken through our (biased) evaluations of the outcast's or scapegoat's qualities, attitudes and behaviour (unless we incidentally happen to be one of the outcast's supporters). Being in the agentic or systemic (Milgram, 1974) or compliant (Apter and Smith, 1976, 1985) motivational mode while dealing with a victim, we involuntarily tend to see the person in question to a larger or lesser extent as inferior, or even repulsive, detestable or evil. This cognitive distortion can in fact be considered the behavioural basis of torture. Without this psychological effect, the role of torturer would be impossible (Amnesty International, 1973), various built-in inhibitions on aggression would then in most cases take precedence. What happened in the extermination camps of 'das Dritte Reich' is an extreme – though unfortunately not very rare – type of event, exemplifying what this human faculty for selective blindness may facilitate.

The Nazis called their victims 'Untermenschen', but likewise, we ourselves have in turn a strong tendency to label the people who were in charge of the Nazi extermination projects as incorporations of evil, as devils incarnate. As was stressed in section 4.10 however, they were, if they can be characterized at all, rather the opposite, or they would not have been fit for a task where ethics and personal norms would most likely conflict with obedience. Like the spectator-subjects in Milgram's experiments, we cannot imagine ourselves doing the same in similar circumstances, but the facts are that most of those Nazis were not beasts, but very quiet middle-class, social-oriented adaptors, and we are no saints, but ordinary people, who in similar circumstances are rather likely to do similar sorts of things. The difficulty we have with acknowledging that those Nazi employees were not so very different from ourselves, and the other way around, exemplifies the all overruling strength of this type of social-role blindness within ourselves.

All in all, it seems that we cannot help but hate our (self-created) enemies and that we cannot help but love primarily just those individuals which the described selection-cycle mechanism urges us to appreciate. The effects of this same blinding mechanism can also be recognized in less extreme contexts, like for example, the social interactions between scientists or between managers. The contribution by Segerstrale gives us a very illustrative and piquant example of how this mechanism works out in the case of scientific colleagues with strikingly different cognitive styles. In her account of Wilson's and Lewontin's respective contributions to the sociobiology debate, Lewontin plays the part of the thorough and careful adaptor whereas Wilson plays the part of the creative, speculative and daring innovator, and the subsequent mutual denunciation of each others scientific qualities is prototypical.

Thus, the turn-over catastrophes keep happening unhampered, in the case of man just disguised in cognitive ornaments which we, erringly, take for true. Whenever a turn-over catastrophe is at hand, there is still another type of social-role blindness in operation which ties in with the cognitive biases discussed above. It is discussed in more detail in the contribution by Tiger (see also e. g., Janis' book Group-think, 1982; Tiger, 1985). According to Tiger the evolution of the human intellect must of necessity have been accompanied by a simultaneous development of a set of awareness blocks, safeguarding groupthink tendencies and safeguarding the unhampered compliance with social habits and prejudices. He argues that the human intellect has primarily evolved as a tool for enhancing coordinated social action, not for independence and for critically observing the social processes one is involved in. Reason was designed to improve consent with the overriding purposes of kinship, not to challenge them. The effect of these particular blocks is that eventual intelligent attempts by any non-conforming individuals, trying to stop the precipitating catastrophe from happening, are likely to be futile. In most persons involved, this particular limitation to the use of intellectual faculties will overrule any capacity to rationally assess the personal risks and general consequences of the turn-over catastrophe at hand, and that will impel them to join compliantly in concerted mobbing or warring actions, not unlike lower social mammals.

It is clear from the aforesaid that the former type of social-role blindness ties in here seamlessly. The concerted actions of animosity towards scapegoats, outcasts or enemies are of course greatly facilitated by the involuntary and uncritical denouncement of the supposed opponent's qualities. And at higher levels of organization, for example political states, the degrees of blindness of the collective are even more disquieting, not only with respect to the systematic and collective denunciation of supposed enemies, but also with respect to what are desirable and effective political courses of action (Janis, 1982), in particular as soon as the ideals and goals chosen become fixed and rigid (Talmon, 1980). As Popper says: 'The attempt to make Heaven on earth invariably produces hell'. The most extensive, quixotic and disgusting violence is justified with the invocation of an Utopian ideology, a paradisaic myth, a superiority doctrine, an eschatological or millenarian ideal state, or other highly abstract political/ethical categories, metaphysical values, and quasi-metaphysical mental monstrosities: national security; raison d'Etat; freedom; democracy; God; Volk und Heimat; Blut und Boden; peace; progress; empire; historical imperative; sacred order; natural necessity; divine will; and so on and so forth (van der Dennen, 1987). In view of their tasks, the stream of information governments take in is even more biased and unbalanced, and their tools are even less effective, than they are in the case of individuals (Deutsch and Senghaas, 1971). This unbalance has become particularly precarious under the present 21st century conditions.

<center><big>Discussion</big></center>

== Nature and nurture ==

{{level|3}} It can be argued that, at least in the case of man, the same social structure cycles with their turn-over catastrophes might occur merely because of mechanisms on the cognitive psychological level. In that case one would not need to postulate a genetic background for these gradual shifts in social structures to occur.

Indeed, as we saw above, social-role blindness and related cognitive biases are a very powerful influence in man. Moreover, we can also find a wealth of empirical and experimental data on the various constraints on learning in man, on habit forming, traditions and the transfer of cultural information, on perceptual biases like the cognitive dissonance theory, etc., all showing that our behaviour is organized in such a way that a great inertia of ideas, concepts and habits is safeguarded in spite of our capacity to keep learning. These data would suggest that enough mechanisms, at a purely cognitive and cultural level, can be traced as to make social-structural cycles likely to occur. Admittedly, the basic requirement for the postulated selection cycles to occur is not so much that there is a genetic basis to it, but rather that individuals, once their phenotypes in these areas of functioning have established themselves, can not be reshaped into their opposites. As we saw above, this inflexibility aspect, irrespective of its causes, has been firmly established by psychological research. However, the evidence for genetic influence cannot be neglected. These mechanisms therefore are most probably implemented on the genetic as well as on the learning level. It goes without saying that in man, the learning animal par excellence, the influence of learning will be relatively important in that case.

Another, related, critique is the argument that where a multi-gene basis of these differences should be expected, a strong enough selection pressure and a quick selection response are difficult to imagine. However, no high mortality, low fecundity or whatever on the part of the declining morph needs to be assumed at all. Basic to the model rather is the existence of differences between incrowd- and outcast-individuals. No physical elimination whatsoever needs to be assumed to let the cycles run. The only thing which needs to be postulated is that the in-group/out-group and the incrowd/outcast distribution of social roles and positions is subject to reshuffling; it depends on the level of organization we are talking about whether the postulate of a genetic effect needs to be included in a description of the cycles or not. In man this will, in my view, probably only be indispensable in the case of very longterm cycles on a very large scale. On most levels of human social structures the individuals selected against just need to be shifted into outgroup or outcast positions, relative to the unit(s) of organization in question, for the selection process to proceed. The very presence of the removed individuals in the organizational periphery then increases the likelihood of a turn-over catastrophe.

== Perspective ==

{{level|3}} As was pointed out above, the duration of social-structural cycles is
predicted to be roughly inversely proportional to speed and intensity of
selection for the trait under discussion. In an industrial company the
intensity of selection and the take-on/dismissal percentages are much higher
than for example, the selection intensity and the immigration/emigration
percentages in the much larger units of political states. Therefore the
average cycle periods are likely to vary from a few decades in companies (for
illustrative material refer to e.g., Schumpeter, 1939; Kirton, 1961, 1976) or
in political parties (e.g., Ostrogorski, 1982), to a few centuries in
political states (e.g., Olson, 1982), or even to one or two millennia in whole
civilizations (refer to e.g., Spengler, 1918; Toynbee, 1972;<ref>Toynbee
disagrees with what he calls Spengler's 'determinism'. Though he (Toynbee)
gives abundant material to illustrate the point made here, he emphasizes that
one cannot convincingly speak of some or other predetermined and fixed life
span of societies. The present theory would support Spengler's view. But it
would also give room for something that Toynbee stresses, namely that, as far
as their life span and their spin-off in terms of disseminative effect towards
other societies is concerned, societies differ greatly from one another.
According to the present theory, it very much depends on incidental
environmental factors how effective selective emigration can be, and how
strong the differential propagation within the structures themselves. And it
depends on the actual presence of competing structures how quickly the effects
of the internal selection processes will precipitate an eventual turn-over
catastrophe.</ref> Darlington, 1969; Davis, 1974). The small-scale turn-over cycles with a relatively stronger and quicker selection effect are superimposed, therefore, on the larger-scale turn-over cycles with a longer life span. Thus, individuals may be outcasts in terms of some small-scale social structure while at the same time being totally accepted incrowd members in terms of some larger-scale social structure. The small-scale cycles may be seen as the ripples on the surface of the long range waves of the large-scale cycles, What happens with a person at the social-role level of a sports club is not necessarily parallel to what happens to him at home or at the level of the village community, and what happens to a person at the level of a company does not at all need to be parallel to what happens to him on the level of the political state. In fact, being an incrowd group member on some small-scale level of organization may be vital for a person to keep functioning properly in case of struggling with an outcast position on a larger-scale level of organization.

If it were possible to manipulate these – hitherto involuntary – selection mechanisms, it would be possible to stop or to speed up population cycles at will. This might for instance be relevant for personnel management in industrial companies or for measures at the level of political nations. The latter might be of particular significance in our nuclear age, since population cycles at this broad level tend to be worked out and consolidated by means of war and other economic strangling techniques. Mankind as a whole, up until now, has been able to afford this luxury of genocidal praxis, but war and economic asphyxia, nowadays, threatens to come close to total nuclear destruction. It might be worthwhile, therefore, to take the pressure off the dynamic population cycles kettle and to search for a way to replace or short-circuit nature's hitherto applied selection tricks with which it powered our evolution and our spatial spreading. It seems about time to substitute alternative and less dangerous mechanisms for it.

It will be clear however from section 4.12 that such is easier said than done. The mechanisms in question apparently are anchored in our behavioural system quite solidly. Many authors are however of the opinion that this is no reason to sit down in utter despair. Girard (1982) for instance, points out that in some respects social-role blindness is gradually losing its grip on our behaviour. He calls attention to the exemplary function of Christianity. On the one hand, Christianity has its roots in ancient Jewish traditions, suffused with admonitions towards and justifications of revenge and genocide (see e.g., Deuteronomy, 20, 17, 7, 12; Joshua, 1-3, 6, 8, 10; Kings, 3, 22, 23; Isaiah, 61). The Old Testament can in fact serve as a school example of militant- ethnocentric delusions of racial superiority. On the other hand, a novel phenomenon has emerged from the Jewish tradition, and even more so in Christianity, which is the attempt to replace organized spite, hate and revenge by love and compassion. This scheme may not have been completely successful as yet – were it only for the systematically organized violent blindness in and through the Christian religious organizations themselves –but it certainly has had some effect in overcoming the all-out violent tendencies towards deviants and scapegoats. Christ's example and admonitions like 'love your enemies', and the attempts to break the old tradition of revenge and the resulting vicious spirals of violence and counter-violence, counteract the ordinary selective forces within social groups we have discussed here. They put the primordial tradition upside down by denying the guilt of the victims and scapegoats and by putting the blame on the persecuting society. They de-sanctionize social violence; but what is most important, this tradition, though not reversing our behaviour instantaneously, has opened our awareness to what is actually going on at the social-cognitive level. It has opened our awareness for the fact that we do not like to give up our scapegoats, that we are attached to them and find it utterly difficult to refrain from denouncing and persecuting them (Girard, 1982). It constitutes therefore a massive attack on certain blind spots, on aspects of social-role blindness that, since aeons, have been the cornerstone of the cyclic selection processes themselves.

That is surely not the only glimmer of hope that may be discerned. The involuntary selection forces discussed are under attack from more sides. On the level of personnel management Kirton's work – as described in the previous paragraphs – may also be interpreted as an attempt to extend our awareness beyond its age-old confines into the realm of the dynamics of social attraction and repulsion, and what is more, his approach provides practical scientific tools to undercut the involuntary selection effects, tools that are likely to be utilized more and more because of their profitable effects on the output of the social structures (industrial companies) involved.

It is my hope that this chapter may also add to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying periodic turn-over catastrophes. Admittedly, the present theory, in part, is still tentative, but its relevance for our very existence might urge us to search for further experimental evidence against or in favour of its basic assumptions.

== Notes ==

<references />

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